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Resumo 
 
 
A mobilidade/migração da mão-de-obra rural para a cidade, quando extrapola a capacidade de 
absorção do emprego ou quando é incompatível com o desenvolvimento dinâmico da 
industrialização na história, pode ser tanto o sintoma do subdesenvolvimento quanto o fator que 
agrava o subdesenvolvimento. Mesmo que várias teorias em desenvolvimento econômico e 
literatura migratória tenham como alvo essa proposição, estudos sobre a mobilidade da mão-
de-obra rural e a industrialização são frequentemente realizados separadamente. Assim, esta 
tese apresenta uma iniciativa para se debruçar sobre as interações entre esses dois processos (ou 
seja, colocar o processo de mobilidade laboral rural sob a estrutura analítica do processo de 
industrialização) para trazer uma perspectiva diferente, não apenas na interpretação histórica, 
mas também na reflexão teórica. 
A análise histórica de quatro primeiros industrializados selecionados (Reino Unido, França, 
EUA e Alemanha) e de seus respectivos processos de industrialização, nos ofereceu materiais 
concretos para articular o espectro completo de evoluções estruturais na indústria, economia e 
sociedade etc., e, em particular, elaborar os impactos dessas mudanças correspondentes a 
mobilidade da mão-de-obra rural. Além disso, facilitada pela estrutura analítica do paradigma 
dinâmico que se enreda entre as dimensões de tempo, espaço e povo, essa tese não apenas expõe 
as condições externas (impactos causados pelas circunstâncias), incluindo várias singularidades 
históricas como as revoluções industriais, mas também destaca e explora as medidas internas 
(intervenções em conteúdo) por meio de análises institucionais e evolutivas do estado e de 
outras forças sociais, como sindicatos, que influenciam o processo como um todo e também o 
ritmo da mobilidade da mão-de-obra. Em suma, esta tese argumenta que a transição de 
mobilidade comparativamente compatível com o processo de desenvolvimento da 
industrialização nesses primeiros industrializados pode ser atribuída principalmente às 
condições externas particulares e às intervenções internas ativas na história. 
 
Palavras-chave: Mobilidade da Mão-de-Obra; Industrialização; Desenvolvimento Econômico; 
Relações Industriais; Tempo- Espaço-Povo. 
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Abstract 
 
 
Rural-to-urban labour mobility/migration in history, once beyond employment absorption 
capacity or incompatible with the dynamic development of industrialization, can be both a 
symptom of underdevelopment and a factor that exacerbates underdevelopment. Although 
various theories in development economics and migrational literature target this proposition, 
studies of both the rural labour mobility and industrialization are often conducted separately. 
As thus, this thesis puts forward an initiative to delve into the interactions between these two 
processes (or, rather, places the process of rural labour mobility under the analytical framework 
of the industrialization process) and proposes a different perspective not only in historical 
interpretation but also in theoretical reflection. 
The historical analysis of four selected early industrializers (the UK, France, the U.S., and 
Germany) along with their respective processes of industrialization, offered us concrete 
materials to project the whole spectra of structural evolutions in industry, economy, society, 
etc., which, in particular, enabled us to elaborate the impacts of these corresponding changes 
upon rural labour mobility. Besides, facilitated by the dynamic paradigm analytical framework 
that entangled within the dimensions of time, space and people, this thesis not only tries to 
expound the external conditions (circumstance-based impacts) including various historical 
singularities, such as the industrial revolutions, but it also highlights and explores the internal 
measures (content-based interventions) via institutional and evolutionary analyses on the state 
and other social forces such as trade unions,  that influence the general process and pace of 
rural labour mobility. In short, this thesis argues that the comparatively compatible mobility 
transition with the process of the development of industrialization in these early industrializers 
can be mainly attributed to both the particular external conditions and the active internal 
interventions in history.  
Key Words: Labour Mobility; Industrialization; Development Economics; Industrial Relations; 
Time-Space-People. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Substantial rural-to-urban labour mobility is kicked off along with the first industrial 
revolution and much determined by the general process of industrialization. As of today, almost 
four centuries passed. However, its history is too detailed to be remembered, especially of those 
seemingly “insignificant”1 ones. And to the great extent if Marx is right that the country that is 
more developed industrially shows to the less developed the image of its own future (Marx et 
al., 1972), then perhaps studying the labour mobility of the earlier industrialized countries (EICs) 
in their respective process of industrialization will provide an appropriate frame of reference. 
Many developmental conditions that confront those late underdeveloped/developing countries 
(LDCs), which got newly independent (mainly after World War II) are actually similar to many 
of the EICs during their processes of industrializing, such as Western Europe and North 
America. Exactly as Breman underlined “the research promoted of developing countries from 
the early 1970s onwards is hampered by the virtual lack of comparison with the profound 
restructuring from an agrarian-rural to an industrial-urban workforce that went on in the western 
part of the world at an earlier stage (Breman, 2016).” In particular, from the perspective of 
internal economic structures, being confronted: a high proportion of agricultural sector, 
underdeveloped industrial departments, inchoate capitalism, with the vast majority of the 
population living in rural areas, and scattered rural-to-urban migration, in the context of poor 
conditions of science, technology, and ITCs (information, transportation, and communication), 
the economy was much dependent on agricultural production.  
Before the industrial revolution, boundaries of economic sectors were not well-
distinct, with agriculture led the dominated position; handicrafts widely distributed in rural 
areas and often combined with agriculture; as well as the industry and merchandise remained 
much underdeveloped. However, ever since the industrial revolution takeoff, sectors, 
particularly in industry and merchandise, got tremendously developed. And in reframing new 
                                                
1 ‘Insignificant’ here ironically refer to what the mainstream economics concerns over their biased historical interpretations.  
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sectoral compositions, dramatic changes induced lie in, on the one hand, flourishing industries 
led massive job creation, while on the other hand, applying science and technology or via 
agrarian reform that squeezed out more labour as “surplus” to be transferred. Thus, along with 
this process, almost all countries in history are accompanied by a great transfer of labour force 
from agriculture to industry & service, as well as from rural to urban areas. However, this 
immense process was based on a full-employment assumption, which is what we referred 
“insignificant2” details of labour absorption along with such a transformation that were always 
neglected, or often taken for granted as a simplistic “natural” result in many contemporary 
mainstream analyses of development economics. 
Also, labour mobility in the real world is much more complicated and varies 
dramatically in different countries and history. For most of LDCs, more than half a century 
passed ever since the end of WWII, by adopting a similar path, as enlightened by the “free of 
charge” prescription of Lewisian development model (which will be elaborated later) which 
derived from rich experiences of the EICs, no matter to those (mainly in Latin America3) could 
manage to transfer their major labour force to urban areas, the vast majorities (most in Africa 
and Asia) not only failed to be urbanized but also maintained underdeveloped, and with more 
than one-third of the population still engaged in agricultural activity and more than half of 
population still living in rural areas. Nevertheless, nearly all LDCs at the same time emerged 
deteriorative situations in urban areas, such as urban poverty, high unemployment, 
slummification of cities, growth without employment, etc. For example, as estimated, 
nowadays, one billion people worldwide still live in various forms of slums (Davis, 2004), and 
the number is projected to grow doubled by 2030. Among the most, the population in slums is 
mainly concentrated in developing countries and has increased from 689 million in 1990 to 880 
million in 2014 (Habitat, 2007). 
 
Right after what Marx stated “[…] the country that is more developed 
industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own 
                                                
2 Since most mainstream literature often neglects or takes it for granted. Therefore, very few research has weighted attention 
to the process per se of labour mobility. That is why the quotation marks have been used here for irony.  
3 Here, the analysis solely intents to reveal the result rather than reasoning since its historical singularity. 
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future […]” (Marx et al., 1972), but at the same time he also argued that 
“[…] events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historic 
surroundings led to totally different results. By studying each of these 
forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can easily 
find the clue to this phenomenon […]” (Marx, 1974). Or rather, the 
history neither seems as irreducible singularity nor as the monotonous 
realization of pre-fixed stages of development (Mello, 1982).  
 
Nevertheless, differences are not difficult to find out via tracking the process (which 
will be discussed in detail in the second chapter) that overlapped between rural labour mobility 
and industrialization. Instead, it is too simplistic to attribute every “success” to the economic 
growth as the neoclassic often claimed. Three aspects in the light of the Fisher-Clark hypothesis 
(A. G. Fisher, 1945; C. Clark, 1951), in terms of inherent relations among economic growth, 
industrial structures, and labour transfer, can be used to facilitate the comparison. To elaborate, 
the industrial structural process, labour mobility transition, and demographic transformations 
are summarized as follows:  
In terms of industrial structural process: First of all, many of the EICs 
demonstrated rather a synchronous process of employment distribution, while the LDCs 
manifested an asynchronous way. Generally, it takes centuries for most of EICs to reduce its 
employment in agriculture, although the declining process speeded up ever since the industrial 
revolution (Allen, 2000; Cai et al., 2003). But along with the process, it is found that the 
declining rate of the rural population was much slower than that of agricultural employment; 
However, on the contrary, not only did the LDCs in the transfer of rural labour force much 
faster than that of the EICs (D. X. Rong & Sima 1989):84, for example, it only takes half a 
century for countries especially in the region of Latin America to reduce 50 percent of the 
proportion, but they also transferred in a comparatively absolute way, that is to say, the 
deduction of agricultural employment is almost absolutely transferred to urban areas (Todaro 
et al., 1988).  
Second of all, along with the falling of agricultural value-added to GDP, its 
corresponding employment share also got reduced. And the actual situation revealed a 
comparatively synchronous employment allocation process in most of the EICs, and an 
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asymmetrical way in the LDCs (Todaro et al., 1988). Almost all countries of LDCs are in the 
same situation that agricultural sector possesses of labour force much more than its weighed to 
the entire economy, one of the extreme examples can be taken, China in 1978 with 70% of total 
employment in agriculture only produced 28% of agricultural value, and almost 60% to 22% 
that of India, 47% to 29% that of Kenya, and 18% to 3% that of Mexico in 2000 (World 
Development Report 1984)(C. Li, 2017).  
Third of all, in comparison to urbanization growth, a gradual growth in the EICs (Z. 
H. Wang et al., 1995; Allen, 2000; L. L. Jiang, 2008) and a compressed growth that of the LDCs 
were found. For example, the proportion of the urban population in the United States took 
nearly 70 years to gradually achieve its urbanization rate from 15.3% in 1850 to 51% in 1920; 
France took nearly 80 years from 25.2% in 1851 to 51.2% in 1931; and the UK lasted for nearly 
a century to rise from 25% in 1750 to 50.2% in 1851 (Xiao, 1997). Apart from so, the process 
of industrialization in Western Europe, for instance, was much faster than its process of 
urbanization in the 19th century, and the employment proportion in the industry was always 
higher than that of people living in urban areas. However, in almost all LDCs, the proportion 
of urban residents has far exceeded the share of manufacturing employment (Todaro et al., 
1988). Also, the developmental path of manufacturing or industry in general in many LDCs has 
shown a similar pattern of economic growth at the early stage without an equivalent 
employment growth (Bairoch, 1979). 
In terms of labour mobility transition, two aspects can be reviewed. As for 
internal mobility, the pattern of rural labour mobility is much attached to its economic structures 
in most EICs and demonstrated a symmetrical process of both the economic growth and labour 
mobility (Todaro, 1969b). For example, the growth rate of rural migrants in EICs was slower 
than the rate of urban population growth (Clapham, 1966; Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999). 
However, the situation in LDCs revealed a sharp contrast: Not only the average annual growth 
rate of the urban population itself was more than twice that of EICs, but the growth of rural 
migrants in urban areas was also generally higher (W. Jiang, 2007b);  
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While as for international labour immigration, different from most LDCs today, 
rural-to-urban labour mobility for EICs at that time had a particular condition. From the middle 
of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, a major way out as to transfer the 
agricultural surplus population in Western Europe was via transnational immigration (Todaro 
et al., 1988). However, as compared to today’s LDCs, such a condition to a great extent does 
not exist. Instead, a new phenomenon, such as brain drain, has substantively emerged among 
most LDCs and becomes a severe and striking issue (Carrington & Detragiache, 1998):14; 
(Tanner, 2005):3. Not only because it seriously affects the structure and prosperity of economic 
growth in developing countries due to the great loose of professionals and technicians, but also 
because it profoundly impacts the characteristics and development prospects of developing 
countries (Scherrer & Verma, 2018). 
And in terms of demographic transformation, which has always been one of the 
most fundamental issues in the study of labour mobility. The demographic transition in EICs 
was embedded in the process of industrialization and modernization and was more or less 
endogenous with a gradual process (Q. Zhang, 2016; Kitching, 2010):151. Both birth rate and 
mortality rate took a long time relatively to decline the overall population growth (Todaro et 
al., 1988; Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). However, compared to that in the LDCs, due to the fact that 
both industrialization and modernization have been “compressed” by time (Demeny & 
McNicoll, 2006; Todaro et al., 1988), the corresponding demographic transition then has been 
deeply compressed as well. Namely, the change in mortality rate has been greatly shortened, 
but the change in fertility rate has been relatively delayed. Generally speaking, the demographic 
transition in the EICs of the West is a balanced and external-tensive transition that is compatible 
with its economy and social culture (Cipolla & Z. H. Huang, 1993). That is to say, when the 
demographic transition is at a high growth stage, namely with high birth rate and low mortality 
rate, it is also when the path of modernization/industrialization is gradually embarking on. And 
the tension of the modern industrial sector is basically able to absorb the growing economically 
active population.  
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However, many countries of the LDCs are in an unbalanced, even “compressed” 
demographic transition (J. X. Li, 2000). On the one hand, the birth rate of developing countries 
after WWII also experienced rapid growth, and it even has been higher than that of Western 
Europe when during their population boom (Y. M. Wang, 1995). On the other hand, in terms 
of mortality rate, thanks to the widespread improvement of sanitary and medical conditions by 
the control of infectious diseases and etc., although it is still higher in the current LDCs than 
the developed countries, the difference is much smaller than that of birth rate. For example, in 
Mauritius, it took only seven years for the mortality rate to fall from 27‰ to 15‰, while 
England and Wales, France, Germany, etc., spent more than 100 years (Cipolla & Z. H. Huang, 
1993). 
As such, substantial and accumulative social problems were emerged, which can be 
summarized as following: the widespread of slummification, severe urban poverty, worsening 
inequality, deteriorative urban unemployment, shortage of urban housing, traffic congestion, 
poor sanitation, pollution, limited infant/and school-age schooling, etc. And due to the situation 
that premature cities were not only very disordered with poor sanitary and living conditions, 
but also unprepared to receive massive rural migrants. Although a similar situation also 
occurred in the EICs (Frederick Engels, 2005), and it took centuries for them to resolve the 
problem. However, the situation looks more urgent and nerve-wracking in today’s LDCs. As a 
result, both the informal sector and slum become the labour reservoir of rural migrants. For 
example, in Asia, employment in the informal sector accounts for 65% of total employment; 
72% in the southern Africa region; 48% in North Africa, and 51% in Latin America (Todaro et 
al., 1988). And in terms of the situation of slummification of cities, residents living in slums 
account for more than one-third of the entire urban population in most developing countries. 
Even worse, some accounts for more than 60% of their urban population (Davis, 2004).  
Having realized that the rural-to-urban labour mobility/migration if beyond 
employment capacity (labour absorption), is both a symptom of underdevelopment and a factor 
that exacerbates underdevelopment in the third world. Although in 1978, out of 116 developing 
countries, 90 countries had tried to implement various policies in the light of the research 
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conclusion derived from United Nations, aiming to reduce or slow down the process of rural-
to-urban labour mobility, however, the results were far from being satisfactory, rather with 
more trend of economy informalization, urban slummification, and rural marginalization, etc. 
On the contrary, the results of what the EICs achieved have been relatively convincible, but 
how exactly did they manage to do so and the real situation during their time still remains 
unclear. In other words, in dealing with the problems induced by the excessive or rapid labour 
mobility that is incompatible with the process of industrialization, why such similar processes 
resulted in those contrast differences between EICs and LDCs? Or was it an illusion, given the 
concept of the city or urban life in the 19th century was so much different from today for rural-
to-urban labour migration? 
To answer this question, or even to understand if this is a valid question, the thesis 
starts to devote a great effort in theoretical analysis. Firstly, our study begins with the theories 
of labour mobility, of which were reviewed under macro, micro, and meso levels. This triple-
anchored lense made us understand that neither the individual theory of labourer, nor 
intermediate institution, nor the entire conceptualized economy could solely unfold the 
overarching profile of this grand historical people’s movements. In other words, the rural labour 
mobility is under multiple determinations, of which every social, economic, and political 
entity/institution could impact and via its rationale play certain roles. To elaborate: With macro 
perspective, theories analyze labour migration/mobility in broader economic 
sectors/departments, or institutional structures and expose laws of rural-to-urban 
migration/mobility in the economic transformation, which highlight the factors of externalities 
on labour mobility; In micro perspective, theories target subject of individual 
migration/mobility more in the middle and later stages of mobility transition, highlighting 
economic factors play a major role in the initial phase of labour migration/mobility, and non-
economic factors along with the later phase; and the Meso layer theories focus on a collective 
function which interactions between internalities and externalities, and advances a non-linear 
dynamics within the entire process. 
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These theories are fundamental since they enable us to have a broad understanding 
of the concrete mechanism of each determinant and direct our research on all potential 
determinants to analyze. However, most of them merely concentrate on the study of labour 
mobility. Thus, to supplement this theoretical flaw, the four selected theories of economic 
dualism allowed us to associate the research of rural labour mobility with the study of 
industrialization and economic development. Although these theories are meant to explore 
concrete strategies of industrialization for today’s less developed countries, their emphasis 
provides us one of the distinctive perspectives in interpreting the industrialization by rural 
labour mobility. It is where the interest of this thesis, which requires the analytical scope, covers 
the entire process of industrialization.  
Nevertheless, each theory of economic dualism somewhat limits itself to only parts 
of the entire spectrum of industrialization. For example, Lewis simplistically divides economic 
development into the classical and the neo-classical phases and embodies his staged 
industrialized-rationale much to the first phase when the strategy of urban industrialization 
relies on the unlimited supply of rural labour, rather than have them being scarce in the neo-
classical phase when the development of urban industrialization is subject to the labour supply 
under the increasing wage pressure. Although the first phase of Lewis was further developed 
and subdivided by Ranis and Fei, they are all still lack of theoretical exploration in the neo-
classical phase when massive rural migrants in urban sectors intertwined with the 
industrializing process and induced various social problems. Precisely, the emphasis of Todaro 
and Harris’ theoretical analysis could be placed at this neo-classical phase. Because, even 
before the approaching of the neo-classical phase, the strategies of industrialization were 
proposed via an emphasis on the development of the rural economy (including rural 
industrialization) to reduce the rural-urban differentials and, in turn, slows down the process of 
rural-to-urban labour mobility. However, we do not see this as contradictions. It is merely 
different theoretical emphasis on different stages of industrial development. Or rather, Lewis’ 
assertion would suite the pre-industrialized period, while that of Todaro would fit for the post-
industrialized era.  
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Precisely, it is hard for us to conduct the thesis by blindly following any single 
theory, and this revealed a traditional statically structuralist analytical approach of most theories 
of economic dualism. Therefore, when we adopt theories that are designed for today’s LDCs to 
conduct research of earlier industrialized countries, their reliabilities are questionable, since 
many conditions are crucially different. As Todaro pointed out that some theories may be valid 
and compatible in certain areas or certain periods, but become invalid or incompatible even in 
the same period but different place, or same place but different time (Todaro, 1969b). Precisely, 
most migrational literature aforementioned especially in the structuralist approach, whether the 
sole focus on time or space or people (of the specific country). However, facilitated by one of 
the epistemological frameworks of the archaic Chinese methodology, three fundamental 
concepts emerged and cannot be ignored: Namely, time, space, and people.  
As thus, by criticizing most theories under these time-space-people dimensions, we 
start to understand the broader aspects on the study of rural labour mobility. In short, it is the 
time view that against the static equilibrium analytical approach, rather in favour of a dynamic 
historical evolutionary method. Thus, time can be seen under the lens of capitalist evolution, 
technological invention, productive forces, demographics, international environment, etc.; As 
for the space view, it is no more only physical, absolute, constant, etc., but also characteristic 
space, functional space, abstract space, etc., like the economic space, political space, ideological 
space, structuralist space, even analytical space (like the micro, meso, and macro anchors of 
our analysis), where the invention of new transportation, communication play greater role; And 
the people view, cannot be seen solely as demographic analysis (including birth rate, mortality 
rate, dependency ratio, proportion of working-age population, etc.), nor as collective 
homogeneous nor as individually heterogeneous that under the homo economicus assumption, 
but also under different sense of experience, consciousness, cognition, value, orientation, belief, 
ideology, epistemology, as well as in collective forms such as history, culture, relations, politics, 
customs, morality, so on and so forth. 
As such, given this thesis places its lense over the entire process of industrialization, 
and the theoretical evaluations under the framework of time, space and people not only offer us 
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crucial criteria in combining valid points of aforementioned theories, but they also help us to 
build up a dynamic paradigm, which puts forward a more appropriate frame of reference in 
guiding empirical research. In particular, by intercepting one complete time cycle, combined 
with a certain space and people as the background of its logical deduction, on the one hand, it 
can be used as a frame of reference for theoretical selection and a basis for theoretical evaluation; 
on the other hand, it can also be used to explain and compare the background of the real world. 
After comprehensive theoretical reviews, we found that apart from there were so 
many theories stressed external and historical conditions that favored the EICs better positions 
in dealing with incompatibilities of rural labour mobility and industrialization, but on how to 
cope with the induced social crisis most theories then fell into a root dilemma: On the one hand, 
if purely following the invisible hand of the market, an unpreventable market failure would 
induce problems; on the other hand, if purely following the visible hand of the state, a 
predictable state failure would cause the humanitarian crisis, such as the forced “closure 
movement” or the control over the freedom of people’s mobility.  
However, in the light of Marx’s rationale, most theories attempted to cover up the 
essential issues of capitalist development, namely the socialization of labour, of which the part 
that concealed is the forced labour mobility by capital. This “hand” of capital is, therefore, often 
hidden behind the free market mechanism. Nonetheless, not only did Marx have articulated this 
capitalist “hand” by his systematic rationale of the capitalist mode of production and capital 
accumulation, but he also crucially pointed out the role of the capitalist state in such a process 
of labour mobility (see Chapter I). And this exposure also opened the very area of discourses 
on the role of the state, especially in the arena of development economics. Thus, so as to respond 
to the rural labour mobility in the process of industrialization, most literature can be found from 
different interpretations over the “limited” role of the state.  
To deconstruct this, we went through four prominent theories on the role of the state 
on labour mobility. Firstly, the school of Freiburg and its theory of ordoliberalism considered 
as the “third path” neither the laissez-faire liberalism nor interventionism, advocates the role of 
the state should be strictly procedural. For ordoliberalism, the state has to create and maintain 
32 
 

an appropriate framework of rules and institutions that allows market competition to work 
effectively. Given the free market order is not a natural event, but a political-cultural product 
based on a constitutional order that requires careful cultivation for its maintenance and proper 
functioning. Thus, for labour mobility, the ordoliberalism, on the one hand, preserves the state 
role as long as it has been well framed in the economic-constitutional order; and, on the other 
hand, the state does not interrupt the competitive function of labour market. The space leaves 
the state much in producing policies and legislation in the area of general education, labour 
protection, and working conditions; 
Against the very nature of an ideal, free, and competitive labour market 
epistemology that the ordoliberalism advocated, the labour market segmentation theory has its 
rationale on the role of the state in labour mobility. In particular, along with the process of 
industrialization even before the substantial rural-to-urban labour migration, the labour market 
was at its beginning formation. It, thus, cannot be a well-integrated labour market since its 
nascence. Plus, labour market in nature has certain segmented properties, such as non-
competitive, unequal, fragmented, etc., therefore, a free labour market cannot prevent the 
formation of labour divisions that constrain free labour mobility. The segmentation theory 
claims that labour market tends to be impacted by many non-economic factors, which leave 
potential space for the state and other actors to play. Not even to mention, if the labour market 
as one of the specific tool serves for any particular goal of one country’s industrial strategy. In 
turn, the state and other social forces are also the sources of the new labour market 
segmentations. And within the rural-urban labour market division, the integration propensity 
grants the state different approaches to leverage the rural labour mobility; 
Besides, within the realms of development economics, many theories emphasize the 
failure of structural transformation and stress that the state can be a powerful supplementary 
means to remedy. Nonetheless, the New Structural Economics spurns direct state intervention 
of the old schools and criticizes their advocation went beyond the market mechanism and 
contravened a country’s comparative advantages. The NSE lays out certain coordination 
between the market and the state and claims that the market should still be the basic mechanism 
33 
 

for resource allocation (including labour resource), but the state must play an active role through 
mitigating the coordination and externality problems. And their forms of intervention must be 
dynamic under the Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework that lays out a step-by-
step approach for the state to facilitate the structural changes. In particular, the state should 
involve with industrial upgrading and correspondingly provided both the hard and soft 
infrastructures at each level. And based on one country’s factor endowment structure, the state 
intervention follows the whole range of the developmental spectrum. Thus, for NSE, the rural 
labour mobility in the process of industrialization is merely a changing allocation process of 
labour resource in the light of the whole spectrum of social/economic structural transformations; 
Finally, apart from major discourses over the roles of the market and the state, the 
schools of institutional economics draw our attention to the third force – institutions, and shift 
from general ideas concerning the human agency, institutions, norms and values to the theories 
related to specific institutions, and emphasizes the role of the evolutionary process of the 
institutions in shaping the economic development. For institutional economics (the old school), 
the economy is an open and evolving system and embedded in a broader set of social, cultural, 
political, and power relations. Thus, under the diverging interests of different value-driven 
institutions, the state is often required to mediate, even arbitrate among the conflicting groups, 
regardless of the fact that the state is not absolutely neutral. And the enforcement of legal 
foundations cannot be simplistically considered as being interventionist, nor anti-interventionist 
since other institutions intervene in social entities through the institutionalist interactive system 
where power, value, and culture play important roles. In short, following the institutionalist 
approach, labour mobilizes in the process of industrialization can be viewed in specific 
institutional contexts, followed by the formulation of the migrational theory that is specific to 
the type of institution being investigated. 
Although none of these theories exclusively focused on the topic of our study, if 
properly combine them all together, the very principles in reviewing the roles of the state and 
institutional intervention in our empirical analysis would provide us precious directions.  In 
short, the way of intervention should be dynamic, and embedded in the evolutionary 
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transformations of the whole spectrum of social-economic structures that constitutes of the 
changing structures of endowment factors; the roles if neutral, then, should be well framed in 
the so-called economic-constitutional order (if there is in real-world), and the content should 
be focused on tackling barriers of the labour market segmentations, and facilitating both hard 
and soft infrastructures, and limited to guarantee fair labour market order and supplement to 
universal labour protections and welfare policies. 
Following both the theoretical rationale and the above principles of the role that the 
state and institutional could play, the thesis also conducts very intensive literature reviews. In 
general, the literature of the rural-to-urban labour mobility in the process of industrialization in 
Western academia found is much concentrated in the theoretical arena. Among concrete 
material analysis, most literature found are either targeting developing countries or being too 
general and lack of cross-studies deliberating the relationships between labour mobility and 
industrialization. They are often the narrative analysis of labour migration of the specific 
country in a particular period of the industrial revolution. To be noted, the literature on the 
Western historical interpretations and with direct cross-studies of the rural labour mobility to 
the process of industrialization, is found intensively in contemporary Chinese academia. 
Among the great number of studies, there are growing monographs exclusively in reviewing 
the successful experiences of the EICs in dealing with the rural labour mobility at their 
processes of industrialization. 
Among the most direct literature on our topic, there is a growing wave of studies 
spared special attention on the discourses of roles of the state and other institutions in their 
concrete material analysis. Apart from there is a small proportion that still affirms the neoliberal 
approach, arguing that rural labour mobility is the natural consequence of industrialization, thus, 
no any external force needed to distort the market allocation mechanism over labour resources. 
And generally, they avoid the historical analysis of the political economy paradigm. Majority 
literature holds this argument often quote American history, claiming that the US rural labour 
mobility during its industrialization process was a spontaneous and liberal model. And the US 
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managed its labour transfer under a synchronous development path of industrialization, 
urbanization, and de-agriculturalization; 
On the contrary, more and more literature based on detailed historical materials 
confronted the neoliberal proposition. Generally, the literature of this realm can be grouped into 
two principal directions. The former ones are devoted to exposing a fact that in almost all 
industrialized countries, there were varied forms of interventions mainly via progressive 
policies and legislations on labour mobility along with their industrialized histories. Therefore, 
they are mainly in narrative approach, following the institutionalist analytical framework; 
While, the others are via historical analysis, following the structuralist framework to reveal the 
fundamental rationales among all these interventions, and to uncover what, where, how and 
why did these interventions work or fail in each specific historical experience. By itself, 
literature in this realm often underline the influences of those institutions (including the state) 
over the rural labour mobility, and with the intention to associate them to the process of 
industrialization. While for the later ones, in line with the above propositions, other literature 
also based on historical materials but with emphasis on its analytical approaches, elaborate 
more in perspectives of conditions, reasons, consequences, possible rationale, and potential 
mechanism over rural labour mobility. 
Finally, despite the very comprehensive and overarching literature review, the 
following critiques still motivated us to explore more in this area. 1. Among these literature, 
very few research set its analytical scope so broad that covers the entire industrialization process. 
As such, their research, for one thing, are often lack of horizontal comparisons to other countries; 
For another, they are usually short of a vertical track on the impact of certain institutions on 
labour mobility with entire evolution; 2. Although there is some research attempted to deal with 
intrinsic correlations of the rural labour mobility and the process of industrialization, their 
methodologies seem to be quite a sameness: often a historical narrative analysis. In binding 
these two together, their research either with weighted focuses on industrialization, and only 
timely associate some declarative discourse of rural labour mobility, or vice versa; 3. Although 
many studies advertised their research scope on the industrial revolution, most of their analysis 
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on labour policies are post-war period, due to the lack of reliable historical materials and related 
data; 4. Apart from mainstream socioeconomic analysis, only a few studies spared some 
attention on cultural and demographic factors on labour mobility; 5. the broad contexts of the 
capitalist evolution, the international environment, and many historical singularities are often 
missing in their analytical scope; Last but by no means the least, none of them are directly 
confronting and able to answer the initial query arose after the comparison of EICs and LDCs.  
It is precisely where our thesis is meant to pick up. In order to unfold an overarching 
profile of rural-to-urban labour mobility along with the process of industrialization, it requires 
methodological innovations, which could explore both exogenous and endogenous conditions 
that facilitate rural labour mobility dynamically compatible with industrial development. 
 
Research Objectives 
 
 In short, this project attempts to study the rural labour mobility along with the 
process of industrialization of the early industrialized countries. Firstly, it will project the whole 
spectra of the industrialization process in all selected EICs and their respective stage of rural-
to-urban labour mobility; Secondly, it will analyze the external conditions in the dimension of 
time, space and people that grant EICs particular positions in history; Lastly, via the 
evolutionary institutionalist approach, it will deliberate upon a dynamic intervention of the state 
and other institutions over the rural labour mobility in promoting the industrialization. As such, 
rural labour moves in the process of industrialization can be viewed in specific institutional 
contexts. Beyond so, this project also intends to offer a new interpretation of the history of the 
industrial revolution in the perspective of labour mobility, so as to supplement systematic & 
dynamic labour policies to the current broader scope of industrial policies.  
 
Research questions 
To be brief, the research questions of this thesis can be listed as follow: What are 
the trend of rural labour mobility during their industrialization of the EICs? Is rural labour 
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mobility in EICs had a compatible transition (to the industrialization process) when compared 
with the LDCs? If so, why? What are the main aspects of the process of industrialization on 
labour mobility, and what are the essential reasons attributed to the compatible transition in 
some of the EICs cases? Was the initial capitalist evolution in certain situations that facilitated 
EICs a compatible transition on labour mobility? How the processes of development or 
industrialization of EICs of the 19th century in the competitive phase of capitalism at the world 
level have dynamics distinct from the industrializations of the LDCs of the 20th century in the 
monopolist phase of capitalism? And are the traditional, classical, neoclassical approaches 
enough to understand these processes?   
Apart from exploring the external conditions, what are the internal interventions, or 
in particular, what were laws/policies that had been produced on labour mobility that were 
compatible along with the industrialization in the history of EICs? Or rather, how the 
transformation of industrial structures, demographic structures, as well as social & political 
structures have been compelled to match the dynamic stage of the capitalist development, and 
in turn, reframed conditions for labour mobility? How did each intervention function along with 
its entire policy cycle? How have these policies been made, or in particular, what are the 
concrete mechanisms? So on and so forth.  
 
Research hypotheses 
 
Based on our previous theoretical analysis and literature reviews, there is no 
sufficient interpretation regarding reasons for the compatible process of labour mobility 
transition to their industrialization in the EICs, especially under the dimensions of time, space, 
and people. Many economic theories with limited sociopolitical views that were based on the 
hypotheses often disregarded the importance and differences of concrete, singular and specific 
movement both at the national level and international level, thus, lack for particular analysis in 
the political and power relations among diverse nations.  
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The central hypothesis of this thesis is that a good understanding of the process that 
made their labour mobility transition compatible to industrialization in EICs, can only be 
achieved by considering especially two main commonalities in the history of EICs: 1. the 
particular external conditions (including historical singularity, capitalist development and 
demography); 2. the dynamic internal achievements (like the state and institutional intervention 
via laws, policies and regulations). The former one intakes the specificities and historical 
singularities of the capitalist stages in which if this process of gradual labour mobility was 
determined; While the later one assumes a dynamic intervention via different institutions that 
impact on labour mobility that was compelled to the dynamic requirements to the development 
of industrialization. We also presume a mutual influent mechanism between these two 
determinants was resulted by the power structure/relation that was led by workers’ political 
mobilization/movement, or rather people’s subjective initiatives.   
 
Research Design 
 
Bearing the above research questions and hypotheses, in order to unfold an 
overarching dynamics of rural-to-urban labour mobility along with the process of 
industrialization, this project will be conducted through a historical evolutionary approach on 
some of the early industrialized countries. As argued before, any single analytical/theoretical 
framework either in macro, or micro, or meso anchor is broad enough to cover the scope of this 
research. Plus, the current theories of labour mobility are biased concentrated, whether only for 
a period of time or in a specific region, which block potential findings over a long run/time 
vision. Thus, misusages of theories inevitably lead to chaotic interpretations of reality. And 
since economics in general still lacks for a dynamic framework that restricts its analytical ability 
to select more appropriate logic concepts of time/space/people, which is not able to break the 
limitations of the traditional paradigms of static analysis, shifting its focus from the equilibrium 
point to the process.  
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Therefore, the dynamic paradigm (entangled among time, space, and people) is 
designed exclusively to tackle these obstacles. In particular, it can be used as an analytical tool 
to seek these external conditions and put forward a more appropriate frame of reference for us 
to compare among the selected EICs. In short, by intercepting one complete time cycle, the 
analysis will be combined with a certain space and people as the background of its logical 
deduction. To do so, the “vertical” axis of the thesis is thus in time order: with historical 
circumstance from the first industrial revolution to the second one; with the historical evolution 
of capitalist transformation from capitalism in primitive accumulation to the competitive and 
the monopoly capitalism; While the “horizontal” axis lies in the comparisons of countries 
within the United Kingdom, France, the United States of America, and Germany. 
As for the internal intervention, previous studies revealed have enabled us to unpack 
the very complexities that none of any single theory (either of rural labour mobility or 
industrialization) could interpret. But at the same time, on the one hand, each and every theory 
(of labour mobility) deconstructs some distinctive perspectives/angles that implicitly contain 
exploratory interpretations in this field. In particular, each of them opened the very social, 
economic, and political space that the state and other institutions could step in. More details 
can be found in Table 1. It, thus, will go over most relevant legislation, policies, and regulations 
of the selected countries in history, adopting measures from “macro, meso and micro” 
perspectives, and verify the applicability and compatibility to both endogenous & exogenous 
conditions in each and every stage of capitalist and industrial development. 
 
Table 1: Theoretical reviews in the dimension of time, space, and people 
No. Theories Time Space People Factors/insights (Repeat 
not enumerated) 
1 Comparative 
Benefits 
Hypothesis 
Short term (pre 
industrialization) 
Macro/three 
departments; 
developed world 
Homogeneous; Homo 
economicus 
intersectoral wage 
differentials 
2 The Capitalist 
Model 
Long term Macro & Micro Homogeneous & 
heterogeneous 
Closure movement; Capital 
accumulation; Capitalist 
mode of production; Social 
division of labour; 
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3 Pioneering 
Gravity Model 
Short term (pre 
industrialization) 
Macro & Meso; 
developed world 
Homogeneous; Homo 
economicus 
Economic policies (law, tax 
etc.); Public services, 
transportation 
4 Big Push Model Short term (pre 
industrialization) 
Macro; LDCs Homogeneous; Homo 
economicus 
network effects 
5 Dual Economy 
Model 
Short term (pre 
industrialization) 
or classic world 
Macro/Dual 
departments; 
LDCs 
Homogeneous; Homo 
economicus 
Labour surplus 
(prescription to 
industrialization) 
6 Labour Surplus 
Model 
Middle term Macro/Dual 
departments; 
LDCs 
Homogeneous; Homo 
economicus 
Agricultural labour 
productivity; agricultural 
commercialization  
7 Agricultural 
Surplus Model  
Middle term Macro/Dual 
departments; 
LDCs 
Homogeneous; Demographic 
transformation; 
Consumption structure;  
8 Expected Income 
Differential 
Model 
Middle term Macro/Dual 
departments; 
Micro/individual; 
LDCs 
Heterogeneous; 
Rational choice; 
Subjective initiative 
Urban unemployment; 
Expected income 
differential 
9 Push-Pull model Middle term Micro & Meso; 
internal migration 
& international 
immigration; 
Heterogeneous; 
Rational choice; 
Selective 
Exogenous factors: 
Economic policies, Labour 
market policies;  
10 Cost-Return 
model 
Short term Micro & Meso; 
internal migration 
& international 
immigration; 
Heterogeneous; 
Rational choice;  
Human capital;  
11 Self-selection 
model 
Short term Micro; internal 
migration & 
international 
immigration; 
Heterogeneous; 
Rational choice; 
subjective initiative 
Endogeneity: 
Skills/Education/vocational 
training; 
12 New Economics 
of Migration 
Middle term Meso (family); 
internal migration 
& international 
immigration; 
Collective; 
Interactive; Social 
ties; 
Rural social security; rural 
financial/credit/insurance 
markets; 
13 Social Network 
Theory 
Middle term Meso (Social 
networks); internal 
migration & 
international 
immigration; 
Interpersonal 
structure; Interactive; 
Place-dependent ties; 
Social networks; 
Information; Social capital; 
Peer effect; 
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As we can see from the above table, each theoretical model is involved with various 
factors in the arena for policy/law-making, such as wage policy, land policy, poor law, social 
protection and security policy, rural and agricultural policy, demographic policy, employment 
policy, labour market policy, tax policy, education and vocational training policy, as well as the 
closure movement, labour/union movement, class struggle, capital accumulation, capitalist 
models of production, transportation technology, and communication, so on and so forth. 
On the other hand, theories that explore the role of the state in our previous study 
can be placed to source the valid materials to analyze, since they are not only set the direction 
of where the state and other institutions to play their roles, but also in revealing what are the 
concrete mechanism of the intervention. In short, whatsoever policies/laws/regulations that the 
state and other institutions can produce should create only conditions rather than bring about 
desired outcomes directly by specific interventions into the economic process. 
In addition, as referring to the essence of dynamics, one of its rationales can be 
analyzed from the New Structural Economics, given its broader scope that systematically 
advocated a dynamic intervention mechanism along with the industrial development. For 
example, in the labour market, on the one hand, it argues that “labour mobility” should be not 
only as one of the productive factors, but it also should be adapted in accordance with the 
dynamic endowment changes so as to match an optimal industrial structure. On the other hand, 
it institutionalizes dynamic policies and regulations on the division of labour in the light of 
different stages of economic structure. Also, the other rationale of the dynamics can be referred 
in accordance with the Marxist Historical Materialism. The dynamics can be produced by the 
dialectical relationships/contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of 
production, as well as between economic foundation and superstructure. That is to say, the 
dynamics can also be understood in the principle that relations of production should adapt to 
the changes in productive forces. In order to achieve industrialization, policies should be 
produced dynamically in a balance between industry and employment, machine and labour, as 
well as structural internality and externality. Thus far, a comprehensive analytical foundation 
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has been well articulated, bearing the initial questions that are this analysis of dynamic 
paradigm reliable in explaining this complexity of rural labour mobility. 
As such, to elaborate, starting with rural-to-urban labour mobility in the initial stage 
of industrialization, the corresponding public/macro/industrial policies, on the one hand, guide 
the labour mobility as to make sure the sufficient labour supply, and on the other hand, facilitate 
the industrial expansion (like to support the manufacturing) so as to guarantee the employment 
for rural migrants. At the same time, in avoiding the side effects, like urban unemployment, the 
role of the sate has been framed in offering conditions like labour rights, public services, and 
legislations; While as entering the deepening phase of industrialization, policies not only 
required to facilitate a smooth mobility transition, but also required to optimize the emerging 
labour market; at the same time, other policies, on the one hand, focus on rural development as 
to establish financial/capital/insurance market, and to apply modern technology and science in 
improving agricultural productivity, in turn, to produce more labour surplus for industrial 
development; on the other hand, policies like social protection/security, income distribution, 
etc., required so as to guarantee rather a stable than a militant working class. And the role of 
the state follows by the ideology of an ordoliberalist discourse (Bonefeld, 2012), focusing itself 
as a monitor in providing fair regulations of various markets, and actively participate in 
international affairs so as to make sure the country’s position in the international division of 
labour;  
And finally, as in the post-industrial era, policies not only in guarantee a still strong 
industrial sector but also should facilitate the industrial transformation/upgrade to be high-tech 
and innovative and to services, as well upgrade the agricultural sector to be more modernized 
and technology & science-led, thus, the corresponding labour policies subsequently also 
required to accompany, such as policies of education and vocational training, the introduction 
of skilled foreign workers, so on and so forth. And other policies as the remedy to reframe side 
effects of various social, economic, and political issues. At this stage, it is then the time to 
redefine the role of the state in many aspects, and gradually approach to the welfare states model. 
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In a word, such dynamics are more in a dynamic/interacted/balanced development approach 
and analyzed under the time, space, and people’s framework. 
In short, to organize the thesis, general theories of labour mobility measured by 
anchors of macro, micro, and meso layer will be presented firstly, not only with chief intention 
to get well understandings of critical areas and limits of the mainstream theories but also to 
pave the way for referring relevant policies and their rationales towards labour mobility thereof; 
the first chapter then follows by a narrowed emphasis on rural labour mobility (rural-to-urban 
labour mobility) with great critiques on theories of economic dualism in special, which connects 
the contemporary development theories back to the period of the industrial revolution of the 
18th and 19th and make it more relevant to this thesis. Lastly, by criticizing all the above theories 
in the dimension of time, space and people, it formed this thesis’ theoretical framework and 
also provided orientation on the potential policies (that will be analyzed in the third chapter).  
The second chapter starts with detailed comparisons of labour mobility between the 
EICs and the LDCs, in the perspectives of industrial structural process, mobility transition and 
demographic transformations in history, and with more focus on the result rather than reasoning, 
since each country has its own situation and historical consequence. By doing so, as to respond 
to questions regarding the contrast comparisons, it started with the comprehensive literature 
review, including reviews of studies on the role of the state and other institutions in the study 
of rural labour mobility.  
The third chapter, according to research design, begins with the divisions of the 
industrialization process in the respective analysis of the UK, France, the U.S., and Germany. 
It is then followed by the elaborative presentation of rural labour mobility in each country of 
their stages of industrialization into the proto-industrial era, the industrial revolution, and the 
later stage of industrialization; Secondly, we analyze these common external conditions that 
enable these EICs in their process of industrialization realize a smooth and well-accordant rural 
labour mobility, under the dimension of time, space, and people; Thirdly, we highlight the effect 
of the state and other institutional interventions that internally contributed to the compatible 
labour mobility transition. In short, the evolution of institutional interventions in the process of 
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industrialization is elaborated. The analysis is also under the staged industrialization framework, 
mainly via legislation, public/economic/industrial policies, and various social movements, 
highlighting roles especially of land policy, agricultural/ rural/ farmer’s policy, labour market 
policy, social security policy, educational policy and other public policies in determining rural 
labour mobility as well as relief systems towards urban crisis; And finally, we reveal the 
mechanism of the policy-making, especially underlining roles of social forces (especially the 
working class) with weighted emphasis on the state, and political/power relations and structures 
with other social groups in determining of those interventions. 
And finally with the fourth chapter concludes the thesis. This thesis via the initiative 
to combine both (or place the rural labour mobility process under the analytical framework of 
industrialization process) brought out a refreshed perspective not only in historical 
interpretation but also in theoretical reflection. As per se a very dynamic social process, the 
rural labour mobility when was integrated into the process of industrialization manifested even 
a more complicated evolution. Not only does it embrace the external circumstances including 
historical singularities such as industrial revolution, but also all other internal social 
stakeholders/forces, as well as any particular socio-politico-economic circumstances, would 
have profound influences on the pattern of rural labour mobility.  
And the dynamic paradigm entangled among the dimension of time, space, and 
people is served to explore especially these external and context/circumstance-based impacts 
on rural labour mobility; Whereas the evolutionary analysis of the state and institutional 
interventions is adopted to delve into these internal and content-based materials in dealing with 
the process of rural labour mobility. To conclude, over three centuries’ historical analysis of 
the selected EICs had provided us with the whole spectrum of (social, industrial, and economic) 
structural changes, which enabled us to explore the dynamic interactions between 
industrialization and rural labour mobility in a very consistent perspective. Moreover, most 
policies, regulations, and laws based on labour mobility in the history of EICs have 
demonstrated strong dynamic characteristics, which to a large extent, conformed to the process 
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and strategy of their industrialization at that time, and also met the requirements of endogenous 
& exogenous dynamics in the corresponding stages of capitalist development. 
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Chapter I. Theoretical Framework  
 
 
Nothing is more profound than Marx’s rationale of the political economy to 
understand labour mobility. Thus, the chapter begins with an analysis of Marx’s discourse on 
how labour has been produced, reproduced, mobilized, and utilized in the capitalist economy. 
Following contemporary political economics, numerous theories from different angles present 
how complex labour mobility could be by different stands/analysis. Thus, to present them in a 
clear way, theories of labour mobility in macro perspective selected are concentrated more on 
the analysis of the macro-institutional-demographic social and economic conditions for labour 
mobility; theories in micro perspective take focus on individual value system in determining 
mobility decision-making; and theories in meso perspective emphasize on collective and social 
bonds that influence labour mobility. Not only do they offer various references of theoretical 
concerns (even though most of them are orthodox), which can be used in the further analysis 
(by heterodox approaches), but they also expose research gaps/limits which is useful to the 
following up researches, especially for this thesis.      
By exclusively focusing on theories of rural labour mobility (in particular the rural-
to-urban labour mobility), critiques on theories of economic dualism are narrowed down to the 
main theoretical reference. Lewis, with his dual economic model, sets the seminal theory for 
analysis rural labour mobility in the dualistic economic framework and followed by Ranis-Fei’s 
labour surplus economy, Jorgenson’s agricultural surplus model, and Harris-Todaro’s expected 
income differential model. Finally, by realizing the situation that most theories are mainly in 
the discourse centered on the content/activity-based of labour mobility, a context (spatial-
temporal context) based theory is missing. And with facilitation of one of the epistemological 
frameworks of the archaic Chinese methodology, dimensions of time, space, and people are 
placed on reviewing all aforementioned theories and set the main analytical foundation for this 
thesis.  
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I.1. Theories of rural labour mobility in Macro, Micro and Meso anchors 
 
From the perspective of industrial structural processing/evolution, early stages of 
economic development often witnessed an uneven growth between departments/sectors, with 
the agricultural sector reserved a vast labour force extremely exceed than its capacity thereof. 
However, sound industrialization brought affirmative changes to this, in the light of rich 
experiences from earlier industrialized countries. Dramatic changes induced by a sound 
industrial development even overthrew the initial economic structures: On the one hand, 
flourishing industries led massive jobs creations, while on the other hand, applying science and 
technology or via agrarian reform in agriculture by squeezing out more labour as surplus to be 
transferred. Thus, along with this process, it lies in the transfer of surplus labour from 
unproductive to productive employment to promote more economic growth. Also, the process 
of social transformation induced thereof is accompanied by the efflux of rural labour fore and 
shift it from a traditional and agriculture-based society to a modern industry & service-based 
society. As such, economic development is often defined in terms of transferring a large 
proportion of workers from agricultural production to industrial activities (Fei and Ranis, 1964). 
In other words, the process is often viewed as a phenomenon where a worker migrates from a 
lower productive rural job to a higher productive urban/industrial job (Todaro, 1969). And this 
motif of labour mobility/migration places at the center stage in many development economics 
theories.  
Before starting to understand labour mobility more fundamentally, one has to bring 
it back to the capitalist discourse. And it is significantly crucial to understand the fundamental 
rationale of how labour has been produced, mobilized, and utilized in the political economy. 
Although Marx did not have exclusive work on labour mobility/migration, in fact, articulations 
of labour mobility can be found almost everywhere in Marx’s Manuscripts (1844) and the 
Capital (1867). In general, Marx via exposures of “the Primitive accumulation of capital, the 
Capitalist mode of production, Social division of labour, Reserve army of labour, etc.” all imply 
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a great foundation and provide valuable references for the rationale of labour mobility. 
Expressly, three targeting points as following are set to elaborate on Marx’s intelligent legacy.   
 
Production of Labour Surplus (produced) 
 
The primitive, coupled with the general accumulation of capital, both produce and 
reproduce the surplus labour force. As in the primitive accumulation, the existence or through 
force to produce a large number of the surplus labour force for capital accumulation is precisely 
the inevitable result and prerequisite of the capitalist mode of production. Essentially, Marx’s 
primitive accumulation of capital is the use of violence to deprive means of production of small 
producers/peasants. And in order to obtain the initial capital, small producers/peasants are 
converted to free labour. And the reproduction of capital produces an increase in the bourgeoisie. 
Thus, one pole is more and more capitalists, and the other is more and more wage workers. In 
other words, the surplus labour force is intrinsically linked to the capitalist model of production, 
especially the rationale of primitive accumulation of capital. In Marx’s words: The Secret of 
Primitive Accumulation  
“[...] those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and 
forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and 
“unattached” proletarians on the labour-market. The expropriation of 
the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of 
the whole process [...].” (Vol. I, Chap. 26). 
 
As for general capital accumulation, the further separation of producers and means 
of production then creates more conditions for their capital accumulation, and in turn, 
reproduces the surplus labour force. In the discourse of general law of capitalist accumulation, 
as Marx pointed out that  
“[…] capital works on both sides at the same time. If its accumulation, 
on the one hand, increases the demand for labour, it increases on the 
other the supply of labourers by the “setting free” of them, whilst at the 
same time the pressure of the unemployed compels those that are 
employed to furnish more labour, and therefore makes the supply of 
labour, to a certain extent, independent of the supply of labourers. The 
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action of the law of supply and demand of labour on this basis 
completes the despotism of capital […].” (Vol. I, Chap. 25).  
 
Relative Surplus Labouring Population (reproduced) 
 
From another side of capital accumulation, the surplus labouring population then 
becomes a necessary product of it or the development of wealth on a capitalist basis. And this 
surplus population becomes, conversely, the lever of capitalist accumulation – a condition of 
existence of the capitalist model of production (Vol. I, Chap. 25). For Marx, it, in turn, forms a 
disposable industrial reserve army that belongs to capital as absolutely. As such, when 
capitalism develops, the organic composition of capital will increase, which means that the 
mass of constant capital grows faster than the mass of variable capital. Fewer workers can 
produce all that is necessary for society’s requirements. In addition, capital will become more 
concentrated and centralized in fewer hands. So for Marx, this being the absolute historical 
tendency, part of the working population will tend to become surplus to the requirements of 
capital accumulation over time. Paradoxically, the larger the wealth of society, the larger the 
industrial reserve army will become. And once the capital enters into agriculture, it induces the 
increase of organic composition of capital in agriculture. Therefore, the demand for capital for 
labour is absolutely reduced, and form the rural surplus labour force. To be noted, this 
mechanism of the reproduction of the surplus labour force is much subtle compared to that have 
been produced by force.  
 
Social Combinations of the Labour Process (mobilized/utilized) 
 
And back to labour mobility, Marx follows the very principle of the capitalist 
distribution and redistribution of social labour, via the social combinations of the labour process. 
It clearly exposes its very nature of the industry, which necessitates variation of labour, fluency 
of function, universal mobility of the labourer, setting a fundamental rationale of labour 
mobility for the industry. As in the Machinery and Modern Industry, Marx analyzed that  
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“[...] by means of machinery, chemical processes and other methods, it 
is continually causing changes not only in the technical basis of 
production but also in the functions of the labourer. At the same time, 
it thereby also revolutionises the division of labour within the society, 
and incessantly launches masses of capital and of workpeople from one 
branch of production to another [...]” (Capital Vol. I, Chap. 15).  
 
In addition, Marx also critically pointed out the role of the capitalist state in such a 
process of labour mobility: “[...] the pretensions of capital in embryo — when, beginning to 
grow, it secures the right of absorbing a quantum sufficit [sufficient quantity] of surplus-labour, 
not merely by the force of economic relations, but by the help of the state [...]” (Vol. I, Chap. 
10). The Closure Moment had witnessed and exposed how brutal the state through legislation 
mandatorily transfer people into free labour for industrial development. In short, in order to 
obtain the initial capital (primitive and capital accumulation) and labour (industrial reserve 
army) for the development of modern industry, labour transformation (rural labour mobility) as 
for Marx, can be understood as the process of using the state’s absolute power imperatively 
deprived farmers (small producers) of means of production, transfer them as “free labour” and 
reconfigure the overall social resources for the development of capitalism. 
Therefore, labour mobility and the relative surplus population are deeply rooted in 
the capitalist mode of production. The primary accumulation of capital, as well as the general 
capital accumulation, set the mechanism to the production of labour surplus. To be noted, here, 
the labour surplus is a concept more referenced in the theory of development economics, which 
is different from the Marxian term on “Surplus Labour.” Concretely, surplus labour as the 
extension concept of surplus value used by Marx in his critique of the political economy 
(Capital Vol.3), meaning a worker performed in excess of the labour necessary to produce the 
means of livelihood of the worker4. The “Surplus” hence means the additional labour a worker 
has to do in his/her job, beyond earning his/her own compensation.  
And in contemporary political economy, labour mobility is much studied in 
numerous development theories from different angles indicate a complex migrational process. 
                                                
4 …the specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship 
of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element... 
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To unfold clearly, they can be analyzed by three layers and measured by macro, micro and 
meso anchors (Kalinowska & Knapinska, 2009; Sun, 2012; Sheng, 2007): The macro approach 
concentrates on the economic, politic, institutional and demographic angles; The micro 
approach, on the other hand, takes into account an individual value system, motivations, and 
expectations as well as human capital of migrants; Finally, the meso approach presents an 
additional dimension, which is absent in the two former approaches: the collective and social 
network bonds that influence decisions made by potential and current migrants. 
 
I.1.1.  Macro Anchor 
 
Based on macro anchor, theories analyze the macro-institutional-demographic 
social and economic structures, intending to expose general laws of rural-to-urban labour 
mobility. It includes universal factors applicable to a particular territory, such as laws, 
immigration and emigration regulations, and global economic changes. And early classic 
theories explained labour mobility mostly to wage differentials and considered labour mobility 
as a cost-free flow in a perfectly competitive market economy. Since various theories in the 
macro perspective are developed along all-time in history, to elaborate clearly, theories are 
presented here in a timeline order: 
As early as the 17th century, under comparative economic benefits hypothesis, 
William Petty already pointed out5 that industry has much more yield/income than agriculture, 
while merchandise gains much more than industry, trying to explain the causation of population 
flow (Petty & Graunt, 1899)[1691]. And such intersectoral wage differentials between 
industries promote the mobility of labour from the low-income sector to the higher ones. Along 
with the rise and development of the First Industrial Revolution, Great Britain in the mid-1800s 
witnessed more than one out of every three rural inhabitants in urban areas (Long & Ferrie, 
2003). In the 19th century, Karl Marx although did not have an exclusive work on labour 
                                                
5 William Petty (1691[1899], p. 256) “There is much more to be gained by Manufacture than Husbandry; and by Merchandise 
than Manufacture….”, as well as Lars Herlitz (1993, pp. 92-93) ‘the labour of crafts and manufacturing was more productive, 
or at least capable of becoming more productive, than that of agriculture.’ 
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mobility, but his rationale discourses6 all implied a profound analysis on it, which can be 
understood as the process by the help of the state’s absolute power, capitalism imperatively 
deprived farmers (small producers) of means of production, transfer them as “free labour” and 
reconfigure the overall social resources for the capitalism, unmasked the very nature of 
industrial development much dependent on labour mobility. 
Also, Ernst G. Ravenstein (with his Pioneering Gravity Model), in reference to the 
British internal migration in the 19th century, systemically analyzed the phenomenon of 
migration and proposed the Laws of Migration7 (Ravenstein, 1885). He argued that migrants 
search for better work and financial profits in the context of the development of transport should 
lead to increasing migration tendencies. And the laws/ hypotheses of migration highlighted that 
public policies such as legislations and taxes could all induce the migration. In addition, his 
relative importance of natural increase, migration in the growth of cities, and the relative 
importance of “push” and “pull” factors in causing migration merit further researches (Grigg, 
1977).  
Entering the 20th century, theories on migration has been fruitful, especially after 
the World War II., P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) with his “Big Push Model” brought the 
Development Economics in the center for LDCs to approach the development of 
industrialization (Lin, 2012), claiming that for planned large-scale investment programmes in 
industrialization in countries with a large surplus workforce in agriculture, in order to take 
advantage of network effects. And later on, various theories bearing postcolonial and post-
independent context, are largely focusing on the LDCs. Colin Clarke, in 1940, reconfirmed 
Petty’s argument by measuring and comparing the changing trend of the distribution structure 
of employment in the three industries under different income levels (Rothbarth, 1941; 
Maddison, 2004). 
                                                
6 with his “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844”, “Capital: Critique of Political Economy of 1867”, “Social 
Combinations of the Labour Process in the Machinery and Modern Industry; Productions of Labour Surplus for the Primitive 
Accumulation & general Capital Accumulation; Relative Surplus Labouring Population as Industrial Reserve Army, and etc.” 
7 1.mainly in short-distance, with direction towards commerce and industry; 2. flow from surrounding areas of towns step by 
step to cities; 3. flows of migration from rural to urban concentration; 4. compensating a reverse flow of migration; 5.the long-
distance flow more into big cities; 6. less migratory of town natives than rural people; 7. higher migratory of female than that 
of men 
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In addition, by exclusively focusing on theories of rural-urban migration/ rural-to-
urban labour mobility in the LDCs, and based on Lewis’ economic dualistic framework, 
assumption of an unlimited supply of labour is the key to the initial economic development (W. 
A. Lewis, 1954; W. A. Lewis, 1958b; W. A. Lewis, 1958a; W. A. Lewis, 1976; W. A. Lewis, 
1967; W. A. Lewis, 1972; W. A. Lewis, 1979), which started to drew great academic attentions 
in the area of development economics. The Ranis–Fei’s modified version of Lewis’ model 
(Ranis & J. C. Fei, 1961; J. Fei & Ranis, 1964; Ranis, 2004), placed extra emphasis on labour 
productivity of agriculture and the impacts of the commercialization of agricultural output as 
additional conditions to the industrial expansion, as well as to the labour mobility; Jorgenson’s 
agricultural surplus model assumed that the production of agricultural surplus and changes of 
behaviour consumption are in condition for labour mobility (Jorgenson, 1967; Jorgenson, 1961) 
and primary accumulation of capital for the industrial growth; the Todaro’s expected income 
differential model (Todaro, 1969a; Harris & Todaro, 1970) further the neoclassic discourse on 
peoples’ expectation and possibilities to gain a job under the context of the urban 
unemployment in pursuing of balanced growth of a dual economy, etc.  
To name just a few, such a macro anchor provides a theoretical framework that is 
practical, explicit, and operational. And the macro perspective has a guiding value for taking 
full advantage of the labour surplus of LDCs at the initial stage of economic development. 
However, it inseparably places the structuralist contradictions excessively over the dualistic 
confrontation and reflects an overall linear and cognitional developmental direction. Thus, the 
perspective is too simplistic to prevent further exploration: 1. The labour mobility within its 
respective department is not taken into account, namely, the mobility from agricultural 
production to the rural non-agricultural activity or the mobility from the urban informal sector 
to the formal sector. As Zhu (2005) put forward, the quaternary economic hypothesis, namely, 
labour mobilizes among a four-sector framework (Zhu, 2001). Also, it did not refer to the actual 
practice of a reversed mobility of rural labour in a certain circumstance, like urban economic 
crisis; 2. The labour per se is taking for granted to be homogeneous and non-subjective, thus 
lack of in-depth post-structuralist studies on the motivations of labour itself; 3. Critical 
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explanations on why labour continues to mobilize in the context of high urban unemployment 
are ignored. Therefore, further exploring theories of labour mobility in the micro perspective 
offers a new breakthrough. 
 
I.1.2.  Micro Anchor 
 
From a micro perspective, theories selected are targeting characteristics of 
individual mobility in different stages of social, economic, and demographic environments, and 
analyzing roles of different factors in the labour migration/mobility. And in general, most 
theories in the micro anchor are not based on the Homo economicus hypothesis. They have 
emphasized in the micro decision-making process that it is the individual who makes the 
migration decision. And there are two main approaches. One argues that migration decision is 
based on the rational choice of the exogenous labour market conditions; while, the other from 
the behaviorist assertion holds that migration decision is made upon the endogeneity of 
individual labour.  
The origin of the push-pull theory can be traced back to the 19th century. Among the 
very early scholars who study population migration, Ravenstein, when proposed the basic 
framework can be the first (Ravenstein, 1885). The laws of migration were used to explore the 
possible causes of labour mobility, arguing that among other factors, economic factors place 
the important reasons for migration. Everett S. Lee (1966), based on the Ravenstein Laws, 
further built up a comprehensive analytical framework, trying to explain the tension, thrust and 
resistance encountered in the process of migration. As far as the characteristics of migrants are 
concerned, Lee claims that migration is selective. Migrants tend to consider positive factors or 
pulling factors occurring in the migration destination place as well as negative factors, which, 
in a way, ‘push’ them to migrate. The level of positive selection of the aforementioned factors, 
i.e., the level of making decisions about departures, depends on many intermediate factors as 
well as on the position of the candidate in his life cycle, which also determines one’s attitude 
to migration. Moreover, the characteristics of migrants also depend, which is rather obvious, 
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on the features of societies of the origin and destination regions (Lee, 1966; G. J. Lewis, 1982). 
These considerations may be formulated otherwise as the push-and-pull theory, according to 
which there are factors ‘pushing’ to migration departures and factors ‘pulling’ potential 
migrants.  
The ‘push’ type factors include, in particular, international conflicts, internal 
military conflicts, totalitarian regimes, persecutions, compulsory displacements, discrimination 
of minority, discrimination of majority, violation of human rights, guerrilla activity and 
terrorism, poverty and hunger, unemployment and low wages, natural disasters, and ecological 
disasters. Among the ‘pull’ factors we can distinguish state guarantees of social minimum 
wages, absorptive labor market with a higher level of wages, educational possibilities or 
possibilities to acquire a new job, economic development and growth, joining of families, a 
chance to achieve prosperity, political stability, lawful governance and democracy, pluralism, 
efficient protection of human rights, life-space (Kalinowska & Knapinska, 2009). Therefore, 
migration is rather the result of the individual choice under the labour market conditions in the 
light of the push-pull theory. To elaborate, factors place as following (Table 2): 
 
Table 2: The push-pull factors of migration 
A. Potential Costs of Migration (Inhibiting factors) B. Potential benefits of Migration (Pulling factors) 
• transport to new destination • higher wages 
• uncertainty related with finding new job; 
• possibility to choose a work place, 
consideration of personal preferences 
• problem of accommodation while looking for 
work; • improvement of living conditions 
• costs of living; 
• possibility to improve the level of education, a 
chance of self fulfillment, raising the level of 
ambitions; 
• necessity costs related to new life;  
• vast possibilities of development and 
education of children; 
• feeling of alienation 
• higher levels of services, higher standard of 
living; 
• lack of respect and acceptance in new 
environment; • attractive social life; 
• necessity to know and use the local language; 
• favorable ethnic, racial, religious, political and 
social conditions; 
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• necessity to change previous manners of 
behavior, habits, likings, etc.;  
C. Potential Costs of Stay (Pushing factors) D. Potential Benefits of Stay (Inhibiting factors) 
• difficulties in finding job on the place of 
origin, lack of adequate work corresponding 
to ambitions of individuals; 
• cheap already owned dwelling place or 
relative housing stabilization; 
• unsatisfactory social and political 
relationships; 
• definite supply of food, relatively easy living 
without the necessity to change; 
• unsatisfactory activities of social and political 
institutions of various type; 
• support of family, direct relationships with the 
closest members of family and social groups; 
• violation of basic human rights; • living while surrounded by closest persons;  
• ethnic, social, political and religious 
inequalities; • having a definite social status; 
 
• comfort resulting from the possibility to 
maintain native tongue, traditions, customs, 
ways of living; 
Source: (Kalinowska & Knapinska, 2009). 
 
Precisely by criticizing the prevailing economic thinking of the time that saw 
migration only in terms of labour market outcomes, the cost-return theory has been widely used 
in the micro analysis of labour migration behaviour researches. Larry A. Sjaastad (1962), as a 
leading scholar in the era, regards the migration decision of labour as an investment behavior, 
and built up a “Cost and Returns model,” arguing that the only goal of measuring behaviour is 
to compare the return and cost and pursue the goal of maximizing net income. Within his 
framework, the goal is to determine the return to investment in migration rather than to relate 
rates of migration to income differentials. The estimated response magnitude of net migration 
to gaps in earnings is of little value in gauging the effectiveness of migration as an equilibrator. 
Thus, migration is treated as investment increases the productivity of human resources, an 
investment that has costs and which also renders returns (Sjaastad, 1962). Also, this treatment 
places migration in a resource allocation framework because it deals with migration as a means 
of promoting efficient resource allocation and because migration is an activity that requires 
resources. In his model, the private costs can be broken down into money and non-money costs. 
The money costs include out of pocket expenses of movement. Thus, returns to migration will 
consist of a positive or negative increment to his real earnings streams to be obtained by moving 
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to another place. Likewise, the non-money costs include foregone earnings and the psychic 
costs of changing one’s environment, while returns arising from locational preferences should 
be ignored to the extent that they represent consumption, which has a zero cost of production. 
Therefore, migration cannot be viewed in isolation. Complementary investments in the human 
agent are probably as important or more important than the migration process itself. 
In addition, there are migrational theories in the micro anchor which managed to 
adopt behaviorist research methodology. They put the personal characteristics of the labour 
mobility subject into the research framework, such as the gender, age, and skill of the workers, 
which are considered to be the key factors affecting the migration decision-making (Sun, 2012). 
By realizing that migrants are not randomly selected from the population, George J. Borjas 
adapts the Roy model of self-selection and has a sound study on labour migration, known as 
the self-selection model (1987). His model also extends the Sjaastad’s framework by 
emphasizing the role of skill prices in allocating workers across regions. From the endogeneity 
of the decision to migrate, he explores the relationship between the individual skill endowments 
and earnings, arguing that migrants are expected to relocate in regions where the returns to 
skills are more compatible with their skill endowments: Income-maximizing behaviour 
generates an equilibrium sorting of skills in which regions offering high rewards for skills 
attract skilled workers, and unskilled workers move to regions with low skill prices. The 
theoretical approach highlights regional differences in the returns to skills: regions that pay 
higher returns to skills attract more skilled workers than regions that pay lower returns (Borjas 
et al., 1992). He concludes that persons whose skills are most mismatched with the reward 
structure offered by their current place of residence are the persons most likely to leave the 
place, and these persons tend to relocate in the region, which offers higher rewards for their 
particular skills. To be noted, his theory is more focused on international labour migration. And 
conditions that determine the nature of the self -selection is derived and depend on economic 
and political characteristics of the sending and receiving countries. Still, it bears valuable 
references to the internal migrational studies.  
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I.1.3.  Meso Anchor 
 
The third anchor lies in the Meso layer (theories of middle range), which advanced 
for the utility of a non-micro and non-macro paradigm, by focusing on theories in a collective 
unity, such as family, community, social network, and group interactions, underlying 
importance of the collective functions in determinants of labour migration/mobility. In general, 
migrant network theory tries to explain the migration flows that can not be explained by other 
already existing theories and tries to show why migration continues even when there are higher 
wages elsewhere or no pull factors or policies in the receiving region (Castles et al., 2013). It 
focuses on different networks and is based on the assumption that the migrant network 
influences the decision of migrants when they are choosing their destination. It also explains 
how migrants can create and even maintain social ties with other migrants and family back 
home and how this can lead to the emergence of social migrant networks. And there are a few 
layers in the meso anchor: family/household, community, and social networks.  
The first layer has been developed by criticizing Todaro’s hypothesis, incorporated 
the unity function of the family decision making rather than the individual way (Stark & Bloom, 
1985; Stark, 1991), and demonstrated that rural-to-urban migration is perfectly rational even if 
urban expected income is lower than rural income, (Katz & Stark, 1986). The New Economics 
of Migration (Stark & Bloom, 1985), argues that the migration decisions are made in fact not 
by separate individuals but by the family in which people act collectively not only to maximize 
the expected income but also to minimize risks. That is to say, family as a carrier of both risks 
and benefits, is collectively responsible for individual migration, as such, both parties (who stay 
behind and migrated) are better off due to migration since an exchange of commitments to share 
income provides coinsurance. The theory suggests the view that empirical evidence seems to 
support the patterns of remittances are better explained as an inter-temporal contractual 
arrangement between the migrant and the family than as the result of purely altruistic 
considerations (Stark & Bloom, 1985). It can also be viewed as a distribution-welfare system: 
the migrant lives separately from his/her family, he/she does participate in the family’s common 
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decisions (which affect him/her too); he/she is involved in familial pooling of resources and 
income, especially pooling aimed at facilitating his/her migration; he/she then is responsible 
for substantial net urban-to-rural remittances; and he/she maintains a close overall (at least in 
the medium run) bond with the family; such a situation can be referred to a notion called the 
rural-based family with an urban extension (Stark, 1984).  
Oded Stark claims that relative deprivation plays an essential role in migration 
decisions. In the light of the New Economics of Migration, when making a migration decision, 
the family not only considers the absolute expected income level but also considers the income 
level relative to the reference group (in the hometown), namely income in relative deprivation 
effect (Stark, 1991). He believes that income (even expected one) in its absolute form does not 
play many roles; in some situations, the desire to increase absolute income may play a weak 
role in determining migratory behaviour and may have no detectable effect (Stark, 1984). 
Rather income in the relative form plays. The “relative deprivation” effect shows that even if 
the income level of the family in the hometown has been greatly improved, as long as the degree 
of improvement is not as good as that of the reference group in the hometown, the family 
members still have a feeling of relative deprivation, which will increase their migration 
tendency (Pan & G. H. Chen, 2014). It can also be explained by the “Tragedy of the Commons” 
(Hardin, 1968) when every migrant is better off in urban areas, the left in rural areas confronted 
more feelings of being deprived, thus stimulates their desire to migrate. In the meantime, for 
internal migration, the perceived risk of relative deprivation in the city plays an important role. 
If the perceived risk is high, migration ceases to be an effective way of achieving gains with 
respect to relative deprivation (Stark, 1991). It is suggested that an optimizing, risk-averse 
small-farmer family confronted with a subjectively risk-increasing situation manages to control 
the risk through diversification of its incomes portfolio via the placing of its best-suited member 
in the urban sector, which is independent of agricultural production (Stark & Levhari, 1982). 
In addition, the theory also highlights the role of rural social security. When income 
inequality is high in rural areas, the relative deprivation effect gets intensified. Thus, in order 
to spread risk, the greater the likelihood of making a migration decision. In developing countries, 
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due to imperfections of markets or lack of social security systems, farmers generally face a 
shortage of institutional arrangements, such as access to capital, credit, and insurance market, 
and do not receive corresponding supports, therefore, such migration is very common. However, 
in developed countries, farmers can get help from a sound insurance and credit system, thus, 
do not fit such a rationale (J. E. Taylor et al., 1996).  
Extension to family-dependent determinants to labour migration, place-dependent 
networks are also captured in various migrational literature. It is also a network of interpersonal 
relationships, which bind migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in the place of origin 
and the place of destination (Kalinowska & Knapinska, 2009). The Social Network Theory is 
broadly referred, which places migratory factors on an interpersonal structure framework, 
focusing on the impact of potential migrants related to relatives, fellow villagers, and friends 
on the migrational behaviours. It is believed that the network of interpersonal relationships can 
reduce the cost and risk of labour mobility, in the result of more migration, and it expands the 
scope of migration as well (Sun, 2012). In the light of social network theory, the established 
social relations and communities by the previous migrants have great impacts on the 
subsequent/potential labour in the place of origin: The more labour force from the community 
migrates, the wider social relations/communities established, and the more likely it is that 
labour force continues to migrate (Sheng, 2007). 
The most representative theoretical models of social network theory are risk 
diversification model and social capital model (Sun, 2012). The former one follows the 
analytical method of the new economics of migration, while, the later one places social capital 
in the study of interpersonal network structure, arguing that migrant labour maximizes his/her 
income via full utilization of the social capital since the possession of social capital will make 
the migratory information more adequate, the channels more diversified, and the risks/costs 
lower, in turn, tends to encourage migration (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). In regard to the 
mechanism of how do social networks exert, the social network effects and peer effects are 
introduced (Pan & G. H. Chen, 2014).  Dolfin and Genicot claim that three potential benefits 
are provided by social networks, namely, information on border crossing, information on jobs, 
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and credit (Dolfin & Genicot, 2010). While for peer effects, much social-economic analysis 
believes that in the case of information asymmetry of the labour market, people collect 
information by observing other people’s behaviors, and make their behaviors converge with 
peer’s behaviours. In doing so, can they make the most benefits under the condition of 
incomplete information (Pan & G. H. Chen, 2014). In addition, Massey via a detailed review 
of interconnections among individual behaviour, household strategies, community structures, 
and national political economies indicates that inter-level and inter-temporal dependencies are 
inherent to the migration process and give it a strong internal momentum. And the dynamic 
interplay between network growth and individual migration labour, migrant remittances, and 
local income distributions all create powerful feedback mechanisms that lead to the cumulative 
causation of migration. (Massey, 1990). 
Till here, triple anchors on theories of labour mobility have been presented. As they 
can be easily perceived that both the micro and meso anchor revealed a universal value-based 
system on labour mobility/migration, regardless of any certain historical, political, and 
economic stand: after all, people are the same (to a certain extent). That is to say, discourses on 
micro and meso labour mobility are indifferent among countries/regions. However, the macro 
anchor is highly involving with the country’s own profile, as well as with political groups, such 
as what we called “developed countries and developing countries.” It is where calls major 
attention to the thesis. In a sense, the macro perspective is very consistent with the structuralist 
analytical approach, which emphasizes the relations of inherent structural components of labour 
mobility. And along with the theoretical attention more shifting to meso and micro perspectives, 
they are rather identical with the new structuralist analytical approach, with more focus on 
labourer’s subjective initiatives, such as individual/collective decision-making, motivations, 
determinants, so on and so forth.  
 
I.2. Theories of rural labour mobility in relation to industrialization 
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Obviously, all the above-mentioned theories have their own stands and objectives, 
via different angles and perspectives brought diversified complex of labour mobility and 
migration. Since some are attempting to explain the causes of international migration, while 
some are exploring migration at a certain time and space, therefore, it could be confusing as 
well. In order to draw back our major attention to the domestic/internal labour mobility, 
especially for their early stage of development for LDCs, selective theories of the dual 
economic framework will be discussed in detail. As Ranis articulated, in the early stages of 
development in developing countries, because the interaction between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors is at the core of economic development, the dualistic labour market theory 
provides an effective, empirical, and practical analytical framework. Moreover, even if the dual 
economy of developing countries has developed to a certain stage, as long as an integrated 
economy has not yet been realized, the dual theory will not lose its guiding value (Ranis, 1988).  
 
I.2.1.  Lewis’ Dual Economic Model 
 
By avoiding the original “Sin” of the Marx’s primitive accumulation of capital, 
combining analysis of historical experience that of the industrialized countries on labour supply, 
and based on a feasible and de facto situation for the LDCs that are lack of the “First Pot of 
Gold”8, the concept of labour surplus is found prominently in the literature of development 
economics which mostly target the underdeveloped and overpopulated economies (Ranis, 
2004). W. Arthur. Lewis succeeded in producing an “ideal” model of development approach 
for the LDCs. Rather, Lewis takes the “unlimited supply” of labour centered core “secret.” In 
short, economic develops basically by reallocating the surplus agricultural labour to industries 
& services, leading the way so that new industries can be created and old industries can be 
expanded without limiting the existing wage level, or in other words, “free” of cost for the take-
off one’s industrialization. As such, this rationale results in higher returns to capital, leading to 
reinvestments (if so) in the initial capital expansions. In turn, the ascending capital stock leads 
                                                
8 Here, it refers to the primitive capital accumulation or the basic capital to take off.  
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to expand employment by drawing further surplus labour from the agricultural sector. Until the 
real exhaustion of the surplus, thus, the process till here as claimed by Lewis a self-sustaining 
circulation to the modernization and economic development (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Lewis’ economic dualism model 
 
            Source: (W. A. Lewis, 1954). 
 
Although Lewis did not bear much the dimension of time, or in other words, in 
which developmental phase could his model be adopted, and till when could it not. Inexplicitly, 
there are two stages, wherein the second stage, classical economics ceases to apply. Quoted by 
Lewis “[…], then we are in the world of neoclassical economics, where all the factors of 
production are scarce, in the sense that their supply is inelastic. Wages are no longer constant 
as accumulation proceeds; the benefits of improved technology do not all accrue to profits; and 
the profit margin does not necessarily increase all the time […]”. Obviously, his theory mainly 
refers to the first stage, as can be shortly concluded: wage, at the subsistence level, and labour, 
as the unskilled surplus, as main characteristics in the labour market, lead the development 
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without paying extra wage, in a world, the surplus labour is the source of the surplus capital 
and the surplus capital reinvested creates employment that further absorbs more surplus labour 
force.  
The idea is rather skeptical since it offers slick opportunism for the LDCs to develop 
with a “free of charge” prescription. It calls the attention of shifting strategies of economic 
development from the existing theory (Dependency Theory in specific), which are much 
dependent on external capitals, to the revitalized utilization of its domestic labour resources, 
especially when they are considered as “surplus.” In reality, although few LDCs could manage 
to develop so, the dual sector model does offer a theoretical framework in the research of rural 
labour mobility. As projected by Lewis, the capitalist sector is the part of the economy which 
uses reproducible capital and pays capitalists for the use thereof. Meanwhile, the subsistence 
sector is, by difference all that part of the economy but labour and land. The process of 
economic development basically consists of the re-allocation of surplus agricultural workers to 
the industry. At the first stage of development, as long as wage in the capitalist sector is slightly 
higher than that of in the subsistence sector, the supply of labour from the subsistence sector 
becomes infinite to the demand of labour at the capitalist sector. As such, the capitalist sector 
expanded, as it is nourished by absorbing the surplus labour, for a period without any pressure 
to raise the wage.  
Apart from a simple & inconvincible assumption on people’s motivation to mobilize 
(which will be further elaborated in the following part), economic factors or absolute wage 
differences set the sole motivation of rural labour. Taking mobility as a rational choice of people, 
Lewis stated that “[…] men will not leave the family farm to seek employment elsewhere if the 
wage is worth less than what they would be able to consume if they remained at home […].” 
Does such rationality hold its ground at the first stage of labour mobility? The further discourse 
will be articulated with great concern. Another fundamental assumption is on the full 
employment of the urban sector, regardless of its actual capabilities and political will, which is 
so much depended on the model of industrial development and investment preference in the 
usage of the capital stock. The model is basically on the process of labour transfer and the 
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growth of employment in the modern sector, which are all brought by the increase in production 
of this sector (Todaro et al., 1988). 
 
Figure 2: Job creation in Lewis’ modeling circulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Todaro et al., 1988). 
 
However, this is much contradictory to the reality in the LDCs. That is to say, if the 
reinvestment of capital stock is realized in the real economy (productive activities), rather than 
in the capital outflows or the virtual economy, Lewis’ circulation will inevitably promote 
employment, and continues its mechanism. Let’s put in this way, as in Figure 2(a) demonstrated, 
when capital (K) moves right forwards, resulting in labour demand curves moves 
correspondingly, so are the labour supply curves, meaning a job creation. But in another 
possibility, even in the initial phase of industrial development, not all the reinvestments are 
guaranteed in the productive sphere. The capital accumulation could also flow into the financial 
arena or even on speculation/ nothing to do with job creation. In reality, some are partly 
involved in productive activities. However, large-scale adoption of labour-saving technologies 
kept massive labour force out the process. As Figure 2(b) manifested, higher capital investment 
did not bring higher demand for labour, and of course, no job creation. This then flaws Lewis’s 
fundamental rationale. In short worlds, saving and investment become the driving forces when 
it comes to the economic development of underdeveloped countries. 
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I.2.2.  Ranis-Fei’s Labour Surplus Economy Model  
 
On the other side of the economic dualism, regarding agricultural & rural 
development, Lewis’ ideology reflects a linear & dichotomic developmental epistemology. 
Namely, the diminishing agricultural sector is for the expansion of the industry. Yet, not much 
was articulated. Contrarily, John C.H Fei and Gustav Ranis, by taking historical examples of 
the dualistic economy of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and etc., assert that their successful 
experiences of a dualistic economy were much based on agricultural development. The 
industry-agriculture interdependency and connectivity would encourage and speed up the 
process. To supplement, they proceeded to wave them into a balanced model, known as the 
‘Ranis-Fei Model.’ They managed to expand their model as crucial contributions to 
development economics, by highlighting the significant role of labour productivity, which set 
the backbone of industrial expansion. The connectivity between the two sectors was heightened, 
presenting the dependency of the capitalist sector on the non-capitalist sector/ agriculture.  
Through their criticism that Lewis failed to present a satisfactory analysis of the 
agricultural sector, the increase in productivity of labour should take place prior to the labour 
transfer between the two sectors, however, did not acknowledge (Ghatak, 1995). And, this point 
has been taken seriously into consideration by Ranis and Fei. Also, a notion of balanced growth 
criterion for the development economics within the dual structure was initiated: any further 
transformation of labour from the agricultural sector could reduce total agricultural production, 
and if agricultural technology is stagnant, increased food prices will necessitate an increase of 
industrial wage to offset the portion that reduced real wage. Since industrial expansion could 
be curbed as a result, at this point, some of the surplus must be used to increase agricultural 
productivity, or in other words, a type of balanced growth is necessary. Simply speaking, it lies 
in the question what proportions of this transformation would be good to balance with the level 
of development within both sectors, for example, the amount of released labour due to the 
increase of agricultural productivity, should at least not exceeds the amount of job creation in 
the capitalist sector. 
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Also, by introducing the concept of agricultural surplus, they managed to step in the 
investigation of agricultural labour productivity and set up a dynamic mechanism thereof. Not 
only did they regard the accumulation of agricultural surplus induced by the improvement of 
agricultural productivity as the premise of surplus labour, but they also claim that transforming 
the continuous agricultural surplus into industrial capital is the driving force for economic 
development, as well as the continuing absorption of agricultural surplus labour. That is to say: 
On the one hand, the increase in agricultural productivity must be sufficient to enable a smaller 
proportion of the population to support the economy with food and raw materials. In this way, 
this part of the “surplus labour” can be relocated to the growing industrial sector, where making 
a positive contribution to the total output. Even when the importance of the agricultural sector 
in the national account continues to decline, yet agricultural labour productivity can be still 
further improved, so that it can continue to produce “new” surplus labour unlimited and sponsor 
the Lewis’ developmental circulation.  
Vice versa, then, the real wage of the industrial sector will rise due to the 
disappearance of the infinite supply of labour or food shortages, and the expansion of the entire 
economy will be hindered; On the other hand, when the marginal labour productivity of 
agriculture rises to the level of “institutional wage,” it means that the entire economy, including 
the allocation of labour, is fully commercialized. And once the agricultural sector is 
commercialized, the industrial sector has no way but to compete in the labour market via the 
expansion of its production through the transfer of agricultural labour. In other words, the semi 
“free of charge” model of Lewis’ industrial development ends. Then the LDCs will face the 
same, or similar developmental issue as the developed countries in a competitive market with 
forces yield the commonly accepted equilibrium conditions. 
It is worth mentioning that in their model, it intrinsically integrates the entire rural 
labour mobility and the industrialization cycle (the initial, critical, and commercialized stage) 
into a complementary and inseparable process. And discourses on the rural labour market have 
been dug explicitly, well distinct from the mainstream segmentation theories in the urban labour 
market: in each stage of industrialization, the rural labour market manifested a disguised but 
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visible unemployment, disguised but invisible unemployment, and open unemployment 
correspondingly. Also, as a seminal theory, labour surplus economy is a nascent concept that 
can be abstracted from the Lewis-Ranis’ models. And it can be a useful analyzing tool in 
development economics, on the one hand, taking full advantages of the “surplus” resources of 
labour as the “First Pot of Gold”; and on the other hand, being well aware the mechanism to 
produce this surplus, to (at least) initiate the process of industrialization, regardless of the 
external capital support.  
However, discourse on how to increase agricultural labour productivity in the 
absence of the initial capital/technology is missing. In other words, is it possible solely via 
changes in the productive relations in agriculture to improve labour productivity? If so, 
unfortunately, they are missing from their discourse. Another very realistic issues confront most 
of the LDCs, on the contrary, lie in the serious urban unemployment as well. And the mistake 
of neoclassical methodology, as they adopted, which is far from reality. For example, by 
measuring the marginal product of labour in the agricultural sector to determine the existence 
of disguised unemployment seems very controversial, and also generated a large number of 
criticisms. Even Lewis, in his later publications stated:  
“[…] whether marginal productivity is zero or negligible is not however 
of fundamental importance to the analysis, and it was probably a 
mistake to mention marginal productivity at all, since this has merely 
led to an irrelevant and intemperate controversy […]” (W. A. Lewis, 
1972). 
In addition, the foreign trade in securing the food security and food price, discounted their 
ignorance since their model is still in a closed economy. For example, it is observed in the 
process of economic dualism: Japan imported cheap farm products to improve the terms of 
trade. And it may be pointed out that the relaxation of a closed economy assumption will soften 
the balanced growth constraints (Ghatak, 1995). 
 
I.2.3.  Jorgenson’s Agricultural Surplus Model 
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Weighing equal importance to agricultural development in the dual economy, Dale 
W. Jorgenson presented another neo-classical approach, which can be a supplement to the 
Lewis-Ranis-Fei model, known as ‘agricultural surplus’ model. Not as a general discourse of 
linear development, Jorgensen, from a theoretical perspective, tries to explain why economic 
development is bound to accompany the expansion of the industrial sector and the shrinking of 
the agricultural sector. As such, he also makes further effort to expose “infinite” employability 
of industry and “finite” employability of agriculture, and finally, confirms that the employment 
of labour force will inevitably lead to inter-departmental transfer. Also, differing from other 
models, the Jorgenson model is not based on the assumption of the existing labour surplus. In 
his model, the existence or non-existence, as well as the production of the labour surplus is not 
crucial anymore. He believes that reasons for labour mobility is not that important as claimed 
on the increase in agricultural productivity by Ranis and Fei, but on the inevitable changes in 
the consumption structure and demographic transformation: On the one hand, it is rather a result 
of the shift of consumer demands, because people’s demand for agricultural products is 
physiologically limited, while, the demand for industrial products is endless. Thus, once 
agricultural products meet the needs of the population, the development of agriculture will 
gradually lose its demand, and the rural labour force will turn to the industrial sector with strong 
demand.  
On the other hand, the notion of the agricultural surplus is used to deepen his 
proposition on the demographic transformation in relation to labour mobility. But the 
mechanism of ‘agricultural surplus’ creation is different from that of Ranis and Fei: When the 
food output is more than sufficient, that is to say, if the per capita food output exceeds the 
minimum level of per capita output needed for a population to grow at its maximum rate, and 
the growth rate of agricultural production exceeds the rate of population growth at its maximum 
level, agricultural surplus then has been made. Hence, a positive and growing agricultural 
surplus assures that the rate9 of growth of agricultural labour force will be less than that of the 
population; accordingly, the ratio of the industrial labour force to agricultural labour force is 
                                                
9 The rate of growth of the agricultural labour force, according to Jorgenson, is equal to the difference between the rate of 
growth of total population and the rate of technological progress in agriculture divided by the share of labour in agriculture. 
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always increasing, subsequently, ensuring migration to the industrial sector. Following this 
process10, the industrial sector expanded, and so did the employment. However, with the reverse 
process, the country will sink into the Leibenstein’s ‘low-level equilibrium trap’, that eventually 
manufacturing activity is brought to a halt, capital is allowed to depreciate without replacement, 
and the country will fail to a modern industrialized country (Jorgenson, 1961). Therefore, the 
positive/negative agricultural surplus determines the development of the industrial sector, as 
well as the scale of rural surplus labour for migration. Subsequently, it is when a rural labour 
force is generated as surplus, thereby ‘freeing’ thereof for industrial employment becomes 
possible. 
The point of emphasizing agricultural development is realized in two possible 
solutions: the improvement of rural income and the capitalization of the rural sector. As for the 
former one, it is because the productivity per head in industry rises is due to labour cost thereof 
rises from the very beginning: the supply curve of labour to the industry was upward rising, 
being equal to the average earnings per head in the rural sector. Therefore, it is necessary to 
deepen the relationship between the supply function of labour for industry and income in the 
rural sector. In other words, by leading the agricultural development, benefiting the prosperity 
of rural livelihood: if farmers become richer, the demand for non-agricultural goods and 
services of the kind whether as aids to their production or else for personal consumption, which 
are most efficiently produced on an industrial basis. Therefore, the very prosperity of the 
agricultural sector will cause the industrial sector to expand as a payback. And for the later 
point, Jorgensen claims that the duality of the two sectors of agriculture and industry is reflected 
in the asymmetry of productive function and organizational form in terms of different 
combinations of land, labour, technology, and capital. In such a dual structure, it is 
recommended that the agricultural sector should introduce capital elements and the competitive 
market mechanism. The competition mechanism promotes the development of agriculture, and 
only when the agricultural surplus is greater than zero, it is possible to form rural labour transfer. 
                                                
However, this process is based on another assumption that the rate of total agriculture output equals to the rate of population 
growth, that is to say, if there is no agricultural surplus, all labour remains on the land; if an agricultural surplus can be generated, 
a labour force available for employment in manufacturing grows at a rate which is equal to the rate of growth of the agricultural 
surplus. 
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Very commendably mentioning is that Jorgensen introduced demographic and 
technological variables into the theory of the dual economy, although the proposition that 
growth rate of the population depends linearly on food output per capita, which through the 
historical evidence, already got denied; however, it may exist at the beginning phase of the 
development. But in the long run, it does not have much accountability, if one takes the case of 
zero or negative population growth in some of the European countries. And the assumption that 
the technological change maintains at more or less a constant rate as changes caused by it are 
neutral can hardly be verified. A technological change is neutral, as Jorgenson explained, 
provided that for a given bundle of factors, the marginal rate of substitution between factors 
with output held constant is the same before and after the change. For example, if technical 
progress can be accelerated by the accumulation of capital in agriculture, then the balance 
between food shortage and agricultural surplus may be tipped in favour of surplus.  
 
I.2.4.  Harris-Todaro’s Expected Income Differential Model 
 
In striking contrast to the sophisticated theories of unemployment in developed 
countries, there have been few attempts to a weighted theory that for LDCs. Also, in the light 
of conventional economic models with their singular dependence on full employment 
equilibrium, through appropriate wage and price adjustments, are hard to provide rational 
explanations for these sizable and growing levels of urban unemployment in the light of 
absolute labour surplus in the economy as a whole (Harris & Todaro, 1970). Despite the 
existence of the positive marginal product in agriculture and significant levels of urban 
unemployment in many LDCs, the rural-urban labour migration not only continues to exist but 
also appears to be accelerating (Harris and Todaro, 1970). John. R. Harris and Michael. P. 
Todaro (1970) built up a dual model (a two-sector analysis) in development economics to 
explain issues concerning rural to urban migration in a context of high urban unemployment, 
arguing that labour migration from rural areas is based on a rational expectation equilibrium, 
which determined by the urban expected income. Their model also acknowledges that there is 
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no certain causation between urban unemployment and supply of rural labour force, subverted 
our traditional cognitions.  
The model assumed that the individual migration decision is based on an expected 
income differential rather than an absolute one between rural and urban areas. Specifically, 
when analyzing the determinants of labour supplies, one should not look at the prevailing 
income difference but rather at one’s expectation and the possibility to obtain an urban job. 
Thus, at the initial stage, based on the assumption that wages are flexible and equal in both 
sectors, thus there is no condition for migration. However, together with an expected income, 
rural labour starts to migrate when wages in the urban sector increase. And since rural labour 
perceives a positive chance of obtaining an urban job, rural-urban migration will continue. 
Along with continuing migration, when the supply of labour higher than the level that the labour 
market is able to clear, unemployment is induced. Then unemployment, in turn, starts to reduce 
the urban income, so as to the expected income. And finally, the equilibrium condition would 
reach when the expected urban income is indifferent between two sectors, no further migration 
takes place. 
Different from other theories, Harris-Todaro’s model combined the characteristics 
of real situations of less developed countries. Also, the process of rural-urban migration was 
divided into two stages. The first stage is when the unskilled rural worker migrates to an urban 
area and initially spends a certain period of time in the so-called urban ‘traditional’ sector, and 
the second stage refers to the eventual attainment of a more permanent modern sector job. The 
recognition of the two-stage process of migration in the urban sector really drew attention to 
the real situation in LDCs, since it brought the theory of the critical segregation within the urban 
labour market. And this has been significantly important to place labour mobility into the 
segmentation theory of the labour market.  
In addition, it also gives positive recognition of rural development in contributing 
to the reduction of urban unemployment. Todaro argues that the industrialization strategy that 
is biased towards the modern industrial sector in accordance with the Lewis model, which does 
not solve the developmental problem in developing countries. On the contrary, it is necessary 
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to expand employment opportunities in rural areas and encourage the comprehensive 
development of rural areas in order to reduce the imbalance between urban and rural 
development, thereby alleviating the flow of rural population to cities. As the logic depicted in 
their model: as long as the urban-rural real income differential continues to rise sufficiently fast 
to offset any sustained increase in the rate of job creation, even in spite of the long-run 
stabilizing effect of a lower possibility of successfully finding permanent employment, the lure 
of relatively higher permanent incomes will continue to attract a steady stream of rural migrants 
into the ever more congested urban slums. Therefore, the most significant policy implication 
emerging from the model is the great difficulty of substantially reducing the size of the 
traditional urban sector without a concentrated effort at making rural life more attractive. For 
example, pay attention to develop small-scale rural industries, while strengthening a modest 
approach in rural development. For instance, from the point of aggressive adoption of new 
technology in the agricultural development, a more serious caution that is given by the Harris-
Todaro model relies on the following: the premature mechanization of agriculture through the 
adoption of the most modern techniques of large-scale farming poses serious problems for rural 
labour absorption (Todaro, 1969). 
However, a perfect and competitive labour market assumption, if so, would be the 
biggest flaw of Harris and Todaro’s theory, especially for LDCs, since the model fully 
recognized the effect and the role of the market economy, which assumed that labour market is 
fully clear. Therefore, it has to give full autonomy to all factors of the market. However, the 
labour market per se is yet mature in most developing countries. For example, there are a large 
number of informal jobs in the urban labour market. On the one hand, the official 
unemployment rate does not indicate the actual situation; on the other hand, rural labour is still 
subject to various discriminatory policies in the formal urban sector. Also, the expected income 
differentials between urban and rural areas place the most critical factor in determining labour 
mobility for their model. Although the motivation for labour mobility has shifted from macro-
neglect to micro-analysis, it is still too simplistic to be convinced. And this kind of expectation 
does not take account of the self-assessment of labour per se (including age, gender, skills, 
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human capital, etc.) as well as considerations of migration costs and unemployment costs in 
searching for jobs. That is to say, when the urban unemployment emerged, the model does not 
take into account the urban living cost for those unemployed who are floating among the society. 
Also, regarding the migration decision-making process, the model, in a sense, assumes that 
potential migrants are neutral to risk based on the same magnitude of expected rural income 
and expected urban income, of which the reflection of economic realities becomes questionable, 
as potential migrants are likely risk-averse. 
The above theories, in various macro perspectives through the utilization of rural 
labour resource, generation, and transfer of labour surplus, provide constructive strategies of 
economic development for LDCs in their early stage of economic development. Synthesizing 
models of Todaro, Lewis, Ranis, and Jorgenson, the theory of rural labour mobility under the 
framework of a dual economy has become more comprehensive, in terms of hypothesis of 
mobility motivations, mechanisms of labour surplus generation, labour mobility, and strategies 
for capital accumulation, rural-urban development as well as for industrialization. Although 
still confronted various criticisms and defects, it has occupied a very significant position in 
development economics and left a broad space for the continuing exploration. Namely, 
Jorgenson based on revealing changes in the consumption structure and transformation of the 
demographic structure inherited in industry and agriculture, as to produce the agricultural 
surplus; Ranis and Fei based on elaborating the importance of agricultural labour productivity 
as to produce and squeeze out the labour surplus; Todaro via expected income motivation draws 
migration flow, and combined with Lewis’ cost-free transfer of labor surplus as to harvest the 
First Pot of Gold for industrial development; all are superimposed to match the Marxian 
rationale on capital accumulation in a realistic application for LDCs.  
 
I.3. Theoretical evaluations in the dimension of time, space and people 
 
Theories of labour mobility are too limitless to list. The old will be reviewed again, 
and the new will be explored soon. However, the essence never changes, only manifested in 
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different outward appearances, since people are still the same. To explore some general 
regularities, an old Chinese saying, “Domains under heaven, after a long period of division, 
tends to unite; after a long period of union, tends to divide. This has been so since antiquity 
[…]”, can be perfectly quoted here to reflect our reviews of massive theories more intriguingly. 
To elaborate, divisions (theories in each angle/topic/perspective) on labour mobility are all good 
in their own arena and era, especially in the contemporary economies under the neoclassical 
approaches, but too long to be divided. For this, we hardly encounter a single theory which 
brings an overarching perspective on labour mobility.  
Also, the above theories are mainly in the discourse centered on the content/activity-
based of labour mobility, a context-based theory (apart from the macro perspective) is missing 
(underlying the spatial-temporal context). Moreover, this old saying can be interpreted by the 
structuralist point of view, namely, in order to understand the overall system/structure, elements 
are divided and further developed, that must be understood by way of their relationship to a 
broader, overarching system or structure (Piaget, 1984). In other words, divisions are also made 
for understanding the unity. And as we can see, elements of labour mobility have been well 
developed so far, however, still fail to provide an overall projection.  
Although there is a positive tendency that more and more migration researches that 
apply interdisciplinary approaches and incorporate achievements of such sciences as economics, 
sociology, demography, political sciences, and history. And this leads to a large diversification 
of research perspectives, methods, and analysis levels of migration phenomena. However, 
something is still missing, since some theories may be valid and compatible in certain areas or 
in a certain period of time, but become invalid or incompatible even in the same period but 
different place, or same place but different time (Todaro, 1969b). That is because most theories 
focus on finding a single, even complex relationship between labour mobility and certain 
factors, however, without taking into serious account on temporal, spatial, and human 
foundations, neither the integrity of these three. Therefore, even adopt any complex models, it 
is still impossible to avoid falling into an epistemological onesidedness. 
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Therefore, a fresh analytical methodology needs to be explored. Time, space, and 
people consist of one of the epistemological frameworks of the archaic Chinese methodology 
(Zhong 2012), targeting most forms of being/existence, including metaphysical concepts, 
values, and theories. And based on such ontological angles, this framework offers rather real 
reflections of existence, among other findings. In fact, each and every theory tries to explain a 
kind of existence, and any kind of existence has a certain time and space background. For 
example, Todaro in his development economics implicitly implies so: there are various trends 
in economics, and even these trends tend to change greatly in different countries (place), 
cultures (people), and time (Todaro et al., 1988). Labour mobility, indifferent to any other 
human activity, is always under a certain time, space, and people/consciousness (as 
entanglements/interactions between time and space). However, most migrational literature 
aforementioned especially in the structuralist/development economic theories, whether solely 
focus on time or space or people, or take it as a static and absolute sense, thus, blocked some 
potential perceptions of our understandings.  
As such, for time, it is a time often based on an absolute, constant, statically balanced, 
reversible, symmetrical, and non-evolving concept, which mostly derived from Newton’s 
machinery mechanics; While, for space, it is almost always treated as absolute, constant, static 
and physical sense, not only neglected the functional approaches but also evolved into a 
dichotomic epistemology (rural vs. urban and central vs. peripheral, hegemony vs. 
subordination, etc. binary oppositions); and for people, in the classical discourse taken whether 
as absolute homogenous or in the neo-classical as heterogeneous factors. For this, many theories 
failed to explain the ongoing reality because the real world is always in various movements, 
which induce changes in time, space, and people. 
 
I.3.1. Time 
 
The concept of time is the essential background for a certain system of thoughts in 
economics, restricting the explanatory boundary of the corresponding logic analysis. Ever since 
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the classical economics, the time of attention of theories is not pure physical time but defined 
by economics. Thus, establishing or selecting a compatible economic time is undoubtedly one 
of the core tasks in economics (C. H. Rong, 2016). Alfred Marshall pointed out in his Principles 
of Economics that time is at the heart of almost every major economic problem (S. J. Chen, 
2006; Peng et al., 2009). And time is not necessarily an objective phenomenon out of human 
beings, rather it is needed to be perceived. Time can be a way of having human nature, which 
involves a process of continuous generation, creation, and transcendence (S. J. Chen, 2006). 
Thus, it is not even exaggerated to claim that many achievements of economic theory stem from 
evolutionary understandings of the concept of time (C. H. Rong, 2016). This can be confirmed 
from a simple historical evolution of economic theories. 
Although Einstein’s Theory of Relativity made the modern concept of time theory 
break the time view of classical mechanics represented by Newton (a static, even, absolute, 
reversible, symmetrical, quantifiable, non-quality, non-directional motion parameter) (S. J. 
Chen, 2006). However, Newton’s view of time has had a major impact on classical economics 
that emerged from the same period, and later on, the neoclassical economic theories developed 
on this basis. As for classical economics, it still somewhat includes historical time and time as 
a resource, but for the neoclassical ones, the time sense is much shorter, even negligent in many 
cases. Claimed by many economists, the main time background of neoclassical economics is a 
static time view derived from machinery mechanics (C. H. Rong, 2016). This can be clearly 
seen from their static equilibrium theory of the neoclassical school, since they still follow some 
assumptions of classical mechanics, including absolute time and space, as well as the 
instantaneous transmission of interactive objects; Also, since every instantaneous time is the 
same, there is no difference between the past and the future in dynamic changes, which makes 
the time in classical mechanics reversible, repeatable, and accumulative (C. H. Rong, 2016).  
Along with the continuous exploration of economic theories, the assumption of the 
neoclassic time view has been broken and further updated. In macroeconomics, Keynes’s 
concept of time has risen to no longer a dispensable variable, since his theory from the very 
beginning has focused on the expectations, decisions, and adjustment cycles of economic agents. 
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And this leads to the concept of time background of macroeconomics. Furthermore, with the 
Institutional Economics, as well as the evolutionary economic theories in the 1980s, especially 
with Kenneth E. Boulding’s Evolutionary Economics, and Nelson and Winter’s An 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, marked the new generation of evolutionary time 
view in economic thoughts (Nelson, 2009; Boulding, 1983; Winter et al., 1997), since they 
convert to the time intersected by thermodynamics and the theory of evolution (C. H. Rong, 
2016). The former one refers to the time view of institutional change theory, while the later one, 
emphasizes the importance of time and history in institutional evolution (regard time as the 
vertical axis) and institutional analysis, considering time as a historical process similar to that 
of biological evolution, and thus manifests irreversibly and heterogeneously. 
In addition, the time view in economic analysis can also be reviewed by Rong’s 
applicable scales of various time paradigms in economic analysis (See Figure 3). From the 
perspective of time view, economics has experienced several stages, such as the historical 
analysis paradigm, the resource analysis paradigm, the equilibrium analysis paradigm, and the 
evolution analysis paradigm (C. H. Rong, 2016). The time scale of economics is then divided 
into immediate, short-term, medium-term, long-term, economic history and natural history; 
correspondingly, the spatial scale is divided into on-site, micro, meso, and macro. However, for 
the study of labour mobility theory, any single time-view theory is not advocated in this thesis, 
rather, it should be more reference to the temporospatial range, which does not preclude to 
combine some appropriate theories. In this regard, Marx set an example. Not only did he 
adopted the mechanic time-view in the micro field of economic phenomena, such as his 
rationale on the law of surplus value, but he is also well aware of the relative time-view in the 
non-equilibrium nature of the macro level, such as discourse on the reserve army of labour. 
Moreover, his Historical Materialism takes the evolution of human society in an evolutionary 
time view.  
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Figure 3: Applicable scales of time paradigms in the spatio-temporal diffusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
source: (C. H. Rong, 2016). 
 
I.3.2. Space 
 
Different from time, the concept of space has yet been successfully incorporated 
into the research framework of mainstream economics. Still, it has made new breakthroughs in 
the development of the past 20 years. Spatial economics was developed on the basis of location 
theory, which concerns the geographic location of economic activity. Von Thünen, with his 
monograph “The Isolated State in relation to Agriculture and Political Economy” in 1826, 
developed location theory in agriculture, which suggests that access to the market (town) can 
create a complete system of agricultural land use. By the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th century, along with development concentrated on locations of “heavy 
industry” and other industries, industrial displacements caused by the construction of railway 
transportation system, as well as the growth of international trade, much relevant research 
turned their focus on location theory as well, such as the industrial location theory of Wilhelm 
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Launhardt (L. T. Chen, 2011), and theory of the location of industries of Alfred Weber, as well 
as later the urban location theory by William Alonso. 
However, traditional theories of location explicitly or implicitly assume that space 
is homogeneous, completely abstracts its spatial factors, as well as all elements, can flow 
instantaneously without cost, or the assumption of perfect competition and constant returns of 
scale (L. T. Chen, 2011). But in fact, because factors like labour and natural resources are not 
even among regions, and different natural endowments as the basis of inter-regional trade also 
involve the distance between different spaces, therefore, inevitably induce transportation costs 
in reality. As such, since1950s, new insights (such as time view) have been incorporated in the 
location theory, and Edgar S. Dunn, E. Otremba, Walter Isard, etc., further deepened to the 
spatial economic sphere. Especially, Walter Isard, with his “Location and Space-economy,” 
combined geography with economics, could be marked as the nascent of modern spatial 
economics. And later on, more and more theories have continuously broadened the scope of 
research in spatial economics. In the 1990s, economists in the new economic geography have 
incorporated spatial factors into the theoretical system of mainstream economics and formed 
the spatial economic framework (L. T. Chen, 2011). Fujita, M., Krugman, P.R., and Venables, 
with their representative work on The spatial economy: Cities, regions, and international trade 
(Fujita et al., 2001), together with Krugman’s core-periphery Model provide new dimensions 
and methodology in spatial economics.  
Thus far, space view has been much incorporated and developed in economic 
theories. Its central concerns/debates brought more insights into the relevant studies of 
migratory theory because it provides a new dimension to our understandings of the spatial 
context on labour mobility, for example, the historical transportation revolution to the impact 
of labour mobility. Transportation costs and returns to production and consumption would be 
two of the most critical debates in space economics, as the CP model underlines its interlinkage 
between economies of scale and transportation costs to the agglomeration or dispersion of the 
spatial distribution of economic activities. Moreover, discussions on the specialized division of 
labour, clusters and networks, information communication, innovation, and regional culture, 
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state role, trade, production factors, and competitive situation, etc., in the spatial discourse build 
up a more comprehensive and systematic spatial equilibrium model than the traditional location 
theory (L. T. Chen, 2011). 
The concept of space does not only consist of spatial location (geographic space), 
but also the characteristic space (functional space, abstract space), although for centuries only 
geographic space has been a factor in economic models, like economic space, political space, 
ideological space, structuralist space, even analytical space (as presented above: micro, meso, 
and macro space). And comparing to geographic space, such as the national territory, the 
characteristic space is even overarching, which derives from not limited to the global south-
north, developing world-developed world, ethnos, culture, social institution, economic system, 
political regime, so on and so forth. And referring to theories of labour mobility, it contains two 
layers of implications: The first layer (more geographic space) refers to the spatial basis of 
theoretical applicability. Namely, which place suits the selected theory (of labour mobility): the 
developed countries (economies) or developing countries (economies)? And the second layer 
(more characteristic/functional space) refers to the spatial carrier of theories (of labour 
mobility). Such as rural-urban areas, economic departments (agriculture, industry, and service), 
regions (poor, rich), geopolitics (center, periphery), etc. And more often, both of them are 
overlapping one another.  
Throughout most migrational literature, space view is still in the classic discourse 
based on location theory, and in the geographic space treated as absolute, static, and constant. 
They might be valid in a physical sense, but not the case in the functional sense. Even worse, 
due to the neglecting of the space view, many of them demonstrated great confusion in adopting 
the relevant theories. Apart from this, both space per se are convertible and interactive, for 
example, the mobility transition could convert the geographic space into the functional space 
of migrants, in the help of the transportation technology, which made the functional space more 
relevant to the geographic space (Zelinsky, 1971). Also, time and space are never separable. 
The complexity of their combination varies from one to another and varies with the overall and 
partial structural changes. As Todaro claimed that many development economists would agree 
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that traditional or Western classical economic theories have limited relevance in their 
understandings of the characteristics of many third-world economies (Todaro, 1969b). It has 
been very well recognized by the spatial economist, for example, Krugman believes that the CP 
model is more applicable to explain real manufacturing industry of the United States in the 19th 
century, but as for today, it rather suits the Chinese case more than that of the USA (Krugman, 
2011). Also, the new economy of geography underlines that the manufacturing situation of the 
developed countries in the past manifested many similarities with many of today’s emerging 
economies (Liang & Z. Huang, 2012). 
By taking into account the research framework of spatiotemporal science, Zelinsky 
(1971) combined labour mobility studies with the process of modernization, and initiated the 
hypothesis of the mobility transition: there are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of 
personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an 
essential component of the modernization process (see Figure 4). As for time, there are different 
forms of mobility suggested appeared to vary considerably through time in their relative 
volumes and rates. The progression of five phases of spatial mobility is indicated for an ideal 
nation, in which the potential migrant enjoys a full range of options (Zelinsky, 1971). While, 
as for time, the ‘circulation’ has been adopted to refer to the territorial mobility, which denotes 
a great variety of movements, usually short-term, repetitive, or cyclical in nature, but all having 
in common the lack of any declared intention of a permanent or long-lasting change in residence. 
This is exactly what we see in most neoclassic models of labour migration. Namely, many of 
them deem that labour mobility is complete in one step, taking for granted that labour mobility 
is thus the migration.  
And these above three curves largely chronicle the rural exodus among developing 
societies. The five-stage vital transition is in the review of the situation of fertility & mortality, 
and each stage of the mobility transition has demonstrated a different feature of rural mobility: 
the pre-modern traditional society (with little genuine residential migration); the early 
transitional society (with massive rural-to-urban migration); the late transitional society (with 
still major migration); the advanced society (with leveled off residential migration but reduced 
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in absolute and relative terms, combined with city-to-city migration); and the future super-
advanced society (with all in the declined feature but a stable interurban circulation). A 
distinctive feature of Phase IV should be highlighted since it is the emergence of noneconomic 
motivations for both migrants and circulators, and if Phase V should ever arrive, it seems likely 
that noneconomic considerations will loom even larger (Zelinsky, 1971). Apart from its 
positivist rationale since not all the society/community would pass each phase orderly, even 
some are upside down or overlapped, the fusion of the spatial with temporal perspective is well 
incorporated in the area of labour mobility and demonstrated the dynamics of labour mobility. 
Indeed, it is surprising how little breakthrough has been made in this hypothesis to treat the 
mobility transition as a process diffusing outward through space and time and offered such 
insightful method in dealing with the dynamics of possible attributions at the varied stage and 
society. 
Figure 4: Changing levels of various forms of mobility transition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:(Zelinsky, 1971). 
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I.3.3. People 
 
No matter in a temporal or spatial context, any economic activity is realized by 
people. And the measurement of time and space in economic motivation/activity/phenomenon 
is still much needed to perceive by people. As thus, at presentational level, decision making of 
people from a different generation, or one person in his/her different stage of life, or indifferent 
family/community/region/country/world, is subsequently different as well. While, at a more 
profound level, the decision making of people would also be varied by a different sense of 
experience, consciousness, cognition, value, orientation, belief, ideology, epistemology, as well 
as in collective forms such as history, culture, relations, politics, customs, morality, so on and 
so forth, which are all as results of the entanglement between space and time, then realized on 
people. In a philosophical sense, this is very identical to one of thirteen’s Confucian classics 
(Erya): The combination of time and space becomes the ontology of existence. Even the word 
“existence in Chinese [s]” per se consists of both the unit of time and space (as at the left [y] 
(reverse form) refers to the unit of space, while at the right [r] refers to the unit of time).   
In fact, time and space are fundamental tools of a human being to cognize the 
objects/world (or to interpret the existence) and presented their understandings by the state and 
process. And due to the fact that objects are all in relative movement, people manage to 
summarize and generalize the phenomenon of time and space to interpret the world. Given so, 
the attributes of each are derived, namely the length, sequence, cycle of time; while the size and 
height of space, as well as the speed and direction of the objects. Moreover, time and space are 
inseparable in the process of people’s cognition of the object. Therefore, by relying on the 
mutual entanglements, relations, and references of time and space, people through the 
instrumentality of the dynamics of time and space to cognize the complexities of each object. 
In other words, to understand time, a spatial background is needed, and vice versa. As people’s 
cognition continues to deepen, objects from the visual layer to the non-visual level (like history, 
culture, value, etc.), simplistic space-time framework is yet enough to explain the complexity 
of the world and must be understood by means of the dynamics. And such dynamics can also 
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be understood as internalizing time and space into a subjective level of thought. Also, the 
consciousness of people here is not only the level of the individual, but also at the collective 
level, such as the national/ethical consciousness, and including the consciousness in the context 
of the entire political and social environment. 
Therefore, people in the context of time and space have a special meaning: People 
are not only individual homo economicus, but also contain attributes like family, collectiveness, 
society, ethics, nationality, world, and ecology. In other words, people are no longer just those 
who are complete egoism under the “Wealth of Nations.” Rather, they could be altruistic under 
“The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” which have been ignored for long. Thus, people actually 
referred by Adam Smith are under a specific social environment (measured by time and space, 
and their entanglements), which bears strong social nature with certain ethics and preferences. 
And such an interpretation is also absolutely identical with the definition of people in theories 
such as humanist economics, welfare economics, and social economics. For example, in social 
economics, people as social individuals are embedded in a web of constitutive social relations 
(value people and evaluate institutions as to their responsiveness to people) (Lutz, 2002), which 
deal with issues like the protection of a person’s rights, including property rights, the 
redistribution of income and wealth, the regulation of wages, land use and the social 
consequences of free-flowing capital, so on and so forth.  
To be noted, people, while subject to the external environment, at the same time, 
have subjective initiative and creative power, which in turn reshape the internal and external 
condition/circumstance. In the view of the social rule system theory, human organized groups 
(human actors/agents), including communities, families, enterprises, governments, institutions, 
parliaments, political parties, international organizations/societies, etc., are the creators, at the 
same time the carriers of the social rules system (Burns, 2000). In addition, the social structure 
of the population (including birth rate, mortality rate, dependency ratio, the proportion of the 
working-age population, etc.) also determines the bases of external environment such as 
economic structure/consumption & production structure of a country, thus creating a reaction 
to the external and internal conditions. The fusion of the spatial with temporal perspective has 
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been made to treat the demographic transition as a process diffusing outward through space and 
time. As confirmed by Zelinsky in his mobility transitions, concluded that “For any specific 
community, the course of the mobility transition closely parallels that of the demographic 
transition (Zelinsky, 1971)”.  
Finally, since the labour-power is attached to people, the mobility of labour-power 
as the productive factor should not be deemed as ordinary productive factors like capital and 
land. And labourers are living people, thus, people’s behaviour and decisions cannot be easily 
analyzed using economic assumptions and principles regardless of changes of external contexts 
(Sun, 2012). Even more complicated, Hanson concluded that the determinants of migration 
willingness and migration behaviour are not the same (Hanson, 2009). A hybrid framework that 
contains the above considerations is needed to understand the complexity of people and their 
world. 
 
I.4. Summary 
 
In summary, back to review theories of labour mobility as all presented and 
criticized before, in general, they can be divided into two major groups: Theories of macro 
anchor (including economic dualism) reflected the structuralist epistemology are more 
emphasizing labour mobility in the external contexts (time and space), which contain specific 
national/historical circumstances, in terms of the certain social and economic structures, 
developmental strategies, demographic structures, cultures, values and etc.; While, theories of 
micro and meso anchor reflected the post-structuralist epistemology are more focus on the main 
subjects (people and in group) of labour mobility, in terms of individual and collective 
attributes/factors of analytical framework to labour mobility behaviours, motivations, and 
decision making. By highlighting people’s subjective initiative, they incorporate factors of 
human capital, family endowment, social/public resource, peer and social network effect, etc., 
into the scope of labour mobility studies.  
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Although all perspectives are precious, especially to the following research as to 
deepen the studies, yet most of them still highly depend on the static point views of time, space, 
and people. As such, they have been reviewed/criticized under the dynamic paradigm as 
entangled among time space and people, which has been exclusively designed thereof. By doing 
so, labour mobility is thus not as claimed as a simple economic phenomenon or a pure economic 
behaviour, which must be reviewed under this dynamic constellation. And it is more reflected 
in the new structuralist epistemology that combines both the content-based and context-based 
factors/attributes/conditions in interpreting labour mobility from an overarching perspective. 
Labour mobility, indifferent from any other human activity, is always under a certain time, 
space, and people/consciousness. Thus, the dynamic paradigm can be used as an analytical tool, 
reviewing context-based and content-based applicability and compatibility of theories in labour 
mobility, also putting forward a more appropriate frame of reference in guiding empirical 
research. By intercepting one complete time cycle, combined with a certain space and people 
as the background of its logical deduction, on the one hand, it can be used as a frame of reference 
for theoretical selection and the basis for theoretical evaluation; on the other hand, it can also 
be used to explain and compare the background of the real world. 
To conclude, most economic theorists, unlike sociologist, for long have the tradition 
to claim a general model, and then add up time, place, and cultural background as bases for 
their hypotheses (Todaro, 1969b). And these bases can be understood as the applicability and 
compatibility of theory, which could not but involve with limitations of the dynamics as 
entangled among time, space, and people (“dynamic paradigm”). That is to say, when 
theoretical hypotheses are formulated to adapt to a particular situation in the Western world, 
their theories have included the assumptions of social reality inherent in the Western world. 
Thus, using this theory for studying underdeveloped countries is certainly inappropriate 
(Todaro, 1969b). For example, one of the hypotheses of Lewis is based on the assumption of 
full employment in the urban sector, namely, as long as the surplus labour mobilize, they will 
be employed automatically in the urban labour market. Although, this discourse had been 
framed in the classical world by Lewis. Self-evidently, it might be the case in the early stage of 
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industrialized countries, but definitely not for most of today’s LDCs. Thus, bearing this 
dynamic paradigm at mind, we start to review the labour mobility in real-world as to kick off 
the second chapter.  
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Chapter II. Research Background and Literature Reviews 
 
 
II.1. Comparisons of Rural Labour Mobility between the EICs and LDCs 
 
Distinct from general theories, theories specialized in rural labour mobility are much 
practical and tend to contain very realistic guiding orientations. Also, as demonstrated 
aforementioned, labour mobility in the real world is much more complicated and varies 
dramatically in different countries and different histories. And along with the historical 
evolution of capitalist development, labour mobility/migration, either in the internal form 
(rural-to-urban, transregional), or transnational form, consists of a constant topic of economic 
development. And under the dimension of time, space and people, it offers additional angles in 
reviewing labour mobility that has been articulated in the first chapter and puts forward a more 
appropriate frame of reference in guiding empirical research.  
Thus, to those who newly independent and underdeveloped (mostly after World War 
II [WWII]), developmental conditions confronted are actually similar to many countries of 
Western Europe and North America before their industrial revolution. Especially from the 
perspective of their internal economic structures, being confronted a high proportion of 
agricultural sector, underdeveloped industrial departments, with the vast majority of the 
population living in rural areas, as well as unsubstantial rural-to-urban migration, and in the 
context of poor conditions of transportation, information, and communication, the economy is 
much dependent on agricultural production. And along with the initial development in the 
process of industrialization, almost all countries are accompanied by a great transfer of labour 
force from agriculture to industrial & service sectors, as well as from rural to urban areas. And 
since, what if it is correct that the country that is more developed industrially shows to the less 
developed the image of its own future, a comparative analysis of such might offer reliable 
references. Thus, as to facilitate this comparison, countries are generally divided into early 
industrialized/developed countries (EICs) and late developing/underdeveloped countries 
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(LDCs); accordingly, the historical timeline is selected respectively with the first & second 
industrial revolution (18th to 20th century) for the EICs, and with post-independent (mid 20th 
century) timeline for the LDCs.    
Throughout history, from the first industrial revolution up to now, most countries of 
the EICs one after another wave had managed to develop in a seemingly smooth transition. 
However, for countries of LDCs, more than half a century passed, by adopting a similar path, 
as enlightened by the “free of charge” prescription of Lewisian development model, no matter 
to those who managed to transfer their major labour force to urban areas, or not, the vast 
majorities are still maintained underdeveloped. Apparently, only a few of them had managed 
so (See Chart 1), since some (mainly in Latin America) reached as high-level urbanization as 
north America and Europe, while the rest (mostly in Africa and Asia) are still with more than 
half of the population living in rural areas. Nevertheless, nearly all LDCs at the same time 
emerged deteriorative situations in urban areas, such as urban poverty, high unemployment, 
slummification of cities, economic growth without employment, etc. Coupled with a population 
boom in most developing countries, especially in the urban population, the subsequent urban 
labour force is also growing rapidly, as estimated by 409 million in 1980, 825 million in 2000, 
and 1.7 billion by 2025 (Q. Zhang, 2016). Unfortunately, at the same time, the number of slum 
is also growing. As estimated, nowadays, one billion people worldwide live in slums (Davis, 
2004), and the figure is projected to grow to two billion by 2030 (Habitat, 2007). Among the 
most, the population in slums is most concentrated in developing countries and has increased 
from 689 million in 1990 to 880 million in 2014. Moreover, according to the World Bank’s 
estimation, around 64% of people who live in urban slums are in Asia, since the region is right 
now experiencing a rapid rural-to-urban migration.  
However, what is worth pondering here is why such a similar process of labour 
mobility results in those vast differences? Unfortunately, most development theories fail to 
interpret and neglect the history of capitalism both at the world and national level, thus abstract 
the essential determinants of the different national development processes (Oliveira, 1985). As 
such, internationally, due to this undue abstraction it prevents the further contemplation, for 
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example, how the processes of development or industrialization of European countries of the 
19th century in the competitive phase of capitalism at the world level have dynamics distinct 
from the industrializations of the Latin American countries of the 20th century in the monopolist 
phase of capitalism (Oliveira, 1985); while, internally, how the process of industrial structures, 
demographic structures, as well as social & politic structures have been compelled to match the 
dynamic stage of the national capitalist development, and in turn, to reframe the conditions of 
these structures.  
 
Chart 1: Urbanization rate by regions, 1960-2017 
 
Source: United Nations Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects: 2018 Revision. 
 
It is indeed difficult to answer these questions but not impossible to unpack factors 
that hidden behind. In the light of critiques of theories, exploring both exogenous and 
endogenous conditions that entangled among time, space, and people would offer a 
breakthrough. For example, the United Kingdom, as the first country achieved industrialization, 
had spent more than a century to achieve its urbanization accompanied by the migration of rural 
population: nearly 70 years raising it from 1/4 of the total population to 1/2, and another 40 
years from 1/2 to 3/4 (Cai et al., 2003). As compared to Brazil, a high urbanization rate has 
been accomplished only in half a century, yet it is still yet industrialized, at the same time, the 
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rapid process also brought stubborn side effects, like slummification, and urban poverty. 
Obviously, it was too simplistic to conclude so, and the real situation is more complicated. But 
the direction of research has been projected for further explorations. And it is exactly the object 
of this chapter, as to unmask context-based and content-based differences in the regard of labour 
mobility between the EICs and the LDCs.   
To systematically elaborate on the dynamics of labour mobility in the light of the 
aforementioned macro and micro theories in the real world, the following three main processes 
would facilitate the industrial structural process, mobility transition, and demographic 
transformation. Since before the industrial revolution, the boundaries of the three sectors of the 
economy were not well distinct, with the agricultural sector led the dominated position of entire 
economy; handicrafts widely distributed in rural areas and often combined with agriculture, and 
the merchandize much underdeveloped. However, ever since the taking off industrial revolution, 
sectors of industry and merchandize which got tremendously developed. Accompanying a 
substantial population/labour movement, boundaries of the three sectors got gradually distinct. 
And this simplified evolution of industrial structure, in a great extent, is very consistent with 
the Fisher-Clark hypothesis (A. G. Fisher, 1945; C. Clark, 1951), setting forth of inherent 
relations among economic growth, industrial structures and labour transfer, arguing that: The 
level of economic development of a country can be measured by the proportion of agricultural 
employment; it can also be weighed by the structural heights of the three sectors (agriculture, 
industry, and service); and changes of industrial heights are accompanying the different 
compositions of employment structures, in other words, by the proportional transfers of 
agricultural labour (W. Jiang, 2007b).  
Also, this process can be understood by the Todaro’s positivist transformations of 
economic structures: In terms of the economic sectors, activities have been gradually shifted 
from agriculture to non-agriculture/manufacturing, and then gradually shifted to 
merchandize/finance; in terms of production scale, it changes from small families, individual 
enterprises to huge group organizations in the form of national or multinational companies; and 
in terms of employment location and occupational position for labour, the corresponding 
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transfer is from rural and agricultural location to urban space (Todaro et al., 1988). To be noted, 
this only set for the background conditions, and the object is to analyze the practical dynamics 
of labour mobility between the EICs and the LDCs.  
 
II.1.1. Industrial Structural Process (in Employment) 
 
II.1.1.1. Synchronous & Asynchronous employment distribution 
 
Ever since the Middle Ages, it took more than four centuries for England to reduce 
20 percent of its agricultural population from 76.4% (in 1300) to 54.9% in 1700. Also, for other 
countries, like France and Germany, it even takes a much longer time (See Table 3). However, 
the process has been speeded up dramatically since the industrial revolution, employment in 
the agricultural sector of the United Kingdom had been reduced from 36.8% in 1750 (Allen, 
2000), to 21.7% in 1850, to 8.7% in 1901, to 5% in 1950 (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995), and 1.09% 
in 2018 (World Bank). And ever since, countries like France, the USA, Germany, Japan, etc., 
within one century had managed to reduce 40-50% of the total proportion (Todaro et al., 1988), 
and demonstrate a similar situation that of today’s UK, with each respective percentage in 2.82% 
(France), 1.63% (USA), 1.26% (Germany), 3.41% (Japan).  
 
Table 3: Estimated population distribution, 1300-1800 (UK, France, and Germany) 
  United Kingdom (%) France (%) Germany (%) 
Year 
Urban 
Pop.  
Rural 
Non-
Agr. 
Agr. 
Rural 
Pop. 
Urban 
Pop.  
Rural 
Non-
Agr. 
Agr. 
Rural 
Pop. 
Urban 
Pop.  
Rural 
Non-
Agr. 
Agr. 
Rural 
Pop. 
1300 4.4 19.2 76.4 95.6 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1400 8.0 18.4 73.6 92.0 10.8 17.8 71.4 89.3 11.1 17.7 71.1 88.9 
1500 7.2 18.5 74.3 92.8 8.8 18.2 73.0 91.2 8.2 18.4 73.4 91.8 
1600 9.7 21.7 68.6 90.3 10.8 21.4 67.8 89.2 8.5 22.0 69.5 91.5 
1700 16.9 28.2 54.9 83.1 12.4 24.5 63.2 87.6 7.7 25.8 66.5 92.3 
1750 23.0 32.3 44.7 77.0 12.7 26.2 61.1 87.3 8.8 27.4 63.8 91.2 
1800 28.8 35.6 35.6 71.2 12.9 27.9 59.2 87.1 9.4 29.0 61.6 90.6 
Note: data estimated by changing of the notions and regions, like England, United Kingdom, and the 
Great Britain. 
Source: (Allen, 2000). 
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And comparing to countries of LDCs, apart from some disparities, all demonstrated 
a sharp decline, as shown in the following Chart 2. Countries, especially in the region of Latin 
America, they took only half a century as to reduce 50 percent of the proportion. Taking Brazil, 
for instance, the share of agriculture in total employment fell from almost 60 percent in 1950 
to 44.3 percent in 1970 (Rex, 1997), 31% in 1980 (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989):84, 27.6 percent 
in 1991, and 10.16 percent in 2018 (World Bank). And as of today, employment in agriculture 
of countries in the regions of Latin America and the Caribbean manifest a lower proportion 
between 15 to 25%; while countries in the region of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, their 
proportions still maintain above 40%.  
 
Chart 2: Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate) 
Source: International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. Data retrieved in September 2018. 
 
To be noted, not only did the LDCs in the transfer of rural labour force much faster 
than that of the EICs, but they also transferred in a comparatively absolute way. To unmask this 
point, a hidden phenomenon that has been seriously neglected: Along with the process that 
labour mobilized from agriculture to industry and service, the number of the non-agricultural 
rural population of the EICs was not declining but growing, which means that rural labour force 
while mobilized to urban industry and service, some were still maintained in rural areas. As 
shown in Table 3, from 1300 to 1800, while the agricultural population was declining in the 
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UK, France, and Germany, at the same time, the rural non-agricultural population was growing, 
in other words, the declining rate of the rural population was much slower than that of the 
agricultural population. However, on the contrary, to most LDCs, such a buffering process was 
seriously missing, that is to say the deduction of agricultural employment is almost absolutely 
transferred to urban areas.  
Since it can be roughly proved by the investigation of the urbanization process 
(regardless of the demographic changes), see the following Chart 3, as is clear, from 1990 to 
2018, the declining proportion of employment in agriculture are 17.44% in Brazil, 21.98% in 
India, 8.38% in Kenya, and 13.87% in Mexico, while the growing proportion of the urban 
population is 12.39%, 8.05%, 9.81%, and 8.45% respectively (Data would be more compatible 
if available in the 1950s to 90s). In addition, studies also found that countries in Europe that 
during 1880-1900, the capability rate of industries so as to absorb the rural labour force was as 
high as 80%. However, in most developing countries in the 1950s, due to the population growth 
rate was usually 3-4 times higher than that of the EICs in their industrial take-off time. 
Therefore, the absorption rate was only about 30% (Todaro et al., 1988). 
 
Chart 3: Declining employment in agriculture V.S. growing urban population (%), 1990-2018 
 
 
Source: International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. Data retrieved in September 2018. 
II.1.1.2. Symmetrical & Asymmetrical employment resources allocation 
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Throughout the history of industrial processing, along with the prosperous boom of 
industry and service, the economy also witnessed a sharp decline of the value-added of 
agriculture to the gross domestic products/values, so is the employment contribution to total 
employment. Countries both of the EICs and the LDCs manifested a tremendous falloff, 
however, the actual situation reveled a comparatively synchronous drop in most of the EICs 
(See Table 4), and an asymmetrical drop in the LDCs (See Chart 3). As clearly showed in the 
following table, the share of British agriculture in the gross national product fell from 45% in 
1770 to 22% in 1841, and 6% in 1901; while, the proportion of its agricultural workforce in the 
total labour force fell from 35% in 1801 to 9% in 1901 (X. H. Chen, 1990); and for France, 
both synchronously dropped from 42% (43%) to 35% (30%).   
 
Table 4: Synchronous employment distribution in the corresponding sector of the EICs 
  
Agr./G
NP 
Agr. 
Employment
/Total Emp. 
Ind./G
NP 
Ind. 
Emp/Tot
al Emp. 
  
Agr./G
NP 
Agr. 
Employment
/Total Emp. 
Ind./G
NP 
Ind. 
Emp/T
otal 
Emp. 
UK France 
1770 45 36.8 (1750) 24 NA 
1789/1
815 
50  20  
1841 22 21.7 (1851) 34 
29 
(1801) 
1872/1
882 
42 43 (1866) 30 38 
1901 6 8.7 40 45 
1908/1
910 
35 30 (1911) 37 39 
Germany USA 
1860/1
869 
32 
51 (1861-
1871) 
24 
 28 
(61-71) 
1839 69 68 (1840)  NA 
1905/1
914 
18 35.5 39 38  1879 49 NA  
30 
(1870) 
          1910   32   41 
Source: (X. H. Chen, 1990); (Todaro et al., 1988) and (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995; Zorn, 1971); 
 
However, once comparing to the LDCs, situations are much asymmetrical. In fact, 
for any country of the third world, its proportion of agriculture to GDP has never exceeded 35% 
(Todaro et al., 1988), and this lies in a very contrast history to that of the EICs. And this is much 
identical to what Todaro in his “Development in the Third World” stated: the proportion of 
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agriculture products (to GDP) was always synchronously consistent with that of the agricultural 
employment share along with the early stage of the EICs’ economic development. However, 
that could only account for half in most of the LDCs (Todaro et al., 1988). As in the early 1980s, 
regions like South Asia, East Asia (including China), Latin America, and Africa, the 
employment share of agriculture are in respectively: 69 percent, 66 percent, 39 percent, and 66 
percent, while their corresponding share to GDP are only: 35 percent, 29 percent, 23 percent, 
and 31 percent (World Development Report, 1984). And the situation can be even worse, for 
example, in China, due to the preferential developmental path over the industry, as of 1978, 70% 
of total employment only produced 28% of the agricultural value (C. Li, 2017). 
 
Chart 4: Agriculture to GDP (value) V.S. to total employment %, selected LDCs 
 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
 
And even as of today, taking China, Kenya, Mexico, Indian and Brazil, for instance, 
the situation is still self-evident (see the above Chart 4): firstly, all countries are in the same 
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situation that agricultural sector possesses of labour force much more than its weighed to the 
entire economy, which means, in a certain extent that all these countries have labour surplus in 
agriculture; secondly, both the proportion of agricultural employment and its value to GDP are 
declining along the time. And the declining speed of the employment is much faster than that 
of the value to GDP; and lastly, this process demonstrates a seriously asymmetrical downgrade 
of the sector. For example, 43% of the Chinese labour force was only producing 15% of the 
value in 2000, and almost 60% to 22% that of India, 21% to 5% that of Brazil, 47% to 29% that 
of Kenya, and 18% to 3% that of Mexico.  
 
II.1.1.3. Consonant & Inconsonant employment realization 
 
In addition, another key finding also lies in the comparison of a gradual growth of 
urbanization in the EICs and a “compressed” growth that of the LDCs. In terms of the growth 
of urban population, as demonstrated in the following Table (5), the proportion of the urban 
population in the United States took nearly 70 years to gradually achieve its urbanization rate 
from 15.3% in 1850 to 51% in 1920; France took nearly 80 years from 25.2% in 1851 to 51.2% 
in 1931; and the UK lasted for nearly a century to rise from 25% in 1750 to 50.2% in 1851. At 
the same time, the major source of the growth of the urban population was found much from 
rural areas. For example, the French rural residents manifested a rapid decline after 1846, the 
proportion in 50 years decreased by 15%. So was Germany, from the beginning of 19th century, 
the proportion of rural residents accounted for almost 85%, while till 1850, 15% migrated, and 
after a century, its proportion only left 40% in rural areas. And in the United States of America, 
after the Civil War, the transfer of rural population to cities accelerated. In 40 years after 1860, 
although the rural population also increased by 50%, the urban population increased even 
fourfold (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). 
 
 
Table 5: Urban population/total population (%) in the EICs 
Year UK  Year France Year Germany Year USA 
1750 25 1800 12.9 1800 (assumed) 15 1850 15.3 
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1800 28.8 1851 25.2 1850 30 1860 19.8 
1851 50.2 1861 28.9 1861 30.1 1870 25.7 
1861 62.3 1891 37.4 1891 50 1890 35.1 
1891 72 1921 46.3 1900 54.4 1910 45.7 
1921 77.2 1931 51.2 1910  65  1920 51 
Source: (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995; Allen, 2000; L. L. Jiang, 2008). 
 
Apart from so, the process of industrialization in Western Europe, for instance, was 
much faster than the process of their urbanization in the 19th century, and the employment 
proportion in industry was always higher than that of people living in urban areas. For example, 
in 1856, residents of cities with more than 20,000 people in France accounted for 10% of the 
total population, while those employed in manufacturing sectors also accounted for 20%; And 
for Germany, in 1870, urban residents in cities with more than 10,000 accounted for about 12.5% 
of the total population (Xiao, 1997), while at the same time nearly 30% of the employment was 
in manufacturing sectors (Todaro et al., 1988). Moreover, the population at that time of France 
and Germany grew at a rate of no more than 1% per year, thus, the manufacturing industry only 
needed to grow by 2.2-3.3% per year so as to absorb the additional people.  
However, such a base is quite different and tends to be more severe in today’s LDCs. 
Due to high population growth rate, as predicted that the urban population of developing 
countries in the 21st century will still maintain a growth rate of 3%-4% (Q. Zhang, 2016), 
together with the situation that employment share in manufacturing sectors of most LDCs only 
accounts for 10-20%, therefore, as to absorb newly-born population per year, 15-30% of 
manufacturing growth is required  (0.2 x 0.15=0.03) (Todaro et al., 1988). Even worse, in 
almost all LDCs, the proportion of urban residents has far exceeded the share of manufacturing 
employment. For instance, the proportion of urban residents of cities above 50,000 in Brazil 
was around 52% in 1980, while those employed in manufacturing during the same period 
accounted only 20% of the total employment; and in Colombia, the former proportion reached 
51%, while manufacturing employment only accounted for 17% (Todaro et al., 1988).  
Also, the developmental path of manufacturing or industry in general in many LDCs 
has shown a similar pattern of economic growth at an early stage without an equivalent 
100 
 

employment growth. Due to the lack of corresponding data, a brief demonstration of the 1960s 
is listed at the following table (6). In the 1960s, most of the LDCs were experiencing a boom 
in manufacturing. The annual production growth of manufacturing in various countries, like 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Pakistan, Thailand, Ecuador, and Panama, with double digital growth. 
However, as clear to all, the corresponding growth in the employment was further lag behind, 
none of them exceeded 8% growth.  
 
Table 6: Manufacturing growth in selected LDCs (%), 1963-1969 
Country Annual production growth Annual employment growth Ratio 
Ethiopia 12.8 6.4 2.0 
Kenya 6.4 4.3 1.5 
Nigeria 14.1 5.3 2.7 
Egypt 11.2 0.7 16.0 
India 5.9 5.3 1.1 
Pakistan 12.3 2.6 4.7 
Philippines 6.1 4.8 1.3 
Thailand 10.7 -12.0 -0.9 
Brazil 6.5 1.1 5.9 
Colombia 5.9 2.8 2.1 
Costa Rica 8.9 2.8 3.2 
Dominican Republic 1.7 -3.3 -0.5 
Ecuador 11.4 6.0 1.9 
Panama 12.9 7.4 1.7 
Source: (Bairoch, 1979; Todaro et al., 1988). 
 
In this regard, studies have shown that in many developing countries, the output 
value of the manufacturing industry increases by 3 to 4 percentage points, which can bring 
about one percentage of employment growth (Todaro, 1969b). And with the modern structural 
adjustment of the urban industrial sector in many LDCs, such as import-substitution strategy, 
structural unemployment will inevitably occur in urban areas. On the other hand, regarding the 
capability of absorption of rural labour from manufacturing sectors in LDCs, the employable 
capacity of the rural labor force to the manufacturing industry did not exceed 10% from 1950 
to 1960 and did not exceed 10-12% in 1960-70 (Bairoch, 1979). 
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II.1.2. Mobility Transition 
 
II.1.2.1. Internal labour mobility 
 
Economic development in Western Europe and North America is often described as 
economic activities, and population symmetrically mobilized within and between countries: 
Along with the expansion of urban industries, new employment opportunities have been created. 
At the same time, technologies applied in agriculture have reduced the demand for rural labour. 
Combined together, these two phenomena have enabled rural labour resources in Western 
countries to be effectively and orderly allocated (Todaro, 1969b). And for a long period of time, 
the rural labour force is often witnessed that firstly with bigger proportion mobilizes to the 
secondary industry, such as manufacturing, which is not only concentrated in urban areas, but 
also in small towns and even in rural areas. It is thus the sector that absorbs the most agricultural 
labour force. However, in the post-industrialized time or when traditional industries started to 
shrink, rural labour force then substantially mobilizes to the tertiary industry, such as service, 
(mainly concentrated in cities). And this path had been mostly identified with British history. 
As the following table (7) shows: The share of agricultural employment dropped by 14.2% from 
35.9% (in 1801) to 21.7% (in 1851), while the share that for the industry had increased two 
times (28%) but for service only 4.6%.  
 
Table 7: Employment share (%) in Great Britain and Germany 
Year Agriculture Industry 
Service  
(Commerce & Transportation) 
Great Britain  
1750 36.8 14 NA 
1801 35.9 29 11.2  
1851 21.7 42 15.8  
Germany 
1843 61 23.4 1.95 
1882 42.3 39 NA 
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1907 35 42 23 
Source: (Clapham, 1966; Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999). 
 
However, this is not necessarily a universal/positivist path. Studies (W. Jiang, 2007b) 
demonstrated a “leapfrog” path. Namely, as the development/growth of the tertiary industry 
shows a simultaneous (or even prior) trend that of the secondary industry, subsequently, so will 
be the employment, thus manifesting a corresponding flow of rural labour force to the tertiary 
industry. Thus, the same comparison can be found differently in the case of Germany, since at 
the beginning of its industrialization, Germany had paid close attention in the construction of 
service infrastructure, as shown in the Table (6): the employment shares of agriculture dropped 
26% from 61% (1843) to 35% (1907), however, the corresponding increments in industry and 
service were 18.6% and 21.05% respectively. Therefore, the path of rural labour mobility is 
highly based on one’s economic structures. In regard to LDCs, it is found that many of them 
were following the leapfrog path but in a very fragile way, since their employment share of 
industry per se is very low (see Chart 5), and more other aspects will be elaborated further.  
 
Chart 5: Employment in industry (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate) 
 
Source: International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. Data retrieved in September 2018. 
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The process of rural labour mobility in different time and space could demonstrate 
completely different views. To a great extent, for many EICs, the rural-to-urban labour mobility 
was largely maintained in a smooth growth process. Taking the historical experience of England 
during its industrializing process as an example, for nearly a century (1776-1871), its urban 
population was only increasing at an average annual growth rate of 2.19% (See Table 7). And 
the growth of urbanization rate was even slower, at an average annual growth rate of 0.92%, 
from 25% in 1776 to 50% in 1850, and 62% in 1871; in the meanwhile, the growth rate of rural 
migrants in urban areas was also very smooth and even slower. It had remained at an average 
annual growth rate of 0.91% for nearly a century, from 0.86% to 2.05%. As the process per se 
is self-evident that England had undergone a very stable and smooth mobility transition. 
However, the process in developing countries from the 1950s to the 1980s revealed a sharp 
contrast. Regardless of unachievable industrialization as the fundamental fact, firstly, the 
urbanization rate was almost doubled within 40 years. Not only the average annual growth rate 
of the urban population itself was more than twice that of England, but the growth of rural 
migrants in urban areas was also generally higher than that of England (See Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Comparisons of urban population growth and rural migrants 
England  
Year Urbanization Rate (%) 
Annual Growth Rate of 
Urban Population 
Annual Growth Rate of 
Rural Migrants 
1776-81 25.9 2.08 0.86 
1781-86 27.5 1.81 0.5 
1786-91 29.1 2.2 0.56 
1791-96 30.6 2.17 0.79 
1796-01 32.2 2.08 0.83 
1801-06 33.8 2.15 -0.18 
1806-11 35.2 2.07 1.07 
1811-16 36.6 2.4 0.59 
1816-21 38.3 2.39 0.87 
1821-26 40 2.61 1.19 
1826-31 42.2 2.33 1.14 
1831-36 44.3 2.08 1.01 
1836-41 46.3 2.04 1.2 
1841-46 48.3 2.41 1.57 
1846-51 51.2 2.05 1.73 
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1851-56 54 2.06 1.54 
1856-61 56.4 2.08 1.6 
1861-66 58.7 2.35 2.1 
1866-71 62 2.29 2.05 
Developing Countries NA 
1950-60 17 4.87 NA 
1960-70 22.1 3.59 NA 
1970-80 24.7 3.9 NA 
1980-90 28.9 4.68 NA 
Asia 1.33 
1950-60 16.4 5.01 0.99 
1960-70 21.5 3.07 1.07 
1970-80 22.9 3.78 1.4 
1980-90 26.3 5.17 1.8 
Latin America 2.06 
1950-60 41.5 4.57 1.22 
1960-70 49.3 4.27 1.93 
1970-80 57.3 3.74 2.64 
1980-90 65 3.12 2.35 
Africa 1.06 
1950-60 14.5 4.72 0.51 
1960-70 18.3 4.92 0.71 
1970-80 22.9 4.83 1.25 
1980-90 27.8 5.08 1.33 
Source: (Rosenzweig & Stark, 1997; Chenery et al., 1988; Cai et al., 2003).  
 
As such, together with a lower absorption rate of industries to rural migrants (which 
has been articulated before), the only possible result would be in a situation that massive 
population is crowded in urban areas. Accumulatively, it rapidly formed various nerve-
wracking social phenomena, such as the substantial emergence of the informal sector and the 
slummification of cities in most developing countries. And both the informal sector and slum 
become labour reservoir of rural migrants. Although a similar situation also occurred in the 
EICs. For example, the phenomenon of the back-to-back house in the 19th century of England; 
France until the end of the 19th century, about one-third of Parisians still lived in conditions that 
are similar to today’s slum with an environment that is crowded, dirty, without 
sanitation/lights/fresh air (Y. G. Zhou, 2007); as well as in Germany, at the early stage of 
industrialization, a phenomenon as referring to rural migrants could only manage to take break 
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by renting a single bed as a place for temporary residence (L. Y. Zhang & L. J. Chen, 2010), 
etc., and it took centuries for them to resolve the problem. However, the situation looks more 
urgent and nerve-wracking in today’s LDCs. 
In most developing countries, the labour force moving out of agriculture is not 
absorbed into formal employment in the industrial and service sectors. Instead, they move 
mostly into the informal service sector (Newman et al., 2016): 13. In Africa, only about one in 
five workers has found employment in the industry after leaving agriculture (McMillan & 
Harttgen, 2014):2. Overall only 3.2% of the total sub-Saharan workforce was employed in the 
formal industry in the early 2010s (Losch, 2016): 15. The informal sector has already become 
a major sector that absorbs rural migrants in most of the LDCs. In average, it absorbs 45-50% 
of employment at the world level (M. A. Chen et al., 2004), among which, in Asia, employment 
in the informal sector accounts for 65% of total employment; 72% in the southern Africa region; 
48% in North Africa, and 51% in Latin America. And in terms of the situation of slummification 
of cities, residents living in slums account for more than one-third of the entire urban population 
in most developing countries. Even worse, some accounts for more than 60% of their urban 
population (Todaro et al., 1988). And obviously, rural migrants are more venerable and with 
bigger possibilities to live in slums. As it can be roughly estimated in the light of the following 
table (9), the majority of rural migrants in the urban population increment is very consistent 
with the proportion of people living in slums at the corresponding region of the country.    
 
Table 9: Proportion of rural to urban migration in population increment 1970 
Country Average Population Growth Rate 
Share of Migrants in Population 
Increment 
Argentina 2 35 
Brazil 4.5 36 
Colombia 4.9 43 
India 3.8 45 
Indonesia 4.7 49 
Nigeria 7 64 
Philippines 4.8 42 
Sri Lanka 4.3 61 
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Tanzania 7.5 64 
Thailand 5.3 45 
Source: (Todaro et al., 1988). 
 
In addition, not only should the process of rural-to-urban labour mobility never be 
viewed too simplistic, but the consequence also demonstrates very discrepantly. Although the 
situation was never too simple, one of them was very clear: Some of the EICs had managed to 
separate the flow of rural-to-urban mobility, on the one hand, chasing out of the unskilled labour 
force, such as the Enclosure Movement of England, and October Edict (1807) of Prussia; on 
the other hand, supporting the capitalist elites together with wealthy patriciate to maintain in 
rural areas and participate in the development of modern farms by their capital and financial 
resources. However, what had happened and is ongoing happening in most LDCs tells a very 
contrast story. Various studies (Cai et al., 2003) have already revealed that in LDCs, most of 
the rural migrants are not actually unskilled; on the contrary, are those with basic education, 
with certain skills and capitals. Also, the consequence lied in the situation: on the one hand, 
with the substantial outflow of rural elites and capital along with labour migration caused 
depression of rural development; on the other hand, induced hollowing situation of rural society.  
 
II.1.2.2. international labour mobility 
 
Surprisingly, different from most LDCs today, rural-to-urban labour mobility for 
EICs at that time had a special condition. From the middle of the 19th century to the beginning 
of the 20th century, a major way out as to transfer the agricultural surplus population in EICs of 
Western Europe was via transnational immigration (Todaro et al., 1988). In fact, ever since the 
18th century, developed countries of West Europe had already entered into a tremendous 
demographic transition. And under the pressure of domestic population growth and other 
factors like war, at that time, substantial transnational immigration had already taken place, 
since some governments of the EICs regarded immigration as a way to alleviate social conflicts 
(such as exacerbated unemployment). For example, in the first half of the 19th century, the 
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British government had repeatedly sponsored immigration. As such, from 1815 to 1830, an 
average annual immigrants from the UK was 25,000; from 1831 to 1841, the annual number 
got trebled to 74,000; and it was found that even 60,000 people were sole from Scotland from 
1853 to 1870. Also, a similar situation was found in Germany as well (S. L. Liu, 1987). After 
1815, around 70 million Europeans settled overseas. On the British Isles and in Norway, mass 
emigration amounted to more than 30% of their respective populations (Stalker, 1994): 16. 
And by the middle of the 19th century, more European countries were found in a 
similar way and had experienced a substantial population discharge. Even until World War I 
[WWI], the mainstream of transnational emigration was still in long-distance and long-term. 
The majority of the European immigrants had flowed to the New World - America. It was found 
that between 1846 and 1930, more than 50 million Europeans emigrated overseas, most of 
whom emigrated to the regions of America (Cipolla & Z. H. Huang, 1993). And taking that to 
the United States of America, for instance, there were 1.18 million of Irish and 919,000 
Germans between 1847 and 1855; 418,000 Scandinavians and 1.45 million Germans between 
1880 and 1885; and 1.754 million Italians between 1898 and 1907 (S. L. Liu, 1987). 
Also, the research found that transnational labour mobility between the EICs is an 
important carrier of technology transfer (Landes, 1969). That is to say, at their early stage of 
industrialization, where advanced technology transfer is largely achieved through international 
labour mobility. Since if initially the technology was incorporated through the importation of 
machines, these soon could be manufactured in the USA, France, and Germany, the transfer of 
technical knowledge was basically done through the immigration of skilled English workers. 
As Landes in his study affirms: the growing technological independence of the continent has 
largely resulted from the man-to-man transmission of technical knowledge, of immediate minor 
importance but of great future consequences (Landes, 1969). In synthesis, the relative simplicity 
of the techniques allowed its diffusion of England by workers who emigrated, and the 
manufacturing past of the backward countries generated specialized workers capable of 
absorbing the technology of industrial production so in the same way that technological 
innovations in England were more or less quickly incorporated by most producers, the Uni
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States, France and Germany were able to absorb the most advanced technology of the time, 
therefore, and this dimension of competitive capitalism - the impossibility of monopoly control 
of technology - which ultimately explains why the backward countries at that time were able to 
create a productive structure technologically similar to that of England (Oliveira, 1985). 
However, as compared to today’s LDCs, such a condition to a great extent does not 
exist. Due to the gradual establishment of a new international order after WWII, extensive 
transnational immigration has been highly alerted and strictly regulated by more and more 
countries. Instead, a new phenomenon, such as brain drain, has substantively emerged among 
most LDCs and becomes a severe and striking issue. For example, 60% of immigrants from 
Egypt, Ghana, and South Africa to the United States had tertiary education in 1990 (Carrington 
& Detragiache, 1998): 14. And It is estimated that in recent decades a third of Africa’s skilled 
professionals emigrated (Tanner, 2005): 3. While this outmigration reduces the pressure on the 
labour market, on the one hand, the loss of so many qualified people, on the other hand, limits 
the capacity to build a modern economy (Scherrer & Verma, 2018). Not only because it 
seriously affects the structure and prosperity of economic growth in developing countries due 
to the great loose of professionals and technicians, but also because it profoundly impacts the 
characteristics and development prospects of developing countries. Concretely speaking, the 
brain drain not only reduces the number of the scarce professional and technical labour force in 
developing countries but, perhaps more seriously, it diverts the attention of national scientists, 
doctors, architects, engineers and university professors from the goal of national development 
and domestic issues away (Todaro et al., 1988). As is self-evident from the following table (10), 
massive professionals and technicians found from the LDCs immigrated to countries like the 
USA, Canada, and Europe, with an average annual growth rate of 13.5% from 1962 to 1973.  
 
Table 10: Professional and technical immigrants from LDCs to the U.S., Canada and the UK 
Year To USA To Canada To UK Sum 
1962 9024 1381 NA NA 
1963 11029 1525 4600 17154 
1964 11418 1873 NA NA 
1965 11001 3707 3230 17938 
1966 13986 5548 NA NA  
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1967 23361 7897 2900 34158 
1968 28511 6930 2400 37861 
1969 27536 7585 1720 36841 
1970 33796 6118 1000 40914 
1971 38647 5184 1270 45101 
1972 39106 5360 377 44843 
1973 31939 NA NA NA 
Source: (Todaro et al., 1988). 
 
II.1.3. Demographic Transformation 
 
The demographic transformation has always been one of the most fundamental 
issues in the study of labour mobility, although it is highly Spatio-temporal. In the short term, 
it seems that changes in the demographic structure in each country are relatively stable, but 
once the timeline is lengthened, the situation demonstrates a very complicated version. 
Especially in contrast to the transformation of the demographic structures of the EICs and the 
LDCs, it is of considerable significance. Generally speaking, the demographic transition in the 
EICs of the West is a balanced and external-tensive population transition that is compatible 
with its economy and social culture (Q. Zhang, 2016). That is to say, the phased characteristics 
of population transition in these countries are basically consistent with each and every level of 
their corresponding economic and social progress: When the demographic transition is at a high 
growth stage, namely with high birth rate and low mortality rate, it is also when the path of 
modernization/industrialization is gradually embarking on. And the tension of the modern 
industrial sector is basically able to absorb the growing economically active population which 
has been articulated before. For example, at the time of industrialization, in Europe and Japan, 
population growth rates were lower than they are now, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
early industrializers ‘had proportionately fewer people to absorb’ (Kitching, 2010): 151. 
As shown in the following table (11), the birth rate in England (& Wales) increased 
significantly during the period from 1710 to 1810, and the average birth rate per decade 
increased steadily from 31.6 ‰ to 37.5 ‰, among which, 1760-1810 were the peak and had 
been maintained the level of 37 ‰. And by 1830, the birth rate returned to the level that of 
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1750; France demonstrated a very similar situation as well: its average birth rate per 5 years 
began to rise from around 1750 (at 35.4‰) and remained at 35‰ until the outbreak of the 
Revolution. Since then, the birth rate started to decline from 34.8‰ (in 1800) to 28.2‰ (in 
1840). Since then, the birth rate in each country of Europe had begun to decline. For example, 
the birth rate dropped from 30‰ to 20‰ had spent 40 years in most countries in West Europe, 
and 30 years in Great Britain (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). 
 
Table 11: Comparison of birth rate (‰) in selected EICs, 1701-1840 
Year England & Wales Year France 
1701-1710 31.6 1750 35.4 
1711-1720 31.4 1771-1775 38.6 
1721-1730 33.9 1776-1780 38.1 
1731-1740 35.6 1781-1785 37.5 
1741-1750 36.9 1786-1790 36.4 
1751-1760 36.9 1791-1795 35.9 
1761-1770 37.0 1796-1800 34.8 
1771-1780 37.5 1801-1805 32.0 
1781-1790 37.7 1806-1810 31.6 
1791-1800 37.3 1811-1815 31.2 
1801-1810 37.5 1816-1820 31.3 
1811-1820 36.6 1821-1825 30.7 
1821-1830 36.6 1826-1830 29.9 
1831-1840 36.6 1831-1835 29.3 
  1836-1840 28.2 
(‰) 1840-1900 
Year England & Wales France Germany 
1840-1850 32.6 27.3 36.1 
1851-1860 34.1 26.1 25.3 
1861-1870 35.2 26.2 37.2 
1876-1880 35.3 25.3 39.2 
1886-1890 31.4 23.0 36.5 
1896-1900 29.3 21.9 36.0 
Source: (Todaro et al., 1988; Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). 
 
In comparison, on the one hand, the birth rate of developing countries after the 
WWII also experienced rapid growth, and it even has been higher than that of Western Europe 
when during their population boom, as almost all maintained above 40‰ (See Table 12): like 
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48.1‰ in Africa, 47.9‰ in the Middle East, 41.4 in Latin America and 43.2 in South Asia. 
Also, although the birth rate of today’s LDCs dropped sharply, as demonstrated below, within 
50 years, the birth rate of developing countries dropped from 41.8‰ to 26.2‰, it still maintains 
almost two times higher than that of the EICs, especially regions like Africa, Latin America, 
and South Asia. And most countries of LDCs still in the phase of high population growth. In 
comparison, the population growth rate for Europe and Japan during their industrialization 
phase at roughly 1.5–2 % per annum (at the peak), while for the developing countries (not 
necessarily at the peak) in the 1990s at 2.5% or 3% and over (Kitching, 2010): 151. 
 
Table 12: Birth rate & mortality rate ‰ (crude) 1950-2000 
Region and Country 1950-55 1960-65 1970-75 1980-85 1990-95 1995-2000 
World 35.6 34.0 30.3 28.1 25.4 23.8 
Developed Countries 22.7 20.3 16.7 15.9 15.2 14.9 
Developing Countries 41.8 40.0 35.5 32.1 28.3 26.2 
Africa 48.1 47.6 46.1 45.0 40.1 36.9 
Middle East 47.9 48.0 46.3 44.2 40.0 36.9 
Latin America 41.4 39.9 36.9 34.4 31.3 29.6 
China 39.8 33.8 26.0 20.1 18.0 17.4 
East Asia 36.6 38.3 30.1 26.1 22.4 20.3 
South Asia 43.2 44.1 40.5 36.9 31.0 27.8 
Mortality  Rate ‰  
Region and Country 1950-55 1960-65 1970-75 1980-85 1990-95 1995-2000 
World 18.3 14.4 12.0 10.6 9.2 8.7 
Developed Countries 10.1 9.6 9.2 9.7 10.1 10.1 
Developing Countries 22.2 16.8 13.2 10.9 9.0 8.3 
Africa 26.9 22.4 18.8 15.4 12.0 10.6 
Middle East 25.3 20.9 16.6 13.4 10.4 9.2 
Latin America 14.5 11.5 9.3 7.7 6.5 6.0 
China 20.1 13.6 9.4 8.3 7.8 7.7 
East Africa 30.0 11.8 8.7 7.4 6.7 6.6 
South Asia 24.6 19.8 15.8 12.5 9.9 8.8 
 Source: (Demeny & McNicoll, 2006; Todaro et al., 1988). 
 
On the other hand, in terms of mortality rate, thanks to the widespread improvement 
of sanitary conditions and medical conditions by the control of infectious diseases together with 
higher nutritional standards and medical progress, although it is still higher in the current LDCs 
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than the developed countries, the difference is much smaller than that of birth rate (See Table 
12). In 30 years since WWII, mortality rates have fallen by 50‰ in parts of Asia and Latin 
America, and 30‰ in parts of Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, the drop in LDCs is much 
faster than that of developed countries. For example, in Mauritius, it took only seven years for 
the mortality rate to fall from 27‰ to 15‰, while England and Wales, France, Germany, etc., 
spent more than 100 years (Cipolla & Z. H. Huang, 1993). Also, although the average life 
expectancy in developed countries is 20 years longer than in developing countries, this gap has 
been sharply narrowed in 30 years after WWII. For instance, the average life expectancy of the 
third world countries in 1950 was 35-40 years old, and the average life expectancy in developed 
countries was 62-65 years. But by 1980, the life expectancy of the former ones increased 42% 
to 56 years; while, in the later ones, life expectancy has only increased 13% to 72 years (Todaro 
et al., 1988). 
As such, studies (J. X. Li, 2000) have concluded that many countries of the LDCs 
are in an unbalanced, even “compressed” demographic transition. That is to say, the 
demographic transition in EICs was embedded in the process of industrialization and 
modernization, and was more or less endogenous with a gradual process. Both birth rate and 
mortality rate took a relatively long time so reduce the overall population growth. However, 
compared to that in the LDCs, due to the fact that both industrialization and modernization have 
been “compressed” in time, the corresponding demographic transition then has been deeply 
compressed as well (J. X. Li, 2000). Namely, the change in population mortality has been 
greatly shortened, but the change in fertility has been relatively delayed. As a result, the natural 
growth rate of the population has been significantly enhanced. And Coupled with the massive 
rural-to-urban mobility/migration, it inevitably leads to a crowed urban population. 
In the light of overall historical experience, the change in birth/fertility rate normally 
is lagging, comparing to the decline in mortality rate. That is because the change of people’s 
consciousness thereof is a gradual process of transformation. Especially the decline in fertility 
rate apart from economic factors is always accompanying a gradual diminishing of the old 
socio-economic system and a gradual establishment of new concepts in various societal values 
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(Q. Zhang, 2016). Along with this process, the natural population growth rate of LDCs is 
therefore always higher due to the sharp declined mortality rate which is much impacted by 
exogenous factors, and even higher than that of the EICs in their stage of population booming. 
In the 19th century, the average population annual growth rate of European countries was mostly 
below 2%. However, the average annual growth rate of the population in LDCs after the post-
war to the 1970s was more than 2%, some even reached levels above 3% (Y. M. Wang, 1995). 
And as of today, the average annual population growth rate of the least developed countries 
(UN classification) is about 2.4%. In contrast, that of developed countries is only 0.4%-0.7% 
(See Chart 6). 
 
Chart 6: Population growth (annual %) least developed countries & OECD members 
    Source: World Bank.  
 
Despite all that, still, most researches of labour mobility often tend to neglect the 
impact of demographic transformations of a certain country and take it for granted a natural and 
stable transition. However, one of the most extreme examples would be China, when it comes 
to the recent half-century in terms of its changing demographic structures. There were dramatic 
changes before and after the 1980s, since its well-known “Family Planning Policy or One-Child 
policy.” For example, during the first two decades right after the republic of China (1949), the 
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net growth of the population maintained at an average of 20 thousandths. After the 1980s, since 
the state intervention over birth control, although there was a period of a birth boom right before 
the implementations of the policy, the net growth maintained lower down to around 12.5 
thousandths (see Chart 7). The Chinese case might not be very representative, however, once 
investigating each developing country, one thing is very certain that its demographic 
transformation is never as smooth as today’s developed countries. 
 
Chart 7: Chinese population growth, 1949 to 2014 
 
Last but not the least, the most indispensable part of the transformation of 
demographic structures also lies in the sense of life identity and the collective consciousness of 
generation after generation, which also impacts the individual’s mobility decision-making. For 
example, the older French generation was very attached to the land and rurality, mainly because 
it was inseparable from their retention of revolutionary achievements, at the same time the 
small-scale peasant economy could also sustain the family at that time; however, as of the 1870s, 
most of the French rural migrants flowed to cities found were the most next generations. E.g. 
as in the Baalong area of Alpis, France, 81% of the rural migrants mobilized to cities before the 
age of 30 (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). Also, rural-to-urban labour mobility in today’s developing 
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countries can not be simplified as purely economic behavior, because to many peasants of the 
LDCs, doing farm is not only a profession but also a way of life (Todaro et al., 1988). 
II.1.4. Issues hidden behind “success” 
 
Through the above comparisons, it can be rashly concluded that the process of rural-
to-urban labour mobility of the EICs in their corresponding process of industrialization & 
urbanization seems to be quite smooth. However, if deducting the assumption of auto-fully 
employment of a market economy which requires the free flow of factors including labour 
mobility, rural migrant does not always find a job promptly once mobilizes to urban areas. This 
then would instantly cause urban unemployment and induce social problems (Z. H. Jiang, 
2012a). In general, almost all countries of EICs had experienced various problems arising from 
the rural labour mobility, and suffered to varying degrees, along the process of their 
industrializing. Issues that induced can be summarized as following: the widespread of 
slummification, severe urban poverty, worsening inequality, deteriorative urban unemployment, 
shortage of urban housing, traffic congestion, poor sanitation, pollution, limited infant/and 
school-age schooling, etc. And due to the situation that rudimentary cities were not only very 
disordered with poor sanitary and living conditions, but also un-prepared to receive massive 
rural migrants. The amplification of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, cholera, smallpox, 
malaria, typhoid, dysentery, etc., had led to a very high urban mortality rate.  
Even a rough review of history could already reflect so. For example, in terms of 
living conditions, back-to-back housing was the typical living space of the English working 
class in most of the industrial cities in the 19th century (Frederick Engels, 2005). The average 
number of people living in one house in England increased from 7.03 in 1801, to 7.72 in 1851, 
and 7.85 in 1881 (Chapman & Wohl, 1971). Also, the basement housing was another major 
place for working-class. In Liverpool, around 20 percent of its population (45,000 people) at 
that time lived in 7,862 narrow, dark, humid, and airless basements (Frederick Engels, 2005); 
In terms of slummification of cities and non-human conditions of the living environment, in the 
19th century, nearly every big city had one or more slums crowed with the working class. And 
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in the 1830s and 1840s, about 50,000 people were homeless in London. The slum situation was 
not only in England, but also in Scotland Ireland.  
The situation can also be reflected in the urban life expectancy and rate of urban 
mortality, generally, early industrialized cities have lower life expectancy than rural areas. For 
example, in 1843, the average life expectancy of Liverpool residents was only 26 years old, 
London was 37 years old, while in Surrey (a typical rural region) was 45 years old (Perkin, 
2003). A similar situation also occurred in other countries, according to the statistics of France 
from 1886-1889, the larger of the city, the higher of the mortality rate: Urban mortality rate was 
2.091% of cities with 5,000 or fewer people, 2.158% (cities of 5,000-10,000 people), 2.58% 
(cities of 10,000-20,000), and 2.665% (cities of 100,000-400,000 people) (Z. M. Ding, 2002). 
Also in the USA, the 1890 census showed that the mortality rate of the rural population at that 
time was 1.534% while 2.215% for the urban population (Z. M. Ding, 2002);  
For more details, they can be found in Engels’ “the Condition of Working Class in 
England.” As described vivid situations of early big cities and living conditions of the working 
class: another side of human “civilization” along with the industrial civilization. The early big 
city is a place full of devastating human civilization: huddle, chaos, pollution, poverty, disease, 
violence, theft, crime, moral decay, etc. Only until the mid-19th century, did countries start to 
remedy. For instance, most countries started to establish urban water supply systems, and 
intercept rivers to build reservoirs. In around the 1870s, Britain firstly took the lead in building 
waterworks in the city (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). The urban drainage project was also 
established after the 1950s. In the 1860s and 1870s, the UK and Germany, one after another, 
began to rectify urban drainage systems. And the United States started at the very end of the 
19th century by its 1899 Refuse Act, to name just a few.  
To sum up, on the one hand, the rural-to-urban labour mobility in history has 
manifested itself clearly that no country in this world had not passed such a problematic 
transition. On the other hand, nevertheless, comparing to the situation of today’s LDCs, EICs 
still did well (as discussed before,) and managed to achieve their industrialization respectively. 
Also, they appeared to have created essential conditions to realize a dynamic equilibrium in a 
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non-subjective/unconscious situation. Except for the early state intervention during the 
colonization, there seems to be no obvious intervention internally during the process, especially 
direct intervention to labour mobility. However, was it so in real history?  
Therefore, a dynamic paradigm (entangled among time, space, and people) was 
designed exclusively to answer such a question. As simply to respond, two dimensions of 
historical observations (internality and externality) would facilitate and unmask the truth. For 
externality, although the industrialization process of each country is at a different historical 
stage of capitalist development, thus, it faces different external conditions. This, in turn, will 
affect the internal conditions, including labour mobility. But for the first two batches of 
industrial countries, the world capitalist development made very close external connections and 
offered many similar external conditions, which can be viewed by a historical circumstances 
analysis: “We can call capitalism (England) that forms a world still immersed in the age of 
primitive accumulation. Of late capital (Germany, France, etc.) that capitalism constitutes the 
concrete stage of capitalism” (Oliveira, 1985). 
While for internality, United Kingdom - the first country started off industrial 
revolution, together with France, Germany, the United States of America and Japan - countries 
later seized the second industrial revolution, all demonstrated similar policies and regulations 
in the light of each stage of industrialization, which directly and indirectly, tangibly and 
intangibly, intervened rural-to-urban labour mobility. On the one hand, from the perspective of 
a non-state consciousness, the dynamic evolution that engaged between the early bourgeoisies 
fighting for power and the working-class struggling for rights, in a certain extent, had forced 
the emerging formation of the state via a series of public policies to solve issues induced by the 
chaos of rural-to-urban labour mobility. And perhaps the first industrializer (the UK) did not 
have a clear sense of intervention, rather, it more reflected a dynamic process of power relations 
and power structures in the development of capitalism among the state, labour, and capital, and 
resulted in the fact that various mobility-related policies and regulations had been 
synchronously produced along each and every stage. On the other hand, for the second 
industrializers, especially Germany and Japan, the consciousness of the state intervention to 
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catch up emerged. Taking the enclosure movement, for example, the UK used it mainly for the 
production of industrial workers, however, the German version “the Prussian Reform 
Movement,” produced not only industrial workers, but also mobilized huge capital in fewer 
Junkers for the primitive accumulation.  
In addition, as for demographic transformations of the EICs as discussed before, it 
also seems a process of a non-intervened & natural consequence. However, ever since the 
publication of the Malthusian Theory of Population, various public policies of the EICs had 
directly intervened in population fertility, which has been much neglected today since its 
sensitivity to the issue of human rights. For example, the amended Poor Law in the UK had 
indirectly changed the fertility policy, since it believed that the unemployment and poverty of 
the working class of a capitalist society are attributed to the rate of population growth exceeding 
the rate of growth of the means of subsistence. To name just a few, although examples given 
are scattered/unsystematic, it has already unveiled the mysterious veil of what the neoclassic 
claimed.   
To sum up, differences in rural-to-urban labour mobility between the EICs and the 
LDCs, along with their respective process of industrialization, have been basically elaborated. 
Although it is a general comparison mainly in objective conditions and historical circumstances, 
the practical complexity of rural labour mobility itself has been fully demonstrated. However, 
this research cannot be profound if not only in exposing these differentials, but it should also 
try to explain the hidden causations behind. Thus, it is indispensable to have an in-depth 
understanding of different theoretical interpretations thereof. However, through the pectination 
of various classic theories of labour mobility in the previous chapter, it is self-evident that no 
single theory can adequately explain these differences and provide essential causations. For this, 
it requires methodological innovations and heterodox approaches in the study of rural labour 
mobility in the process of industrializing. In turn, it would provide theoretical and practical 
guidance to today’s LDCs that are experiencing large-scale rural-to-urban labour mobility. And 
it is precisely the purpose of this thesis.  
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II.2. Literature Reviews 
 
Having realized that the rural-to-urban labour mobility/migration if beyond 
employment capacity (or urbanization beyond industrialization) is both a symptom of 
underdevelopment and a factor that exacerbates underdevelopment in the third world. Although 
in 1978, out of 116 developing countries, 90 had tried to implement various policies in the light 
of the research conclusion derived from United Nations, aiming to reduce or slow down the 
process of rural-to-urban labour mobility, the results were far from being satisfactory (Todaro 
et al., 1988), rather with the trend of turning economy into informatization, urban 
slummification and rural marginalization, etc. What should be attributed to this “dissatisfaction,” 
unfortunately, remains very little in current literature, since the dilemma lies in: On the one 
hand, if purely following the “invisible hand,” an unpreventable market failure might induce 
problems by the ‘disordered/blind’ rural labour mobility; On the other hand, if purely following 
the “visible hand”, a predictable state failure as claimed by most neoclassical discourse that the 
third world often lacks “good governance,” would cause the humanitarian crisis, such as the 
forced “closure movement” or the control over the freedom of people’s mobility.  
Although there are currently a few exclusive theoretical works devoted to deliberate 
this dilemma, and almost all theories of labour mobility aforementioned implicitly contain 
exploratory interpretations in this field. In particular, each of them opened the social, economic, 
and political space that the state could step in; more details can be seen in Table 12. Also, over 
the last hundred years, the Western political economy has broadly experienced significant 
breakdown periods and transition of different politico-economic paradigm that generally 
encompass political/economic goals, for understanding the functioning of economies and 
societies (Laybourn-Langton & Jacobs, 2018). Although some narratives which describe and 
justify the goals and analytical framework, as well as economic and social policies, that seek to 
achieve specific goals, many of them, such as the laissez-faire paradigm, the neoliberalism 
paradigm, coupled with many migrational theories, like the Cost and Returns model, Self-
selection Model, Agricultural Surplus Model, and New Economics of Migration Model (that 
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have been presented in Chapter I), etc., still much affirm that the state or its whatsoever 
interventions should be out of the free market mechanism (Lin, 2012; Storey, 2017), and the 
state should never attempt via any forms of labour market interventions to promote the 
industrialization (Justin Yifu, 2010). The rural labour mobility, as for them, is merely the 
natural selection of free-market or the results of the re-allocation mechanism of labour market 
factors and individual liberal willingness/human capital.  
However, they all attempted to cover up the essential issues of capitalist 
development, namely the socialization of labour, of which the part that concealed is the forced 
labour mobility by capital. This “hand” of capital is, therefore, often hidden behind the free 
market mechanism. Nonetheless, not only did Marx have articulated this capitalist “hand” by 
his systematic rationale of the capitalist mode of production and capital accumulation (see 
Chapter I), but he also crucially pointed out the role of the capitalist state in such a process of 
labour mobility. “[...] the pretensions of capital in embryo — when, beginning to grow, it 
secures the right of absorbing a quantum sufficit (sufficient quantity) of surplus-labour, not 
merely by the force of economic relations, but by the help of the state [...]” (Vol. I, Chap. 10). 
This exposure also opened the very area of discourses over the role of the state, especially in 
the arena of development economics. Thus, so as to respond to the rural labour mobility in the 
process of industrialization, most literature can be found from different interpretations over the 
“limited” role of the state.  
The most controversial attempt would lie in the school of Freiburg and its theory of 
ordoliberalism, given both the neoliberalism and the interventionism criticize it to both opposite 
propositions (Moszyński, 2015; Siems & Schnyder, 2014). To get rid of these critiques, the 
Freiburg School advocates itself strictly procedural and rule-oriented liberalism, which can be 
considered as the “third path” neither liberalism nor interventionism (Zhao, 2016). It is the 
liberalism that Eucken with his school place in the tradition of classical liberalism but have 
been developed a systematically integrated approach to the theoretical study and the political 
shaping of constitutional social-economic-political order. In other words, they try to create 
conditions under which the ‘invisible hand’ that Adam Smith had described can be expected to 
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do its work (Vanberg et al., 2007). But the liberalism in free-market order is not merely what 
one would find if and where the state is absent. Besides, the school distances itself from laissez-
faire liberalism that failed to appreciate the essential positive role that the state has to play in 
creating and maintaining an appropriate framework of rules and institutions that allows market 
competition to work effectively, given that the free market order is not a natural event but a 
political-cultural product, based on a constitutional order that requires careful ‘cultivation’ for 
its maintenance and proper functioning (Vanberg, 2004).  
In itself, the ordoliberalism under the constructed economic “constitution” not only 
regulates the market order but it also strongly shapes the state power, ensuring an “absolute” 
competitive free market. This is significantly important since other forms of state intervention 
often neglect or lack of concrete regulations towards the state, which, in a sense, often failed 
by the “unregulated” state power and ended up by its internal political crisis, such as corruption. 
It is exactly where most neoliberalism claimed that, especially for LDCs, they often lack good 
governance/institution. Thus, for ordoliberalism, the state is by no means an argument in favour 
of an authoritarian state with large discretionary power (Vanberg, 2004). The shaped state was 
meant by them is constrained by a political constitution that prevents the government from 
becoming the target of special interest rent-seeking of other market actors. 
Concretely, the ordoliberalism starts from the very premise that the market order is 
a constitutional order, that it is defined by its institutional framework and, as such, subject to 
(explicit or implicit) constitutional choice. It assumes that the working properties of market 
processes depend on the nature of the legal-institutional frameworks within which they take 
place and that the issue of which rules are and which are not desirable elements of such 
frameworks ought to be judged as a constitutional issue (Vanberg, 2004). In turn, the 
constitutional economic policies that the state can produce have to pursue ways to create 
conditions under which economic actors in seeking to improve the framework of rules, the 
economic constitution, such that a well-functioning and desirable economic order results, rather 
than seeking to bring about desired outcomes directly by specific interventions into the 
economic process.  
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For all that, what would be the ordoliberalism for the research of rural labour 
mobility? Obviously, on the one hand, it preserves the state role as long as it has been well 
framed in the economic-constitutional order, and the state does not interrupt the competitive 
function of labour market. The space leaves the state much in producing policies and 
legislations in the area of general education, labour protection, and working conditions. And 
for any other public policies, even welfare provisions, they must not be in conflict with the 
privilege-free nature (privileges granted to particular industries) of the rules of the game of the 
market and must not be provided in ways, e.g., subsidies, that corrupt the fundamental ethical 
principle of the market order (Vanberg, 2004). Rural labourers freely mobilize based on their 
own individual advantages (qualification, skill, experience, etc.), while the labour market 
functions regardless of any barriers of race, gender, religion, etc. On the other hand, if rural 
labourers mobilize based on this guaranteed competitive functioning labour market, then 
nothing the state should place itself inside it. To a great extent, it is still much identical to what 
the neoliberalism claims. And apparently, the ordoliberalism tries to place the state in a neutral 
position between the capital and labour, and believes that a competitive labour market is also 
neutral, biased ignore whatsoever the nature of capitalist labour market is never neutral for 
labour.  
Although ordoliberalism in exploring the role of the state does offer some open 
discussions, a free competitive labour market as it pursues may actually not exist in real world 
since main stakeholders of labour market are considered as “dead” factors of production. The 
ordoliberalism seems to ignore that these stakeholders are people who can make a social-
political-economic alliance, like labour forms trade unions and bourgeois mobilizes industrial 
alliance, etc. Indeed, the state has been well-framed if so under the economic constitution, then 
how about other forms of institutions? What if other institutions or power groups intervene or 
even manipulate the rules of the game in labour market, should the state still keep neutral as 
ordoliberalism claims? Obviously, the labour market as what the ordoliberalism projected is 
much ideal, which inquires all actors obey the so-called economic constitution that from the 
very beginning is hard to achieve.   
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Also, if taken the perspective from the labour market segmentation theory, a free, 
competitive, and a well-integrated labour market ever since its nascence is actually never 
existed. Notably, along with the process of industrialization even before the substantial rural-
to-urban labour mobility, the labour market was at its beginning formation. It, thus, can not be 
a well-integrated labour market since the very beginning. Along with the process of formation, 
the continuing labour market divisions pose anomalies for neoclassical economic theories. The 
orthodox theory assumes that profit-maximizing employers evaluate workers in terms of their 
individual characteristics and predicts that labour market differences among groups will decline 
over time because of competitive mechanism (Arrow, 1971). However, by most measures, the 
labour market differences among groups have not been disappearing (Reich et al., 1973). 
Therefore, from the perspective of labour mobility in the process of labour market formation, 
it should be viewed in the historical process whereby political-economic forces encourage the 
division of labour market into separate submarkets or segments, distinguished by different 
labour market characteristics. And the rural-urban segmentation would be the most prominent 
outcome of this segmentation process of the initial stage of industrialization.   
The origin of the theory of labour market segmentation can be traced back to Muller 
and Keynes, who opposed Adam Smith’s competitive nature of the labour market (Yao & X. 
Li, 2005). The segmentation theory claims that labour market per se is very complex, and tend 
to be impacted by many non-economic factors. Due to many institutional and social reasons, 
non-competitive groups are formed and constrain free labour mobility (Lester, 1951). Although 
the real divisions of labour market are further complicated than Doringer and Piore’s Dual 
labour market (Doeringer & Piore, 1971) and Lindbeck and Snower’s insider-outsider model 
(Lindbeck & Snower, 1986) and other simplistic divisions, all forms of segmentation theories 
have already exposed the very nature of a non-competitive labour market and where potential 
space for the state and other actors to pave the way for an integrated rural-urban labour market. 
Not even to mention, if the labour market as one of the specific tool serves for any specific goal 
of one country’s industrial strategy.  
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Since segmentation theories believe that labour market per se has certain segmented 
properties, such as non-competitive, unequal, fragmented, etc., therefore, a free labour market 
cannot prevent the formation of labour divisions that constrain free labour mobility. Thus, even 
in a properly functioning market economy, the labour market could not achieve perfect 
competitiveness if only relying on the market’s own strength. That is to say, we cannot expect 
it to eliminate the segmentations through the market force itself. It is our new interpretation of 
labour market segmentation theory place where a theoretical space for the state and other labour 
market stakeholders to play. And of course, the state and its interventions are always the sources 
of the new labour market segmentations.     
Furthermore, most of the segmentation theories still pay much attention within the 
urban labour market arena, which neglects the fact that in the initial stage of rural-to-urban 
labour mobility, the segmentation was more rural-urban division. For this, Lewis offers his 
dichotomic projection. Namely, the urban labour market fully substitutes the rural one if along 
with urban expansion, all surplus rural labourers have been fully transferred to urban labour 
market. Then the urban labour market is thus the ultimate integrated labour market. In contrary, 
Todaro stands for through narrowing gaps between urban and rural labour market by improving 
rural standards and promotion for rural industrialization, make both rural and urban labour 
markets indifference for labours to free mobilize so as to achieve the ultimate integration. In 
any way, both Lewis’ and Todaro’s propositions pose the state a biased choice, of which any 
polices in the realm of labour market would have influences on the rural labour mobility.  
Besides, the realms of development economics also have numerous theoretical 
foundations in articulating the role of the state in economic development. Especially after 
WWII, emphasizing market failures has become the core of “development economics” (Lin, 
2012). And under the influence of Keynesianism, the early developmental theories held that the 
market encompassed insurmountable defects and that the state was a powerful supplementary 
means to accelerate the pace of economic development (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). Thus, to 
insert the role of the state, Rosenstein’s framework sparked a wave of similar ideas (Rosenstein-
Rodan, 1943; W. A. Lewis, 1954) that in favour of the state’s direct intervention in the 
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development of industrialization. Besides, various schools of first-generation structuralist 
economists also emphasized the importance of structural change and saw structural differences 
as another result of market failure. They claim that all countries that remain poor have failed to 
achieve structural transformation, that is, they have been unable to diversify away from 
agriculture and the production of traditional goods into manufacturing and other modern 
activities. Thus, for structuralism, sustained economic growth cannot happen without structural 
changes (Kuznets & J. T. Murphy, 1966). Accordingly, the most strategic intervention proposed 
to use government interventions to facilitate structural change mainly via import substitution 
and gave priority to modern advanced industries.  
However, the emergence of stagflation in the 1970s, the Latin American debt crisis, 
and the collapse of the socialist planning system in the 1980s have marked the failure of the 
“old” interventionist structuralism. It is when the New Structural Economics (NSE) came into 
being. By criticizing the state’s intervention of old schools which went beyond the market 
mechanism and contravened a country’s comparative advantages, the NSE emphasizes certain 
coordination between the market and the state in the process of promoting economic 
development and claims that the market should be the basic mechanism for resource allocation, 
but that government must play an active role in coordinating activities in the dynamic growth 
process, such as investments for industrial upgrading and diversification and in compensating 
for externalities generated by first moves (that cannot be internalized by individual enterprises) 
(Justin Yifu, 2010).  
Specifically, the active role that the state can paly is mainly to facilitate structural 
change through mitigating the coordination and externality problem. And this form of 
intervention must be dynamic under the Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework11 
that lays out a step-by-step approach for the state to facilitate the structural change. Because 
economic development per se is a dynamic process that entails structural changes, involving 
industrial upgrading and corresponding improvements in “hard” (tangible) and “soft” 
(intangible) infrastructure at each level (Lin, 2012). Examples of hard infrastructure are 
                                                
11 The GIFF basically guides policy markers on how to identify new industries consistent with a country’s latent comparative 
advantage. 
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highways, port facilities, airports, telecommunication systems, electricity grids, and other 
public utilities. And soft infrastructure consists of institutions, regulations, social capital, value 
systems, and other social, economical arrangements. Therefore, the main contents of the state 
intervention are much framed to accompany and provide them accordingly infrastructures of 
each level’s development’s requirements.  
Furthermore, the essential economic structure of an economy for the NSE is 
endogenous to its factor endowment structure and that sustained economic development is 
driven by changes in factor endowments and continuous technological innovation. Thus, a 
country’s comparative advantages and thus, its optimal industrial structure is determined by 
these factor endowments. Upgrading the industrial structure in a given country requires the 
upgrading of the factor endowment structure from one that is relatively abundant in labour and 
natural resources to one that is relatively abundant in the capital, the introduction of new 
technologies, and the corresponding improvement in infrastructure to facilitate economic 
operations. But each level of economic development is a point along the continuum from a low-
income agrarian economy to a high-income post-industrialized economy, not a dichotomy of 
two economic development levels (poor versus rich or developing versus industrialized).  
As such, factor endowments for countries at the early levels of development are 
typically characterized by a relative scarcity of capital and relative abundance of labour or 
resources. And at the other extreme of the development spectrum, high-income countries 
display an utterly different endowment structure, namely, the relatively abundant factor in the 
capital, not natural resources or labour. Although the NSE denies the lineal growth spectrum of 
Rostow’s five stages of growth, in between of the two extreme sides of endowment structures, 
these five stages manifested five formations of different social structures: (i) traditional 
societies, characterized by subsistence economy, with output not traded or even recorded, the 
existence of barter, high levels of agriculture, and labour-intensive agriculture; (ii) societies 
with preconditions to growth, where there is an increase in capital use in agriculture, the 
development of mining industries, and some growth in savings and investment; (iii) societies 
in take-off mode, with higher levels of investment and industrialization, accumulation of 
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savings, and a decline in the share of agricultural labour force; (iv) societies that driven to 
maturity and where wealth generation enables further investment in value-adding industry and 
development - growth becomes self-sustaining, industry is diversified, and more sophisticated 
technology is used; and (v) mass-consumption societies that achieve high output levels and 
where the services industry dominates the economy (Rostow, 1960). 
The same as other presented theories, the NSE is also too broad and general for the 
research of the rural labour mobility in the process of industrialization. But what the NSE 
offered validly is this whole spectrum growth framework that consisted of the dynamic state 
intervention in accordance with each structural change of factor endowments. Because being 
one of the structures, substantial rural labour mobility from rural to urban areas and among 
three sectors of industries indeed transforms the overall employment structure, which in turn 
changes the factor endowment (labour/capital ratio) that requires the correspondent/different 
both hard and soft infrastructures where need necessary facilitation from the state. That is to 
say, for NSE, the rural labour mobility in the process of industrialization, is merely a changing 
allocation process of labour resource in the light of the whole spectrum (not necessarily a lineal 
way) of social/economic structural transformations. Different from the old schools of 
structuralism, the NSE articulates a dynamic state intervention mechanism.  
Nevertheless, apart from major discourses over the roles of the market and the state, 
the schools of institutional economics12 draw our attention to the third force – institutions, and 
shift from general ideas concerning human agency, institutions, norms, and values to the 
theories related to specific institutions, and emphasizes the role of the evolutionary process of 
the institutions in shaping the economic development. Institutions in this sense then can be 
understood as the linkages between the market and the state. Even the broader studies of 
institutions view markets as a result of the complex interaction and power relations of various 
institutions of labour, bourgeois, the state, social norms, etc. In itself, the institutionalism was 
born taking different types of institutions into its analysis, especially these non-market factors, 
such as institutional, legal, historical, social, ethical factors, etc.  
                                                
12  To be noted, the term “institutional economics or institutionalism” in this thesis is referred to the so-called old 
institutionalism in the tradition of Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Wesley Mitchell. 
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For institutionalism, the economy is an open and evolving system and embedded in 
a broader set of social, cultural, political, and power relations (Hodgson, 2000). And institutions 
are regarded as the “rules of the game,” the “general regularities in social behavior” (Schotter, 
2008), or the “humanly devised constraints” (North, 1990), both the formal legal rules and the 
informal social norms that structure social interactions (North, 1991). On the one hand, being 
as imposing form, institutions possess causal powers upon human activity through the 
continuing production and reproduction of habits of thought and action (Veblen, 1919; Hodgson, 
1998; Hamilton, 1919); On the other hand, institutions as “collective action in liberation and 
expansion of individual action” (Commons, 2001). And the scope of institutions encompasses 
not simply organizations such as markets, corporations, banks, labour unions, political parties, 
universities, etc., but also integrates systematic social entities such as money, language, culture, 
history, and law (Hodgson, 1998).  
By its very nature, institutional economics was born congenitally to explore the 
essential mechanism of each institution. However, we cannot take each individual institution 
solely, since all institutions involve the interaction of agents which sustain and are sustained by 
shared conceptions, information, and routines. Also, all institutions are per se with a biased 
position, since each institution incorporate values, and processes of normative evaluation. In 
particular, institutions reinforce their own moral legitimation: that which endures is often - 
rightly or wrongly - seen as morally just (Hodgson, 1998). As such, under the diverging 
interests of different value-driven institutions, the state is often required to mediate, even 
arbitrate among these conflicting groups (even the state is not absolutely neutral). Being the 
most concrete forms, the laws of the state, the case laws of the courts, the legal conducts, ratified 
international conventions, various forms of policies, regulations, so on and so forth are 
identified the volition of the state. By firmly highlighting the role of the law in the publication 
of the Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Commons, 2007), Commons argues that institutions 
emerge and change through the actions of decision-makers, through political efforts, or 
pressures from political parties to change legislation (Parada, 2001). 
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However, as for the institutionalism, perceptions on the role of the state is quite 
different from the aforementioned discourses. The enforcement of legal foundations cannot be 
simplistically considered as being interventionist, nor anti-interventionist since other 
institutions intervene in social entities through the institutionalist interactive system where 
power, value, and culture play an important role. The institutionalism is more concerned with 
the role of the state in “enhancing the life process,” guided by the ongoing and continuing 
construction of values in society, where the government does not care only about the market 
allocation of resources but about the development of these resources with a view toward higher 
efficiency that goes far beyond Pareto Optimality (Parada, 2001). 
Being traced back to the German Historical School in the 19th century, the 
methodology of institutionalism is thus, historically located, based on a value-driven, dynamic 
process that is instrumental, not equilibrium focused, but evolutionary. And extensive use is 
made of historical and comparative empirical material concerning socioeconomic institutions. 
Accordingly, there are multiple levels and types of analysis. And these different levels must be 
linked together. In general, institutional economists approach the analysis of macroeconomic 
systems by examining patterns and regularities of human behavior. The regularities at the 
systemic level may arise from variations at the micro-level. That is to say, institutional 
economics sees regularities at the systemic level as being reinforced through positive feedbacks 
upon the microeconomic elements. The institutionalizing function of institutions means that 
macroeconomic order and relative stability is reinforced alongside variety and diversity at the 
microeconomic level. The strong influence of institutions upon individual cognition provides 
some significant stability in socioeconomic systems, partly by buffering and constraining the 
diverse and variable actions of many agents (Hodgson, 1998). 
And being evolutionary and dynamic, the institutionalism is also much concerned 
with processes of structural transformation, emergence, and change (Hodgson, 2000). It is thus, 
more useful, for instance, in dealing with issues such as long-term economic development 
(Hodgson, 2000). The evolutionary and dynamic nature of the institutionalism can be derived 
from two forces. One is the internal force, in which the evolutionary process is an endless 
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sequence subjected to cumulative causation. For the institutionalism, the economic life history 
is a cumulative process of adaptation of means to ends that cumulatively change, as the process 
goes on, both the agent and its environment being at any point the outcome of the past process 
(Veblen, 1899): 411. And the other one is the external force effected by the progressive 
technological changes, viewing the human history as “a perpetual opposition of the forces,” 
that the force of technology continuing making changes impact internal institutions” (Ayres, 
1944). And there is always resistance to technological change in institutions that are embedded 
in social stratification, conventions, or more, and are carefully protected and enforced by 
ideology (Ayres, 1944).  
Last but not the least, the importance of the institutional economics (especially the 
original school of thought13), lies in outlining the principle scope and content of its subject, 
rather than its further amplification. In particular, what the analysis of the success of some 
specific institutions does not imply its equal functions to others, although this does not prevent 
us from learning how specific institutions function. Besides, the institutionalism has no general 
theory on the study of labour mobility, but it offers a set of guideline approaches and principles 
to this specific topic. Following the institutionalist approach, labour mobilizes in the process of 
industrialization can be viewed in specific institutional contexts, followed by the formulation 
of the migrational theory that is specific to the type of institution being investigated. These then 
lead to historically and institutionally specific studies that are arguable of more operational 
value than any all-embracing general theory. And this can be guided for our research in deeply 
looking at all these evolutionary changes of the institutions that play a role in rural labour 
mobility. 
In summary, although there are many more theories in exploring the roles of the 
state, the market, the institution and other factors in economic development, and the above 
theories are much complicated than being presented, they are all too broad and general in 
connecting to the topic of this thesis. But each theory from its own standpoint offers us very 
crucial perspectives. And if properly combine them all together, the very principles in 
                                                
13 The major discourses of institutional economics in this thesis are mainly from the original school of institutionalism.  
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determining our focus in reviewing the role of these factors especially of the state in empirical 
researches are quite clear: the way of intervention should be dynamic, and embedded in the 
evolutionary transformations of the whole spectrum of social-economic structures that 
constitutes of the changing structures of endowment factors; the roles if neutral, then, should 
be well framed in the so-called economic-constitutional order (if there is in real-world), and the 
content should be focused on tackling barriers of the labour market segmentations, and 
facilitating both hard and soft infrastructures, and limited to guarantee fair labour market order 
and supplement to universal labour protections and welfare policies. 
Unfortunately, the state here in all the above theories is often a neutral object (a state 
ought to be). Most of them are hesitated to expose the real nature of the state in reality, which 
always has biased roles in governing the entire system. For example, the Marxist state is purely 
a capitalist state which stands in the position of the interests of the bourgeois and has objectives 
to possess of the surplus value and occupy bigger markets. Or, as Galbraith’s industrial state 
that economic decisions are planned by a private bureaucracy, a technostructure14 of experts 
who manipulate marketing and public relations channels. They recruit governments to serve 
their interests with various policies (Galbraith, 2007). In specific, the following literature 
reviews on the study of the labour mobility can expose what exactly the role that the state played 
in history. And to narrow down the very concrete interventions of the state and institutions, all 
forms of policies and the whole bundles of legislations can be as our targets in the research 
analysis.  
In general, the literature of the rural-to-urban labour mobility in the process of 
industrialization in Western academia found is much concentrated in the theoretical arena, of 
which have been mostly presented in chapter I of this thesis. Among concrete material analysis, 
most literature found are either targeting developing countries, like (Todaro, 1969b; Todaro, 
1969a; Bloom & Freeman, 1986; Skeldon, 1990; Squire, 1981; Nunnenkamp, 1987; W. A. 
Lewis, 1967), or being too general and lack of cross-studies deliberating the relationships 
between labour mobility and industrialization: they are often the narrative analysis of labour 
                                                
14 Technostructure is the group of technicians, analysts within an organization with considerable influence and control on its 
economy. 
132 
 

migration of the specific country in its particular period of industrial revolution, to name just a 
few, such as, Redford’s “Labour migration in England (1800-1850);” Baines’ “Migration in a 
mature economy: emigration and internal migration in England and Wales (1861-1900);” 
John’s “Rural depopulation in England and Wales (1851-1951);” Eric’s “The agricultural 
labour market in England (1793-1872);” Hochstadt’s “Mobility and modernity: migration in 
Germany (1820-1989);” Hoerder & Nagler’s “People in transit: German migrations in 
comparative perspective (1820-1930);” Grant’s “Migration and inequality in Germany (1870-
1913);” Jackson’s “Migration and Urbanization in the Ruhr Valley (1821-1914),” Leslie’s 
“Internal migration before and during the Industrial Revolution: the case of France and 
Germany,” and George’s “Human migration: a geographical perspective.” so on and so forth.  
Surprisingly, the literature on the Western historical interpretations (especially of 
the earlier industrialized economies) and with direct cross-studies of the rural labour mobility 
to the process of industrialization, is found intensively in the contemporary Chinese academia. 
This might due to the level of the Chinese industrialization arrives at a similar stage of the 
industrialized countries of their earlier time, which needs the very concrete studies of the 
corresponding historical reinterpretations. Among the great number of studies, there are 
growing monographs exclusively in reviewing the successful experiences of countries in 
dealing with the rural labour mobility at their process of industrialization: like Jiang’s 
“Industrialization, urbanization, and labour migration in Europe;” Wang & Huang’s “Rural 
labour migration and urbanization in the USA and Europe;” Rong & Sima’s “Research of the 
agricultural labour mobility in various industrial countries;” Zhang’s “European social policies 
for rural labour mobility;” Meng’s “A study on the transfer of rural labour in the German Reich 
period: 1871-1914;” Cai et al.’s “Political economy of rural labour mobility;” Jiang’s 
“European labour policy and its inspiration to China;” Wang & Sun as well as Wang et al.’s 
“The industrial society: comparisons among five industrializers.” 
Following similar methodological analysis, there are numerous researches on these 
studies as well. In general, they are either comparison studies among the earlier industrializers, 
revealing different models of rural labour mobility in different types of industrialization 
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(Clapham, 1966; Burkhauser et al., 1997; B. J. Shi, 2006; C. Y. Wang & X. E. Li, 2004; Y. P. 
Wang, 2008; W. Gao, 2011; K. Jiang, 2012; P. Liu, 2006; Q. M. Liu & J. Huang, 2008); Or 
individual country studies that elaborate the specific historical singularities of each country in 
dealing with rural labour mobility, such as Germany (W. Jiang, 2007a; K. Jiang, 2012; L. Y. 
Zhang & L. J. Chen, 2010; Burda & Wyplosz, 1991); France (X. Huang, 1997; Klatzmann, 
1982; W. T. Shen, 2010; X. T. Chen, 2005; O'Brien, 1996); the UK (X. H. Liu, 2016; He & L. 
Liu, 2007; S. A. Li, 2005; Xue, 2004; Z. H. Wang, 1996; D. B. Gao, 1995); and the USA (D. 
M. Johnson & Campbell, 1981; Glaab & A. T. Brown, 1967; Kuznets & D. S. T. Thomas, 1957; 
Hauser & Taeuber, 1945; Burkhauser et al., 1997; Borjas et al., 1992).  
Apart from the above exclusive monographs, enormous researches are also engaged 
in this topic and managed to specialize in certain perspectives and explore other relevant areas 
that impact on rural labour mobility. To summarize, there are researches from the institutionalist 
emphases which exclusively focus on all types of policies and legislations of the industrialized 
period and the various reflections of the roles of the state and other institutions in determining 
rural labour mobility, e.g. Jiang’s European labour policies during the industrial revolution and 
their characteristics, and the like (Fraser, 1992; A. H. Hansen, 1959; M. J. Hill, 2004; Leonard, 
2013; J. T. Liu, 2003; Lu, 2007; Neal & Dickens, 2006; Yan, 2004; Chapman & Wohl, 1971; 
Y. Shen, 2001; Z. H. Jiang, 2012a); studies in the lense to expose of the very essence of 
industrial revolution and its strategies in dealing between labour mobility and capital 
mobilization in the capitalist economy, e.g. Robinson & Bank’s Industrialization and growth: 
a comparative study, and others (Toynbee & Jowett, 1894; Beales, 1958; Crafts, 1985; Huang, 
1997; Mantoux, 1983; Marshall, 2013; O'Brien, 1996; Oliveira, 1985; Robinson et al., 1986; 
Shen, 2010; Wang, 1994; Xing, 1999; Gu, 2007); researches from the angles of urbanizing 
process, social structural changes, and demographic transformations that expose dynamic 
societal conditions and causations to the rural labour mobility, e.g. Xiao’s German urbanization, 
population mobility and economic development, and others ( Development Research Center of 
the State Council, 2013; Vries, 2013; Ji, 2004; A. F. Weber, 1899; Xiao, 1997; X. Wang, 2000; 
Xing, 2005; L. L. Jiang, 2008; Perkin, 2003). 
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Moreover, there are researches in the traditional focus of economic growth, sectoral 
development, structural adjustment, modernization and etc., regarding labour mobility as the 
passive consequences thereof, such as Thomas’ Migration and economic growth: a study of 
Great Britain and the Atlantic economy, and the like (Burns, 2000; Chang, 2001; Dearie & Cole, 
1967; Kuznets & J. T. Murphy, 1966; Clapham, 1966; B. Thomas, 1973); Furthermore, studies 
from the perspective of rural development, agricultural revolution, labour productivity, rural 
industrialization, and land reforms in reviewing the supply side of labour migration, like 
Chambers & Mingay’s Agricultural revolution (1750-1880), and others (Chambers & Mingay, 
1966; G. Y. Huang, 1997; Thompson, 2013; G. X. Zhang, 2009; Allen, 2000; Klatzmann, 1982); 
Lastly, there are great varieties of economic historical literature although not intended to 
involve with labour mobility studies, but offered substantial data that is helpful to our study. 
Such as Clough & Cole’s Economic history of Europe; Floud & McCloskey’s The economic 
history of Britain since 1700 and Fan’s A brief history of the economy of major capitalist 
countries, so on and so forth like (Handcock, 1977; Dodgshon & Butlin, 2013; C. P. Hill, 1957; 
C. P. Hill, 1977; Bing & Da Yin, 1995; Anon, 1962; Cipolla, 1988; Clapham, 1964; Fan & 
Song, 1981; Lv & Qi, 2005; Wu & Z. B. Huang, 2000).  
This growing wave of studies on the history of the industrial revolution with 
weighted emphasis on reviewing its inherent relations to rural labour mobility pushed the labour 
mobility again at the center spot of migrational research, especially for those countries which 
are undergoing the process. And in corresponding to the theoretical debate over the roles of the 
state and other institutions along with the process, there are basically two prominent voices in 
this regard after concrete material analysis of the earlier industrializers. To elaborate, only the 
most representative arguments will be presented here. Some continually affirm the neoliberal 
approach arguing that rural labour mobility is merely the natural consequence of 
industrialization (or general economic growth), thus, no any external force needed to distort the 
market allocation mechanism over labour resources.  
For them, after assessing the experiences of early industrial countries, the economic 
structure always shows the declining proportion of primary industries and the increasing 
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proportion of the secondary and tertiary industries such as industry and service. Subsequently, 
the share of agricultural employment and rural population decline, whereas non-agricultural 
employment and urban population increase. The flow of labour is nothing but a spontaneous 
phenomenon of economic development, and often labour mobilizes from the primary industries 
to the secondary industry and finally to the service industry (Kuznets et al., 1989; Ravenstein, 
1885). And the driven forces that push rural labourers to mobilize are mainly due to the 
improvement of agricultural labour productivity and substantial application of technology in 
rural production, while, the pull factors can be summarized as the industrialization per se, and 
higher industrial wages (Petty & Graunt, 1899; Long & Ferrie, 2003; Colin, 1940). Thus, 
majority literature holds this argument often quote the American historical analysis, arguing 
that the American rural labour mobility during its own industrialization process is a spontaneous 
& liberal model (B. J. Shi, 2006; C. Y. Wang & X. E. Li, 2004), of which the rural labour 
mobility underwent a spontaneous process of transferring while releasing, given the distinctness 
of the American history and socioeconomic background at the time of industrial revolution. 
Moreover, the USA managed its labour transfer under a synchronous development path of 
industrialization, urbanization, and de-agriculturalization; 
On the contrary, the others, based on detailed historical materials, confronted the 
neoliberal propositions. Generally, the literature of this realm can be grouped into two principal 
directions. The ones are devoted to exposing a fact that in almost all industrialized countries, 
there were varied forms of interventions mainly via progressive policies and legislations on 
labour mobility along with their industrialized histories. Therefore, they are mainly in narrative 
approach, following the institutionalist analytical framework; While, the others are via 
historical analysis, following the structuralist framework to reveal the fundamental rationales 
among all these interventions, and to uncover what, where, how and why did these interventions 
work or fail in each specific historical experience.  
For the former ones, we can take England as an example. Before the first industrial 
revolution, under the influence of various legal restrictions, such as the Poor Law and the 
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Settlement Act, substantial rural labourers were much “orderly”15 mobilized under the forced 
enclosure movements (including the parliament-approved ones), and were much transferred to 
the area where the textile industries boomed (C. Y. Wang & X. E. Li, 2004; P. Liu, 2006); 
While, during and after the industrial revolution, in order to guarantee the full supply of labour 
for all industries, a series of laws were enacted and amended so as to eliminate previous 
institutional barriers that restricted labourer’s mobility. For example, the Poor Law Amendment 
Act, after 1846, no more required the poor rural migrants to move back to their places of origin 
if proved to be burdened. Together with the enactment of the Union Chargeability Act (1865), 
an essential free rural labour mobility was finally confirmed (Y. P. Wang, 2008). At the same 
time, various policies and laws were also enacted to solve urban problems induced by the 
massive rural labour mobility (to be noted the mobility of labourers in the workhouses again 
was restricted by the New Poor Law), coupled with other policies focused: On the one hand, 
started to regulate workers’ rights (such as the Factory Act and the Health and Morals of 
Apprentices Act); on the other hand, began to control the political mobilization of working-
class and their unions so as to have a stabilized and qualified workforce to sustain the ongoing 
industrialization (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). Lastly, as the UK gradually achieved its 
industrialization, in accordance, laws and polices then much accompany the shift of labour 
mobility from geographic transfer to occupational conversion. For instance, the “Increase of 
Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, the Housing and Planning Act, and the 
Public Health Law” etc. were all set to improve the living conditions of the rural migrants (Z. 
C. Liu et al., 2001; He & L. Liu, 2007). And coupled with the biased policies on the promotion 
of the development of the service sectors, the labour mobility was much in the form of 
occupational conversions among all different urban sectors (W. Jiang, 2013; D. X. Rong & 
Sima, 1989; Z. H. Jiang, 2012b; Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). 
By itself, literature in this realm often underline the influences of those institutions 
(including the state) over the rural labour mobility, and with the intention to associate them to 
the process of industrialization. As Liu concluded in his research that the practice of the English 
                                                
15 Orderly here refers to the will of farm landowners who pushed out rural laborers and the emerging factory owner who 
demanded labour. 
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rural labour mobility was largely in line with the needs of its own industrial development, 
arguing that both the early Enclosure movement and the later New Town movement all much 
involved with the participation of the state, and the state through varied legislations constantly 
intervened in areas related to rural labour mobility (X. H. Liu, 2016); Li also argues that no 
matter consciously or unconsciously the British government had indeed intervened in the 
process of rural labour mobility or tried with varied administrative measures to solve the so-
called problems of the rural surplus labourers, and managed to explore a set of practices over 
rural labour mobility from punish, to regulate, to monitor, to stimulate, to facilitate, and to 
protect (S. A. Li, 2005); Shi believes that more than 400 years’ experience over the rural-to-
urban labour migration in the UK, explored models of the state intervention from spontaneous 
response to conscious induction. The government deliberately leveraged the effects of the 
combination of legal enforcement and policy induction on rural labour mobility (B. J. Shi, 2006); 
He, Liu, and Xue believe that the spontaneous flow of rural population to cities in Britain history 
had manifested large degrees of blindness. However, the government from beginning to end 
has adopted a series of measures of state intervention, especially in the social problems caused 
by labour mobility, such as poverty, housing crowding, environmental sanitation, diseases, 
crimes, etc., and eventually evolved the embryonic form of the welfare state (He & L. Liu, 2007; 
Xue, 2004); to name just a few.  
To be noted, the above example is only the tip of the iceberg of the progressive 
British interventions over rural labour mobility in its industrialized history. And there is 
enormous literature demonstrated the similar historical situations of other countries as well, like 
France, the USA, Germany, and Japan. Since the UK is the first country that experienced the 
industrial revolution, the way how the English state interacted with the issues of the transfer of 
the rural surplus labour set many references for countries like France and Germany. And the 
policies of these catching-up countries in history have manifested more or less from passive 
coping to active initiation for rural labour migration (S. A. Li, 2005). 
While for the later ones, in line with the above propositions, other literature also 
based on historical materials but with emphasis on its analytical approaches, elaborate more in 
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perspectives of conditions, reasons, consequences, possible rationale, and potential mechanism 
over rural labour mobility. For example, Scherrer attributes early industrializers absorbed rural 
surplus population to conditions, such as population pressure, restrictions on migration, 
productivity differentials, terms of trade and the constraints on the promotion of industry, etc. 
(Scherrer & Verma, 2018). Although implicitly attributed to the role of the early industrialized 
state, Scherrer articulates that one of the reasons for late industrializers failed to catch up is 
because of the insufficient state capacity and, therefore, weak industrial policies (Breman, 
2016). 
Jiang articulates that through consecutively reforming and developing, many 
European countries have managed to build up a policy framework, which enables the allocation 
of labour source to match the labour supply in the process of structural change. Under such a 
framework, policies that regulate rural labour mobility from sporadic attempts to a complete 
policy system formation underwent a dynamic process, which impacted by a combination of 
various structural factors, such as, productivity changes, social structural and value changes, 
etc., of the specific countries (Z. H. Jiang, 2012b). However, he highlighted that the state did 
not have a prospective version of the layout of the labour-mobility-related police system, 
especially before the second industrial revolution. Thus, these policies demonstrated typical 
phased features which have inherent correlations to their phased features of industrial 
development.  
In his further studies (W. Jiang, 2013), Jiang shifted the attention to the analytical 
approach of the traditional political economy, asserting that the formation of labour policy 
system was basically the result of various interactions of power relations of different interests-
driven institutions. He argues that from historical analysis, due to the spontaneity and blindness 
of earlier labour mobility, it inevitably caused problems, such as unemployment, poverty, and 
social stratification, and led to social imbalances, which exacerbated the opposition between 
the two classes: the bourgeois and the proletariat. And this social imbalance did not naturally 
rebalance by its own force, where implies the external force, like the state. He quoted the 
experience of the German industrialization and presented the effects of political leverage under 
139 
 

the decentralization and rural urbanization in dealing with this social imbalance. The former 
via equalized and homogenized the distribution of public goods and public services of economic, 
social and political resources, has eliminated the central position of the metropolis, thus, greatly 
reduced the migrational desire of rural populations and promoted regional equalization and 
employment decentralization; The latter via transitional economic sectors, like rural and family 
industries, to develop rural urbanization. These sectors rely on the features of low qualification, 
high labour intensity, and high turnover, etc., to absorb the surplus rural labour and unemployed 
workers. In other words, it can be treated as one of the significant experiences of the German 
industrial strategy by promoting industry transfer rather than solely rely on labour mobility.  
By now, the literature on rural labour mobility in the process of industrialization has 
been mostly reviewed. Indeed, there are more and more studies devote to this topic, contributing 
multiple perspectives that diversify our understandings of the complexity of this research. And 
it is impossible to elaborate on them all. But based on current literature reviews, the following 
points deserve a notable highlight: 1. Among this literature, only a few research set its analytical 
scope so broad that covers the entire industrialization process. As such, their research, for one 
thing, are often lack of horizontal comparisons to other countries; For another, they are usually 
short of a vertical track on the impact of certain institutions on labour mobility with entire 
evolution; 2. Although there is some research attempted to deal with intrinsic correlations of 
the rural labour mobility and the process of industrialization, their methodologies seem to be 
quite a sameness: often a historical narrative analysis. In binding these two together, their 
research either with weighted focuses on industrialization, and only timely associate some 
declarative discourse of rural labour mobility, or vice versa; 3. Although many studies 
advertised their research scope on the industrial revolution, most of their analysis on labour 
policies are post-war period, due to the lack of reliable historical materials and related data; 4. 
Apart from mainstream socioeconomic analysis, only a few studies spared some attention on 
cultural and demographic factors on labour mobility. 
Last but not least, there are a great number of literature unilaterally magnifies the 
dominant and decisive role of state intervention in determining rural labour mobility. Since they 
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materialized the state intervention into a human’s conscious will, two significant points are 
often ignored: 1. The broad contexts of the capitalist evolution, the international environment, 
and the historical singularity are all essential in the sense that on the one hand, framing and 
reframing the ways of the state intervention; On the other hand, direct impacting on human’s 
reaction including the mobility to the changes of this broad contexts; 2. Very few literature 
adopted the traditional Marxist political economy analytical approach, in reviewing the state as 
a congregation of different interest-driven groups that interact under the power relations, of 
which people have subjective initiative, while being restricted by the system, they also change 
the system through various political mobilizations. In short, by highlighting the role of the state 
and relevant institutional interventions, these literatures at the same time, ignore the research 
of institutional creations and policy formations. Obviously, they are all with significant valuable 
reference to this thesis.  
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Chapter III. Rural Labour Mobility in the Process of Industrialization of the 
Selected EICs 
 
 
Being identical to our theoretical framework, this chapter is generally divided into 
four major parts. In the first part, we will present an overall situation of rural labour mobility 
of the selected EICs (the UK, France, the USA, and Germany) in their respective 
industrialization period mainly from the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century; the 
second part follows with overview analysis of cross-comparisons under the dynamic paradigm 
(time, space, and people), in explaining external conditions for EICs to have managed the 
smooth mobility transition; And the third part, we elaborate in details of the internal 
achievements of EICs by their dynamic state/institutions interventions via various forms of 
legislation, policies and regulations, under the institutionalist and new structuralist approaches; 
and in the last part, we explore the fundamental mechanism of those interventionist policies and 
legislations and attribute to the dynamic class struggles.  
 
III.1. Progression of industrialization and situations of rural labour mobility  
 
III.1.1. Definitions of industrialization process for the study of rural labour mobility 
 
Before the empirical analysis of rural labour mobility in the process of 
industrialization in selected EICs, measurement of industrialization process/stages needs some 
feasibility studies, though its process in relation to labour mobility has been discussed under 
theoretical dimensions. Thus, regarding the industrialization process/stages, there is a great 
variety of measures for analysis. And to present them in a clear way, we start with measures 
that are derived from original definitions of industrialization; then move to measures that vary 
by different evaluation criteria/indexes, such as the Hoffmann index, the Cody index, the 
Zelinsky’s mobility transition, per capita income, output value ratio, urbanization, etc.; And 
lastly, we present measures that are under the broader concept of economic 
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growth/development, like the Chenery’s economic development stage, Kuznets’ economic 
growth, Rostow’s five stages of growth, so on and so forth.  
In the light of the New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (Murray & Newman, 
1998), the industrialization per se is a process, which involves two simultaneous changing 
characteristics: manufacturing activities or the secondary industry, in general, are occupying 
higher proportion in national/regional income; and the proportion of working population 
employed in manufacturing or secondary industry is on the increase; Likewise, Chenery in his 
“Patterns of industrial growth” also defines industrialization as intrinsic changes of the 
economic structure, including a rise in the relative importance of manufacturing industry; a 
change in the composition of industrial output; and changes in production techniques and 
sources of supply for individual commodities (Chenery, 1960); Similarly but not solely limited 
to economy, Arthur and Sheffrin in their “Economics: Principles in action” define 
industrialization as the period of social change that transforms a human group from an agrarian 
society into an industrial society, involving the extensive re-organization of an economy for the 
purpose of manufacturing (Arthur & Sheffrin, 2003). There are others somehow quite a 
sameness in defining industrialization, thus, to name just a few. 
Furthermore, the industrialization process can also be staged under broader concepts 
of economic growth. It is often in line with what Kuznets has called “modern economic growth”, 
which in general includes a process narrowing gap between productivity per head in the 
secondary and primary sector, continual changes in the methods of production, the fashioning 
of new products, rise in the proportion of population living in towns, changes in the relative 
ratios of expenditures on capital formation and consumption and so on (Kuznets & J. T. Murphy, 
1966); Or it can be phased by the lineal growth spectrum of Rostow’s five stages of growth 
under social structures: (i) traditional societies, characterized by subsistence economy, with 
output not traded or even recorded, the existence of barter, high levels of agriculture, and 
labour-intensive agriculture; (ii) societies with preconditions to growth, where there is an 
increase in capital use in agriculture, the development of mining industries, and some growth 
in savings and investment; (iii) societies in take-off mode, with higher levels of investment and 
143 
 

industrialization, accumulation of savings, and a decline in the share of agricultural labour force; 
(iv) societies that driven to maturity and where wealth generation enables further investment in 
value-adding industry and development - growth becomes self-sustaining, industry is 
diversified, and more sophisticated technology is used; and (v) mass-consumption societies that 
achieve high output levels and where the services industry dominates the economy (Rostow, 
1960). 
By itself, the industrialization process/stages, thus, can be abstracted from above 
definitions and measured in the following aspects thereof: economic development level (can be 
reflected by per capita income), industrial structure (three strata compositions), industry 
structure (proportion value-added by manufacturing), employment structure (labour force 
distributions) and spatial structure (urbanization rate of the population), so on and so forth: 
 
In terms of economic development level, often measured by per capita GDP levels, 
Chenery firstly divides economic development into (three stages with six periods16): primary 
production stage (100-200 $ in 1964), industrialization stage, and developed economic stage 
(over 1,500 $), whereby three out of six variation periods break up the industrialization stage 
into the earlier period (200-400 $), the metaphase period (400-800 $) and the anaphase period 
(800-1,500 $). Moreover, his period judgment revealed intrinsic industry structure changes 
that reflect industrialization, among which the earlier period with manufacturing is centered 
on the labour-intensive industry, the metaphase period on the capital-intensive industry, and 
the anaphase period on the service-intensive industry (Robinson et al., 1986); 
As to measures by industrial structure changes, Chen et al., claim a positivist evolution 
of industrialization stages that are divided by the so-called optimizing compositions of 
industrial structures. In particular, their classification of industrialization stages is measured 
by four different output structures of strata industries. Specifically, valued by proportion size, 
the strata industry compositions are evolved in the following structural order along with 
industrialization stages: from “first, secondary and tertiary” to “secondary, first, and tertiary,” 
                                                
16 whereas the first period on (agriculture, or primary production), the fifth period on (technology-intensive) and the sixth 
period on (knowledge-intensive) corresponding to the pre-industrialization, post-industrialization, and modern time.  
144 
 

then to “secondary, tertiary, first,” and finally to “tertiary, secondary and first” (J. G. Chen et 
al., 2012); With Fang and Yu’s study (Chuanglin & Yu, 2016), it even detailed rough value 
ranges (value-added proportion). For them, the industrial structure (the primary-secondary-
tertiary) is evolved into the following corresponding composition: 50-25-25, 25-45-30, 15-
40-45, and 10-30-60.   
As for classification based on industry structure, John Cody and other scholars in a 
study co-sponsored by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
and World Bank (WB), proposed criteria (known as Cody index) for measuring the 
industrialization levels into four stages, including non-industrialization (below 20%), on-
going industrialization (20-40%), semi-industrialization (40-60%), and industrialization (over 
60%) based on the proportion of value-added of manufacturing in the total added value of 
commodity production sector (John Cody et al., 1990). Also, W. G. Hoffmann, according to 
the Hoffmann ratio (H) of net outputs of consumer to capital goods industries, varies four 
stages of industrialization (Lago 1969): the first stage when (4<the H ratio<6); second stage 
(1.5<H<3.5); third stage (0.5<H<1.5); and fourth stage (0<H<0.5), claiming a sequential 
regularity that the industrial sector develops along with industrialization from primary 
consumer-goods industries to capital-goods industries;  
Since industrialization enables a gradual shift of human’s major economic activities 
out of the agrarian society, people migrated from villages in search of jobs to places where 
factories were established. This shifting of rural population led to the increase of urbanization, 
in turn with its rate can indirectly reflect the industrialization levels. Ray. M. Northam 
contributes the classification (of industrialization process) based on a spatial structure with 
his demarcated three stages of urbanization (measured as the percentage of the population 
living in cities) (Northam, 1979). The initial stage is when urbanization is less than 30% (slow 
but steady growth of cities). The trend will continue to the middle stage when the urbanization 
level is between 30-70% (yet the accumulation rate is much faster). After the urbanization 
level reaches 70%, the rate of urbanization will gradually slow down and stabilize. And these 
three stages correspond roughly with the initial, middle and post stages of industrialization; 
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Besides, following similar propositions, Chen, with other scholars via flag values after 
exclusive studies on international statistical processing, further enriched the comprehensive 
stage classifications. As is clear in the following table (13), their indexes not only embrace all 
the above-mentioned indexes with estimated value ranges but also include that of the spatial 
and employment structure changes. For them, the increasing rate of urbanization and the 
decreasing proportion of the population employed in the primary industry also bearing 
potentials that indicate levels of industrialization.  
 
Table 13: Chen index: Flag values of different stages of industrialization 
Basic index 
Pre-
industrialization 
Stage (1) 
Industrialization stage Post-
industrialization 
stage (5) 
Early stage 
(2) 
Metaphase 
stage (3) 
Anaphase stage 
(4) 
1. GDP Per capita (Economic 
development level) E.g. US 
dollars in 1964 
100-200 200-400 400-800 800-1500 Over 1500 
2. Structure of added value of 
the three industries (Industrial 
structure) 
A>I 
A>20%, 
and A<I 
A<20%, I>S A<10%, I>S A<10%, I<S 
3. Proportion of added value of 
manufacturing to added value 
of total commodities (Industry 
structure) 
Below 20% 20-40% 40-50% 50-60% Over 60% 
4. Urbanization rate of the 
population (Spatial structure) 
Below 30% 30-50% 50-60% 60-75% Over 75% 
5. Proportion of population 
employed in the first industry 
(Employment structure) 
Over 60% 45-60% 30-45% 10-30% Below 10% 
Note: ‘A’ refers to Agriculture, ‘I’ refers to Industry, and S refers to Service. 
Source: (J. G. Chen et al., 2012; Q. Huang, 2018). 
 
In addition, there are also historical measurements based on the benchmark of the 
industrial revolution (S. G. N. Clark, 1999) in studying the industrialization process. Although 
there is much confusion on the boundaries of the industrial revolution itself, especially the 
implicit period of the second industrial revolution, the industrialization process can still be 
mirrored based on changes of certain indicators before and after the industrial revolution. Take 
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energy as a major productive force for instance, before the first industrial revolution (or deemed 
as the initial stage of industrialization), most kinds of productive energy were manpower, 
animal power, and natural forces (e.g., wind and water power), etc., but the first industrial 
revolution substantially turned them into steam power, as well the second industrial revolution 
shifts them mainly on the mechanic and electric power.  
And together with our previous studies of the economic dualism that elaborate 
relationships between rural labour mobility and the process of industrialization, as well as the 
integrated mobility transition of Zelinsky’s five-stage hypothesis (Zelinsky, 1971) (in Chapter 
I), and to facilitate our research analysis with its particular focus, we adopt this historical 
measurement which roughly divides industrialization based on the industrial singularity of each 
country’s industrial revolution into: the proto-industrialization (Clarkson, 1985) (the stage pre-
industrial revolution), industrial revolution (considered the end of the industrial revolution as 
when basically realized industrialization), and the later stage of industrialization or the stage 
after the industrial revolution (and due to our limited time frame, our analysis cannot cover the 
entire time frame of the post-industrialization). And this division is similarly equivalent to Stage 
1, 2&3, and 4 of the Chen Index. 
To set the start time-point of one’s industrialization which can be defined the 
boundary between the proto-industrialization and the industrial revolution, we can trace the 
major industrial outputs of the country or at international proportion when start to steadily 
increasing, and together in reference to other historian studies; However, it is rather more 
difficult in defining the end time-point of one’s industrial revolution which is used to divide for 
the later stage of industrialization. However, the term “industrial revolution” per se is 
problematic or, as Cameron claimed as “a misnomer,” since the term itself has no scientific 
standing and conveys a grossly misleading impression of the nature of economic change 
(Cameron, 1982). Especially from the point of the statistical analysis, because once the country 
embarks on its industrializing, all major industrial productions keep growing. And as is the 
consecutive pace of economic and social changes, we can hardly set a time to separate this 
process that was actually more of a gradual evolution than a revolution. For this, we step in 
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several structural changes to facilitate our division. Referenced by the metaphase of Chen Index, 
we take the following range values: when value-added by agriculture to GDP (industrial 
structure) below 20%, the proportion of employment in agriculture (employment structure) 
below 30%, and urbanization rate (spatial structure) above 50%.  
Also, we will take those structural changes (articulated early) of the UK as reference 
for other countries, since the first industrial revolution took place there. Subsequently, we will 
use the value ranges of the UK as a reference, especially by the industrial structure, employment 
structure, and urbanization, to respectively define the rest two stages. Thus, our time frame for 
this thesis would be from the middle of the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century.  
The above well-conceived measures in the industrialization process might be quite 
convincible, however, as industrialization per se is a process, not only consisted of some 
consecutive changes in quantitative measures but also encompassed transformations in a 
qualitative sense. Moreover, if relevant information and data cannot be collected or compared 
under current conditions, these measurements are still valuable for reference. And in the case 
of this thesis, we don’t intend to specify or determine the exact divisions of the industrialization 
stages. And the history of the industrialization process in the 18th and 19th centuries was not 
evolved in any normative paradigm. Thus, some classifications only facilitate a rough time 
frame for our analysis of industrialization. In the further analysis of rural labour mobility under 
time dimension, our time frame will be evaluated in broader including non-economic 
perspectives, such as time views of the changing capitalist forms, modes of production, 
productive forces & relations, agricultural/energy/transportation revolution, so on and so forth. 
And we never intend to view industrialization as a purely economic development process, but 
a process in which economic development results in social, political, and cultural changes; 
likewise, social, political, and cultural changes will influence economic development and the 
industrialization process.  
 
III.1.2. Industrialization stages and Rural labour mobility in EICs 
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III.1.2.1. Time frames of industrialization stages in the UK, France, the USA, and 
Germany 
 
In this part, our major task is to have a defined division of the industrialization 
process for each selected country with proper time-point of the start and end of their respective 
industrial revolution. But we do not intend to elaborate in detail on how the industrial revolution 
of each country occurred. Some statistical data of the industrial revolution will be used but just 
facilitate our concerns of the division. And the method will be much in light of the above 
discussion in part 1 of this chapter.  
 
III.1.2.1.1. Industrialization stages in the UK  
 
The experience of Great Britain, or more narrowly England and Wales, was the first 
country to industrialize. But the precise start and end of the industrial revolution are still debated 
among historians, as is the consecutive pace of economic and social changes (Hobsbawm, 1969). 
The British industrial revolution is well-recognized as occurred after mid of the 18th century 
(Hobsbawm, 1969; Inikori, 2002) since many research often regard the invention of the 
Spinning Jenny in 1764 as the very start of the first Industrial Revolution (D. X. Rong & Sima, 
1989). Also, for one among other reasons because ever since then substantial transitions of 
productive forces took place included from hand production methods to machines, new 
chemical manufacturing and iron production process, the increasing use of steam power and 
water power, the development of machine tools and the rise of the mechanized factory system, 
etc.  
To supplement this proposition, however, due to the limitations of reliable data in 
the 18th century of Great Britain, the industrial production index (See the following Table 14) 
could somewhat reflect that historical situation. For example, the overall industrial production 
index (if include construction) took nearly 70 years to get it increased up to 3, while only 10 
years since 1775 made the index grow from 3 to 4, and 5 years from 4-5; and for other industries, 
like productive materials (since 1789), consumer goods (since 1748), coal mining (since 1766), 
149 
 

cotton fabric (since 1750), and pig iron production (since 1740) all showed accelerated growth 
since around the mid 18th century (Anon, 1962):197, 198, 210. Also, in terms of the industrial 
output, it had increased by less than 1 percent per year in the first half of the 18th century, was 
rising by nearly 3 percent per year since the second half of the 18th century and by the early part 
of the 19th century (Wolfe, 2015). Thus, we take the year 1760 as the start of the British 
industrial revolution, subsequently, years before 1760 is considered as in the proto/pre-
industrialization.  
 
Table 14: British industrial production index (1913=100) 
Overall 
Industrial 
Production 
Include 
Construction 
<2 (1700-1720) 2-3 (1721-1773) 3-4 (1775-1785) 4-5 (1786-1791) 
Exclude 
Construction 
<2 (1700-1747) 2-3 (1748-1784) 3-4 (1785-1788) 4-5 (1789-1798) 
Other 
industries 
Productive 
materials industry 
<1 (1700-1732) 1-2 (1733-1788) 2-3 (1789-1801) 3-4 (1802-1818) 
Consumer goods 
industry 
<2 (1700-1712) 2-3 (1713-1747) 3-4 (1748-1781) 4-5 (1782-1784) 
Source: (Anon, 1962): 197, 198, 199; (Hoffmann, 1965). 
Regarding the time that ended the First Industrial Revolution (or being basically 
industrialized), it is rather more complex. However, one of the major disrupts of previous rapid 
growth could be attributed to the economic recession that occurred from the late 1830s to the 
early 1840s, thus, is often regarded as the end of the First Industrial Revolution. Hobsbawm 
held that the industrial revolution in Britain was not fully realized until the 1830s or 1840s 
(Hobsbawm, 1969), while Ashton held that it ended roughly in 1830 (Inikori, 2002). Moreover, 
from other aspects, we also see similar articulations. For instance, taking the estimation when 
the factory system had been basically established in all major industrial sectors, Rong and Sima 
mark 1840 as Britain basically achieved its industrialization (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989; Chang, 
2001). Although the recession occurred and interrupted the previous growth speed, innovations 
continually developed late in the period and constantly transform social and economic 
structures, such as the increasing adoption of locomotives, steamboats and steamships, hot blast 
iron smelting and new technologies, such as the electrical telegraph, widely introduced in the 
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1840s and 1850s. Thus, it is relatively difficult to determine precisely when Britain would 
basically achieve its industrialization.  
For such reason, we step in by looking at the industrial structural changes since the 
industrial revolution has always brought about dramatic changes in industrial structure. To be 
noted, although the structural change from agriculture to industry is widely associated with the 
industrial revolution in Britain, before the first industrial revolution, contributions from 
agriculture to the overall economy had already been below 50% and became less important than 
the service sector. And it is seen that the UK’s secondary industry (including manufacturing, 
mining, and construction) value-added to GDP has constantly been growing and surpassed the 
primary industry in around 1820 (see Table 15). Therefore, if followed by Chen Index, when 
value-added by agriculture to GDP below 20%, 1850 would be marked as Britain has been 
basically achieved industrialization; but if taken when value-added by the secondary industry 
surpassed that agriculture, 1820, then would be so. As being self-evident, these divarications 
are urging for more detailed investigations.  
 
Table 15: Industrial structural changes in UK (%), 1750-1910 
Year 
Value-added by Agriculture to 
GDP 
Value-added by Secondary Industry 
to GDP 
Value added by service to 
GDP 
1750 40 21 39 
1801 32.5 23.4 44.1 
1822 26 (1820-1824) 32 (1820-1824) 42 
1841 22 34 44 
1851 20.3 34.3 45.4 
1872 15 (1870-1874) 40 (1870-1874) 45 
1901 6.1 40.2 53.7 
1907 6 (1905-1909) 38 (1905-1909) 56 
Source: (Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999; Dearie & Cole, 1967; Xue, 2004; Floud et al., 1994).  
 
Thus, if taken the perception of the sector that produces productive materials, 
although the machinery factory emerged firstly in Britain was in 1820, and by the 1840s, the 
machine manufacturing industry had already reached a considerable scale, providing various 
technical equipment needed for other industrial sectors (Chang, 2001), then could be considered 
as the end of the British first industrial revolution. Or by 1890, since the proportion of the 
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production materials industry had the first time exceeded that of the consumer goods industry 
(Anon, 1962):205; We could also take the perspectives of employment structure and spatial 
structure. And if in the light of the Chen index, as for employment structure, the British 
employment in agriculture already reduced to 30% in around 1820 (see Table 15); while as for 
spatial structure, its urbanization rate reached 50% in around 1851 (see Chart 16); and between 
1700 and 1850, England’s population surged from between 6 and 7 million to nearly 21 million 
(Wolfe, 2015), where its urbanization rate reached by 50% in 1851.  
Obviously, following different concerns would always bring about confusion. And 
most indicators e.g., industrial production index, showed durative growing even till the 20th 
century, which again make the term “industrial revolution” per se more problematic or as 
Cameron claimed as “a misnomer,” since the term itself has no scientific standing and conveys 
a grossly misleading impression of the nature of economic change (Cameron, 1982). But this 
has already been well-aware and considered not as precise as needed in our analysis. Thus, to 
provide the time frame that guides our research on rural labour mobility, we make the British 
industrialization process in the following division: proto/pre-industrialization (years before 
1760); industrial revolution (being basically industrialized between 1760-1850); and the later 
stage of industrialization (years after 1850). And to set the reference framework for other 
countries, we see this division is very similar to the Chen Index, with agriculture value-added 
to GDP below 20%, employment proportion in agriculture below 20%, and urbanization rate 
reached 50%.  
 
III.1.2.1.2. Industrialization stages in France  
 
It is often articulated that when Britain almost finished its first industrial revolution 
in the early-mid-19th century is the time that Belgium, France, and the United States started 
their industrial revolution respectively (W. Jiang, 2013; D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989; Z. H. Wang 
& K. K. Huang, 1999). While Britain was establishing its industrial leadership, France was 
immersed in its Revolution, and the uncertain political situation discouraged its progressive 
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industrial innovations. Until 1815 France was still busy with the Napoleonic Wars, and it had 
little opportunity to introduce machinery. When peace came, France began to follow England 
(Wolfe, 2015). However, it followed slowly and has never devoted itself as exclusively to 
manufacturing as England has. Apart from Belgium, which was ahead of France in adopting 
the new methods. The other European countries made little progress until the second half of the 
19th century. By 1848 France had become an industrial power, but, despite considerable growth 
under the Second Empire (1852-1870), it remained behind Britain (Wolfe, 2015). In general, 
France was more slowly and less thoroughly industrialized. 
The French Revolution in 1789 destroyed the monarchy, the feudal land ownership, 
and the medieval guild system, and paved the way for the development of capitalist industry 
and transited to the factory system, which created potentials for being the first continent 
countries for industrial revolution (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). Although there was a short periodic 
rapid growth of industrial output (1789-1815), neither major changes in production methods 
and relations nor fundamental changes in economic structure occurred (X. Huang, 1997). 
Together with political chaos (Constitutional monarchy [1789-1792], the First Republic [1792-
1804], and the First Empire [1804-1815]), only after 1815, by which time an intense industrial 
revolution was taking shape in northern France. E.g., the French coal and iron output doubled 
in the same span - considerable changes in national capacities and the material bases of 
industrialization (Wolfe, 2015). 
Therefore, to set the start time-point of the French industrialization, the following 
observations could facilitate. In general, momentous changes were more or less occurred from 
the 1810s and onwards. As the symbol of the first industrial revolution, the steam engine in 
France in 1818 was only about 100 units, which grew to 572 in 1830 (Z. H. Wang, 1994). Ever 
since then, it reached 2,540 in 1839, 3,369 in 1843, and 4,853 in 1847 (Anon, 1962): 349. 
Moreover, from 1850 to 1870, the number of steam engines in the French industry increased 
from about 5,000 to 28,000 (Lv & Qi, 2005); Likewise, there were only 5,000 looms in 1831, 
and by 1846 this number had increased by 6 times to 31,000 (Lv & Qi, 2005); Furthermore, 
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since the development of the railway in France in 1828, the operating mileage was merely 4 
km, and it had grown to 3,230 km by 1851 and reached 24,100 km in 1881 (Anon, 1962): 354.  
Besides, other industrial production indicators could also reveal and affirm these 
significant changes in the French economic transformations since 1815. From 1815 to 1848, 
especially after the July Monarchy (1830-1848), the average annual growth rate of French 
industrial outputs reached 3-3.5%, very close to that level of Britain (Lv & Qi, 2005). More 
details can be found that, for example, the production of pig iron ever since 1815 exceeded 
100,000 tons, had also begun to accelerate, and by 1862, it had reached 1 million tons (see 
Table 16). The steel products also increased rapidly from 5,000 tons in 1826 to 1.02 million 
tons in 1869 (Anon 1962):333; Likewise, the production and consumption of raw coal only rose 
rapidly after 1815 respectively (See Table 16). Between 1802 and 1815, both the production 
and consumption stayed stagnated around 800,000 tons and 900,000 tons (Anon, 1962):336; In 
addition, the materials such as iron, lead, zinc, manganese, and other ores had also been very 
large-scale mined since 1815, to name just a few. Thus, we can more or less mark the beginning 
of 1815 as the start time-point of the French industrialization.  
The task to mark the end time-point of the French industrial revolution lies in the 
same difficulty as Britain. Before the Third Republic (1870), France underwent the July 
Monarchy (1830-1848), the Second Republic (1848-1852), and Second French Empire (1852-
1870). The political uncertainty also dragged the pace and other conditions for the French 
industrialization. France experienced a slow change to commercialized agriculture, power-
driven machinery, and mass production. Even by the end of the nineteenth century, the majority 
of French workers were still employed outside of the industry, while factories were located 
mainly in a few cities in the northern part of France (Wolfe, 2015). Still, analysis of structural 
changes of industry, employment, and space, coupled with other observations, could help in 
determining the end time-point for our research. 
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Table 16: Major industrial productions and consumptions in France (/1000 tons), 1810-1880 
Year Cotton consumption 
Iron ore 
production 
Pig iron production Raw coal production 
Raw coal 
consumption 
1802 NA NA NA 800 900 
1810 6 NA NA 774 900 
1812 6.3 NA NA 800 900 
1813 9.6 NA NA 800 900 
1815 16.4 NA 111 882 1100 
1820 20.2 NA 113 1094 1300 
1825 24.7 NA 199 1491 2000 
1830 31.8 NA 266 1863 2494 
1835 38.7 830 295 2506 3288 
1840 52.9 995 348 3003 4257 
1845 60.7 2460 439 4202 6343 
1850 59.5 1821 406 4434 7225 
1855 76 3876 849 7453 12293 
1860 115 3033 898 8304 14270 
1865 61 3011 1204 11600 18522 
1870 59 2614 1178 13330 18830 
1875 110 2506 1448 16957 24657 
1880 89 2874 1725 19362 28846 
Source: (Anon, 1962): 333, 336, 340.  
 
Approaching the end of the Second Empire, some critical indicators started to 
manifest essential changes in the French economy. For instance, concentrations of factories and 
the adoption of new technologies have been apparent in French industrial production. 
According to the statistics, French factory workers in 1848 managed to account for 1/4 to 1/5 
of the total number of workers. Until 1870, SMEs took a major position (Z. H. Wang et al., 
1995): as the average scale of French factory at that time was with fewer than three workers; 1-
2 workers were employed in 100,00 small factories; and the number of big factory with more 
than 1,000 workers was only 100 (Lv & Qi, 2005); It has also been found that after 1850 the 
focus of industrial production in France shifted from light industry to heavy industry. And by 
the end of the 1960s, large-scale production of machinery had become the main form of 
industrial production in France (Wu, 2005); Likewise, the average annual growth rate of the 
steel industry was over 10% in the 1870s. Or we can look at the steel production, it was only 
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283,000 tons in 1850, and by 1869 it had already reached 1.01 million tons (Tunzelmann, 1978). 
Also, the average annual growth rate of other major industrial sectors was around 3-6% (Wu, 
2005).  
As is known to all, the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) had made France lost 
Alsace and Lorraine, where were significantly weighted industrial regions of France, and the 
vast war reparation disrupted the continuity of its industrialization pace. Till the late 19th 
century, the adjustment of industrial structure again appeared in France, that is, the more 
concentration of industrial production and the further-strengthened monopoly among which the 
heavy industry and the emerging sectors become more prominent (W. Jiang, 2013). Till 
entering the 20th century, another growing wave of industrialization took place in France again 
(Schultz, 1964).  
Thus, to the reference of our division of the British industrialization process, France, 
at the end of the 19th century, had been far from realizing the task of the industrial revolution. 
For example, the value-added by the second industry in France when exceeded that of 
agriculture was even at the end of the 1880s (see Table 17). And if judged by the Chen Index 
(when value-added by agriculture below 20%), the end time-point of the French industrial 
revolution then would be after 1930. Plus, if measured by the employment structural changes, 
France in the 1930s, its employment in agriculture started to below 30%; also, for spatial 
structural changes, its urbanization rate exceeded 50% in 1930 (see Chart 12). Thus we mark 
1930 as the end time-point of the French industrial revolution. Taking all the above factors into 
consideration, we take 1930 as the end time-point of the French industrial revolution or France 
being basically industrialized, with agriculture contributed around 20% to GDP and occupied 
around 30% of total employment, as well as urbanization rate, reached 50%. And subsequently 
divided the French industrialization process into proto/pre-industrialization (years before 1815); 
industrial revolution (between 1815-1930); and the later stage of industrialization (years after 
1930). 
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Table 17: Industrial structural changes in France (%), 1815-1911 
Year 
Value added by Agriculture to 
GDP 
Value added by Secondary Industry 
to GDP 
Value added by service to 
GDP 
1815 51 22 27 
1851 50 (1789-1851) 20 (1789-1851) 30 
1859 45 30 25 
1872 41 (1870-1874) 33 (1870-1874) 26 
1882 42 (1872-1882) 30 (1872-1882) 28 
1887 36 (1885-1889) 36 (1885-1889) 28 
1910 35 (1908-1910) 37 (1908-1910) 28 
1911 33 (1910-1913) 40 (1910-1913) 27 
1930 21 NA NA 
Source: ( Development Research Center of the State Council, 2013) (B. Thomas, 1954). 
However, to be noted, the French industrialization was not a constant process with 
a durative development, not like what the case of Britain may suggest. It demonstrated rather a 
discontinuous situation, especially in the 19th century, as may be convinced by the French 
industrial production index (Anon, 1962):331-332. Also, in the 20th century, two world wars 
also interrupted the French industrialization. Thus, years before WWI, between 1924 and 1933, 
as well as years after WWII, saw the French industrial expansion. Again, our artificial division 
was mainly served for further analysis of labour mobility.   
 
III.1.2.1.3. Industrialization stages in the U.S.  
 
As Western Europe began with industrializing in the late-18th century and early 
1800s, the United States remained agrarian in nature with resource processing (G. R. Taylor, 
2015). The new nation, since its independence, had little capital with which to buy the 
machinery and put up the investment required. Such capital, as existed, was largely invested in 
shipping and commerce. Labour was also scarce because people continued to push westward, 
clearing the forests, and establishing themselves on the land (Wolfe, 2015). In the first half of 
the 19th century, the United States was slow in adopting machine methods of manufacture. 
Farming and trading were its chief interests. However, very different from other early 
industrializers, feudalism was hardly as burden for the U.S. to break away before the industrial 
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revolution. It was rather the War of 1812, which made the United States completely rid of its 
dependence on the British economy and enabled the industrial revolution to be fully launched 
nationwide.  
Again, it is difficult to point to the exact years in which the industrial revolution 
took place. However, most historians would agree that the initial changes occurred slowly 
during the 1790s (Lv & Qi, 2005), and quickly picked up during the year before the Civil War 
(1861-1865) (Thomas Ladenburg, 1974). To trace the start time-point of the American 
Industrial Revolution, also the signifying shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy which 
widely accepted to have taken place since the Samuel Slater’s introduction of British industrial 
methods in textile manufacturing to the United States, and founded the first U.S. cotton mill in 
Beverly, Massachusetts in 1789 (Library of Congress, n.d.). Together with the Slater Mill in 
Rhode Island in 1790, and the Waltham Mill in Massachusetts in 1814, the American industrial 
revolution seemed to embark on and rapidly led to widespread in the region of New England.  
To verify the above propositions, we dig into some available data of the American 
major industrial productions during the late 18th century to the early 19th century (see Chart 8). 
Data of the cotton production and tonnage of ships are only available before 1800, and already 
demonstrate a sharp increase, e.g., the cotton production grew sharply from 1.4 million pounds 
in 1790 to 34.9 million pounds in 1800; and the total tonnage of ships from 4.34 million tons 
doubled to 8.82 million tons at the end of the 1790s. Although we could not affirm 1790 as the 
start time-point of the American industrial revolution, other productions, such as bituminous 
coal, pig iron, and wood, as in the following chart (8), all manifested a steady growth ever since 
1800. For this, we mark 1800 as the start time frame of the American industrial revolution for 
our further analysis.  
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Chart 8: American major industrial productions, 1790-1860 
 
Source: (Anon, 1962):32, 64. 
 
The task to set the end time-point of the American industrial revolution is equally 
tough as for other industrializers. In itself, value-added by the secondary industry to GDP for 
the first time surpassed that of agriculture occurred in the late 1870s (see Table 18). And one 
decade even made its proportion doubled. In terms of the industrial structure if measured by the 
Chen Index then 1880, would be marked as the U.S. ended its industrial revolution when the 
value-added by agriculture accounted below 20%; while in terms of employment structure, then 
1910 would be the end time-point, given its proportion in agriculture to total employment 
started to below 30% (see Table 26). Regarding the spatial structure, it would be postponed to 
the end of the 1910s, when the American urbanization exceeded 50% (see Chart 17). However, 
we cannot take the American spatial structure changes to measure its industrialized levels, since 
its particular history in the Westward movement and the continuous expansion of territories 
definitely postpone its urbanization process.   
 
Table 18: Industrial structural changes in the United States (%), 1839-1960 
Year 
Value added by Agriculture to 
GDP 
Value added by Secondary Industry 
to GDP 
Value added by service to 
GDP 
1839 69 NA NA 
1869 22.2 21.8 56 
1879 19 20.4 60.6 
1889 14.2 27 58.8 
1921 13.2 29.3 57.5 
1
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1933 9.3 28 62.7 
1947 8.9 35.6 55.5 
1950 8.9 45 46.1 
1955 4.9 37.9 57.2 
1960 4.3 35.6 60.1 
Source: (Anon, 1962): 203.  
 
Besides, perception can also be taken from international comparisons. For example, 
by 1880, the American steel production already occupied 1/3 of the world’s production, with 
the pig iron production also accounted for 21.1% ( American Bureau of Metal Statistics, 1960); 
(Anon, 1962): 3. Moreover, in 1860, although the American total industrial outputs (17%) took 
nearly half that of Britain (36%), it already occupied the second position in the world (see Chart 
9). By 1890, its proportion almost marked one-third of world industrial outputs and positioned 
the U.S. at the top of the world. And by 1913, its industrial outputs even bigger than the sum 
that of the UK, France, and Germany. Also, in 1880, the United States accounted for 29.8% of 
the world’s steel production, and pig iron production accounted for 21.1% of the world.    
 
Chart 9: Proportion of industrial outputs in the EICs (%), 1860-1960 
 
Note: data of Germany after WWII is inconsistent due to separation, thus is missing in this chart.  
Source: (Anon, 1962): 2.  
 
Taking all above factors into consideration, we take 1900 as the end time-point of 
American industrial revolution or the U.S. being basically industrialized, with value-added by 
agriculture accounts for 14%, and occupied around 30% of total employment, and nearly 
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marked off half of its population residing in the urban area. Also, there are numerous studies 
also support our division, mostly by taking the dominant position of the U.S. industrial power 
in the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century which far outstripped European 
countries, mark 1900 as the U.S. basically realized its industrialized task (C. Y. Wang & X. E., 
Li 2004; B. J. Shi, 2006; Thomas Ladenburg, 1974). Therefore, we subsequently divide the 
American industrialization process into proto/pre-industrialization (years before 1800;) 
industrial revolution (between 1800-1900;) and the later stage of industrialization (years after 
1900). 
 
III.1.2.1.4. Industrialization stages in Germany 
 
Comparing to Britain, France, and Belgium, the outbreak of the industrial revolution 
in other European countries lagged far behind. Germany, despite vast resources of coal and 
iron17, did not manage to embark on an early industrial revolution, principally hindered by its 
political conditions (Wolfe, 2015). Until the early 19th century, Germany, a federation of 
numerous states of varying size and development, retained its pre-industrial character (A. 
Mitchell, 2000). Saxony and the Rhineland were the earliest part of Germany to industrialize 
by about 1815 (Ogilvie, 1996). And the beginning of the industrial revolution firstly came in 
the textile industry, e.g., the first spinning machine was built in Chemnitz in 1782; and in 1784, 
the first textile factory built in Ratingen, Dusseldorf. Plus, the development in the textile 
industry was facilitated by eliminating tariff barriers through the Zollverein (or the German 
Customs Union), starting in 1834. And the takeoff stage of economic development came with 
the railroad revolution in the 1840s, which opened up new markets for local products, and 
stimulated investments in coal and iron. Ever since then, the rapid economic growth and 
modernization sparked the process of industrialization(A. Mitchell, 2000).   
The first railroad line opened in December 1835 and ran between Nuremberg and 
Furth, which is often symbolized as the start of the German industrial revolution (L. X. Zhang, 
                                                
17 Large coal reserves located in the areas of Saar, Ruhr, Upper Silesia, and Saxony. And Iron deposits sited in the areas of 
Erzgebirge, Harz Mountains, and Upper Silesia. 
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2015). Germany had 27,960 km in 1875 from just 6 km in 1835, and 2,300 km in 1845. The 
increment of the German railway was about 11.49 times, much higher than the UK’s 3.42 times, 
and France’s 4.68 times in the 1940s (Wu, 2005). Other indicators at the same time also 
demonstrated substantial growth. For this, we analyze a few major industrial productions, as 
shown in the following chart (10). Although many data were only available after 1848, both 
Zinc and Copper production manifested an increasing growth after 1830; Also, take the pig iron 
production, for instance, it was a mere 40,000 tons in 1825, soared to 150,000 tons a decade 
later and reached 250,000 tons by the early 1850s (Wolfe, 2015); to name a few.  
 
Chart 10: Major industrial production in Germany, 1820-1920 
 
Source: (Anon, 1962): 263; (Anon, 1989): 601.  
 
In short, the industrial ‘take-off’ did not take place in Germany until 1835-50. 
Although some German regions, especially the Rhineland and Saxony, experienced a phase of 
‘pre-industrialization’ from about 1780 onward, with the scattered establishment of mechanized 
factories, industrialization proper did not begin even till about 1815, and many other areas, 
especially in north-east and the south, failed to industrialize until the late nineteenth century or 
even later (Ogilvie, 1996). Still, it is convincible for us to mark 1830 as the start time-point of 
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the German industrial revolution, agreed to many specialized studies on the German 
industrialization (Wu, 2005; L. X. Zhang, 2015; Bing & Da Yin, 1995; Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). 
In the 19th century, another crucial event for Germany was the political unification 
in 1871, which would mark a new phase of Germany’s industrialization. As well, the provinces 
of Alsace and Lorraine that took from France gave Germany even more natural resources 
needed for industrial expansion. However, before this, among the German states, Prussia firstly 
emerged as the most economically powerful state. For example, in 1860, Germany produced 
more than 420,000 tons of steel and 530,000 tons of iron, of which Prussian accounted for 82.7% 
and 74.4% respectively; in the same year, Germany’s stone coal mining volume was 12.88 
million tons. Among them, Prussia occupied 82.7%. Also, by the 1860s, Prussia’s share of 
German heavy industry production had accounted for about 4/5 (Wu, 2005). However, by the 
end of the 1960s, other states, such as Saxony, Bavaria, Baden, etc., had also embarked on their 
industrial revolution (Wu, 2005).  
After 1860, the industrialization had been speeded up, with steam engines and 
machinery are used almost everywhere; large factories also began to replace small workshops 
(Marx, 1974). In 1863, Germany’s machine exports surpassed imports for the first time and 
made Germany an emerging country exporting machinery (Wu, 2005; Marx, 1974). During this 
period, industrial production grew at an average annual rate of 7.5%, ranking first among other 
major industrial countries (Fan, 1973). As approaching the end of the 19th century, there were 
a few significant structural changes occurred: Firstly, it not only firmed its position as major 
machinery exporter but also shifted from exporting light industrial products to the heavy ones, 
e.g., in 1872, Germany’s exports of light industrial products (1,139 million marks) were almost 
twice as large as the exports of heavy industrial products (629 million marks). However, in 
1900, the export volume of the two was nearly close (Anon, 1962): 278; secondly, by 1890, for 
the first time, value-added by the secondary industry to GDP exceeded that of the agriculture 
(see Table 19); and thirdly, as of 1900, employment in agriculture was also for the first time 
exceeded by the secondary industry (see Table 28).  
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Table 19: Industrial structural changes in Germany (%), 1850-1950 
Year 
Value added by Agriculture to 
GDP 
Value added by Secondary 
Industry to GDP 
Value added by service to 
GDP 
1852 45 (1850-1854) 21 (1850-1854) 34 
1865 32 (1860-1869) 24 (1860-1869) 44 
1870 38 32 30 
1871 37.9 31.7 30.4 
1872 38 (1870-1874) 32 (1870-1874) 30 
1887 36 (1885-1889) 34 (1885-1889) 30 
1892 32 (1890-1894) 37 (1890-1894) 31 
1900 29 40 31 
1907 18 39 43 
1910 18 (1905-1914) 39 (1905-1914) 43 
1912 23 (1910-1913) 44 (1910-1913) 33 
1913 23.4 45 31.8 
1929 15.8 48.5 35.7 
1950 10.3 48 42 
Note: The data was collected from various sources, and may not be very consistent.  
Source: (Kolb & Schumann, 2013; Meng, 2018; Xing, 2002; W. Jiang, 2013; Wu, 2005; Z. H. Wang & K. K. 
Huang, 1999; L. X. Zhang, 2015). 
 
Although the German industrial revolution took place relatively late, it grew so 
rapidly that by the turn of the century it outproduced Britain in many industrial outputs, like its 
chemical industry and steel production (Wolfe, 2015), and had become the largest economy in 
Europe (Aftalion, 2001). However, is it enough for us to conclude that by 1910, Germany 
basically achieved its industrialization, in accordance with our analysis of previous countries. 
Judged by the Chen Index, if measured by the industrial structural changes, then 1910 (when 
value-added by agriculture below 20%); by employment structural change, 1915 (when the 
proportion of employment in agriculture below 30%), and by spatial structural change,1890 
(when the urbanization reached 50%) would be considered the end time-point of its industrial 
revolution.  
Coupled with other observations, for example, the proportion of the German 
industrial outputs at the world level in 1900 reached 16% very near to the level of Britain (18%), 
but already doubled French proportion (7%). Also, in the Chemical industry, the production of 
basic chemicals such as acid and alkali in the 1900’s Germany had taken first place in the world 
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(L. X. Zhang, 2015). For all the above considerations, we mark 1910 as the end time-point of 
the German industrial revolution. Subsequently, we divide the German industrialization process 
into proto/pre-industrialization (years before 1830), the industrial revolution (between 1830-
1910), and the later stage of industrialization (years after 1910). 
As thus, we have basically provided a comparable time frame of the industrialization 
process for our further analysis. And the tasks of basically achieved industrialization for these 
countries are more or less the same, which are principally measured by the industrial, 
employment, and spatial structural changes, not even to mention of other considerations. As 
manifested in the following table (20), these structures are only slightly different before the 
industrial revolution, of which with value-added by agriculture overall above 50%, employment 
proposition in agriculture over 50%, and urbanization below 20%. As of the end of their 
industrial revolution, when it is considered as the country basically achieved industrialization, 
these structures reached a consistent configuration.  
    
Table 20: Time frame of industrialization stages in the UK, France, USA and Germany 
Country Value ranges  Pre industrialization  Industrial Revolution Later stage of Industrialization  
UK 
  before 1760 (1760-1850) 1850 after 
Value added by 
Agriculture (%) 
       40      20  
Employment in 
Agriculture (%) 
       48      20  
Urbanization Rate         17      50   
France 
  before 1815 (1815-1930) 1930 after 
Value added by 
Agriculture (%) 
       50      20  
Employment in 
Agriculture (%) 
       65      30  
Urbanization Rate         20      50   
USA 
  before 1800 (1800-1900) 1900 after 
Value added by 
Agriculture (%) 
       >70      14  
Employment in 
Agriculture (%) 
        85      35  
Urbanization Rate          6      40   
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Germany 
  before 1830 (1830-1910) 1910 after 
Value added by 
Agriculture (%) 
        50      18  
Employment in 
Agriculture (%) 
        65      35  
Urbanization Rate          15      60   
Note: data of employment in Agriculture and urbanization in France in 1815, data of value-added by agriculture and 
employment in agriculture in USA in 1800, and data of value added by agriculture and employment in agriculture as well as 
urbanization in Germany in 1830 were estimated. 
 
III.1.2.2. Rural labour mobility in their respective processes of industrialization  
 
Following our pre-defined time frame of industrialization stages, in this part, we 
will deliberate upon detailed distinctions of rural labour mobility within each process of 
industrialization. In doing so, both employment and spatial structural changes draw substantial 
support, given their macro data coverage. Many scattered observations will also be used to 
support our propositions. And in this part, we do not intend to analyze critical propositions on 
how did these countries manage their rural labour motility in accordance with strategies of 
industrialization. Only the general profile of the rural labour mobility will be reviewed in each 
stage of the industrialization.  
 
III.1.2.2.1. The United Kingdom 
 
Proto-industrialization (before 1760)  
 
In England and Wales before the British Industrial Revolution (1760), a certain 
scaled rural labour mobility occurred since the 17th century, mainly due to the Enclosure 
Movement18. And there are many studies attributing the rural labour mobility at this stage 
primarily to the enclosure movement (Deane, 1967). The peasantry was expelled from the land 
with the emergence of full private property rights, due to the influx of wealth from trade and 
plunder provided merchants at the turn of the seventeenth century. As thus, farmers left the 
                                                
18 Enclosure was the process in England of consolidating (enclosing) small landholdings into larger farms, and once enclosed, 
the used of the land became restricted and available only to the owner, and it ceased to be common land for communal use. 
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means of production in the fewer hands of the landowning elite. They then rented consolidated 
and enclosed holdings to capitalist tenant farmers, who had to sell their output to pay rents 
(Hann, 1999). According to statistics, from 1714 to 1820, a total of more than 6 million acres 
of land was enclosed in the UK (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). And the scaled rural labourers left their 
places of origin for subsistence. For example, in the 24 parishes of Oxfordshire, the number of 
farmers holding less than 100 acres of land, had been reduced by more than 2/3 from 482 in the 
early 17th century to 212 in 1785 (Turner, 1975). And as of the second half of the 18th century, 
the proportion of farmers (including yeomen, leaseholder, and permanent tenant) was already 
quite limited. According to statistics, by 1760 (England and Wales), there were only 210,000 
farmers with an annual income of more than 25 pounds, about 940,000 people, accounting for 
14% to the total population (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). Notably, by the eve of its industrial 
revolution, more than half of the British employment was no longer working in agriculture.  
In general, rural labourers at this stage mainly moved among the non-agricultural 
sectors of rural areas, and slowly flowing towards urban areas. This can be seen from the 
comparison between the changes in the employment and spatial structures. In particular, 
although the proportion of employment in agriculture dropped rapidly from 55.6% in 1688 (the 
Glorious Revolution) to 36.8% in 1750 (see Table 22), the urbanization growth was far lagged 
behind, as it was estimated that people living in cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants in 1700 
accounted for about 13% of the total population, only rose to 16.7% on the eve of the industrial 
revolution (Chang, 2001). That is to say, there was roughly around 20% of rural migrants 
employed in rural non-agricultural sectors. And it is more or less consistent with Wrigley’s 
study confirmed that nearly half of the rural labourers working in non-agricultural activities at 
this stage (Wrigley, 1987). Whereas, against the backdrop of the limited labour migration to 
urban areas, in urban areas, there was still no major displacement of labour took place within 
the period of the proto-industrialization in England (Murray & Newman, 1998).  
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Chart 11: Urbanization rate (%) in the UK, 1700-1950 
Note: data collected from various sources, may not be consistent; data from 1801 to 1921 included the entire Irish population, 
and did not include the Irish Free State since 1922; data of 1801 and 1891 were cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants (and 
limited to England and Wales); the data of 1700 referred to cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. 
Source: (Chang, 2001; Wrigley, 1987; A. F. Weber, 1899; Krein & Teixeira, 2014); (Anon, 1962):174-177; (Anon, 1989):796-
798.   
Industrial revolution (1760-1850) 
 
The takeoff of the industrial revolution also brought about scaled rural labour 
mobility. Substantial rural labourers started to move to the emerging industries like 
manufacturing, handicraft, construction, railway, mining, etc. In the 1750s, the average annual 
amount of rural migrants was merely 27,600 and climbed nearly tripled to 78,200 by the 1780s. 
It continuously grew and reached its peak in history as arrived in the 1820s, the annual amount 
had reached 267,500, almost ten times to the amount of the beginning of the industrial 
revolution. Ever since then, the growth rate of rural labour mobility began to decrease (see 
Table 21).  
 
Table 21: British rural labour mobility during the industrial revolution 
Per decade Average annual amount /1000 Growth rate per decade (%) 
1751-1760 27.6 NA 
1761-1770 26.1 -0.05 
1771-1780 24.3 -0.07 
1781-1790 78.2 2.22 
1791-1800 69.4 -0.11 
1801-1810 137.7 0.98 
1811-1820 214.2 0.56 
1821-1830 267.5 0.25 
1831-1840 184.3 -0.31 
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1841-1850 87.6 -0.52 
Source: (Saville, 2013; Dearie & Cole, 1967):143. (W. Jiang, 2013):17. 
 
At this stage, the rural labour mobility was not only demonstrated a simplified 
spatial change (from rural to the urban area), but it also revealed the mobility from agricultural-
based regions to the emerging industrial regions. For instance, 15 towns that were mainly based 
on agriculture in Bedford, Burke, etc., and Wales, lost 113,826 people due to labour migration 
during 1751-1781, 251,285 people during 1781-1801, and 379,044 people in 1801-1831 
(Dearie & Cole, 1967); Also, it was found that an average annual 40,000 rural labour force 
migrated out from agriculture-based Norfolk, Suffolk, and Essex in the 1840s, on the contrary, 
in industry-based regions like Lancashire and Cheshire, during the same period, the local 
population had naturally increased by 218,443, whereas the influx of rural migrants increased 
by 205,375, of which accounted for 48.5% of the total population growth (Dodgshon & Butlin, 
2013). A similar situation can also be found from the census (in 1851), in the 1840s, the natural 
growth of the population in London was 144,688, while the actual increase was 413,819, which 
means that 269,131 people (65%) were from other regions (Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999). 
While, regions that were mainly based on agriculture all revealed contrast situation that the 
actual increase of population growth was less than the natural growth (H. E. S. Fisher et al. 
1977), to name just a few.  
With this continuous rural labour mobility, as one of the results, the absolute number 
of the rural population in some parts of Britain started to decline since the beginning of the 
1830s. Also, the entire rural population in the UK was found to drop from the 1850s and 
onwards. To the contrary, the population in urban and mining areas manifested a steady growth. 
As demonstrated in the above chart (see Chart 11), the urbanization rate grew from 16.7% in 
1750 to 50% in 1851. By the end of its industrial revolution, Britain almost achieved with more 
than half of its population living in urban areas (Dodgshon & Butlin, 2013).   
Our further observations can also be revealed from the analysis of the British 
employment structural changes. In contrast to the situation of the pre-industrialization, the 
declining rate of employment in agriculture manifested slower than the increasing rate of 
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urbanization at the stage of the industrial revolution in the UK. As we can see from the 
following Table (22), employment in agriculture, forestry, and fishery in 1750 was about 36.8%. 
It gradually reduced to 21.7%, whereas the urbanization grew from 16.7% to 50%. This is 
significantly important because the gradual reduction of agricultural employment could create 
more time to convert the profession of the surplus rural migrants in urban areas. As is clear in 
the Table, in contrast to the gradual decline of employment in agriculture, the proportion of 
employment in manufacturing, mining, construction, and other utilities grew from 14% in 1750 
to 42.9% in 1851.  
 
Table 22: Employment distribution in UK’s three strata of industry (%), 1688-1970 
Year 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery 
Manufacturing, mining, construction and 
other utilities 
Service and 
others 
1688 55.6   
1750 36.8 14  
1801 35.9 29.7 34.5 
1811 33   
1831 25   
1841 23   
1851 21.7 42.9 35.5 
1870 16   
1890 15.3   
1901 8.7 46.3 45.1 
1947 5   
1951 5.5 49.1 43.8 
1961 5 47 48 
1970 2.8 45.9 51.3 
Source: (C. P. Hill, 1957; Dearie & Cole, 1967; Floud et al., 1994; Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999);(Anon, 
1962):171-181.  
 
Besides, to be noted, the growth of the British urban population was not only from 
the rural area of Britain. There was a considerable amount of Irish found influx to many British 
cities as well since 180119. And there was around 22,000 Irish in 1801, and quickly grew to 
nearly 1 million in 1845 (Y. Shen, 2001). And in many cities of England, especially these 
industrial ones, nearly 1/5 of the population were Irish by the 1850s (Y. Shen, 2001). In short, 
                                                
19 when the Act of the Union took effect amalgamating Ireland with Great Britain and creating the United Kingdom.  
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at the stage of the industrial revolution, the British rural labour mobility not only maintained 
high growth of urbanization (spatial structural changes), but it also started shifting to the 
employment structural change (or professional conversion) and demonstrated a quick growth 
in the secondary industries, at the same time maintained a gradual decline of employment in 
the primary industry.  
 
The later stage of industrialization (after 1850) 
 
By itself, the rural labour mobility at the later stage of industrialization was 
continuously taking place, since it is a stage that was artificially divided and primarily served 
for research analysis. In the UK after 1850, pushed by the wave of the Second Industrial 
Revolution (or the Technological Revolution), old industries with great potentials together with 
the emerging industries, such as machinofacture, railroad, telecommunication, metallurgy, 
electric, chemicals, automobile, petroleum, etc., together with the sector of service were 
expanded prominently and created substantial employment. As a consequence, the rural labour 
mobility at this stage was still largely flowing into those sectors. According to relevant statistics, 
the number of workers engaged in manufacturing, mining, and construction increased from 1.08 
million in 1841 to 4.3 million in 1911 (Xue, 2004). Also, the number of workers in commerce, 
transportation, and other service industries expanded from 415,000 in 1841 to 3.56 million in 
1911, of which the employment solely in transportation grew from 927,000 (in 1881) to 1.78 
million in 1911 (Anon, 1962): 177.  
Although the increment of rural migrants was persistently growing, the speed started 
to decline gradually since the 1890s (A. F. Weber, 1899). And before the 50s of the 20th century, 
the British rural labourers were still flowing to the secondary and the tertiary industries, mainly 
in mining and construction industries. Nevertheless, the absorbing capability of employment in 
the secondary industry manifested weakening after WWII. E.g., the employment in the 
secondary industry started to drop from 49.1% (in 1951) to 47% (in 1961), and 45.9% (in 1970); 
Whereas, the service industry in the 1960s started to replace the secondary industry intaking 
bigger proportion of employment. Since 1970, over half of the UK’s employment was absorbed 
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by the service (see Table 22). And this tendency continues ever since. As of 1986, it had reached 
even 71% of the UK’s entire employment (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989).  
On the contrary, over the half-century from the 1850s to the 1900s, the proportion 
of the UK’s employed population in agriculture fell only 13 percent. As well as from the 1900s 
to the 1940s, it fell even less than 5 percent (see Table 22). The situation can be found from the 
absolute term as well. The agricultural employment population in 1881 was 1.65 million. As of 
1940, it had been still maintained around 1.26 million (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989). Thus, we 
can somewhat conclude that when the proportion of the employment in agriculture in the UK 
reduced to around 5% since 1940, the rural labour mobility towards cities was more or less 
ceased, and marked as the end of the English rural labour mobility (Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 
1999).   
To be noted, the reduction of the English rural population was not only due to its 
rural-to-urban labour migration. And there was a great number of population (including rural 
population) emigrated to the British colonies. And it was found that the emigration started to 
be scaled ever since 1815 (Baines, 2002). For example, there were about 621,000 emigrants 
between 1815 and 1850 (Baines, 2002); and 2.47 million between 1853-1880 (Clapham, 1964). 
Apart from emigration to Asia and Africa, there were around 10 million English emigrants in 
the American continent, accounted for almost 20% of the total European emigration before 
WWI (Baines, 2002).  
Consequently, the rural population demonstrated a slow decline, especially after the 
1860s, from around 10.87 million in 1860, reduced to 9.45 million in 1940 (Anon, 1962):174-
177. And there are other scattered estimations as well. For example, in the 30 years since 1851, 
the rural population of England and Wales per decade reduced by 5.86%, 3.84%, and 2.76% 
(A. F. Weber, 1899). As estimated, in 70 years from 1841 to 1911, around 4.5 million of the 
rural population migrated to cities or abroad (Baines, 2002). In contrast to this, the urban 
population manifested a dramatic growth. In the 30 years since 1850, the urban population in 
the UK grew by 21.9%, 28.1%, and 25.6% per decade (A. F. Weber, 1899). According to the 
census, the urban population of England and Wales climbed from 8.99 million in 1851 to 28.16 
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million in 1911 (Saville, 2013). In order to demonstrate this sharp growth of urban population 
in the UK, the detailed number of the population in1801, 1851, and 1901 of selected cities are 
listed below (see Table 23). Besides, the urbanization rate ever since it reached 72% in 1900, 
started to grow very slowly (like 78.9% in 1950) (see Chart 11).  
 
Table 23: Number of population in the selected cities of the UK (/1000) 
Cities 1801 1851 1901 
London  1088 2491 4563 
Birmingham 71 233 522 
Bristol 61 137 329 
Edinburgh 83 194 394 
Glasgow 77 345 762 
Leeds 53 172 429 
Liverpool 82 376 685 
Manchester 75 303 544 
Schefeld 46 135 381 
                Source: (B. R. Mitchell, 1962; Z. H. Wang, 1996). 
 
In short, the rural labour mobility of the UK at the later stage of industrialization 
continues the tendency that of the industrial revolution. The rural labour force declined but at a 
slow pace, and the increment of rural migrants was persistently growing, but the speed started 
to decline slowly since the 1890s. Employment was shifting from the concentrated sectors of 
the secondary industries to the service sectors. The rural labour mobility was changed in 
accordance with the broader evolution of the industrial structural changes.  
 
III.1.2.2.2. France 
 
Proto-industrialization (before 1815)  
 
The rural labour mobility at the stage of proto-industrialization in France was quite 
consistent with its pace of industrialization and demonstrated a very slow pace, although the 
scattered labour mobility started as early as the 18th century. Similarly to Britain, the Enclosure 
movement also occurred before the French industrial revolution, however, its scale and impact 
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were rather much insignificant (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). On the contrary, in France, the 
strengthening of the peasantry after the French Revolution (1789-1799) made agriculture 
extremely slow in articulating itself to the market and adopting new methods of production. 
The elimination of feudal rights, by itself, did not liberate agriculture from the practices of the 
commune organization of production (Oliveira, 1985). The French peasants clung to their old 
customs in such a way that they survived the discontinuous plots and the common-land institute, 
which evidently restrained their will to migrate to cities.  
By 1793, the French farmers were completely exempted from the feudal constraints 
and entitled the private property of small land. As thus, a small peasant economy that was 
centered on the small land tenure was confirmed by the end of the 18th century. Not only did 
the number of farmers get increased, but the land owned by small farmers also expanded. For 
example, the proportion of peasant land to the total land area increased from 30% to 42% 
throughout the province of Noor from 1789 to 1802 (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). However, farmers, 
except for very few lands (e.g., the communal land in some communities allocated by their 
population), were obtained free of charge. Most of the land was for sale, and farmers often 
purchased land on installment. This put on heavy debt and laid curse for the peasants to be 
exploited by usury, and in turn, attached farmers to their small land (W. T. Shen, 2010).  
Although, at the beginning of the 19th century, France also experienced the 
phenomenon of land concentration and emerged certain sort of capitalist farms (W. T. Shen, 
2010). Some French nobility and bourgeoisie divided their land into small pieces and re-rented 
to those peasants who lacked land. For example, in some regions like the suburbs of Paris, 
northwestern France, and Alsace-Lorraine, some rich peasants expanded their land by rent or 
acquisition and carried out the capitalist farming by hiring wage labour (Lv & Qi, 2005). Yet, 
many of them were forced to mortgage the land when they could not afford the rent. As thus, 
the land concentration in France was taking place very slowly. And this small land tenure, 
together with the small peasant economy that centered on the vast amount of small family 
handicrafts, is often attributed to detain the rural labour mobility (Z. L. Zhang, 1989). And even 
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the speed of rural labour mobility was slower when entering the 19th century until the French 
industrial revolution (X. T. Chen, 2005).  
Over the half-century from the mid-18th century, the urbanization grew less than ten 
percent. The proportion of the urban population in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants was 
only 9.1% in 1750 (Vries, 2013), grew to nearly 20% in 1815 (see Chart 12). Before the takeoff 
of its industrial revolution, about 80% of the French population living in rural areas, among 
which 80% were farmers and attached to their small pieces of land, which only accounted for 
35% of total land (W. T. Shen, 2010). In short, the vast majority of French rural labourers were 
much attached to their small land and affirmed the small peasant economy at the stage of the 
proto-industrialization.  
 
Chart 12: Urbanization rate (%) in France, 1750-1975 
 
Note: data collected from various sources, may not be consistent; the urbanization rates of 1750 and 1850 were 
measured cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, which are different from other years; the statistics from 1872 
to 1921 does not include population from Alsace-Lorraine. 
Source: (Anon, 1989):690; (Anon, 1962):313; (Vries, 2013).  
Industrial revolution (1815-1930) 
 
In general, the flow of French rural labourers to cities manifested a gradual and 
phased feature from a long slow, and discontinuous start to accelerated growth (X. T. Chen, 
2005). In its beginning of the industrial revolution, there was a small wave of the rural labour 
mobility towards urban areas in the period, especially during the Bourbon Restoration (1814-
1830), e.g., in Paris by 1823, 34% of its population (244,000) were wage workers and small 
craftsmen mainly coming from the rural area (Z. L. Zhang, 1989). But in general, there wasn’t 
much rural labour mobility found flowing to cities in the first half of the 19th century.   
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A steady and scaled rural labour mobility, was only found in the second half of the 
19th century, especially during and after the Second Empire (1852-1870), driven by its rapid 
industrialization. As we can estimate from its population growth rate by rural-urban divisions 
(see Chart 13), the rural population ever since 1865 manifested a negative growth, but at the 
same time, its total population still demonstrated a positive growth (apart from the 1870s), 
whereas urban population growth for long maintained its average rate as higher as four times 
to the total population growth rate. In other words, if only relied on the urban population growth, 
its rate cannot reach as high as it was, meaning there was a steady flow of rural population 
migrated to urban areas, although we do not know the exact amount.  
 
Chart 13: French average annual population growth rate (‰) in rural-urban divisions, 1846-1931 
 
Note: data collected from different sources may not be consistent.  
Source: (Anon, 1962):313-315; (Anon, 1989):685-689.  
 
The rural labour mobility also continued in the entire French Third Republic (1870-
1940). Estimated by Zhang, there were an average 100,000 rural labourers annually flowing to 
urban areas from 1871 to the beginning of the 20th century (Z. L. Zhang, 1989). Chen also 
measured and found that there was around 820,000 rural population migrated to cities between 
1876-1881, 670,000 between 1896-1901, and 770,000 between 1906-1911 (X. T. Chen, 2005). 
As can also be confirmed by the above chart, when the rural population growth rate 
demonstrated an overall declining tendency ever since 1886, to the contrary, the annual growth 
-8.00
-3.00
2.00
7.00
12.00
17.00
22.00
1846 1851 1856 1861 1866 1871 1876 1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 1906 1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 
Urban growth rate Rural growth rate Total population growth rate
176 
 

rate of the urban population kept constantly growing and maintained its rate bigger than that of 
the total population. In other words, the growth rate of the urban population in order to maintain 
such high speed, the natural growth of the urban population was not enough, thus, manifested 
a positive influx of rural migrants.  
Very different from Britain that once the industrial revolution took off, it instantly 
kicked off an aggressive and substantial rural labour mobility. The French rural labour mobility 
manifested an impassive response. And to understand this distinction, we have to know firstly 
how did the French agriculture evolve. In short, due to the strengthened small peasant economy 
by the revolution (as we articulated in the proto-industrialization), the French approach to 
eliminate peasants was much postponed by the delayed shift of agriculture to the capitalistic 
farming. The long-lasting small peasants were one of the dominant features of the French 
agricultural production. E.g., there were still 2.15 million farmers as self-cultivator, whereas 
only 968,000 manors that hired workers, doing farm by 1882 in France (Clapham, 1966).  
However, significant changes were found much in the second half of the French 
industrial revolution or at the end of the 19th century. The level of agricultural mechanization 
and farming techniques had been greatly improved. Among most changes, the capitalist farm 
started to emerge, and land also got fast concentration. The amount of farms of the small-sized 
land (less than 10 hectares) grew until 1892, then started to drop, e.g., from 4.8 million in 1892 
to 1.4 million in 1942, and 0.7 million in 1970; whereby that of the large-sized (over 50 hectares) 
had constantly been growing from 85,700 in 1882 to 105,100 in 1942, and 131,300 in 1942 
(Anon, 1989):733. The overall evolution of this is presented as following (see Chart 14). The 
proportion of small-sized farms from 84.7% in 1882, double-decreased to 44.2% in 1970, 
whereas the mid-sized and large-sized farms increased to 47.5% and 8.3% in 1970. Furthermore, 
there was almost 3.44 million wage labour found in French agricultural production in 1882 
(Clapham, 1966). Thus, capitalist agriculture already got further developed in France in its 
industrial revolution.  
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Chart 14: Proportion of different scales of farming unit in France (%), 1882-1970 
 
Source: (Anon, 1989):733.  
 
The elimination process of peasants in France was not only due to the capitalistic 
mode of production in agriculture that expelled surplus labour, but it also bears distinct features 
of France. As mentioned before, after the revolution, most farmers purchased land on 
installment and involved in usury with heavy debts. For example, between 1820 and 1842, the 
total amount of mortgage debt of small and medium-sized farmers in the poor regions of France 
had increased by 50%, and about 45 billion francs equivalent of land capital was used as a 
guaranty, plus 13 billion francs of the loan (W. T. Shen, 2010). As such, many bankrupt farmers 
had no option but to sell their land. As of 1840 in the rural area of France, five classes had been 
formed among 7 million rural families, of which 35.7% of rural families owned their own land; 
13% rent land from manors; 7% were entitled to the dividend (over the communal land); 30.5% 
were day labour; and 13.8% were farm maids (Z. L. Zhang, 1989). And by 1860, the situation 
even got deteriorated. More than half of the land of small peasants that had obtained from the 
Revolution had been mortgaged (W. T. Shen, 2010). And some studies suggest that the landless 
farmers initially still prefer to stay in rural areas rather than migrate to cities (W. T. Shen, 2010; 
Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). This could also explain the slow pace of French rural labour mobility.  
Also, we can take the perspective of employment structural changes to review the 
rural labour mobility at the stage of the industrial revolution. The proportion of employment in 
agriculture had been gradually dropped to 50% by 1866. Although the speed was slow, it had 
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constantly been reducing. By the end of the industrial revolution, France managed to have 
around 30% of its employment retained in agriculture (see Table 24). On the other side, the 
employment in the non-agricultural sectors also manifested a slow growth and was again 
reflected in the French small peasant economy. The French industrial revolution then suggested 
was much based on its massive and dispersive small and medium-sized factories. Nearly half-
century passed since the industrial revolution took off, a vast majority of small manual 
workshops still existed in dispersive villages. By the beginning of the Second Empire in 1852, 
there were still around 1 million peasants worked as day labour in these rural workshops (W. 
T. Shen, 2010). In the same year, contained 60% of the total employment, small-sized factories 
with less than 10 workers still accounted for 75% of the entire industry (Z. H. Wang, 1994). 
Even by the end of the 1860s, the small and medium sized factories were still the dominant 
status of the French industry (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995).  
Within over a half century long from 1866 to 1921, people worked in the secondary 
industry (including manufacturing, mining, construction, and other utilities) only grew 5 
percent from 28.6% to 33.6% (see Table 24). And France only managed to have its employment 
in industry bigger than that of agriculture almost at the end of its industrial revolution (in 1926), 
which again made the fact clear that the French industrialization was not as typical as other 
industrializers may suggest. The very substantial reduction of the rural labourers occurred much 
in the later stage of its industrialization, as we can see clearly in its employment structural 
evolutions. The reducing pace was speeded up mainly in thirty years after WWII, as it dropped 
from 29.1% in 1946 to 8.8% in 1979.  
 
Table 24: Employment distribution in three strata of industry (%) in France, 1866-1992 
Year 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery 
Manufacturing, mining, construction and other 
utilities 
Service and 
others 
1866 50.5 28.6 20.9 
1876 48.7 29.2 22.1 
1881 46.3 29.7 25.4 
1886 45.2 29.4 25.4 
1891 44.1 29.7 26.2 
1896 42.5 31.4 26.1 
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1901 41 31.8 27.2 
1906 39.9 32.3 27.8 
1911 38.5 33.1 28.4 
1921 36.2 33.6 30.2 
1926 34.1 36.2 29.7 
1931 31.5 36.6 31.9 
1936 31.6 33.6 34.8 
1946 29.1 35.1 35.8 
1950 28.3 34.9 36.8 
1970 13 37.7 49.3 
1979 8.8 35.6 55.6 
1984 7.8 31.4 60.8 
1992 5.2 28.1 66.7 
Note: data collected from different sources may not be consistent. 
Source: data from 1886 to 1936 are from (Vivier 2006); (Kjeldsen-Kragh, 2007):75; data of 1700 was estimated 
from (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995); other data were calculated by (Anon, 1989):691-698.  
 
Chart 15: Population growth in rural-urban divisions and urbanization in France, 1846-1946 
 
Note: data collected from different sources may not be consistent.  
Source: (Anon, 1962):313-315; (Anon, 1989):685-689. 
In addition, the spatial structural changes can also facilitate our understandings over 
labour mobility. During the industrial revolution in France, the urban population grew at an 
annual rate of 1.09% from 8.65 million in 1846 to 21.42 million in 1931; whereas the rural 
population at an average annual rate of 0.32% decreased from 26.76 million to 20.41 million 
(see Chart 15). Thus, the urbanization reached 50% by 1930 from 24% in 1846.  
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The later stage of industrialization (after 1930) 
 
In the light of our staged divisions in industrialization, France in 1930 had only 
generally achieved some basic tasks of industrialization. As for rural labour mobility, another 
peak wave was found and continued in the later stage of industrialization. As of the end 1980s, 
France more or less finished the task of rural labour mobility, since its proportion of 
employment in agricultural had been reduced less than 5%, and the urbanization rate reached 
as high as 75%, and ever since then both the industrial structure and the spatial structure 
maintained long-lasting stably. Besides, although the non-agricultural industries manifested a 
steady growth since the industrial revolution and the proportion of the secondary industry had 
exceeded that of the agriculture in 1926, the absorbing capability of employment in the 
secondary industry demonstrated a gradual decline from 1930 and onwards, whereas that of the 
service became the biggest sector accommodating employment since 1950 (see Chart 16).  
In particular, employment in the secondary industry reached its peak in 1966 with 
almost 40% of total employment share, every since then gradually reducing but still contributed 
nearly 1/3 of the total employment by 1980; Whereas that of service exceeded 60% in 1980 
absorbed the most of the French employment, among which the sectors of the wholesale and 
retail contributed above 10%, 5% from the transportation, 3% from the insurance and finance. 
And this tendency continues as of today, as clearly demonstrated in the following chart. 
Moreover, another striking feature of the French employment structural evolution lies on the 
sharp decrease of employment in agriculture. Right afterward the WWII, employment in 
agriculture started to drop very fast from nearly 30% to 16.4% in 1966, and 8.5% in 1980.  
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Chart 16: Employment evolution at the later stage of industrialization (%) in France, 1926-1980 
 
Note: data collected from different sources may not be consistent. 
Source: (Anon, 1962):691-698. 
 
And within the rural sector, the pace of land concentration also got speeded up at 
this stage. The number of total farms got dramatically drop. Nearly 2.7 million farms got 
merged within a half-century from 3.97 million in 1929, fell to 2.45 million in 1942, and 1.26 
million in 1979. Of which the amount of farm with less than one hectare dropped the most, 
from 1.01 million (25.6% of total farms in 1929) to 0.22 million (9% in 1942); whereas middle 
and large sized farms got weighted expansions (see Table 25). In particular, the farms with less 
than five hectares in 1929 still accounted for more than half of the French farming, however, 
only occupied less than 1/3 of total farming land; whereas, scaled farming got rapidly expanded. 
This situation of land concentration in a certain sense also facilitated the wave of rural labour 
mobility at the later stage of industrialization.  
 
Table 25: Land concentration measured by the scale of the farming unit in France, 1929 and 1979 
Year 
Less than 1 
hectare 
1-5 hectares 5-50 hectares 
50-100 
hectares 
over 100 
hectares 
Total 
1929 
Amount (/1000) 
1014.7 1146.3 1691.1 81.8 32.5 3966.4 
Percentage (%) 
25.6 28.9 42.6 2.1 0.8 100 
1979 
Amount (/1000) 
119.7 237.1 757.3 114.1 34.5 1262.7 
Percentage (%) 
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9.5 18.8 60.0 9.0 2.7 100 
Source: (Anon, 1989):733.  
 
The last wave of rural labour mobility can also be reflected by its fast pace of 
urbanization in the later stage of industrialization. According to statistics, the number of French 
rural labour force had dropped from 5.03 million in 1954 to 1.99 million in 1975, in other words, 
more than 3 million of the rural labour force had been transferred to urban areas only in two 
decades (G. X. Zhang, 2009). Reflected by the urbanization rate estimation, nearly 20% of the 
French rural population migrated to cities within 40 years since France firstly achieved a 50% 
urbanization rate in 1930. Thus, by 1970 it had reached 70%, whereas slowly grew to 80% even 
as of today (World Bank).  
In short, impacted by the small peasant economy, the mobility of French rural 
labourers demonstrated a postponed response. And the pace of French rural labour mobility 
comparing to that in the period of the industrial revolution (from 1815 to 1930), was even faster 
at the later stage of its industrialization, especially after WWII. However, it was much in 
accordance with its development of the industrialization. And the rural land tenure, given its 
dramatic change after the revolution, also severely determined the flow of its rural labour 
mobility. But it hardly resisted the expelled nature of the capitalist mode of production when 
implementing largely in agricultural production. 
 
III.1.2.2.3. The United States (before 1800-1900 after) 
 
Proto-industrialization (before 1800)  
 
The United States of America, due to its particular history, demonstrated a very 
different profile of the rural labour mobility in the proto-industrialization. Successive waves of 
immigration, particularly from Europe, together with Africans began being traded as slaves 
since the early 17th century, flowed to the American colonies (Bailyn, 2011). The British ruled 
and remained the U.S. within its Empire until the American Revolution (1775-1783). The new 
nation, since its political independence, had little capacity to industrialize and remained 
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agrarian in nature with resources processing. Labour was so scarce, of which most were 
exploited to work as indentured servants, forced labour, and even slaves in the production of 
crops such as tobacco and cotton, and coupled with settlers continued to push westward, 
clearing the forests and establishing themselves on the land (Wolfe, 2015). And among most of 
the early British settlers were indentured servants who traded four to seven years of unpaid 
labour for a one-way ticket to the U.S (Ellis Island Foundation, n.d.), with over 90% of them 
became farmers in the U.S (Bailyn, 2011). By itself, such a situation hindered the labour 
mobility, since they were indentured to be attached to the land. Besides, in the early years of 
the republic, immigration became light (6,000 people a year on average), including French 
refugees from the revolt in Haiti (Ellis Island Foundation, n.d.). And the flow of immigration 
was even reduced to a trickle as hostilities between England and Napoleon’s France disrupted 
Atlantic shipping lanes in the early 19th century (Ellis Island Foundation, n.d.).  
Against the backdrop of this scarcity of labour force, and apart from little scattered 
rural-to-urban labour mobility in the northeast region (represented by New England), most 
regions before the beginning of the 19th century manifested very insignificant rural labour 
mobility (Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999). And before the Slater’s mills and factories in the 
Northeast sprang up in the next few years of the end 18th century that accommodated some rural 
migrants, there was a prevailing mode of the production before the breakthrough of the factory 
system, which was called “outwork system” whereby small parts of a larger production process 
were carried out in numerous individual homes and small workshops (U.S. History Online 
Textbook, n.d.). Gradually, new forms of organizational production, such as the factory system, 
emerged and stimulated early rural labour mobility. For example, among the early innovators, 
there was a group of businessmen known as the Boston Associates who recruited thousands of 
New England farm girls to operate the machines in their new factories (U.S. History Online 
Textbook, n.d.). 
In short, agricultural production took the dominant position before the industrial 
revolution and accommodated more than 90% of its labour force within the sector and its 
sidelines; whereas small craftsmen, artisans, and wage labourers consisted of the most non-
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agricultural activities (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). As estimated, in big cities like Boston, New 
York, and Philadelphia at that time, workers in the handicraft industry normally accounted for 
17-27%, and business and maritime trade employed 21-25%, while the largest industry was 
construction and transportation, accounting for 45 -56% (R. B. Morris & J. B. Morris, 1953). 
And according to the first Census (apart from the Natives) in 1790, 3.9 million people counted, 
of which only 5% living in cities with over 2,500 inhabitants (Faulkner, 1964); and in 1800, 
with 322,000 people accounted for 6% of its urbanization rate (Y. P. Chen, 1990):114-123. 
Together with the Westward expansion with land seizing, the particular history of the U.S. 
made its rural-to-urban migration (including labour mobility) slow even till the mid-19th century, 
as presented in the following chart (17).  
 
Chart 17: Urbanization rate (%) in the US, 1790-1980 
 
Note: data collected from different sources may not be consistent; city initially was measured by its inhabitants 
over 2,500, and got changed in 1950. 
Source:(Anon, 1962):6,7,17;(Anon, 1989):182. 
 
Industrial revolution (1800-1900) 
 
Very different from other early industrializers that the major labour resources (apart 
from the natural growth of the urban population) at the stage of the industrial revolution were 
from rural areas. Whereas in the U.S., vast labour resources were contributed by the influx of 
immigrants. In general, the situation of rural-to-urban labour mobility in the first half of the 18th 
century before the Civil War (1861-1865) in the U.S. was moderate and slow. However, the 
real situation was more complicated not only by the influx of massive immigrants but also 
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impacted by its aggressive territorial westward expansion, since both the local rural migrants 
and the urban growth were much diluted. In short, during this period, the growth of northern 
cities mainly consisted of the rural migrants and the influx of immigrants20; the southern was 
basically dependent on its local rural migrants; while the west was mainly by migrants (Z. H. 
Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999). To be noted, the movement of slaves (not even to mention their 
labour mobility) in the antebellum South constituted about one-third of the southern population 
(with nearly four million in 1860) were absolutely restricted till 1865 when the 13th Amendment 
of the constitution officially abolished slavery ( History.com Editors, n.d.), whereas all of the 
northern states had abolished slavery by 1804.  
Although the Westward Movement took shape at the beginning of the 18th century 
when the U.S. purchased Louisiana in 1803 and doubled its size by that time. In the 30s to 50s 
of the 19th century facilitated by the transportation revolution and driven by the California Gold 
Rush, the Westward movement became a sort of the large-scale cross-regional population 
movement in American history. Nonetheless, it was not simply the flow of people from rural 
to urban areas and drove by the industrialization. According to statistics, the American 
population in the 1840s increased by 36%, of which the population living in cities (with more 
than 8,000) grew by 90% (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995).  
It was rather an off-site flow of population since the main purpose of most migrants 
was to obtain land for cultivation. Thus, at this stage, the substantial rural-to-urban labour 
mobility if needed to be differentiated from the massive westward movement, only occurred 
after the end of the Civil War when the south ultimately abolished slavery, and arrived at its 
peak when approaching the end of the 19th century, lasting till the 20s of the 20th century (Z. H. 
Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999).  
On the contrary, the magnitude of immigrants, at a particular point, reached a 
significant amount comparing to its own rural-to-urban labour mobility that sponsored the 
industrialization during the industrial revolution. The 1820s saw 150,000 immigrants enter the 
U.S., a number which quadrupled in the 1830s, rose to more than 1,500,000 in the 1840s and 
                                                
20 E.g., according to statistics, the total inhabitants of New York in 1885 reached 623,000, of which 52% were immigrants (D. 
X. Rong & Sima, 1989).  
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peaked at nearly 2,500,000 in the 1850s. On the eve of the Civil War, one out of every seven 
Americans was either an immigrant or the child of an immigrant (Seller, 1982). Altogether, 
between 1820 and 1900, the number of immigrants to the United States reached 19.12 million 
(Z. H. Wang et al., 1995), accounted for nearly half of the reduction of the entire rural 
population (36.89 million) at the same period (Anon, 1962):17. Moreover, the number of 
immigrants manifested a steady growth in the 19th century, so did its share to local population 
growth. According to various estimations, total immigrants between 1820 and 1860 reached 5 
million (Jones, 1992), and got almost tripled to 14 million between 1860 and 1890 (Library of 
Congress, n.d.; Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). And the immigrants contributed to local population 
growth also kept a significant proportion: 4.7% in the 1820s, 14.3% in the 1830s, 27.9% in the 
1840s, 31.5% in the 1850s (Glass & Eversley, 1965), 17.1% in the 1860s, 10.8% in the 1870s, 
20.1% in the 1880s, and 8.4% in the 1890s (Hauser & Taeuber, 1945; Z. H. Wang et al., 1995).  
Such the influx of immigrants, especially after the 1860s, together with the natural 
population growth, satisfied the American industrial revolution with hug demand for labour 
resources. Not only were most of the immigrants working-age population, but also there were 
considerablely skilled artisans. In general, over half of the total immigrants were male and aged 
labour force (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989). Particularly, in the light of the registration of foreign 
immigrants to the United States from 1819 to 1855, 67.2% of them were aged between 15-40 
years old. And from 1871 to 1892, 22.9% of them were skilled artisans from the West and North 
Europe (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). Also, several studies revealed that major immigrants in the 
19th century before 1848 were farmers and skilled artisans, but turned to be industrial workers 
after 1848 (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001) (Library of Congress, n.d.).  
The rural-to-urban labour mobility in the second half of the 19th century in the U.S. 
also appeared prominently. The first wave found was occurred in the region of New England, 
and general in the north of America. As gradually arrived in the 1880s, it was the first time in 
the region of New England that witnessed the absolute reduction of the rural labour force (D. 
X. Rong & Sima, 1989). Coupled with the labour mobility from the south when substantial 
slaves were released as cheap labour to the north industry. By 1880, employment in agriculture 
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in the U.S. for the first time in history was below that in non-agricultural industries (see Table 
26), even though the amount in agriculture constantly grew in the entire 19th century with an 
increasing amount of labour thereof (see Chart 18). And as of 1900, the employment proportion 
in agriculture reduced from 71.9% in 1820 to 37.5%, only slightly higher than that in 
manufacturing, mining, construction, and utilities.  
 
Table 26: Employment distribution in the US’ three strata of industry (%), 1790-1990 
Year 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery 
Manufacturing, mining, construction and 
utilities 
Service and 
others 
1790 90   
1820 71.9 14 14.1 
1830 70.5   
1840 68.6 14.9 16.5 
1850 64 17.6 18.4 
1860 59.5 19.9 20.6 
1870 53.5 24.4 22.1 
1880 50 24.8 25.2 
1890 42.9 28.1 29 
1900 37.5 30.1 32.4 
1910 31.6 31.6 36.8 
1920 27.4 34.3 38.3 
1930 21.8 31.5 46.7 
1940 17.2 31.1 51.7 
1950 12 33.6 54.4 
1960 6.6 37.7 55.7 
1970 4.8 33.2 62 
1971 3.1 32.2 64.7 
1992 2.8 23.3 73.9 
Source: (Anon, 1962):16-18; (Anon, 1989):183.  
 
In the entire 19th century, the population in both rural and urban areas, together with 
their employments, all demonstrated rapid growth. However, the growth rate (per decade) of 
the rural population was always below total population growth, and in general, expanded the 
gap since 1840 (see Chart 18). This reflects in a certain degree (not fully given the impact of 
immigrants) a takeoff of the American rural-to-urban labour migration. And the amount of 
employment in agriculture expanded in the 19th century, till it arrived at the peak in 1910 with 
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11.59 million (from 2.07 million in 1820) started to decline. However, its growth rate prior to 
this already started to decline from 1850 and onwards.  
 
Chart 18: Rural population, agricultural employment and grwoth in the U.S., 1790-1950 
 
Source:(Anon, 1962):6,7,17; (Anon, 1989):181. 
 
In rural areas, the elimination of peasants also occurred largely in the last decades 
of the 19th century by the U.S’ large farm production. Although many Americans obtained or 
purchased land after the successive enactments of the Land Acts (1796, 1800, 1804, 1820 and 
1832) especially the Homestead Acts in 1862, a limited number of farmers and laborers could 
afford to build a farm, which included access to tools, crops, livestock and more, according to 
the National Archives (History.com Editors, 2019). Even though the 1862 Acts enabled any 
American, including freed slaves, to put in a claim for up to 160 free acres of federal land, its 
implementation did not manage to hold in the hands of small farmers. In fact, large landowners 
occupied a larger amount of land, and land speculation was quite prevailing (History.com 
Editors, 2019). For example, 23% of homesteads allocated between 1881 and 1904 acquired 
land ownership via depreciation (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). By 1900, large-farmers accounted 
for 0.8% of total landowners occupied nearly 20% of total farmland, while, small-farmers 
accounted for 57.4% of total landowners only had 16.7% of total farmland (Clapham, 1966). 
In short, the small peasant economy in American agriculture only experienced a small phase 
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and had been transformed into the capitalist farming system eventually (Z. H. Wang et al., 
1995). 
Besides, the land was also concentrated via acquiring and merging that of the 
expelled bankrupt farmers by the capitalist competition. This can be revealed from the situation 
of the mortgaged land by the rural family, as demonstrated in the following table. Over 40% in 
the north, 5.7% in the south, and 23.1% in the west of farmland were mortgaged and bore an 
increasing tendency (see Table 27). Thus, a large number of small farmers lost their land 
became tenant farmers, wage labourers, or industrial workers. And gradually, the wage labour 
had become a prevailing form in agricultural production. By 1900, the amount of wage labour 
in agriculture reached 2 million, accounted for one-fifth of the rural population (Clapham, 1966). 
Arrived in 1909, farms with wage labour accounted for 45.9% of the total farms, of which 55.1% 
were in the north, 52.5% in the west, and 36.6% in the south. And nearly one-third of the rural 
labour force was employed in these big farms (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989). Otherwise, those 
who did not continue farming in the rural area most migrated to cities and became industrial 
workers.  
 
Table 27: The proportion of the mortgaged land (%) in the U.S., 1890-1910 
Region 1890 1900 1910 
North 40.3 40.9 41.9 
South 5.7 17.2 23.5 
West 23.1 21.7 28.6 
All 28.2 31 33.6 
Source: (Vladimir Ilich Lenin, 1984):81; (S. L. Liu, 1987).  
 
On the other side, the prosperity of urban growth got a tremendous expansion. The 
number of cities in 1810 was only 46 and grew to 61 in 1820, 90 in 1830 (Hughes & Cain, 
2011). By 1850 it had been reached 236 and accommodated 15.3% of the total population. As 
of 1870, it had almost tripled to 663 with 25.7% of the population and expanded to 1,348 (with 
35.1%) in 1890, and 2,262 (with 45.7%) in 1910 (Faulkner, 1964). Although the situation of 
urban growth cannot fully represent, it could reflect some perceptions of rural-to-urban labour 
mobility. Since the growth rate of urban population (59.3%, 42.7%, 56.4%, 36.4%, and 39.2% 
190 
 

from 1870 to 1910 per decade) always remained higher than that of the total population growth 
(22.7%, 30.1%, 25.5%,20.7%, and 21%) (the United States, Bureau of the Census, 1975), it 
signifies that, apart from the immigrants (deducted those flowed to rural areas), rest were all 
from rural migrants. Also, the urbanization rate started from 6.1% in 1800 to 39.7% in 1900, 
somewhat reflects the general magnitude of its rural labour mobility (see Chart 17). In short, 
the general situation of American rural-to-urban labour mobility during its industrial revolution 
was much difficult to be accurate, but had manifested in other estimations, and demonstrated a 
rapid growth at the second half of the 19th century.  
 
The later stage of industrialization (after 1900) 
 
Generally speaking, the rural-to-urban labour mobility in the United States also 
demonstrated certain levels of hysteresis if comparing to its process of industrialization. The 
substantial mobility intensively took place between the end of the industrial revolution and the 
beginning of the later stage of industrialization. Even still impacted by the continuous influx of 
immigrants, the employment structure none the less managed to reduce nearly 40% of the 
proportion in agriculture from 50% in 1880 to 12% in 1950 (see Table 26). It further dropped 
to 6.6% in 1960, and 4.8% in 1970, thus, marked the end of its rural-to-urban labour mobility. 
Moreover, the urbanization rate against the backdrop of the non-stop process of westward 
movement, since 1920, reached 51.2%, also manifested a steady growth, as it reached nearly 
75% in 1970 (see Chart 17). Ever since then, the urbanization rate maintained stabile and grew 
very little, as it only reached 82% in 2018 (World Bank).   
This wave’s rural-to-urban labour mobility led to a constant decline of rural 
population growth until the 1940s. The absolute number of its rural population reached a peak 
in 1940, with 57.2 million then manifested a downward trend (see Chart 18). According to 
estimates by the US Department of Agriculture, more than 6 million rural people (19% of the 
rural population in 1920) in the 1920s, and 3.5 million (13%) in the 1930s, left agriculture (D. 
X. Rong & Sima, 1989). And there was a total amount of 30 million rural population migrating 
to urban areas between 1920 and 1965. As of the 1970s, the massive flow of rural population 
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was approaching its end, since only 715,000 rural population found were outflowed from 1970 
to 1974 (Shover & Shover, 1976):6. 
The major force of rural labour mobility during the industrial revolution may be 
driven by the industrial expansion; it was then substituted and pushed by the mechanism of the 
agricultural elimination facilitated by the capitalization and modernization of large farming 
system in the later stage of industrialization. Along with the same period of the rapid growth of 
labour productivity in agriculture, between 1930 and 1970 also witnessed the fast period of 
rural labour mobility. As some studies revealed that every one percent of agricultural labour 
productivity growth would reduce 0.5 percent of the rural labour force during the period (D. X. 
Rong & Sima, 1989). As we can see that the annual average decline of the rural labour force 
from the 1930s to the 1960s were 0.7%, 2.4%, 2.8%, and 4.5%; whereas the average annual 
growth rate of agricultural productivity were 1.88%, 6%, 7.35%, and 6.92% (the United States, 
Bureau of the Census, 1975). Thus, the total rural labour force dropped from 6.2 million in 1950 
to 3.2 million in 1977 (X. Y. Liu, 1989). And as of 1984, only 2.7 million labour force was left 
in the agricultural sector (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989).  
Furthermore, along with the modernization, capitalization, and mechanization of 
agricultural development, the situation of land concentration also got much intensified at the 
later stage of industrialization, in turn, further expelled surplus rural labour force. The total 
amount of farms reduced almost half from 4 million in 1880 to 2.48 million in 1974, whereas 
the number of farms with over 1,000 acres climbed from 29,000 units (0.7% to total farm 
amount) to 163,000 units (6.7%). To the contrary, the amount of small-sized farms with less 
than 10 acres dropped from 509,000 units (at its peak in 1940) to 128,000 units, accounting for 
merely 5.8% of total farm amounts, whereas, the middle-sized farms with 100-1,000 acres 
maintained a steady growth from 44.2% to 52.2% (see Chart 19).  
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Chart 19: Land concentration measured by the scale of farming unit (%) in the U.S., 1880-1974 
 
Source:(Anon, 1989):250. 
 
Still, it is worth mentioning the situation of immigration in the U.S. at this stage, 
since all immigrants basically made the country and contributed to its industrial development. 
Although at the end of the 19th century, the U.S. started to shift the previously open immigration 
policy to be restrictive, started from the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), and culminated in 1924 
with the exclusion of all Asian and African immigrants and sharp limitation of southern and 
eastern Europeans (Act of May 26, 1924) (Seller, 1982), the large amount of labour demanded 
for the rapid growth of American industry and agriculture was still supplemented by a steady 
stream of immigrants before the WWI (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989). As between 1900 and 1980, 
total immigration had numbered around 127 million (see Chart 20). And it was found that more 
than half of immigrants inflowed to cities (Seller, 1982). As well as, large amounts were 
accommodated in the secondary and service sectors. For example, one-third of manufacturing 
employment, one-fourth of construction and transportation, and half of steel and mining were 
immigrants in 1910 (Shaybe & Faulkner, 1983).  
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Chart 20: Immigrant population and share in the U.S., 1850-2000 
 
Source: Migration Policy Institute (MPI) tabulation of data from U.S. Census Bureau.  
 
Another striking feature of the rural labour mobility at the later stage of 
industrialization lies in the employment structural changes that witnessed immense growth of 
the service sectors and the gradual decline of the second industry. Although the absolute number 
of employment in the second industry, including manufacturing, mining, and construction, kept 
growing until 1955, then started to decline, its share to total employment since 1920 already 
started to drop from 34.3% to 23.3% in 1990. On the contrary, employment in the service ever 
since surpassed that of the second industry in 1900, demonstrated a steady and sharp increase, 
from 32.4% to 62% in 1970 and 70% in 1980 (see Table 21). More specific, as we present in 
the following chart (21), changes in the non-agricultural sectors are more distinct. Among all 
services, sectors like wholesale and retail, insurance, finance, and real estate got tremendous 
growth. As the employment they provided grew from 4.6 million and 1.1 million in 1920 to 
11.7 million and 2.49 million respectively in 1960. And the total non-agricultural employment 
also doubled from 27 million to 52.9 million.  
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Chart 21: Non-agricultural employment composition in the U.S. (%), 1920-1960 
 
Source:(Anon, 1962):16.  
 
In short, ever since the industrial revolution took off in 1800, the United States spent 
more than one and a half-century to finish the task of its rural-to-urban labour mobility. Due to 
its particular immigrant history, the long-lasting and vast influx of immigrants, not only formed 
the United States but also supplied immense labour force for its industrialization. And the 
westward movement, although kicked off the earlier population movement, it delayed or diluted 
the process of the rural-to-urban labour mobility that drove by the industrialization. But in 
general, the magnitude and the speed of its rural labour mobility kept pace with its 
industrialization, urbanization, and agricultural modernization (Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 
1999). The drive forces mainly relied on the industrial expansion during the period of the 
industrial revolution, as well as, the expansion of service and the capitalist upgrading of the 
agriculture in the later stage of industrialization.  
 
III.1.2.2.4. Germany (1830-1910) 
 
Proto-industrialization (before 1830)  
 
During the entire period we associate with proto-industrialization, Germany did not 
exist. It was a conglomeration of some 384 separate sovereign jurisdictions - indeed, almost 
2,500 when the sovereign estates of Free Imperial Knights were also taken into account. It was 
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not until 1814-15 that this plethora of German principalities were reduced to a mere 39 
(including Austria), not until 1834 that they even formed a customs union, and not until 1871 
that all (except the Austrian lands) were unified into a single state, the German Empire, headed 
by the King of Prussia (Gagliardo, 2014). At this stage, diversity and segmentation arose over 
very small geographical areas, by trade barriers, economic policies, currency, weights and 
measures, transportation infrastructure, the level and distribution of taxation, warfare, 
diplomatic alliances, religion, education, and law. Above all, each German state possessed a 
different legacy of their social institutions, and thus a different framework for economic activity 
(Ogilvie, 1996). In any case, we can not generalize the situation in Germany, including the 
rural-to-urban labour mobility. Thus, Prussia is what we most analyze in this thesis until the 
unification of Germany in 1871.  
Until the early 19th century Germany, numerous states of varying size and 
development, retained its pre-industrial character (A. Mitchell, 2000). Although there was wide 
variation in institutions across German proto-industries, the majority were regulated by guilds, 
merchant companies, or other corporate privileges and monopolies, until at least 1800 (Ogilvie, 
1996). For example, in almost all Saxon proto-industries, urban merchant guilds obtained state 
privileges forcing rural producers to sell their products through them until after 1800; In 
Westphalia, rural producers were compelled to sell to merchants in the local town through the 
Leggen (state inspection offices), which were strengthened by the state in the 1770s; And in the 
south, like Wurttemberg, all proto-industrial linen and worsted weavers were placed by the state 
under the ‘Bann’ of privileged merchant companies, to whom they were legally obliged to sell 
their output, at fixed quotas and prices, until the companies dissolved - along with the industries 
around 1800 (Ogilvie, 1996).  
In vast rural areas before the emancipation of the serfs, peasants were bound 
permanently to parcels of land across Germany and especially in the east (Wunder, 1983). 
Farming was handled by tenant peasants who paid rents and obligatory services to the landlord. 
Not even to mention their labour mobility, freedom as a person was yet realized. There were 
few scattered emancipation of serfs since 1770, e.g., the Schleswig did in 1780. However, 
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substantial abolishment of serfdom led by Prussia with the “October Edict” in 1807, and 
followed by other German states after 1815 (Sagarra, 2017). Although for most peasants, 
customs and traditions continued largely unchanged, including the old habits of deference to 
the nobles whose legal authority remained quite strong over villagers. What was new was that 
the peasant could sell his land, enabling him to move to the city (Sagarra, 2017). Yet, there was 
very little rural-to-urban labour mobility in some German states at the proto-industrialization.  
Although Germany did not have the enclosure movement that of England, the 
mechanism of the serfdom abolishment that expelled peasants was more or less the same but 
hidden and cruel. One of the results was the expropriation of the agricultural population from 
land, or transformed the feudal relationship into landlord property and proletarianized labour 
force. The peasant was allowed to become a free proprietor of land if only he could buy it. Since 
most peasants did not have enough money, they were allowed to pay for the land by giving up 
their rights to use common lands. Alternatively, they could “pay” by ceding some of their lands 
to their landlords. The net outcome was that the peasants’ situation has worsened - they had 
less land to till, and no access to common lands (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). In consequence, this 
created conditions of the potential rural labour mobility, especially during the German industrial 
revolution.  
The same as other early industrializers, Germany at the beginning of the 19th century 
was still an agriculture-based nation, with the majority of its population (more than 85%) still 
living in rural areas (Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999). Prussia, in 1816 only 10% of its 
population residing in cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants (Meng, 2018). As demonstrated 
in the following chart (22), the urbanization rate in the German proto-industrialization grew 
slowly from 11.3% in 1800 to around 20% when it entered the industrial revolution. At this 
stage, rural handicraft was still the dominant mode of production in the industry. And it was 
estimated that in 1800, rural household handicraft workers accounted for one-third of the total 
number of handicraft workers at that time. Until 1849, the actual factory workers of Pruss’s 
working population over 14 years old were only 5.44% (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). 
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Chart 22: Urbanization rate (%) in Germany, 1800-1990 
 
Note: data collected from different sources may not be consistent. 
Source: data of 1800-1910 are from (Clapham, 1966; Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999; Z. H. Jiang, 2012b; Meng, 
2018);1960-1990 from World Bank;  
 
Industrial revolution (1830-1910) 
 
At the end of the first half 19th century, the impacts of the industrial revolution 
started to appear, the growing rural-to-urban labour mobility got scaled from the 1840s onwards 
(Z. H. Wang, 1996). In general, there were a few climax waves of the rural-to-urban labour 
mobility, which all found had a close relation to its industrial upgrading of the entire 19th 
century (W. S. Gao, 2013). After eliminating tariff barriers through the Zollverein in the 1830s, 
the textile industry got firstly flourished in many urban areas, e.g., Silesia and Saxony, and 
became one of the early industries absorbed the influx of rural labour mobility (W. Jiang, 
2007a). It was then supplemented largely by the railroad and later by construction industries. 
For example, the number of people employed in the railroad got an explosive jump from 1,648 
in 1940 to 26,084 in 1850, 85,608 in 1860, and 161,014 in 1870 (W. Jiang, 2007a). So was that 
in the coal industry, the amount of people in the coal industry was also witnessed tremendous 
growth, as there was 4,500 in 1830, 8,900 in 1840, 12,700 in 1850, 125,000 in 1870 (W. Jiang, 
2007a). By 1900 the largest economy in Europe, Germany, had established a primary position 
in several key sectors, like the chemical industry and steel production (Aftalion, 2001), which 
then offered major employment to rural migrants.  
The rural labour mobility during the period of the German industrial revolution 
demonstrated highly regional distinctions, which was much consistent with the level of regional 
industrial development. In the early 19th century, due to the expansion of cultivated land in the 
11.3 15
30 30.7
36.1
50
54.4
60
71.3 72.3 72.8 73.1
1800 1831 1862 1890 1921 1951 1982
198 
 

east, the eastern rural labour force was not found with significant migration. Only some 
scattered flow to Prussia of short-distance, and to Ruhr region with long-distance (K. Jiang, 
2012). Thus, before 1871, most rural-to-urban labour mobility was found in the west and 
northwest of Germany. In the 1860s, the industrial revolution arrived at its acceleration phase, 
especially in the central and west, together with the push of agricultural crisis, substantial rural 
labour mobility occurred not only from rural to urban areas but also from the east and south to 
the central and western regions (Moch, 2011; Meng, 2018). And it was estimated that the 
migration rate in the east reached 45.3% in the 1870s (Meng, 2018). After the 1870s, 
comprehensive rural labour mobility took place of the entire Germany. And it was found that 
more than half of the population movement between 1875 and 1880 was in the form of rural to 
urban migration (Grant, 2005).  
The second industrial revolution also pumped in great power to the German 
industrialization, which enabled the rural-to-urban labour mobility lasting until the WWI. The 
accelerated industrialization in the late 19th century not only reversed the situation of German 
emigration but also attracted a large amount of foreign labour force. Due to the political 
uncertainty and some periodic agricultural crisis, there was a growing German emigration until 
the 1890s. As estimated, there was around 5 million German population emigrated to other 
countries during the entire 19th century (Cipolla, 1988):54. However, the situation got reversed 
from the 1890s onwards. For example, in the decade from 1895 to 1905, immigrants were 
nearly 147,000 more than emigrants. And from 1890 to 1910, the number of foreigners living 
in Germany rose from 433,000 to 779,000, and 1.26 million in 1910 (Hoerder & Nagler, 2002). 
The continuing rural-to-urban labour mobility, when reflected by the German 
employment structural changes, can also release some clues which were near the real situation. 
Nearly a half century passed ever since the industrial revolution took off, Germen workers with 
nearly half of them from 1870 started to work in the non-agricultural sectors. And it was 
estimated that over 20 million of agricultural labour force moved to non-agricultural sectors 
between 1870 and 1920 (K. Jiang, 2012). In specific, the number of workers in the second and 
service industries increased from 3.8 million and 3 million to 11.5 million and 8.5 million 
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between 1852 and 1913, an increase of 203% and 183%; At the same time, the amount in 
agriculture although also increased from 8.3 million to 10.7 million, the increment was only 
29% (W. Jiang, 2013). It can also be demonstrated by the proportion of employment, e.g., in 
agriculture, forestry and fishery it manifested a constant decline during its industrial revolution, 
from around 60% in 1840 to 35.5% in 1910; that in manufacturing, mining, construction, and 
other utilities increased rapidly from around 20% doubled to 40%; coupled with a modest 
growth that in service sectors. And by the end of the industrial revolution, the employment 
proportion in the second industry already surpassed that of agriculture (see Table 28).   
 
Table 28: Employment distribution in three strata of industry (%) in Germany, 1843-1992 
Year 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery 
Manufacturing, mining, 
construction and other utilities 
Service and others 
1843 61 23.4 13.7 
1852 55 25 20 
1854 55 25 20 
1865 51 (1861-1871) 28 (1861-1871) 21 
1866 51 28 21 
1870 50 29 22 
1875 49 29 22 
1882 42.3 39 19 
1885 47 31 22 
1895 41 35 24 
1900 37 41 22 
1907 36 38 26 
1910 35.5 (1905-1914) 38 (1905-1914) 26.5 
1911 35 38 27 
1913 34.6 41.1 24.3 
1929 24.7 40.3 30.6 
1950 22.2 43 35 
1960 14 48 38 
1970 8.9 48 44 
1980 5.9 44.9 49.2 
1992 3.1 41.6 55.3 
Note: data collected from different sources may not be consistent; 
Source: (Anon, 1989):597; (Zorn, 1971):528; (W. Jiang, 2013):47; (Meng, 2018; Kolb & Schumann, 2013). 
 
While in rural areas, until the mid-19th century, the guilds, the landed aristocracy, 
the churches, and the government bureaucracies still had many rules and restrictions that 
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restrained rural development (Geiss, 2013). However, from the 1830s and 1840s, Prussia, 
Saxony, and other states reorganized agriculture, introducing sugar beets, turnips, and potatoes, 
yielding a higher level of food production that enabled a surplus rural population to move to 
industrial areas. And along with the German approach to abolishing serfdom, also known as the 
Stein-Hardenberg Reforms in Prussia ever since 1807, (in short serfs redeemed feudal 
obligations by land or a process of land concentration), by the 60s of the 19th century, most 
small-peasants (71.4% of the total rural family) only owned 9% of the total farmland; whereas 
Junker landlords and rich peasants (28.6% of the total rural family) possessed 91% of the total 
farmland (Cipolla, 1988). In other words, by the 1860s, German agriculture already 
concentrated the majority of land in fewer hands with the potential to implement the capitalist 
mode of production on the one hand; and already accumulated hug surplus rural labour force to 
be transferred on the other hand. For example, there was still 78% rural population in Prussia, 
however, it got reduced to 64% in 1849, and 42.5% in 1882 (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). 
Besides, Germany’s rapid industrialization also realized fast urbanization, 
especially in those industrial regions like Ruhr. E.g., Dortmund, the mining city in the Ruhr 
area, was with only 12,700 inhabitants in 1850; grew dramatically to 51,400 in 1870, 101,800 
in 1885, and 394,600 in 1913, nearly 30 times that of 1850 (J. H. Ding, 2012):109. It was also 
found that over 30 million rural population migrated to cities between 1870 and 1920 (K. Jiang, 
2012). Rapid urban growth also started from the 1860s and onwards, as we can see clearly from 
Chart (22). The urbanization rate in 1860 was only 30%, grew up to 36% in 1871, 48% in 1890, 
and 60% in 1910.  
 
The later stage of industrialization (after 1910) 
 
The German rural-to-urban labour mobility as entering the 20th century continued 
the previous pace, given there was still 37% of the entire employment in agriculture, and if in 
accordance with previous countries, when agricultural employment dropped around 5% is 
considered as the country basically finish its task of rural labour mobility, 1980 then would be 
marked off for Germany. However, there were some new features. Firstly, the rural labour 
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mobility was then largely shifted to service sectors from that of previously in the second 
industry; Secondly, the rural-to-urban migration since 1910 was no longer the chief movement 
of the German population (Grant, 2005), and was replaced by the movements from rural-to-
rural or urban-to-urban. According to the statistics in 1907, among the total population (60.4 
million), nearly half of them (28.64 million) were involved in certain forms of migration, whom 
mostly migrated to neighboring cities or long-distance cities (Jackson, 1997; W. S. Gao, 2013). 
In other words, by 1907, less than half of the German population was living at the birthplace, 
almost one in every two Germans participated in different forms of population movement. And 
it was found that at least two-thirds of the 42 large cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants 
were new entrants by 1907 (W. Jiang, 2007b). The urbanization rate ever since reached 60% in 
1910, only grew 10% within a half century, and once reached the level of 70%, it remained 
even till today (with 77%) (World Bank).  
One of the most distinctive features of Germany’s industrialization at the later stage 
was that its stable share of employment in the second industry maintained around 40% for 
nearly a century since 1900. The absolute amount of industrial workers jumped rapidly from 
3.8 million in 1852 to 8 million in 1895, 10.9 million in 1907, 13.3 million in 1925, and 13.1 
in 1933 (Anon, 1962):256. Before WWI, sectors with more than one million workers were 1.89 
million in metal processing; 1.63 million in construction; 1.54 million in clothing; 1.43 million 
in catering; and 1.1 million in textile (Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999). Meanwhile, the 
employment in service sectors kept growing, and surpassed that of the second industry only 
from 1980 and onwards, as well as started to occupy half of the German employment since 
1990. Among the service, sectors like (commerce, bank, insurance) and transportation 
demonstrated a steady increase, from 1.9 million and 230,000 in 1895 to 4.4 million and 1.6 
million in 1933 (Anon, 1962):256.  
In the first half of the 20th century, workers in agriculture bore a progressive 
reduction and reduced its proportion to total employment, nearly 15% from 37% to 22%. And 
there was another rapid wave in the first two decades of the second 20th century. As approaching 
the 1970s, Germany managed to reduce its proportion below 10%. Taken West Germany (BRD 
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or the Federal Republic of Germany until 1990) as an example, the rural labour force was 
declined from 5.02 million in 1950 to 1.37 million in 1984, nearly 72.7% of absolute reduction. 
In other words, during this period, every two out of three rural labour force in BRD migrated 
to other non-agricultural sectors (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989). And as of the reunification in 
1990, total German employment in agriculture already got reduced to nearly 3%.   
In short, Germany spent about one century and a half to finish the task of the rural-
to-urban labour mobility since the takeoff of its industrial revolution in 1830. However, if 
deducted some period of the political chaos before its unification and the west-east partition 
after WWII, the real situation was even shorter. The principle period would be between 1870 
and 1970. While in rural areas, right before the unification, the process of the expropriation of 
the agricultural population from land, proletarianized labour force, together with land 
concentration, a large amount of surplus rural labour force was created against the backdrop of 
extensive implementation of the capitalist mode of production in agriculture. This somewhat 
explains that once the rural-to-urban labour mobility was kicked-off, its process was successive. 
Besides, although the rural labour mobility at the later stage of industrialization manifested a 
flow to service sectors and surpassed the second industry, still, the major part of labour mobility 
ever since the industrial revolution started flowing into the second industry was maintained for 
nearly a century-long.   
To summarize, the rural-to-urban labour mobility of selected countries during each 
stage of the pre-defined time-frame of industrialization was basically presented. As we can see 
clearly, it is really a complicated study that involved with many historical singularities. 
Although the complexities and particularities are even more complicated in the real situation, 
thus, often prevent our attempt to compare among each other, we would still like to give a try, 
abstracting some similarities and regularities which deepen our understandings. From another 
perspective, it is a thesis that intends to spurn mainstream perceptions and re-interpret the 
history of the industrial revolution, especially in the angle of rural labour mobility. To be noted, 
these countries selected are not implied any sense of acquiescence, which we take them as 
successful examples neither in industrialization nor in rural labour mobility. What they achieve 
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or fail can be attributed to many factors. Here, we mainly intend to deconstruct how did it 
happen and what can we learn. 
Thus, before our systematic analysis, there are some scattered observations worth 
mentioning. First of all, all these EICs experienced rather a long time (at least a century-long) 
to have their rural-to-urban labour mobility basically done. To start, during the period of their 
respective proto-industrialization, the rural labour force was largely deprived of land. And if 
there was labour mobility, it mainly concentrated in rural areas from agricultural sectors to non-
agricultural ones. For example, England, via the enclosure movement, Prussia via the serfdom 
reforms, managed to create huge amount of surplus rural labour force to be transferred in later 
stages. Rural farmland in most countries got concentrated in the fewer hands of landlords or 
rich peasants and prepared for the capitalist mode of production in agriculture. While contrarily 
in France due to its small peasant land system in rural areas right after the revolution, thus, the 
rural labour reversed moving back to land, and delayed its process even at a later stage; as well 
as the particular situation of the United States, the westward movement also dragged the flow 
of population to new rural areas, etc.  
During the period of the industrial revolution, apart from the UK, the industrial 
revolution simultaneously sparked on its substantial rural-to-urban labour mobility, rest 
countries all demonstrated a certain degree of hysteresis, especially France and the U.S. 
However, all these countries experienced rapid rural-to-urban labour mobility during their 
industrial revolution. And the driving force of rural labour mobility was mainly via the vast 
jobs created by new industries, such as railroad, mining, manufacturing, construction, and later 
the steel, chemical, and electronic productions; whereas the pushing force was the worsening 
situation of small peasants against the backdrop of the growing land concentration and the 
emergence of the capitalist farming. However, the pace of the declining employment in 
agriculture in all these countries was largely lagged behind the growth rate of their urbanization, 
meaning the initial industrialization also took place in many rural areas and offered many non-
agricultural jobs for local rural population, etc.  
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Lastly, as entering the later stage of industrialization. The rural-to-urban labour 
mobility continued its previous pace, but at the same time revealed some new characteristics. 
Among the most, the rural labour mobility was shifted from the previous mainly based on the 
spatial movement (namely from rural to urban areas), and professionally mainly shift from 
agricultural farming to industrial workers, to ultimately the service sectors. And the last pushing 
force of the rural labour force was by upgrading agricultural production more competitive, 
modernized, commercialized, and mechanized than that during the industrial revolution, then 
squeezed more rural labour force to be transferred. As of the second half of the 20th century, 
most countries already achieved the most majority of labour force in the non-agricultural sector, 
and more than 70% of the population living in cities.  
 
III.2. Historical review of rural labour mobility under the triple dimension: time, space, 
and people 
 
On all accounts, to elaborate these complexities, we need to recur to a dynamic 
analytical framework that is able to string up all those scattered observations. Thus, the dynamic 
paradigm as entangled among time, space, and people, which has been well presented in the 
first chapter, is placed to facilitate our further analysis of the EICs of their external conditions 
that enabled their smooth labour transfer in each stage of their industrialization. In this part, we 
intend to specify these context-based conditions which were specific to certain historical 
circumstances that can be hardly imitated or re-created by the subjective will of man (in certain 
extent), such as the stages of capitalist development, demography, culture, ideology, etc., that 
enabled those EICs to have certain positions managing the rural labour force in accordance to 
the stage of industrialization. Furthermore, combined with our horizontal projections among 
the UK, France, the U.S., and Germany, and coupled with the analysis of the changing 
demography, culture, ideology of generation, etc., a tempo-spatial-anthropological analytical 
approach is constructed and consistent with our theoretical framework. Thus, in the following 
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part, we will deconstruct each dimension and will reveal these tempo-spatial-anthropological 
based (context-based) conditions. 
 
III.2.1. Time dimension 
 
Time should not be seen as a static tool that is placed to record events, by itself, time 
is also evolving and changing as we have articulated in the first chapter. To deconstruct some 
historical events, like the industrial revolution, we need a more profound knowledge of its 
dynamic time-contexts, of which some still relied on static time view. The foremost impression 
of these countries’ respective history of rural labour mobility would lie in chronicity. As stated 
before, against the backdrop of the long-lasting rural-to-urban labour mobility, if the proportion 
of agricultural employment (or approximately that of the rural labour force) dropped to less 
than 5%, is considered as one of the tasks of one country’s industrialization21. Then it took 
around 180 years for the UK, 175 Years for France, 160 years for the United States, and 150 
years for Germany since their respective industrial revolution took off (see Table 29); And if 
the urbanization rate reached as high as 75% that could be roughly22 considered the end period 
of one’s rural-to-urban migration, then it took almost two centuries for the EICs, such as 150 
years for the UK, 180 years for France, 190 years for the U.S., and 170 years for Germany.  
The chronicity of rural labour mobility is one of the most significant foundations 
that bear the potentials to realize a smooth labour resources allocation in accordance with the 
changing structures of industries, given the evolution of industrial structures and employment 
structures induced by industrial revolution per se are long processes. As we can see that each 
EICs experienced over a century-long time of industrial revolution in the light of our own 
criterion: such as 90 years for the UK, 115 years for France, 100 years for the U.S., and 80 
years for Germany. And these long-run events, including rural labour mobility, industrialization, 
                                                
21 Given the decline rate of employment in agriculture ever since dropped less than 5% maintained very slow, e.g., as of 2018, 
the UK dropped to 1.15%, France with 2.60%, the United States with 1.42%, and 1.27% for Germany.  
22 Given the growth rate of urbanization ever since reached 75% maintained very slow, e.g., as of 2018, the UK reached 83%, 
France reached 80%, the U.S. reached 82%, and Germany reached 77% (World Bank). 
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urbanization, etc., if compare among each other, would reveal so many insights that are often 
ignored.  
 
Table 29: Time length of the EICs in rural labour mobility (/years) 
Country 
Period of industrial 
revolution 
Agricultural 
employment share 
less than 20% 
If agricultural 
employment share 
less than 5% 
Urbanization rate 
surpassed 50% 
Urbanization rate 
reached 75% 
United 
Kingdom  
90 (1760-1850) 90 ( -1850) 180 ( -1940) 90 ( -1850) 150 ( -1910) 
France 115 (1815-1930) 145 ( -1960) 175 ( -1990) 115 (-1930) 180 ( -1995) 
United 
States 
100 (1800-1900) 130 ( -1930) 160 ( -1960) 120 ( -1920) 190 ( -1990) 
Germany 80 (1830-1910) 120 ( -1950) 150 ( -1980) 60 ( -1890) 170 ( -2000) 
Source: data is collected from previous analysis and calculated by author.  
 
III.2.1.1. The time sequence of rural labour mobility 
 
Although certain-scaled rural-to-urban labour mobility in the UK was kicked off 
once its industrial revolution took off, the substantial mobility was found from 1800 and 
onwards23, and the rest of countries all demonstrated a certain extent hysteresis comparing to 
their respective industrial revolution, e.g., France started approximately 35 years after the start 
of its industrial revolution in 1850, the U.S., with nearly 50 years in 1850, and Germany with 
30 years in 1860. However, the delayed period of time had witnessed immense growth of the 
second industry, as we can see from the proportion of the value-added by the non-agricultural 
sectors to total GDP had reached 67.5% in the UK in 1800, 50% in France in 1850, 70% in the 
U.S., in 1850, and 65% in Germany in 1860 (see Table 29). Thus, the rapid growth of non-
agricultural sectors brought immense jobs to rural migrants. To a certain extent, the initial rural-
to-urban labour mobility in these EICs was mainly driven by the expansion of industries. 
However, the outflow of labour force from agricultural sectors highly depends on the industrial 
                                                
23 Even Beales believed that the substantial rural-to-urban labour mobility occurred after the 40s of the 19th century (Beales 
1958).  
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productivity gains brought about by technological advances, whereby the ultimate 
technological transformation in realizing the increase of productivity depends on the degree 
and pace of technological diffusions. Meanwhile, the diffusion of technology in the agricultural 
sector is relatively slow and is dependent on many social-agricultural configurations, and there 
is often a long time lag from innovation to widespread application. Both sectors, therefore, need 
some time to realize these conditions. 
The time sequence of the long-standing rural-to-urban labour mobility also bore a 
phased feature in the process of industrialization. We do not intend to state that all these EICs 
experienced a positivist industrial structural evolution24, but their rural labour mobility, to a 
large extent, manifested a flow principally from the sector of agriculture firstly to that of 
industry and then to service. More specifically, during the period of proto-industrialization, 
there were only scattered rural-to-urban labour mobility but differed largely from country to 
country. For example, due to various factors represented by the enclosure movement in the UK, 
as of the end of proto-industrialization, it had already achieved with more than 60% of its total 
employment in non-agricultural sectors; while other countries, however, still contained more 
than 60% in agriculture. And as we had already reviewed certain aspects of socio-economic 
conditions in each EICs’ proto-industrial period, this stage’s rural-to-urban labour mobility thus 
cannot be largely driven by the industry, it was rather pushed by the eliminated approach of 
some changes of socio-agricultural configurations, centering on the land concentration via 
various forms. As thus, the process was facilitated by the enclosure movement in the UK and 
the serfdom reform in Germany, whereas delayed by the small peasant land system in France, 
and the commercialization of land property in the westward movement in the U.S. 
Then during the period of the industrial revolution, in itself, major driving forces of 
rural-to-urban labour mobility lied principally in the intrinsic development of industrial sectors 
and supplemented by the continuing peasant elimination process mainly via land concentration. 
                                                
24 For example, in the study of Jiang, he articulated Germany experienced a “leaping” flow of rural labour mobility (W. Jiang, 
2013). In other words, as the employment growth of the service sector showed a trend of simultaneous growth with the second 
industry during the industrial revolution, the rural labour force did not follow the sequence and simultaneously flew to the 
tertiary industry.   
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Thus, the magnitude and pace of rural labour mobility in this stage were highly dependent on 
that of industrial expansion. And the industrial expansion centered on manufacturing, mining, 
and construction during the entire 19th century was with a high level of job creation, in other 
words, the direct consequence of industrial expansion during the industrial revolution majorly 
created concrete jobs for rural migrants. The accelerated rural-to-urban labour mobility was 
found mostly in the second half period of the EICs’ industrial revolution, respectively.  
As stated before, the later stage of industrialization was artificially made only served 
for our analysis, thus, the speed and scale of rural-to-urban labour mobility continued its 
previous feature and maintained for nearly a half-century until approaching a semi-stagnated 
status. E.g., employment share in agriculture in the UK in 1900 reached around 9%, France 
with 8% in 1980, the U.S. with 12% in 1950, and Germany with around 14% in 1960. One of 
the most crucial insights as we found, under the context of the rapid growth of the service both 
in terms of its employment and economic contribution, the proportion of employment in the 
second industry maintained more than 30% firmly for more than a century-long, e.g., in the UK 
it maintained ever since 1800 to 1990, from 1890 to 1990 in France, from 1900 to 1980 in the 
U.S., and from 1880 to 2000 in Germany (World Bank). This is significantly important, given 
all those long-standing events would provide ample buffer time for rural migrants settling down 
in urban settings and converting their professions. And the sectors of service arrived 
comparatively late becoming the biggest sectors absorbing employment, like 1970 for the UK, 
1970 for France, 1940 for the U.S., and 1980 for Germany. 
Besides, one more perception from the time sequence can be reviewed by the pace 
of both the proportional decline of the rural labour force and agricultural sectors contributing 
to the overall economy. And we can project in the following chart 23. Roughly as we can see 
that all these EICs manifested a symmetrical drop of agricultural employment in line with the 
declining contribution of the sectors over a long period of time. E.g., for the UK, both dropped 
from approximately 40% in 1750 to 7% in 1900, France from 50% in 1850 to 4% in 1990, the 
U.S., from 70% in 1830 to 3% in 1990, and Germany from 50% in 1850 to 2% in 1990. In turn, 
we could also project the situation of the growth of employment in the second industry and 
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service compared to their economic contribution. And the result would be more or less the same: 
there is a symmetrical growth in both terms of employment and economy.  
 
Chart 23: The pace of rural labour mobility in comparing to that of value-added by agriculture (%) 
  
  
Note: data collected from different sources may not be consistent.  
Source: data collected from previous analysis of this chapter. 
 
III.2.1.2. A gradual process of rural labour mobility 
 
The rural-to-urban labour mobility in the selected EICs was not only manifested a 
long-term process in absolute measures, but it also demonstrated in the relative term. As 
estimated based on previous data analysis, during the respective period of the industrial 
revolution of EICs, the declining rate of employment in agriculture demonstrated a slower pace 
than that of the employment growth rate in the second industry: over the entire period of the 
industrial revolution, the average decade decline rate that of the UK was 6.52%, comparing to 
that of 13.74% in growth rate of the industry; as well as, 7.4% vs. 13.02% in the U.S., and 8.46% 
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vs. 8.84% in Germany, however, the situation of France manifested a contrast (6.09% vs. 4.8%). 
More specifically, the detailed average annual statistics are presented in the following chart 
(24). And this would imply that rural migrants, apart from directly flowing to urban industries, 
some were reserved in rural industries along with the industrial revolution. Or in other words, 
in the early period of the industrial revolution, rural industries, to a large extent, were very 
important and offered immense employment for rural migrants. As thus, many rural migrants 
no need to migrate to urban industries but achieved professional converts from agricultural 
production to non-agricultural activities in rural areas. 
 
Chart 24: The average annual decline/growth rate of employment in agriculture/industry 
  
 
Note: data collected from different sources may not be consistent.  
Source: data collected from previous analysis of this chapter.
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As we can see clearly that apart from France, the rest EICs all demonstrated the 
aforementioned situation. The UK as before approximately in 1820, the U.S., in 1878, and 
Germany in 1906, all had a faster growth rate of employment in the second industry than that 
of agriculture. Not only did a large amount of rural migrants employed in rural industries, but 
it also contained conditions to realize a smooth labour transition in urban industries. Regarding 
the situation in France, as we may attribute to its small peasant land system, which for long 
hindered industrial development. But at the same time, rural non-agricultural activities 
experienced rapid prosperity and provided jobs for small peasants. Notably speaking, both 
contributions in employment and economy of the second industry for over a century-long 
maintained high and well-proportioned with each other. As demonstrated below (see Chart 25), 
in all of these EICs ever since the proportion of employment and GDP contribution, both 
surpassed 30% during their respective industrial revolution had upheld this level till the second 
half of the 20th century. The industrial expansion had been strikingly contributed to its 
employment.  
Chart 25: The employment shares and value added by the second industry 
  
 
Note: data collected from different sources may not be consistent. 
Source: data of UK in 1990, of France after 1960, of the U.S., in 1992, and of Germany in 1992 are from World 
Bank; the rest are from previous statistical analysis. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1730 1780 1830 1880 1930 1980
U K
Employment share in the second industry (%)
Value added by the second industry (% of GDP)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1830 1880 1930 1980
F R A N C E
0
10
20
30
40
50
1810 1860 1910 1960
U S A
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1820 1870 1920 1970
G E R M A N Y
212 
 

III.2.1.3. The rise of agricultural productivity provides a prerequisite  
 
Although we cannot argue that there must be an agricultural revolution before the 
emergence of substantial rural-to-urban labour mobility, there were various forms of socio-
agricultural re-configurations that increased agricultural labour productivity and expelled small 
and poor peasants in EICs as presented in the previous part. In specific, during most of these 
EICs’ proto-industrial stage (apart from France), given the low level of international trade 
constrained by the physical conditions of transportation, the initial rural labour force release 
was mainly owing to the increase of labour productivity in agriculture via various forms of 
agricultural re-organization, like the long-lasting enclosure movement in the UK. Together with 
other improvements, such as the replacement fallow system by rotation system, the promotion 
of new and diversified crops, application of the improved implements and soil, construction of 
irrigation canals, so on and so forth. Those were all happened prior to 1750 in England, as the 
so-called English agricultural revolution (Cipolla, 1988).  
And to what extent can agricultural outputs support the population in non-
agricultural activities, including those new rural migrants were largely depended by the degree 
for how much agricultural labour productivity gained, during the initial phase of rural-to-urban 
labour mobility. For example, as estimated in Floud’s study in the UK, one agricultural labour 
force could feed 1.7 people in 1700; reached 2.5 people by 1800, and 5 people in 1900. 
Agricultural labour productivity had grown twice (Floud et al., 1994). Prior to the industrial 
revolution, food outputs in the UK already met the basic growing needs of the urban population 
and even could be exported. For example, in the early 18th century, the average annual export 
of cereals and flour in the UK was 622,300 kg, which rose to 12.065 million kg in the mid-18th 
century (C. Y. Wang & X. E. Li, 2004). A similar situation also found in the U.S., and Germany. 
In the U.S., one peasant could afford four people’s consumption in 1820, as reached eight in 
1920, and 52 in 1970 (C. Y. Wang & X. E. Li, 2004). And that of in Germany increased from 
three between 1750 and 1800 to four between 1850 and 1870, to five (1905-1914), six (1948-
1953), ten in 1960, and 95 in 1990 (W. Jiang, 2013):23. For this, He and Liu concluded in their 
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study that the improvement of agricultural productivity was an important driving force for the 
initial transfer of rural surplus labour force (He & L. Liu, 2007). In other words, the increase of 
agricultural labor productivity is a prerequisite for the industrial revolution, so was for rural 
labour mobility. 
And this could also be proved by the opposite example of France. The French 
Revolution enlarged and consolidated the scattered small-scale peasant economy. The growing 
population also made the small-scale land smaller and made the number of farmers increased, 
which brought down the labour productivity, in turn, delayed the process of rural labour 
mobility. France from the late-19th century started its agricultural modernization and had slowly 
achieved basic agricultural mechanization by the mid-1960s (W. T. Shen, 2010). E.g., France 
in 1881, small farmers who occupied less than 10 hectares’ farmland still accounted for more 
than 85% of the total number of farmers (Anon, 1989):733. Whereas the U.S., and Germany, 
in the mid-19th century, already sparked on their processes of agricultural mechanization and 
modernization (D. X. Rong & Sima 1989; W. Jiang, 2007b). E.g., ploughing, soil crushing, 
sowing, harvesting, threshing, etc., had already been largely done by machine in the U.S., in 
the mid-19th century (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). 
Parallel to the increasing agricultural labour productivity, the land was rapidly 
concentrated in the UK and Germany partly due to their artificial intervention via their 
respective enclosure movement and serfdom reform. Other reasons for further land 
concentration may attribute to the nature of the capitalist system of agricultural production that 
expelled the bankrupt peasants (who failed to the competition of the large-scale capitalist farms), 
which applied to the later situation of the U.S. and France as well. The intensified land 
concentrating not only continuously eliminating more and more rural labour force, but it also 
made farm owners choose between machine and labour, given on the one hand, the reducing 
rural labour force would cause the rise of labour cost, on the other hand the deepening industrial 
revolution with invented tools would reduce the cost of the machine. Thus, to a certain extent, 
this situation made the machine more favourable for farm owners and gradually formed a circuit 
in which agricultural labour is substituted by machines. And from the practice in many 
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European countries, the improvement of farming techniques, the promotion of machines, the 
use of chemical fertilizers, etc., almost followed a sequence: firstly, in large farms, then in 
medium farms, and lastly in small farms. Those high costs/investments of technologies, such 
as tractors, were the last arrival in small farms (W. Jiang, 2013). 
And not even to mention the significant effect of the rise of agricultural productivity 
principally drove by the expeditious process of agricultural mechanization, technicalization, 
capitalization, and modernization along with the process of industrialization. This had been the 
continuing force squeezing out rural labour force in the period of the industrial revolution, and 
again became more prominent after the driving force of non-agricultural expansion arrived at 
their marginal position at the later stage of industrialization. E.g., if the production index of one 
farmworker in the United States in 1870 is benchmarked as 100, it had risen to 127 in 1890;147 
in 1910; 166 in 1920; 202 in 1930, and 254 in 1940 (Wilcox, 1987). More details can be found 
in the following table (30), as we can see the number of hours per person required in per acre 
of Wheat dropped from 56 hours in 1800 to 4.6 hours in 1950, whereas the yield per acre was 
not reduced but increased from 408 kg to 452kg. In other words, capitalist farming needs less 
labour while maintains even produces more outputs. The similar growth was also found in other 
EICs as well. As thus, by 1990 UK had only 2%, France had 5%, the U.S. had 3%, and Germany 
had 3% of their employment in agriculture (World Bank).   
 
Table 30: Number of hours per person required per acre and yield per acre (kg) in the U.S. 1800-
1950 
  1800 1840 1880 1900 1920 1940 1950 
Wheat Hours (per person) 56 35 20 15 12 7.5 4.6 
Yield per acre (kg) 408 408 359 378 376 433 452 
Cotton Hours (per person) 185 135 119 112 90 98 74 
Yield per acre (kg) 67 67 81 87 73 111 128 
Source:(Anon, 1962):48.  
 
III.2.1.4. The earlier capitalist evolution favored a smooth labour mobility transition 
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There were so many historical circumstances that favored a comparative smooth 
transition of rural labour mobility, especially for early industrializers. As one of these 
circumstances, the characteristics of the earlier evolution of capitalist development deserve a 
highlight. Although we do not believe a linear perception of the capitalist evolutionism which 
is incapable of grasping how distinct qualitative structures were formed in the various processes 
of the capitalist constitution (Oliveira, 1985), the phased characteristics of the world’s capitalist 
evolution deconstructed bears some explanation for our study on rural labour mobility. By the 
late years of the 19th century, these early industrializers had already finished their primitive 
capital accumulation and sparked off their respective industrial revolution, meanwhile, the 
European and American capitalism had more or less completed the transition from competitive 
capitalism25 to monopoly capitalism. And at the competitive age of capitalism, these late-
comers (such as the United States, France, and Germany) were able to upgrade their 
departments of the means of production and integrate to their re-structured industrial apparatus, 
whereas this capitalist structure was becoming more difficult to achieve at the monopolist 
capitalism.  
In particular, this diffusion of capitalism at the world level tended to reproduce the 
structures of England in most European countries, the United States, and Japan. While the 
diffusion of capitalism in its monopoly age in the twentieth century no longer permitted in 
qualitative terms of the economic and social structures that of the dominant countries to the 
countries of late industrialization (Oliveira, 1985). In short, the mechanism of free competition 
allowed the dynamism of the British economy to be diffused through the world market. And 
the expansion of international trade accelerated the process commodification and capital 
accumulation, creating conditions to import means of production, capital, and skilled labour 
from England. In turn, this enabled these late-comers to internalize the various branches of 
industrial production, in a position to compete with English capitalism and accelerate their own 
process of industrialization (Oliveira, 1985). To be noted, we do not intend to say that the 
specificity of industrialization of these late-comers was solely determined by the fact that their 
                                                
25 the early form and ideal type of Western capitalism in which competitive market relations predominate. 
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capitalist development was carried out in the competitive stage of capitalism. However, both 
the international and domestic giant industrial producers yet emerged at that time in all these 
countries.  
As one of these socio-economic structures, labour force, or rural labour force, in 
particular, was under the broader process of the re-allocation of social division of labour. And 
rural labour mobility was the main carrier thereof. In other words, the rural labour mobility was 
partly facilitated by capitalism in its competitive era and became more difficult in the age of 
monopoly capitalism, since the capitalism in this era already lost part of its capacity to 
homogenize these socio-economic structures. However, the situation was still favored to these 
EICs, since they dominated the major production of means of production in the world market, 
and were able to finance their productive departments. As thus, for early industrializers in the 
competitive era, their respective development of capitalism was more or less firstly through 
their domestic capitalist concentration to gain the monopoly power both in the domestic and 
international market, after they gained monopoly power, they started to diminish the 
competition of the free market, then dominated the world market via the capitalist centralization.  
Along with the transition of capitalism from the competitive to monopoly, the 
second industrial revolution kicked off new technological patterns and drove the wave of rapid 
industrialization both for the first industrializer (the UK), and later-comers (France, the U.S., 
Germany, etc.). Apart from the industrial cluster of the first industrial revolution centered 
around textile, manufacturing, mining, smelting, construction, etc., the second industrial 
revolution led to the emergence of new sectors, such as machine manufacturing, steel, power, 
electric, chemistry, petroleum, automobile, finance, insurance, and new forms of service, etc. 
As we can see, the majority of them are in productive and employment-oriented nature. 
Although the evolved monopolies in certain sense hindered the development of small-scale 
producers. But at the early age of monopoly capitalism, these monopolies were still largely 
industrial-based.  
However, the emergence of finance capitalism via merging of banks and its impact 
on industrial cartels, as one of the most striking features within the monopoly capitalism, 
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diminished the previous feature of productive capitalism. In turn, such alteration intensified the 
dominating positions of EICs in the world market among their monopolist companies and 
political powers. Lenin, in his essay “Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism” had 
articulated very clearly the basic functions of how financial capital in generating profits from 
imperialist colonialism (Vladimir Lenin, 2001). The essence of monopoly capitalism or the 
imperialism for Lenin made the world divide into “oppressor/the core” and “oppressed/the 
periphery ” countries, which the former being the imperialist powers, and the later including all 
of the colonial and semi-colonial, as well as many small countries in Europe, being periphery 
(Vladimir Illich Lenin, 1915):409. And the peripheries integrated to the world market largely 
via the flow of natural resources to the cores and became more dependent thereof.  
At this stage, the separation of capital from production had reached a great extent. 
The advantage of financial capital for all other forms of capital implied that a fewer profit-
seekers and financial oligarchs had absolute dominating power (including the economic and 
political manipulation) over all other industrial producers, as well as over other countries 
(Vladimir Lenin, 2001). The basic and initial intermediary role of banks in finance capitalism 
had been greatly insignificant, whereas the function that converted money from the inactive 
monetary capital to the active profit capital got immensely expand. In other words, the higher 
stages of monopoly capitalism were with the trend of de-production mode, not only for the core 
countries but also for the peripheries. However, by this time, most of these core countries (or 
EICs) had already done their basic task of the transfer of major rural labour force into non-
agricultural sectors, and achieved more than half of population residing in an urban setting; 
whereas, most of the peripheries were still colonialized and maintained the feature of the pre-
industrial economy.  
In short, the evolution of capitalist development, both domestically and 
internationally, had favorable historical circumstances for the rural labour mobility of EICs. 
During the age of competitive capitalism, most EICs were comparatively easy to upgrade their 
productive departments via the diffusion of the Britain capitalism and reproduce the industrial 
structures that included rural labour mobility under the broader process of the capitalist 
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allocation of the social division of labour. While, along with the transition of capitalism to the 
monopolist era, grasping the second industrial revolution (employment-oriented) enabled most 
of them to transfer more rural labour force to the second industry. And as by the finance 
capitalism when the capitalism beard trend of de-production mode, however, most EICs had 
already done their basic task of the transfer of major rural labour force.  
 
III.2.1.5. The effect of early cyclical economic crisis 
 
Ever since the nascence of capitalism, the cyclical economic crisis lies at the root of 
capitalism. Crises occurred because of the contradictions (especially between the forces and 
relations of production) inherent in the capitalist system. In Marx’s own words: “The real 
barrier of capitalist production is capital itself” (Capital vol.3). And the most repetitive crisis 
represented by overproduction contradicted between social production and private 
accumulation. Like what Lenin stated: “... the large industrial enterprises set out to produce as 
large a quantity of goods as possible, they throw onto the market such a huge quantity of these 
goods that the majority of people, being poor, are unable to purchase them all...” (Burstein, 
1976). However, we do not intend to repeat Marx’s theory of crisis, our emphasis rather placed 
on the fundamental effect of these cyclical economic crises on the conditions of initial rural 
labour mobility.  
In history, cyclical crises broke out in most of the early industrializers all through 
the 19th century, and not even to mention these global economic crises events in contemporary 
capitalism. In the early era of the UK, the economic crisis had erupted almost every decade 
since the record (S. X. Chen & Yang, 1998). Then the crisis spread to more and more capitalist 
countries in Europe and the U.S., and gradually evolved into a worldwide crisis in 1847 (Z. C. 
Liu et al., 2001). And the world-scale economic crisis became more and more frequent ever 
since the second half of the 19th century, such as the crisis in 1873, 1882, 1890, and 1900 (Z. 
C. Liu et al., 2001). As listed below in the table (31) of the economic crisis records, from 1815 
to 1938, there were 14 economic crises erupted in the UK. The cycle of the economic crisis 
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reached as high as almost every ten years. So were the situation in France, the U.S., and 
Germany.  
 
Table 31: The record of economic crisis in major EICs 
UK  France USA Germany 
1815 1810 1818 1817 
1825 1825   
 1830 1837  
1836 1838   
1847 1847 1848 1847 
1857 1857 1857 1857 
1866 1867 1865 1866 
1878 1873 1873 1873 
 1876   
1882 1882 1882 1883 
 1887   
1890 1891 1893 1890 
1900 1900 1903 1900 
1907 1907 1907 1907 
1920  1920 1920 
1929 1930 1929 1929 
1938 1938 1938   
Source: (Varga, 1958; Z. C. Liu et al., 2001; S. X. Chen & Yang, 1998);(Anon, 1962):424.  
However, the initial crises bore high spatial features (or locality) (Z. C. Liu et al., 
2001). And regarding rural labour mobility, these limited crises still had physical conditions to 
adjust allocation resources between labour and capital. Especially prior to the comprehensive 
realization of the railroad being applied to the daily life’s transportation, the labour mobility 
was still limited in certain geographical scope. Conditions for substantial labour mobility 
(especially for rural migrants) and long-distance move were not yet mature. Thus, these cyclical 
crises at the place where occurred, to a certain extent, prevent the massive inflow of rural 
migrants, and in turn, facilitated a dynamic reallocation of labour force. Moreover, the social 
unrest caused by these constant cyclical economic crises forced the bourgeoisie in order to 
maintain their political power to carry out certain aspects of regulation/intervention (Q. Zhang, 
2016). And it was rather easier to manage since both early crises and labour mobility were 
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limited. As some may claim that the permanently unstable capitalist economy has its corrections 
by periodic crises (Oliveira, 1985). 
However, the bourgeoisies did not ignore the crisis and let it last long. For these 
earlier limited crises, in order to evade or transfer risks induced by cyclical crises, the 
bourgeoisie often dealt with market fluctuations by dismissing workers on a large scale and in 
a short period of time (or by employing child labour and women). Yet, such a response was 
rather temporary. More details can be found in Engels’ “The condition of working class in 
England.” As estimated, most European industrial zones in the economic recession often 
dismissed half (or even two-third in the worst case) workers (W. Jiang, 2013). Yet, there were 
rather more temporary. However, the situation got worse when the crisis turned to be 
comprehensive and extensive, like the world crisis. For the bourgeoisies after each crisis, the 
recovery followed a further replacement of labour-intensive techniques that, in turn, reduce the 
demand for labour. And the new investments in less labour-intensive technology took market 
share from competitors by producing at a lower cost while also lowering the average rate of 
profit and thus explained a cyclical phenomenon that for both economic growth with improved 
technology and a long-run tendency for the rate of profit to fall (Maksakovskiĭ, 2004). Then, 
again their response would cause the following up crises. After all, capitalism is a system of 
crisis26. And each recovery of crisis led the further replacement of labour by the fixed capital. 
In other words, the later of the crisis, the more dominant of bourgeoisies over labour (including 
labour mobility).  
In short, the initial limited and cyclical economic crises (apart from these negative 
impacts to labour) had certain conditions to adjust allocation resources between labour and 
capital. The initial each crisis somehow regulated labour mobility and prevent massive inflow 
of labour. However, this effect got diminishing after each crisis, especially when the crisis was 
no more limited but comprehensive and extensive and gave way to the bourgeoisie. The 
recovery via investment more to the fixed capital so as to replace labour then caused an up-
                                                
26 In the light of Marx’s systematic exploration in the Capital, these cyclical capitalist crises were deeply rooted by the law of 
the tendency for the organic composition of capital to rise and hence for the rate of profit to fall. 
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coming crisis. Ultimately, this deep root of the crisis eventually vanished the effect on labour 
mobility.   
 
III.2.2. Space dimension 
 
Following the similar analytical framework, we will elaborate on these potential 
spatial dimensions that contained conditions to our understandings of the spatial context on 
labour mobility, for example, the historical transportation revolution to the impact of labour 
mobility. And the spatial dimensions not only include spatial location (or geographic space) but 
also embrace the characteristic space (functional space, abstract space), as we have already 
articulated in the first chapter. Furthermore, space and time are never separable, as we have 
already incorporated some space factors in the previous analysis of time dimension. In this part, 
although our main emphasis place on space dimension, some time factors will be also used to 
facilitate our argument.  
 
III.2.2.1. Short-distance, bi-directional, and layer-by-layer flow of early labour mobility 
 
Reviewing the early history of EICs, we hardly encountered any sharp flow of 
massive rural-to-urban labour mobility. Plus, it had taken over a century-long since the initial 
rural labour mobility till the end of this process, as we have already presented in the previous 
part. Besides, at the initial stage, the process of serfdom abolishment in each EICs per se 
experienced a very slow pace. Taken England as an example, although the Great Charter in the 
early-13th century had already granted people’s freedom, the British serf system had been 
actually gradually abolished in the late 14th century (Marx, 1972); Also, the enclosure 
movement had been taking place for nearly four centuries. Apart from all these time dimensions 
that did not allow an excessive flow of rural-to-urban labour mobility, conditions in spatial 
dimensions also embraced some distinct features that favored smooth labour mobility. Overall, 
the rural labour mobility normally followed such route: from short-distance to long-distance, 
and from temporary migration to permanent settle-down.  
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Prior to the mid-19th century and before the railroad had been substantially 
commercialized or used as daily transportation, to a great extent, the large-scale of people’s 
movement was not yet with feasible conditions. According to a survey in 1832 by the Poor Law 
Commission in the UK, migrants from the southern agricultural areas to the northern industrial 
areas were still insignificant. Over half of migrants in the northern industries were rather largely 
from nearby regions, like Yorkshire, Cheshire, Derbyshire, and Westmoreland (Floud et al., 
1994). Take Preston’s influx migrants as an example. In 1851, more than 40% of them were 
from places with no more than 10 miles outside Preston, and 70% or more were from places 
exceed 30 miles (Feng, 2008). The situation of long-distance migration got improved in the 
railway era, however, short-distance labour mobility was still the main form at that time.  
Similar situations were also found in other EICs. Like in Jiang’s study of Germany, 
the rural labour force in the early period of the industrial revolution, neither facilely move away 
from hometowns in search of new jobs. And apart from some migrated to Ruhr industrial zone 
from northern regions, the majority stayed and moved among nearby industries within the state 
(K. Jiang, 2012). Besides, the initial German rural labour mobility not only manifested the 
feature of short-distance and temporary, but it was also much dispersed all around nearby 
industrial towns. For example, between 1850 and 1914 in Germany, circular migration systems 
came to a peak as teams of agricultural and construction workers did the crucial work of 
harvesting and city building. Simultaneously, chain migration from villages and small towns to 
cities became more important as thousands of young people sought urban livelihoods where 
their kin and compatriots had gone (Moch, 2011). In brief, the rural labour mobility of most 
EICs in history somehow manifested a layer-by-layer flow, namely, rural labour initially inflow 
to local and nearby rural industries, and then migrated to urban settings; and the vacancies will 
be fulfilled by the more remote rural migrants (He & L. Liu, 2007). And this type of layer-by-
layer flow by nature prevents the rural-to-urban labour mobility from accomplishing at one 
stroke.  
Furthermore, many European historical studies also presented that along with the 
general rural-to-urban labour mobility, there coexisted a reversed or bi-directional labour 
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mobility, especially during the initial industrial revolution (Redford, 1976; W. Jiang, 2013; Z. 
H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999). Among most forms, the reversed rural labour mobility often 
occurred seasonally. In Germany for example, the peak of labour mobility was normally 
reached in April and October when are seasons for sowing and harvesting; Also, in the UK, 
before the 1830s there was still a prevailing phenomenon that workers often quit manufacturing 
jobs in the harvest season and gained an additional earning in big farms. Although the situation 
in the early U.S., was exceptional, the westward movement had indeed drawn many people 
from urban areas and presented a reversed labour mobility as well.   
Moreover, a reversed labour mobility also largely happened within the occasion of 
economic crisis when rural migrants lost jobs in industries and had to move back to rural areas 
in pursuit of minimum subsistence. E.g., due to economic crisis, between 1806 and 1811 and 
1826-1831, it was found more than 150,000 people outflowed from Paris (W. Jiang, 2013). And 
given the French small peasant land system, many weavers in Lyon regarded farmland as the 
last guarantee of their livelihood, thus, maintained a delicate and long-lasting relationship with 
it. Even in many cases, rural migrants were forced to move back to the place of origin during 
the economic recession. For example, the early versions of British Poor Law did repatriate 
many poor rural migrants. In the economic recession of 1841-1843, there were 15,365 migrants 
forcibly repatriated from industrial towns of Lancashire, Yorkshire, and Cheshire (Redford, 
1976):124. In some regions, even one-third of rural migrants were repatriated, especially the 
immigrants from Ireland during the crisis (Redford, 1976).  
To sum up, these particular events of the early rural labour mobility all in some 
sense, facilitated a smooth and modest labour transition, or at least they prevented an excessive 
flow of rural-to-urban labour mobility. And along with the initial stage of capitalist 
concentration, many industries were developed under a decentralized industrial structure and 
could offer multi-spatial locations for rural migrants. And these initial features of labour 
mobility (short-distance, bi-directional, and layer-by-layer flow) also, to a certain extent, could 
facilitate the effect of labour resources allocation.  
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III.2.2.2. The even development of cities 
 
At the eve of industrial revolution takeoff, most respective EICs were still in the era 
of rural society, with their majority of the population residing in rural areas. The urbanization 
rate stayed low, such as 16.7% in the UK (1760), 20% in France (1815), 6.1% in the U.S. (1800), 
and 20% in Germany (1830) (to be noted, the classification of a city in the early age of 
respective countries was different, e.g., the city was defined as a settlement with more than 
5,000 inhabitants in England and Wales, 10,000 in France, 2,500 in the U.S., and 2,000 in 
Germany). And along with the steady urban expansion, there was not any sharp growth in a 
short period of time. For instance, the annual growth rate of urban population during the period 
of the industrial revolution in the UK maintained 0.91% (1750-1850); 0.873% in France (1846-
1930); 1.91% in the U.S. (1800-1900); and 1.18% in Germany (1850-1910), whereas their 
respective annual population growth stayed at 1.123% in the UK (1800-1850), 0.308% in 
France (1815-1930), 2.728% in the U.S. (1800-1900), and 0.996% in Germany (1830-1910) 
(Anon, 1962).  
The processes of industrialization and urbanization are both parallel and overlapped 
at the same time. And we can hardly direct correlate of these two processes since there are many 
other factors respectively impacting on them. However, it is certain that industrial expansion 
definitely contributes to the growth of urbanization, especially at an early age. And if we assume 
and deduct all other factors, only looking at these two parameters, such a coefficient (when the 
annual urbanization growth rate is divided by that of industrialization growth rate), then can 
bring about some theoretical correlation. As presented below (see Table 32), all EICs 
manifested high correlations during their respective industrial revolution. In other words, we 
could say that each one percentage growth of industrialization would contribute to 1.86% 
growth of urbanization during the British industrial revolution, as well as, 1.52% in France, 
1.74% in the U.S., and 1.12% in Germany. Although these are only assumptions, at least we 
see that the urban population growth in these countries would have rapid industrial expansion 
as strong support.  
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Table 32: Comparisons of annual growth rate between industrialization and urbanization 
 
Period 
Industrialization 
growth rate  
Urban population growth rate 
(%) 
Urbanization growth 
rate/industrialization growth rate 
UK 
1750-1850 0.49 0.91 1.86 
France 
1815-1910 0.55 0.84 1.52 
USA 
1869-1900 0.84 1.46 1.74 
Germany 
1852-1910 1.09 1.22 1.12 
Note: the annual industrialization growth rate is measured by the growth rate of value added (to GDP) of the 
second industry; data collected from different sources may not be consistent;  
Source: data collected from previous analysis of this chapter. 
 
Besides, not only did most of the EICs experience a gradual growth of cities over a 
long period but, to a great extent, they also managed an even development of cities (apart from 
a few megacities in history experienced overpopulation, such as London, Liverpool, Paris, New 
York, etc., as presented in the first chapter). For instance, along with the entire period of the 
industrial revolution, the UK had always retained a large number of small towns. Even at the 
later stage of its industrialization, there was still a considerable amount of small towns. 
According to relevant statistics, in England from 1811 to 1885, the proportion of people living 
in small towns with 2,500-3,300 inhabitants fell from 67% to 46.7%, whereas that of people 
residing in cities between 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants increased from 18.8% to 33.6%. In other 
words, as of 1851, when Britain completed its industrial revolution, only 20% of England lived 
in big cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, and there were still 368 small towns contained 
nearly 50% of urban population (Palliser et al., 2000; W. Jiang, 2013). A similar situation was 
also found in France. Especially impacted by its small peasant economic system, most cities in 
France from early history were in the small and medium size (Y. Z. Zhou & Y. Li, 2013).  
As well in the U.S., especially during and after its industrial revolution, all scales of 
cities got evenly developed. It was self-evident (see the following Chart 26) that the distribution 
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of population in different scales of cities was well-proportioned in history. In particular, at the 
very beginning of the American industrial revolution in 1790, cities with more than 50,000 of 
the population did not even exist, and the urban population was more or less evenly distributed 
in cities of 2,500-5,000 population by 21.8%, cities of 5,000-10,000 by 23.8%, cities of 10,000-
25,000 by 23.8%, and cities of 25,000-50,000 by 30.7%. Once the industrialization was 
basically achieved by the end of the 19th century, apart from 21.3% of the population living in 
megacities with over one million inhabitants, the rest were all evenly distributed. And this 
continued until today. 
Chart 26: City scale evolution and urban population distribution (%) in the U.S., 1790-1950 
Source: (Anon, 1962):7; (United States, Bureau of the Census, 1960). 
 
As for Germany, many studies were articulating that the German industrialization 
and urbanization were mutually reinforcing with each other, and economic structure changes 
were consistent with changes in the social structure, including urban development (K. Jiang, 
2012). And among these four EICs, Germany had manifested the highest correlation between 
industrialization and urbanization (see Table 32). In Germany, before its political unification in 
1871, cities per se were quite even, given many of them had already been evenly developed in 
their respective sovereign jurisdictions. Moreover, the industrial revolution also firstly occurred 
in towns that were rich in coal, iron, water, and other energy sources, rather than large cities, 
objectively inhibiting the rise of megacities. Together with its main forms of rural-to-urban 
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migration were conducted mainly in short-distance and layer-by-layer way. Small towns were 
spread all over Germany, and rural labour mobility happened considerably in all regions. Thus, 
there was no such excessive concentration of rural migrants in any specific location (Y. Z. Zhou 
& Y. Li, 2013). As we can see from the following table (33), In the process of urbanization in 
Germany, although the population of big cities increased rapidly, the population distribution 
among all scales of cities generally was relatively even. 
 
Table 33: Population distribution by scales of cities in Germany, 1871 and 1910 
 1871 1910 
Cities with over 100,000 in habitants 4.8% 21.3% 
Cities with inhabitants 10,000-100,000 7.7% 13.4% 
Cities with inhabitants 5,000-10,000 11.2% 14.1% 
Cities with inhabitants 2,000-5,000 12.4% 11.3% 
Rural areas 63.9% 39.9% 
Source: (Meng, 2018). 
 
III.2.2.3. The long-lasting rural industries 
 
Most of today’s metropolises were originated from the evolution of rural industries 
since the industrial revolution. Although the industry was once thought to be identified with 
what the cities had become, and the importance of rural industries seems insignificant in the 
post-industrial era (especially for most EICs nowadays), they were so crucial in history that 
even gave birth to the industrial revolution. In the early days, among many light industries, such 
as textiles, shoemaking, food processing, etc., were evolved from the peasant handicraft 
industry, and the production methods allowed rural labour force to work both in agriculture and 
off-site facilities, either in their own homes or in workshops with multiple craftsmen. E.g., the 
putting-out system (also known as the domestic system) was very prevailing in Europe and the 
United States from the industrial revolution until the mid-19th century (G. R. Taylor, 2015). For 
example, in the UK, before its industrial revolution, about 30% of the wool textile industry was 
scattered in rural areas (Z. H. Wang, 1996). In the United States, until 1830, even in the textile 
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leading region of New England, more than half of woolen materials were produced in the 
farmhouse than in the factory (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). 
In history, most capitalist sprouts first appeared in rural areas. While taking full 
advantage of nearby land, water, and other natural resources, the early industries largely 
absorbed the local labour force, greatly reduce the cost of labour migration, and relieve the 
pressure of the massive influx of rural migrants into cities. On the one hand, not only did early 
rural industries (or domestic industries) offer by-employment for numerous villagers, but they 
also trained a large amount of skilled labour force that was crucial for the industrial revolution. 
On the other hand, those widespread rural industries, together with the particular productive 
relations (putting-out system), had become the reservoir of labour that retained massive rural 
labour force and, to a certain extent, dragged out the process of rural labour mobility. Exactly 
as Marx commented that we begin to understand where did the enormous masses of workpeople 
flow (Capital Vol.1, Chap.15). Take the UK for instance, the original textile industries were 
basically produced in farmhouses and were gradually formed a large-scale factory. However, 
most of the textile factories were not far from the original settlements. Thus, the labour 
migration in the early stage of the industrial revolution occurred mostly between neighboring 
villages. Moreover, the UK had also vigorously developed rural industries based on agricultural 
products processing, achieving rural labour mobility within rural areas (Ji, 2004). 
The development of rural industries, together with that of agriculture, also 
contributed largely to the capital accumulation in rural areas, in turn, expanded the re-
investment in industry and production expansion. The large amount of bourgeoisies, large farm-
owners and nobles took the remaining capital from agriculture on the exploration of mining and 
natural resources, construction of roads, canals and railways, and establishment of factories, etc. 
Even if capital was invested in banks and financial speculation, a considerable part still 
indirectly flowed into the productive industries at that time. Take the situation of Britain, for 
instance, the major domestic capital around one-third was formed in agriculture during the first 
half of its industrial revolution period (see Table 34); whereas that in industry and commerce 
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became prominently after half a century. In other words, agriculture provided about 30% of 
non-agricultural investment from 1760 to 1800 (Crafts, 1985). 
 
Table 34: Compositions of gross domestic fixed capital formation in the UK (%), 1761-1860 
  Agriculture Industry and commerce Transport Residential and social 
1761-1770 33 20 22 25 
1771-1780 37 12 29 22 
1781-1790 30 30 19 21 
1791-1800 30 23 22 26 
1801-1810 25 24 21 30 
1811-1820 22 29 18 31 
1821-1830 16 35 15 35 
1831-1840 13 34 23 30 
1841-1850 13 29 40 18 
1851-1860 12 36 13 21 
Note: Agriculture includes farm buildings, improvements, and equipment; Industry and commerce include 
buildings, machinery and equipment, mining and quarrying, gas and water; transport includes railways, roads and 
bridges, carriages and coaches, canals and waterways, docks and harbours, and ships; Residential and social 
include dwellings, public buildings and works. 
Source: (Feinstein, 1978): 92.  
 
The situation in France was more evident. Along with its entire period of the 
industrial revolution, a large number of handicraft factories had always dominated in rural areas. 
Until the Second Empire (1852), scattered small rural industries still persistently existed all 
over the countryside. In particular, by 1852, there were around one million peasants working in 
these rural factories (W. T. Shen, 2010). Small factories with less than 10 workers in the entire 
country still accounted for 75% and 60% of total employment share (Z. H. Wang, 1994). And 
even at the end of the Second Empire in 1871, the cotton product was still mainly produced by 
small handicraft industries in rural areas (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). We can also say that many 
cities at that time were merely commercial centers, not yet as industrial production centers. 
A similar situation was also found in Germany, especially before the 1870s. The 
rural family handicraft industries got expansion rapidly: E.g., from 1816 to 1858, household 
cotton textiles, flax factories, and other rural manufacturing appeared in large numbers 
(Hochstadt, 1999). At the same time, many studies also found during the first half of the 19th 
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century, not all rural migrants flowed to cities. There was a large number of rural migrants 
flowed from the agricultural-based to the factory-based rural areas (Meng, 2018). And some 
factories were long-lasting existing in rural areas. For example, by 1875, two-third of German 
cotton weavers were still domestic workers. Prussia in 1861 still had more than 250,000 hand-
looms as sidelines for many farmers (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). Nevertheless, these traditional 
small rural industries were only found to fall principally since the 1870s. According to statistics, 
the number of the rural labour force in rural manufacturing only grew from 2.5 million to 2.9 
million with 0.62% of annual growth rate from 1882 to 1907, whereas that in urban 
manufacturing raised from 4 million to 8.4 million with 3.14% of annual growth rate (Hochstadt, 
1999). 
The long-lasting feature of rural industries in most EICs can also be proved during 
the later stage of industrialization. E.g., according to a sample survey conducted over 140 
villages in the U.S, of the early 1920s, there was an average of 46 rural industries in each village. 
And throughout the 1960s, rural non-agricultural employment increased by 14.5 million. The 
proportion of it in rural areas increased from 26.7% in 1940 to 44.2% in 1970 (D. X. Rong & 
Sima, 1989). Moreover, the rural industries were also evolved more dynamically in the later 
stage of industrialization, and no longer maintained as based on the previous simplex and low 
value-added production and processing. It started to show more diversification and gradually 
integrated into the modern system of industrial development.  
Although the value added by agriculture to the national economy manifested 
extreme low and seemed very insignificant (so was the situation of agricultural employment 
contributions), for example, as of today it only contributed 0.57% in the UK, 1.62% in France, 
0.92% in the United States, and 0.57% in Germany (whereas the employment contribution in 
the respective countries is 1.14%, 2.58%, 1.41%, and 1.14%) (World Bank & ILO), the effect 
of rural industries (including agriculture) is still important if we calculate the relevant parts like 
the upstream and downstream industries27 that based on agriculture. Take the statistics of the 
United States in 1984 for example, the labour force directly engaged in agricultural production 
                                                
27 They include labour force in the services of agricultural materials, food processing, catering, providing soil preparation, 
crop care, veterinary, gardening, etc. 
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was merely 2.7 million, and the output value created only accounted for 2.5% of the economy. 
But if we add the 2 million labour force in the upstream industries, and 16.3 million of the 
downstream industries. It contributed nearly 21 million labour force, accounted for 20% of total 
employment (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989). That is to say, every agricultural laborer directly 
engaged in production on the farm would need 6.7 people to provide him with corresponding 
services. In the 1970’s Britain, there were 670,000 labour force direct in agricultural production, 
whereas 2.9 million labour force engaged in upstream industries and 2.1 million in the 
downstream ones (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989). The diverse development of rural industries was 
also evident in France and the UK. Rural industries were also increasingly involved in 
agricultural production, providing pre and intermediate products for agricultural materials, at 
the same time, provided services or processed the agricultural products. E.g., the value added 
by French rural industries in agricultural pre-production accounted for 24% of total agricultural 
outputs in 1959 and rose to 28% in 1966 (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989).  
 
III.2.2.4. Transportation revolution  
 
The economic transformation in the entire 19th century was closely linked to 
dramatic changes in transportation networks, such as construction of roads, river traffic, canals, 
and railroads. To a great extent, the transportation revolution centered on the commercialization 
of railway indeed altered the static geographic location of economic activity and further led to 
the expansion of markets, facilitated the movement of people, and altered the physical 
landscape. E.g., an improved transportation system is crucial for raw materials to reach the 
factories and manufactured goods to reach markets. And along with the constant reduction of 
transportation costs, because factors like labour and natural resources are no longer unchanged 
out of their original endowments. In turn, this perception provides a new spatial dimension to 
our understandings on labour mobility.  
For one thing, the direct consequence of the transportation revolution created 
material conditions to reduce mobility costs. For example, in Germany between 1840 and 1870, 
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the fare per passenger per kilometer of Railways reduced from 4.4 Pfennige28 to 3.4 Pfennige, 
and the freight rate per ton goods per km even dropped from 16.9 to 5.6 (Wu, 2005). This was 
obviously beneficial to the mobility of labour resources and production materials such as coal 
and iron. Furthermore, improved transportation has also shortened the relative distance between 
villages and cities, in turn, enlarged the scope of labour mobility, and make the long-distance 
labour mobility feasible. This has also explained why substantial rural-to-urban labour mobility 
in most EICs mainly appeared once their respective transportation revolution had accomplished. 
In turn, it has also explained why the basic features of early rural labour mobility manifested 
short-distance, bi-directional, and layer-by-layer, as we have articulated before. As the large 
amount of people moved forward and backward, the information, knowledge, and experience 
that migrants carried along with also broadened the horizons of farmers and directly or 
indirectly brought about/transferred information of urban industry and advanced science and 
technology to rural areas (He & L. Liu, 2007). Even in many aspects, the transportation 
revolution also gradually altered the traditional ideology of farmers (Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 
1999).  
For another, sectors of transportation per se were emerging industries. And its 
development and expansion naturally created considerable jobs for rural migrants. A large 
amount of rural labour force found was the main body in various constructions of roads, bridges, 
river traffic, canals, railroads, as well as other relevant infrastructures. For example, in the UK, 
from 1846-1850, there were about 600,000 people working in railways every year, which was 
almost equal to the number of workers in the factories (D. B. Gao, 1995). The situation in 
Germany was even more prominent. The number of workers in railways in 1840 was merely 
1,648, but sharply climbed to 26,084 in 1850, and 161,014 in 1870 (see Table 35). And by the 
beginning of the 20th century (in 1907), nearly 300,000 workers found were engaged in railways 
(Grant, 2005). In the U.S., workers in the sector of transportation in 1870 was merely 640,000 
(4.95% of total employment), got nearly tripled by 1900, with nearly two million workers and 
7.2% of the total employment (Anon, 1962):17.  
                                                
28 The pfennig or penny is a former German coin or note. 100 pfennigs equal to 1 Mark. 
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Table 35: The development of railways and job created in Germany, 1830-1900 
Year 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 
Length of operating 
rail lines (km) 
6 
(1835) 
2300 
(1845) 
8290 
(1855) 
14690 
(1865) 
18876 33645 41818 49878 
Workers of railways  1648 26084 85608 161014    
Employment in coal 
industry /1000 
4.5 8.9 12.7 83.2 125 179 262 414 
Source: (W. Jiang, 2013):55. (Anon, 1962):264, 266, 274.  
 
Meanwhile, the development of transportation networks also heightened demands 
for many materials, in turn, led the expansion of other industries, such as metalusia, coal mining, 
logistics, and the mechanical industry, of which these industries themselves were also the 
driving force behind the employment of the labour force. In other words, among all the 
industries of transportation demonstrated more intense inter-industrial purchasing relationships. 
And to a certain extent, it would be the most striking dynamics29 of the development of early 
industrialization. As it was estimated that, in the early 1870s, in Germany, “railways purchased 
half of the iron outputs, which, in turn, connoted a third of the Ruhr coal, and transport a quarter 
freight of coal” (Oliveira, 1985). Furthermore, as Oliveira highlighted that the main impact of 
the railroad was undoubtedly the expansion of the Department I30 (means of production), 
especially the machinery industry. Take the case of Germany, for example, after the first 
railway was completed in 1835, most German states started to establish their locomotive 
manufacturing plants, and the first German-made locomotive was produced in Borsich in 1841. 
By 1851, among the 1,084 operational locomotives, there were 679 made in Germany, 
accounting for 63% of the total locomotives (Wu, 2005). 
As thus, most EICs had experienced tremendous development of various 
transportations, centered on the railway construction during the entire 19th century. The world’s 
first locomotive-hauled public railroad was developed in the UK in 1825. And its first 
                                                
29 According to Oliveira, the dynamics of the development of industrialization means inter-industrial purchasing/interaction 
relations to stimulate of each other (Oliveira, 1985). 
30 The departement I, as for Michal Kalecki, produces goods that cannto be used for consumption (the means of production 
that comprise gross investment. 
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commercial line operated between Liverpool and Manchester in 1830 (Wolfe, 2015). By the 
mid-19th century, the UK had already roughly formed its basic rail transport network with 
10,600 km (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001); France established its first railway company in 1821. And 
in 1826, its first rail line began to operate with 21 km (Z. L. Zhang, 1989). By the end of the 
1860s, the mileage of railway operations had reached 16,465 kilometers (Lv & Qi, 2005); The 
United States started to build its railroad since 1828, and it was only 21 km. But it got expanded 
very rapidly, especially between the 1840s and 1880s (Dollar et al., 1982). By 1860, the rail 
line operated had reached 30,630 km (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995); And in Germany, its first rail 
line with merely six km operated in 1835 dramatically expanded to 14,690 km in 1865 and 
27,960 km in 1875 (W. Jiang, 2007b). By the 1860s, a basic rail network had been established 
between major cities. More details can be found in the following chart (27).  
 
Chart 27: Length of operating rail lines (km) in the UK, France, the U.S., and Germany 
 
Note: data of the UK does not include Northern Ireland. 
Source: (Anon, 1989):305-307, 612, 748, 860, 861.  
 
Such the above features and effects of railways can also be applied to other 
transportation, like roads, canals, maritime transport, pipelines, airlines, etc. So were the 
induced industries, such as automobiles, shipbuilding, aircraft, etc., as well as the energy, 
machinery, material, and logistic industries, so on and so forth. However, to be noted, although 
the improvement of transportation indeed brought about the facilitations to labour mobility, the 
previously limited equilibrium of labour supply-demand centered on the short-distance mobility 
did not exist any longer. The substituted form of substantial, widespread, and profound labour 
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mobility added more difficulties to be adjusted. Coincidentally, most EICs by that time had 
basically achieved their task of rural-to-urban labour migration.  
 
III.2.3. People dimension 
 
Although the migration decision making of people in micro layer varies by an 
individual sense of experience, motivation, consciousness, cognition, orientation, belief, 
ideology, epistemology, etc., once it reaches the collective layer, such as history, culture, value, 
relation, politics, customs, etc., many variables would be considered as context-based 
conditions, similar to that of tempo-spatial dimensions, that individual could hardly alter. In 
this part, we spare the emphasis on these people-based external conditions centered on 
demographic structures, together with other non-economic factors (or social circumstances) in 
reviewing rural labour mobility of these EICs. Given time and space are inseparable in the 
process of people’s cognition of the object, we will rely on many time and space dimensions 
along with our analysis in the people’s dimension. More theoretical discourse can be found in 
the first chapter of this thesis.  
 
III.2.3.1. Gradual transformations of demographic structures 
 
In history, the demographic transformation in these EICs manifested a relatively 
long and balanced population transition that was compatible with their economic and social 
structures (Q. Zhang, 2016). Plus, their demographic transformations were well embedded in 
the respective processes of industrialization (J. X. Li, 2000). That is to say, the phased 
characteristics of population transition basically met the intrinsic requirements of the 
corresponding economic and social progress: When the demographic transition was at the high 
growth stage, namely with high birth rate and low mortality rate, it was also the phase when the 
industrialization was gradually embarking on. Thus, the tension of the expanding industrial 
sectors was basically able to absorb the growing economically active population (Kitching, 
2010): 151. For this point, we had already presented in the second chapter (see Table 11). While 
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once each EICs arrived at their later stage of industrialization, most demographic parameters 
also dropped to a low level and manifested an overall low population growth. Like in the UK, 
by 1850, the birth rate had dropped to 33.4 ‰, and mortality rate reduced to 20.8 ‰; with 17.5 ‰ 
and 16.2 ‰ in 1930’s France; with 32.3 ‰ and 17.2 ‰ in 1900’s U.S., and with 29.8 ‰ and 
16.2 ‰ in 1910’s Germany (see Chart 28). 
 
Chart 28: Demographic transformations in the UK, France, the U.S., and Germany 
  
 
 
Note: data of the UK from 1801 to 1921 includes the entire population of Ireland. 
Source: data of the UK is from (Anon 1962):174-177; data of France is from (Anon 1962):313-315; data of the 
U.S., is from (Anon, 1962):6, 7,17; and data of Germany is from (Anon, 1962):254, 255. 
 
As demonstrated in the above chart, being the most striking feature which is often 
ignored, the chronic and slow decline of mortality rate, to a great extent, dragged down the 
overall pressure of population growth during the industrial revolution. E.g., it took these EICs 
about a century to reduce it from 30‰ to 20‰. As thus, the natural population growth in the 
UK since 1850 already reduced to the level of 1%, so did in Germany since 1840. The level in 
France was even lower. Since the French Revolution, it had already dropped below 1%. Besides, 
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since the middle of the 19th century, many European countries had begun to consciously control 
population growth. In countries such as Britain and France, contraceptive methods had been 
widely adopted to reduce fertility. Thus, the birth rate had shown a rapid decline. From 1840 to 
1910, the birth rate in the UK fell from 3.2% to 2.55%. France fell from 2.8% to 2%; the United 
States fell from 5.18% to 3%; and Germany fell from 3.65% to 2.9%.  
To be noted, although the situation of population growth could not directly 
determine the individual labour force supply, and rural labour mobility in great extent was the 
result of the social re-division of labour especially during the industrial revolution, the growth 
or decline of the population fundamentally determines the amount of labour force, as one of the 
major tasks for the industrial revolution to allocate in accordance with the new industrial 
structures. Besides, the higher population growth rate would require the faster absorption 
capacity of manufacturing and higher value-added services (Scherrer & Verma, 2018). Thus, 
whether the population growth is high or low, it should first compare to the situation of 
employment absorption capacities. 
 
III.2.3.2. The efflux of emigrants to alleviate population pressure 
 
Although the general evolution of the demographic structure itself in most EICs 
manifested a declining tendency of the pressure of population growth, the entire transformation 
had undergone century-long. After all, the respective population from 1800 to 1900 had grown 
by 158.9% in the UK; 41.68% in France; 1336.5% in the U.S., and 158.1% in Germany (Chart 
28). Also, their respective gradual process of rural-to-urban labour mobility (as presented 
before) did not occur in any excessive situation. Still, many cities (especially these metropolises) 
in history experienced varied degrees of overpopulation, and the subsequent urban poverty, 
unemployment, underemployment, urban slum, so on and so forth. E.g., in the beginning of the 
19th century, the so-called “surplus population” in England and Wales reached 1.5 million 
(Frederick Engels, 2005); in the 1830s and 1840s, about 50,000 people were homeless in 
London; and in the USA, among 4 million of New Yorkers in 1900, nearly 1.5 million lived in 
43,000 slums (Z. M. Ding, 2002; X. Wang, 2000). Also, according to records, in the middle of 
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the 19th century, only one-third of workers were fully employed, one-third were only half-
employed, one-third were unemployed in most sectors in London(Qiu, 2013). And more 
discourses can be found in the second chapter.  
In general, apart from France, given its particular land system that guaranteed the 
last livelihood of small peasant and the U.S., given its particular immigrant history that formed 
the country, many rural migrants of other EICs in Europe basically had nowhere to go when 
urban unemployment reached high. However, it was found that most of these EICs during the 
entire 19th century (especially from the middle of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th 
century), had taken similar measures to transfer their domestic population abroad especially to 
their respective colonies (Todaro et al., 1988). Many countries in order to encourage emigration, 
the government had adopted various stimulated methods such as reducing or exempting fare, 
giving land or farm tools to emigrants, or giving land to emigration speculators who arranged 
for emigration (S. A. Li, 2005). For example, it was found that during the first half of the 19th 
century, the British government had repeatedly sponsored in emigrants (Z. H. Jiang, 2012a). 
From 1815 to 1830, an average annual emigrants from the UK maintained 25,000; from 1831 
to 1841, the annual emigrants trebled to 74,000 (S. L. Liu, 1987). Also, a similar situation was 
found in Germany, France and low countries (S. L. Liu, 1987). All in all, from 1846 to 1930, 
around 50 million Europeans migrated overseas (see Table 36).  
 
Table 36: Average annual number of emigrants from Europe (/1,000) 
Year From Europe Great Britain Germany 
France, Swiss, and 
Low Countries 
1846-50 256.6 199.1 35.5 14.4 
1851-55 342.3 231.7 74.9 17.8 
1856-60 197.1 123.5 49.4 7.3 
1861-65 219.3 143.6 43.5 6.1 
1866-70 364.9 170.8 83.4 14 
1871-75 370.7 193.9 79 15.1 
1876-80 258 114.9 46.2 8.5 
1881-85 661.3 228 171.5 22.8 
1885-90 737.7 214.8 97 4.6 
1891-95 674.8 128.4 80.5 16.9 
1896-00 543.3 81 24.9 9.5 
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1901-05 1038.9 156 28.4 4.7 
1906-10 1436.7 234.6 26.4 17.8 
1911-15 1365.3 265.7 15.8 15.5 
1916-20 405.5 101.1 2.4 9.2 
1921-25 629.5 197.7 58.9 12.2 
1926-30 555.6 163.3 54 13.3 
1931-35 130.8 30.4 12.7 3.8 
1936-39 147.4 30.3 17.3 5.6 
Note: Low countries include Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Source: (Todaro et al., 1988). 
 
Moreover, it is found that a large number of European emigrants were peasants, 
farmworkers, unemployed workers, low-skilled workers, landless workers, even some were 
skilled workers. For example, over 50% of British immigrants in the United States were 
engaged in agriculture in 1850, and most of them were landless farmers in the UK. While, 
during the second half of the 19th century, the proportion of skilled workers of British emigrants 
in the U.S. increased and were from British cities. And many of them were originally from rural 
areas and migrated to cities (Baines, 2002). As thus, the space/vacancy due to these emigrants 
left turned to be available again for the remaining rural labour force to fill (Baines, 2002). To 
be noted, we do not intend to say how decisive this emigration in release the population pressure. 
But such a historical singularity does not exist anymore, and it was significantly crucial during 
that time.   
 
III.2.3.3. Impacts of sociocultural factors 
 
Labour (or labour mobility in particular), as one of the factors of production, of the 
biggest difference from other factors lies in its subjective uncertainty. And this subjective 
uncertainty does not only reflect personal preferences of the individual labourer, but it also 
embraces factors that are largely influenced by peers, families, communities, societies, and 
networks, as well as concepts, values, religion, ethic, customs, culture, so on and so forth. 
According to sociocultural theory, a person’s cognitive development is largely influenced by 
their surrounding culture. And labour mobility not only touches on nearly all aspects of the 
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lives of the peoples involved but is often the cause as well as the result of important social and 
cultural changes (Skinner, 1960). A few studies concluded that rural labour mobility, together 
with urbanization in the period of proto-industrial UK were not only the changes in economic 
behavior or that of survival mode, but it was also a chronic changing process of culture, social 
value, and collective psychological consciousness (Gu, 2007). Besides, this certainly includes 
the socio-agricultural transformations, especially great changes from the proto-industrial 
system to that of the industrial one, which had been articulated before.  
At an early age, given the underdeveloped transportation, limited communication, 
and un-popularized education, the diffusion of information, knowledge, thoughts were slow 
and restricted. To a large extent, the majority of the rural population for long manifested low 
mobility and maintained various traditional customs. However, as approaching to the era of the 
industrial revolution, along with the growing rural-to-urban labour mobility, the previous 
conservative social system had started to break up gradually. Against the backdrop of the 
increasing interactions between those who migrated and who stayed, the information had been 
rapidly circulated, and this had facilitated the diffusion of new thoughts, knowledge, and culture 
in rural areas. As thus, the response and attitude of the whole society (including labour, class, 
religion, state, etc.) in regarding this growing social phenomenon of rural-to-urban labour 
mobility, as well as towards to the area of work ethic, urban poverty, unemployment, etc., had 
kept changing. Subsequently, this social transformation, to a great extent, impacted on the 
general pace and process of rural labour mobility of the time.  
Like what Weber had emphasized on the work ethic in Protestantism of his “the 
protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism,” and argued that societies having more Protestants 
are those that have a more developed capitalist economy (M. Weber, 2013):15-16. Conversely 
speaking, this had reflected a certain ethical viewpoint of the early society towards the working 
class, especially to these urban unemployed migrants, which could be proved by several 
dramatic changes of the British Poor Law, as we will articulate in the following part. For long, 
there existed a common sense in particular among the ruling class that unemployment was 
merely the result of individual problems. Some even attributed unemployment or poverty in 
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general to personal moral conduct or work ethic (Beveridge, 1912; Z. H. Jiang, 2012b). E.g., in 
his discourse of the 18th century industrial revolution, Paul Mantoux believed that the early 
version of Poor Act in Britain reflected a mentality of a feudal paternalism, and had both 
sympathy and meanwhile disgust, discrimination even fear towards the poor (Mantoux, 1983). 
As thus, freedom of labour mobility at an early age was once restricted in most EICs, such as 
the British Union Chargeability Act, and the French labour booklet system. 
In general, the early demographic transformation of the most European countries 
principally followed a natural or an organic growth model, mainly affected by endogenous 
socio-economic development, as well as influenced by war, religion, emigration & immigration, 
etc. However, Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population, not only provided a “sound” 
theoretical basis for the ruling class to cut early public welfare, but it also accused the excessive 
growth of fertility and urban poverty to these early social welfare policies (Z. L. Zhang, 1989). 
Although we could hardly attribute the modification of the Poor Act and various restricted 
policies of labour mobility in the UK absolutely to the influence of Malthus’ theory, neither 
could we deny the impact of such thought, which was commonly prevailing among the middle 
and rich class. Furthermore, the promotion of birth control was commonly found in most 
European countries. In France, many bourgeois economists even propagandized abstinence to 
workers so as to reduce birth and improve their economic situation (Z. L. Zhang, 1989). In 
Austria and Germany, until the beginning of the 19th century, the law had various restrictions 
on the marriage of the poor. Local authorities often added more difficulties for the poor to get 
married since they believed that the approval would induce more poor children and abandoned 
children who needed more budgets and public resources (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). 
Besides, the attitude and sentiment of people due to living in the different cultures, 
social atmospheres, or historical singularities towards wealth (like land), environment (such as 
rurality), way of life, etc., varies from generation to generation. And this also has impacts on 
an individual’s mobility decision-making. For example, the older French generation was very 
attached to the land and rurality, partly because it was inseparable from their retention of 
revolutionary achievements, at the same time, the small peasant land system could also sustain 
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their livelihood at that time, thus, demonstrated low mobility. However, it was different for the 
younger generation. As of the 1870s, most of the French rural migrants flowed to cities found 
were the most next generations. E.g., as in the Baalong area of Alpis, France, 81% of the rural 
migrants mobilized to cities before the age of 30 (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). And we believe that 
such a situation also existed in all EICs.  
In itself, the impacts of sociocultural factors on labour mobility are limitless and 
complicated. The situation of EICs at their early age demonstrated many conditions that are 
very distinct. Still, two more points are still worth mentioning. One is about the land inheritance 
system. In general, apart from the United States, under the feudal system of medieval Europe, 
many countries implemented the primogeniture which governed the inheritance of land. In the 
UK, primogeniture was, for long mandatory for the inheritance of land. As thus, many 
aristocratic children without inheritance rights often flowed into the industrial and commercial 
fields of the city (Z. H. Wang, 1996). Whereas in France, after the Revolution, the 
primogeniture was abolished, and the Napoleonic Code (1804) affirmed the equal right of 
inheritance on land among all successors. As thus, such an inheritance system made land more 
fragmented, which in turn attached more people (especially the next generation) to land. Some 
studies even argued that French farmers at that time were not willing to give more birth in order 
to prevent the land from being too small. And for this, the implementation of birth control in 
rural areas in France was generally earlier than the city (Z. H. Wang, 1994);  
The other is about religion. At an early age, religion was definitely a major 
consideration of people’s movement. Countries with high religious tolerance often attracted 
more immigrants from neighboring countries. For example, in 1685, the French abolition of 
“Edict of Nantes” forced many Protestants to leave France and flee to Britain, with a large 
amount of funds and technology carried influx to England (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). In the same 
year, Prussia and Brandenburg issued the Edict of Potsdam, encouraged the Protestants to seek 
refuge in their nations. And it was estimated that approximately 20,000 Huguenot refugees 
relocated to Brandenburg-Prussia in response to the Edict of Potsdam. By the beginning of the 
18th century, around 30,000 influx of Protestants settled in Brandenburg-Prussia (Wu, 2005). 
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Also, according to statistics, due to the abolishment of the Edict of Nantes, France lost nearly 
400,000 populations and 60 million Livre (Z. L. Zhang, 1989). 
All in all, although these scattered observations/discourses of the impacts of 
sociocultural factors on rural labour mobility are still far from more attention that they deserved, 
like the aspects of the evolution of marriage, identity, family and social relations, gender, power 
structures/relations, politics, so on and so forth, the above presentations of major points are 
enough for us to project these complexities of sociocultural impacts. At least one point is clear 
that the sociocultural impacts are very chronic and inapparent, especially during the proto-
industrial era, and the early industrial revolution. After all, many physical conditions, such as 
transportation, communication, and technology, etc., also play their roles, and in turn, influence 
the general pace and degree of sociocultural factors.   
To summarize, in the light of our theoretical framework of the rural labour mobility 
under dimensions of time, space, and people, have been basically reviewed in the history of 
these EICs (the UK, France, the U.S., and Germany). It revealed many crucial distinctions, or 
we called external or context-based conditions that, to a great extent, facilitated a smooth 
transition of EICs’ rural-to-urban labour mobility. And these distinctions are largely involved 
with many historical singularities centered on the industrial revolution and evolution of 
capitalist development, which can hardly be imitated based on today’s conditions. In particular, 
time placed its fundamental position and was deconstructed into five aspects in deliberate its 
respective function. Given for its century-long duration of most historical events, the process 
of rural labour mobility firstly bears relative enough time to slowly tackle these problems that 
were induced by the rapid socioeconomic transformations centered on industrial revolution; 
The space contains four interlinked components and intends to reveal these spatial conditions 
of EICs in absorbing rural migrants and allocating them in a relative smooth transit. It explored 
the potential attributions thereof, such as, the early mobility characteristics, even development 
of cities, the long-lasting rural industries, and role of the transportation revolution; and the 
dimension of people, via unfolding the aspects of demographic structure change, efflux of 
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emigrants, and impacts of sociocultural factors, articulated these people-based external 
conditions in history that facilitated EICs a better position on rural labour mobility.  
 
III.3. Historical analysis of the state (institutional) intervention 
 
To a large extent, if the smooth transition of rural-to-urban labour mobility in the 
process of industrialization was merely the result of above external and historical conditions, 
we have too far underestimated the complexity of this issue. And we should not be confused by 
our above analysis in those common regularities of the external and historical conditions. For 
this, we intentionally selected these four EICs, given that not all of them were in the same 
external and historical conditions. Still, these common regularities enabled us a broader 
perspective to look at rural labour mobility. And as the other part of our analytical framework 
of the dynamic paradigm, the exploration of internal conditions of the selected EICs places in 
our endeavor of this part. In general, no matter the first industrializer (UK), or the latecomers, 
all have demonstrated some similar state intervention (including the institutional intervention) 
along with their respective process of industrialization, which directly or indirectly, tangibly or 
intangibly, intervened the process of rural labour mobility. Thus, we will deliberate the state 
(institutional) intervention on labour mobility at each stage of industrialization in the history of 
EICs. To be noted, in any sense, we do not underestimate the effect of the capitalist mechanism 
in dealing with labour mobility since the state (institutional) intervention could never achieve 
solely, and to a large extent, was always accompanied or even as the carrier for the capitalist 
mechanism on labour mobility.  
 
The evolution of institutional intervention in the process of industrialization 
 
III.3.1. Interventions during the proto-industrial stage 
 
During the long proto-industrial period, all EICs had manifested the varied degrees 
of capitalistic sprouting. The primitive accumulation of capital “entailed taking land, say, 
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enclosing it, and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then 
releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation” (Harvey, 2005), 
which was accomplished mainly through violence, war, enslavement, and colonialism. 
Although we do not intend to elaborate the part how and how much they did via colonial 
plundering, instead, we would delve into what and how they accomplished internally that have 
close consequences to labour mobility. In practice, in order to have a rapid primitive 
accumulation of capital, most EICs have firstly conducted agricultural reforms. On the one hand, 
the reform conduced to land concentration in fewer hands of bourgeoisie and aristocracy; On 
the other hand, via various measures detached large amounts of rural peasants or tenant-
peasants from land, and became landless proletariat survived only by selling their labour force.  
And this process can hardly be achieved only via these a few reforms. To a certain 
extent, if the reforms need to be achievable, it should also be compatible with the phased 
endogenous development of capitalism. Exactly like what Engels’ remark: 
“… We have seen how competition created the proletariat at the very 
beginning of the industrial movement by increasing the wages of 
weavers in consequence of the increased demand for woven goods, so 
inducing the weaving peasants to abandon their farms and earn more 
money by devoting themselves to their looms. We have also seen how 
it crowded out the small farmers by means of the large farm system, 
reduced them to the rank of proletarians, and attracted them in part into 
the towns; how it further ruined the small bourgeoisie in great measure 
and reduced its members also to the ranks of the proletariat; how it 
centralized capital in the hands of the few, and population in the great 
towns… (Frederick Engels, 2005).”  
 
III.3.1.1. Abolishment of serfdom: releasing labour power 
 
Except for the United States, the rest EICs during their respective proto-industrial 
era experienced the social transit from a feudal society to the industrial society. Serfdom was 
the biggest obstacle to the free mobility of labour. As requested by the endogenous development 
of capitalism, the bourgeoisie must first have released serfs from agriculture and rural areas. 
And it was common that most EICs via several reforms to abolish the serfdom during the proto-
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industrial age. In England, as early as in the 13th century, the freedom of the individual was 
conceded in The Great Charter. By the early 15th century, serfdom had been basically eliminated. 
According to Marx, in the 15th century, the vast majority of the population were free farmers 
(Marx, 1972). Eventually, the serfdom had largely died out in England by 1500 as a personal 
status and was fully ended when Elizabeth I freed the last remaining serfs in 1574 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1902). Land held by serf tenure (unless enfranchised) continued to 
be held by what was the henceforth known as a copyhold tenancy. However, soon the tenant-
farmers were taken over by the day-labourers in most of England (Frederick Engels, 2005). In 
addition, part of this process also took place in a violent way, centered on the enclosure 
movement, which will be elaborated in the later section.  
The serfdom de facto should be ended in France in 1315 by Louis X (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 1902). According to regulations, in order to get rid of the state of serf, a ransom 
must be paid to the feudal lord. After then, serfs turned to be free tenant-peasant. By the 
beginning of the 16th century, 90% of peasants had got rid of serfhood (Z. L. Zhang, 1989). 
However, the serfdom was formally abolished by the French Revolution in 1789. By the decree 
passed in 1793, it ultimately abolished all feudal rights. Farmers no longer had to redeem, nor 
needed to pay rent and in-kind tribute. The peasant’s land was completely free from feudal 
shackles and became a free private property (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). Besides, the decree of 
agrarian law (3 June, 1793) after the revolution also allowed farmers to purchase the land of 
the fugitives; as well as the decree (10 June) distributed the public land of the rural communes 
to farmers (Lv & Qi, 2005). And these rights, including peasants’ right to free mobility, and 
freedom of profession, were further confirmed in the Napoleonic code (Wu, 2005). The 
direction of the French agricultural development after the abolishment of serfdom confirmed a 
very different path for its further industrial revolution, compared to that of Britain and Germany.  
As for the U.S., although to a large extent, it did not have feudal burdens in that of 
medieval European sense, after all, the scaled immigrants from Britain and other European 
countries arrived at the U.S., from the 17th century and onwards, and a large number of Indians 
and tribes were massacred and destroyed by colonists. Still, there were some feudal remnants 
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that carried by the immigrants, such as peerage, territorial lordship, primogeniture, entail, quit-
rent, so on and so forth. But these feudal remnants were constantly weakened (Z. H. Wang et 
al., 1995) until they got ultimately abolished after the Revolutionary War (1775–1783). The 
bourgeois republic confiscated the land of the British king and largely sold to the bourgeoisie, 
speculators, and slave owners, and established private land tenure in the northeastern states in 
particular (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). 
While, in Germany, there was a few scattered emancipation of serfs since 1770, e.g., 
the Schleswig did in 1780. However, substantial abolishment of serfdom led by Prussia with 
the “October Edict” in 1807, and followed by other German states after 1815 (Sagarra, 2017). 
However, compared to the enclosure movement that of England, the German way of expelling 
the peasants who just redeemed from serfs, which was overlapped in the process of abolishing 
serfdom, was rather more chronic and hidden. The peasant was allowed to become a free 
proprietor of land if only he could buy it (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). Since most peasants did not 
have enough money, they were allowed to pay for the land by giving up their rights to use 
common lands. Alternatively, they could pay by ceding some of their lands to their landlords 
(the amount normally accounts for 1/3 to 1/2 of farmer’s land) (Wu, 2005). The net outcome 
was that the peasants’ situation has worsened - they had less land to till, and no access to 
common lands (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). As a consequence, this reform in abolishing feudal rights 
at the same time created a private and market-oriented rural economy. A large amount of serfs 
once redeemed their feudal obligations and became free peasants, at the same time lost their 
land and turned to be landless proletariat and later as wage-labour (Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 
1999).  
 
III.3.1.2. Agrarian reform: expelling rural labour force 
 
After the respective bourgeois revolution in each EICs, the bourgeoisie often 
initiated agrarian reform via enactment of series of legislations that confiscated and sold the 
land of religion, Crown, and communal estates largely to the big bourgeoisie; and affirmed the 
private land tenure. In the UK, farmers could hardly obtain land from this process. Even worse, 
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those who could not prove their legal possession of land within a certain period of time had 
been expelled from the land. And a large number of tenant farmers often quickly was terminated 
their contract after the reform, since many lands got merged. In short, the number of farmers 
often got sharply reduced right after the land reform (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). Apart from this 
general process, which is similar to other EICs. In the UK, expelling farmers from land could 
be traced back to the 15th century by the notorious Enclosure31 movement or the “Sheep devour 
men” movement.  
Enclosures involve the abolition of stifling feudal servitudes, consolidation, and 
redistribution of small and scattered holdings, grazing of individual herds apart from the 
common herd, freedom from communal crop rotation, and fences or ditches erected on one’s 
land that produces for the market rather than for self-sustenance (Rozental, 1956). In short, it 
was the process of enclosing small landholdings into large farms. In the second half of the 17th 
century, the enclosure movement had gradually evolved from private to parliamentary 
enclosures. The bourgeoisie had constantly enacted new decrees through parliament to approve 
new enclosures (S. L. Liu, 1987). Since the first approval of the enclosure bill by the Parliament 
in 1709, the number had been increased very sharply. E.g., there were only 15 approvals 
between 1717 and 1727, but climbed to 1,727 between 1797 and 1820 (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). 
In total, the number of enclosure approvals reached nearly 4,000, and the land enclosed for 
more than 6 million acres (G. Y. Huang, 1997), which was roughly 20% of the size of England 
(A. H. Johnson, 1963). As thus, those who lost land often became landless proletariat, either 
employed in big farms or flowed to mining areas or service sectors in urban areas (Turner, 
1975). As thus, this long-lasting enclosure movement made the rural communal land eventually 
disappeared. At the eve of the industrial revolution, with the further separation of a large 
number of agricultural producers and means of production (land), the private land tenure system 
in rural areas was finally established, and the production mode of the large farm was gradually 
formed (Y. P. Wang, 2008; Clarkson, 1985). 
                                                
31 Enclosure was the process in England of consolidating (enclosing) small landholdings into large farms. Once enclosed, the 
use of the land became restricted and available only to the owner, and it ceased to be common land for communal use. 
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In their intensity and spread, the enclosures in France cannot be compared with those 
of England (Rozental, 1956). The French deprivation of peasant land experienced a long-term, 
and manifested a hidden way, since it was mainly realized via exploitative leasing and usurious 
loans (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001), after all, the French Revolution guaranteed the small-peasant land 
tenure, and redistributed land to farmers. However, farmers, except for very few lands (e.g., the 
communal land in some communities allocated by their population), were obtained free of 
charge. Most of the lands were for sale, and farmers often purchased land on installment. This 
put on heavy debt and laid curse for the peasants to be exploited by usury, and in turn, attached 
farmers to their small land (W. T. Shen, 2010). The spirit of agrarian reform was strong in the 
second half of the 18th century in most European countries. Although nowhere so potent as in 
England, it affected the least to France, compared to Spain, Germany, Italy, and Holland 
(Rozental, 1956). By 1804 when the French land tenure system was finally confirmed by the 
Napoleonic Code32 (Z. L. Zhang, 1989), the strengthening of the peasantry after the revolution 
made agriculture extremely slow in articulating itself to the market and adopting new methods 
of production. The elimination of feudal rights, by itself, did not liberate agriculture from the 
practices of the commune organization of production. The French peasants clung to their old 
customs in such a way that they survived the discontinuous plots and the common-land institute, 
which evidently delayed the development of agriculture (Oliveira, 1985). 
Although the United States did not have the enclosure movement like England, it 
had adopted various violent and deceptive acts to plunder land from native Indians since the 
British colonial. This effect was even more apparent and instant than that of the enclosure 
movement in England. Initially, there were still treaties between the Native tribes and the newly 
formed United States, however, soon, the government started via war even genocide to plunder 
the native land and sell to immigrant settlers. According to the historical records, from the time 
when Europeans arrived, the colonial authority had authorized over 1,500 wars, attacks, and 
raids on native Indians. By the close of the Indian Wars in the late 19th century, fewer than 
238,000 indigenous people remained, a sharp decline from the estimated 5 million to 15 million 
                                                
32 It was the French civil code established under the French Consulate in 1804, together with other codes that passed between 
1804 and 1810, collectively known as the Napoleonic Code. 
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living in North America when Columbus arrived in 1492 (Fixico, 2018). Besides, the federal 
government encouraged its Indian agents and others to cheat and plunder the Native land under 
cover of series of laws (Woodard, 2016), such as the General Allotment Act33, the Indian 
Removal Bill34, etc.  
In the early colonial period, the primary form of rural land was feudal land tenure: 
the aristocratic landlords leased the land to the peasants for cultivation and levied for the service 
rent. And among most of the early British settlers were indentured servants who traded four to 
seven years of unpaid labour for a one-way ticket to the U.S (Ellis Island Foundation, n.d.), 
with over 90% of them became farmers in the U.S (Bailyn, 2011). However, the War of 
Independence partially destroyed the feudal land tenure (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). At the end 
of the 18th century, the federal government produced a series of land acts (such as in 1784, 1785, 
and 1787) to expand territory westward. At the same time, these acts made the bourgeoisie in a 
favorable position to purchase land, e.g., the Land Act (1785) stipulated a minimum of 640 
acres for sale and required the purchaser to payout within one month. And the private land 
tenure or the capitalistic farm system was firstly established in the northeastern region (Z. H. 
Wang et al., 1995).  
Although the enclosure movement did not happen in Germany, the agrarian reform 
(like the Prussian reform, also known as Stein-Hardenberg-Reforms in 1807/08) together with 
the serfdom abolishment took its position and expelled farmers from land in a more hidden way, 
as we have discussed before. As one of the results, the reform (especially the Edict35 in 1811) 
facilitated, Junker36 landlord further expanded their amount of land via merging the land of the 
peasants and enabled them a better position to develop large farm production (Wu, 2000): 151. 
Whereas apart from a few farmers who obtained land, a large amount of farmers could not even 
manage to redeem their feudal obligations. The Prussian reform in the early 19th century paved 
                                                
33 It privatized many of the communally held reservations by dividing them into small, individually owned “allotments.” Some 
tracts were given to tribal members and the rest declared surplus and sold to settlers. 
34 From 1830 to 1840, the U.S. army removed 60,000 Indians—Choctaw, Creek, Cherokee and others—from the East in 
exchange for new territory west of the Mississippi (Fixico, 2018). 
35 Edict Concerning the Facilitated Possession and Free Use of Real Estate as well as the Personal Circumstances of the Rural 
Population. 
36 The Junkers were members of the landed nobility in Prussia. Originally was the title of members of the higher immediate 
nobility without or before the accolade. 
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the way for what Lenin called the Prussian path of bourgeois development (Vladimir Ilich Lenin, 
1954), of which feudal landlord economy slowly evolves into bourgeois, Junker landlord 
economy, which condemns the peasants to decades of most harrowing expropriation and 
bondage, while at the same time a small minority of big peasants arises, which contrasts to the 
American path, that there is no landlord economy, or else it is broken up by revolution, which 
confiscates and splits up the feudal estates. In that case, the peasant predominates, becomes the 
sole agent of agriculture, and evolves into a capitalist farmer. Thus, such agrarian reform in 
Prussia transformed the feudal bondage into servitude and capitalist exploitation on the land of 
the feudal landlords - Junkers. In retrospect, this turned Prussia from an estate- and manorial-
based rural society into one in which land could be bought and sold like any other commodity 
and marks its entrance into capitalism (Pierenkemper & Tilly, 2004). 
 
III.3.1.3. Restricted labour mobility  
 
Although the substantial rural-to-urban labour mobility did not appear at the proto-
industrial age, we should not take the freedom of people’s movement for granted, even with the 
scattered labour mobility. In the UK, the control of labour mobility was respectively regulated 
by two sets of laws/policies. As for emigration, in order to protect the development of the 
domestic industry, the emigration policy prohibited skilled workers from moving abroad. E.g., 
in 1699, the British Trade Commission prohibited workers engaged in wool textiles from 
leaving the country; in 1718, the commission then restricted to all skilled craftsmen (Greene, 
1966). However, to meet the needs of imperial colonization and to alleviate the pressure on 
landless farmers, the prohibition did not limit peasants and low-skilled workers to emigrate, 
rather the government even once sponsored them to settle in British America (Q. M. Liu & J. 
Huang, 2008; W. Gao, 2011). While, neither did labour have the freedom to move freely 
internally, which principally was regulated by the Old Poor Law37 (1601), together with the 
                                                
37 The Old Poor Law refers to the Poor Relief Act 1601, popularly known as the Elizabethan Poor Law was passed in 1601 
and created a poor law system for England and Wales. The law principally offered relief to people who were unable to work: 
mainly those who were “lame, impotent, old, blind”. However, to the able-bodied poor, their mobility was deprived of, and 
have to work in a House of Industry. 
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Settlement Removal Act38 (1662). Accordingly, for example, if a man left his settled parish to 
move elsewhere, he had to take his settlement certificate, which guaranteed that his home parish 
would pay for his “removal” costs (from the host parish) back to his home if he needed poor 
relief. And the receiving parish within forty days upon any concern could remove the man and 
return him to his home parish. And such Act worked for nearly one century, and a half control 
the poor’s mobility, of which most were landless peasants. Until its Amendment Act, it then 
stipulated that a person who has lived in a parish for more than five years without receiving 
local relief is not allowed to repatriate in 1846 (Z. H. Wang, 1996). And with those receiving 
relief in the poorhouse/workhouse, their labour mobility was strictly deprived, and they were 
forced to work (S. A. Li, 2005; Lu, 2007). E.g., by the end of the 18th century, there were around 
4,000 workhouses only in England (J. T. Liu, 2003).  
In France, a similar situation that limited labour mobility also existed at an early age 
before the Revolution. The Labour Booklet39 was used to control workers’ mobility, including 
their political mobilization, such as form their union (HistoryWeb, 2014). Accordingly, 
apprentices and workers were required to prove their approved movement from previous 
employers to avoid accusations of vagrancy (ARLES, 2013). Also, workers must have this 
booklet stamped by the public authorities when they change their residence. Otherwise would 
be condemned for one to three months in prison. The system was declined gradually from 1860 
under Napoleon III and ended in1890 (HistoryWeb, 2014). Still, during this period of time, 
such a system made workers completely attached to their owners, thus, ensured the employer’s 
absolute exploitation on workers (Z. L. Zhang, 1989).  
Redeeming the feudal obligations in Germany underwent a long period of time. So 
was the transformation of feudal tenures into peasant land ownership. In general, by 1850, the 
bulk of the large landowners, at any rate, were in a position to carry out agricultural 
improvement on the grand scale, however, not much hampered by ancient rights, customs and 
                                                
38 It is also known as the Poor Relief Act or the Settlement Act. The purpose of the Act was to establish the parish to which a 
person belonged, and hence clarify which parish was responsible for him should he become in need of Poor Relief. 
39  The labour booklet (livret d’ouvrier) or Employment Record Book was an official personal document recording the 
employment status of its owner over time, and under the police supervison made workers obligatorily to give to the next 
employer.  
253 
 

routines (Clapham, 1966). In Prussia, be essential to people’s freedom of movement, although 
the Edict of 9 October 1807 of Prussia had announced to abolish of restrictions on mobility, 
several reforms (including the Edict of 29 May 1816 and the Edict of 7 June 1821) until the 
1830s still excluded many small peasants outside the reform process. E.g., by 1848, only 6/7 of 
the rich peasants, 1/5 of the remaining peasants, had the opportunity to exempt from all kinds 
of feudal obligations and entitled to become landowners (Wu, 2005). And between 1811 and 
1848, about 70,000 peasants in Prussia were emancipated from the feudal obligation by ceding 
land, and about 170,000 peasants did via redeeming (Meng, 2018). In Prussia, only until the 
Commutation Law in 1850, a delayed result of the revolution (1848), which ultimately gave the 
peasants complete legal emancipation. It also put an end to compensation of the lords by means 
of peasant land (Pierenkemper & Tilly, 2004). Such the reform process also happened in other 
states, like Saxony (1832), Hannover (1831), Thuringia (1848), Bavaria (1848). The revolution 
of 1848/49 finally ended the emancipation of serfs all over Germany (Meng, 2018).   
 
III.3.1.4. Regulations over urban poverty 
 
Given the enclosure movement that had been largely used in the British proto-
industrial era, many expelled rural poor had been pushed to flow to factories or cities. However, 
their lives were not better than in rural areas, some times even worse. And more detailed 
discourse can be found in Engel’s’ the condition of working class in England. In regard to 
dealing with these landless rural poor in cities, England had adopted a very inhumane approach. 
During the period of Elizabeth, I (1533-1603), the 1572 decree stipulated that for those 14 years 
old or older without begging license paupers, if could not be employed within two years, they 
would be whipped and branded on the left ear; if the same pauper (over 18 years old) again 
found on begging and could not make himself/herself employed within another two years, 
would be sentenced to death (S. X. Chen & Yang, 1998). And in the Elizabethan, I era, there 
were 300 to 400 people hanged each year (Marx, 1972).  
Meanwhile, on the other side, Elizabeth initiated the “Old Poor Law” to manage the 
large-scale poor. And later followed by a series of enactment of Poor Law (such as the Poor 
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Relief Act of 1662, the Workhouse Test Act of 1723, the Gilbert’s Act in 1782, and the 
Speenhamland in 1795) formalized the practices of poor relief distribution and poor 
management in England and Wales. Some even regard the poor law as the preform of earlier 
labour policy in the UK (Boyer, 2006). Thus, the earlier Poor Law intended to regulate towards 
impotent poor (including lame, impotent, old, blind, etc.) the care in a poorhouse; set these able-
bodied poor work in a House of Industry; sent these idle poor and vagrants to a House of 
Correction or even prison (Leonard, 2013). In a sense, these Poor Laws, to a great extent, 
reflected certain functions of early vocational education and training, even forced labour. 
Together with the Settlement Removal Act, these earlier policies offered the employer in his 
parish a monopoly or priority possession on labour (Barton, 1817). 
To summarize, most EICs during their respective proto-industrial era principally via 
agrarian reform on the one hand, rapidly accumulated the primitive capital, concentrated land 
to fewer hands of the bourgeoisie or landlord (case of Germany); on the other hand, via 
abolishment of serfdom, not only released labour-power but also expelled them from the land. 
In short, it was the process that Kitching has coined the somewhat brutal but apt phrase ‘peasant 
elimination’ that started with the enclosure movement in the UK, and would accelerate through 
industrialization and spread through various phases by reducing the amount of labour necessary 
to feed the population of a given territory (Kitching, 2010):148. Although the freedom of 
people’s movement had been largely announced, however, workers’ mobility was still under 
restricted control, such as England’s Settlement Removal Act, and French Labour Booklet 
system. Anyway, these earlier interventions still paved the way towards a further capitalistic 
configuration of the labour market and somehow explored the mechanism of a full supply of 
labour for the industrial revolution that demanded massive labour resources.  
 
III.3.2. Intervention during the industrial revolution 
 
During their respective period of the industrial revolution, most EICs had 
experienced the process and gradually realized free labour mobility from the previous restricted 
ones. And in order to accelerate the industrial expansion, a series of legislations and policies 
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were enacted to ensure the full supply of labour force, especially these from rural areas. And in 
rural areas, the existing process of peasant elimination got accelerated throughout the industrial 
revolution. Meanwhile, the emerging mobilizations of the working class, together with their 
political movement, pushed the ruling class (the bourgeois government) to compromise and 
provide a certain social and work protection. And taken from the long-term interests, plus in 
order to alleviate class conflicts, the bourgeois government started to understand that the 
development of industrialization not only required cheap labour, but also need a long-term 
stabilized social and market environment. Thus, their governments began to actively produced 
a series of decrees, acts, and policies in the labour market, such as to limit working hours, 
protect child labour, expand safety, improve sanitation, and establish factory/mining inspection 
systems, so on and so forth. Even active policies arrived in areas of workers’ housing, public 
health, sanitation, education, transportation, etc. But at the same time, various measures and 
legislations were placed to control worker’s political mobilization and prohibited workers’ 
association and formation of trade unions, etc.  
 
III.3.2.1. Deepened land relations: peasant elimination  
 
After nearly four centuries of the enclosure movement, religious reforms, and the 
bourgeois revolution, the British land relation by the end of its industrial revolution had been 
transformed eventually to capitalistic land tenure. This transformation had witnessed the 
vanishing of the small-peasant class and the increasing dominance of large farms and large 
pastures. E.g., by 1851, the land of small farms and smallholders (with less than 100 acres) only 
accounted for 22% of the arable land in Britain (Chambers & Mingay, 1966); Whereas 24,000 
landowners (holding over 100 acres, accounted for 32% of the total farm & pasture units) 
occupied 24.7 million acres, 78% of total land (Bédarida, 2013). By 1872, nearly 90% of the 
land was concentrated in less than 7,000 landowners (Thompson, 2013):27. As a result, large 
farm production obviously took the dominant position in British agriculture (Clapham, 1964). 
At the end of the 19th century, the large landowners (holding over 1,000 acres) hold 2/3 of total 
land (Bédarida, 2013). And after almost four centuries’ enclosure movement, it had been finally 
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terminated in 1876 (Y. Shen, 2001). E.g., in England sole, total land that had been enclosed 
reached 6.5 million acres, accounting for about 20 percent of England’s territory from the 18th 
century to the 1850s (A. H. Johnson, 1963). Meanwhile, the possession of small peasants’ land 
had been deprived nearly thoroughly. A large amount of small agricultural producers, tenant 
farmers, were constantly bankrupted along with this transformation (Friedrich Engels, 2001). 
After 1815, only a small number of tenant farmers remained but gradually disappeared 
afterward. As approaching the second half of the 19th century, British agriculture was 
completely included in the scope of the capitalist mode of production (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). 
By then, the rural population more or less consisted principally of three classes: large 
landowners, capitalist farmers, and agricultural workers (Chambers & Mingay, 1966). 
In general, France had very few major adjustments in its land relations during the 
industrial revolution, which had principally maintained its previous configurations since the 
French Revolution. It was found that between 1845 and 1850, its agricultural labour force was 
twice as large as that of industry and handicraft (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). Centered on the long-
lasting small peasant tenure, the French approach to eliminate peasants manifested a very slow 
process. By the mid-19th century, none of the modes of agricultural production, land tenure, 
rural structures, etc., had undergone fundamental changes. And most peasants had still involved 
in agricultural production. According to the government’s statistics in 1862, small peasants 
occupying less than one hectare’s land accounted for 38.5% of the total agricultural producers. 
As thus, a large amount of peasants was still attached to their small piece of land. However, 
changes took place in a few decades at the end of the 19th century (Crafts, 1985). Peasants were 
gradually expelled by its inherent evolution of land relations pushed by the improvement of 
agricultural mechanization and farming techniques, and the emerging capitalistic farm 
production.  
As mentioned before, after the revolution, most farmers purchased land on 
installment, which involved with usury with heavy debts and were forced to mortgage their 
land when they could not pay off debt. By 1860, the situation got deteriorated. More than half 
of the land of small peasants that had obtained from the revolution had been mortgaged (W. T. 
257 
 

Shen, 2010). Still, by 1882, there was still 84.7% of farms were cultivated on less than 10 
hectares’ land by small peasants (about 2.15 million) (Clapham, 1966). And land concentration 
was speeded up only found after 1892 and onwards (see Chart 14). Large scale of land 
concentration, the use of machinery and fertilizers, the production of specialized and capitalist 
farms had been further developed at the late stage of its industrial revolution when approaching 
the 20th century. By 1911, the number of agricultural wage workers had reached 2 million (Z. 
L. Zhang, 1989). Yet, the French capitalistic farms were still smaller than that of the United 
States, Germany, and the United Kingdom at that time. 
During the proto-industrial era, the United States, via various measures, had seized 
massive land largely from the indigenous tribes, French and Spanish colonies, and Mexico. By 
the middle of the 19th century, its territory had expanded to the Pacific coast, and the land 
expanded from 2.05 million square kilometers in 1783 to 7.77 million square kilometers before 
the Civil War (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). Against the backdrop of the rapid westward expansion 
movement, the successive enactments of the Land Acts (1796, 1800, 1804, 1820, and 1832) 
gradually reduce the amount of land purchase, which would be favorable to farmers and 
establish a small peasant land tenure. Especially the Homestead Acts in 1862, since it enabled 
any American, including freed slaves, to put in a claim for up to 160 free acres of federal land. 
According to statistics, in the 40 years after 1820, the government sold 8 million acres of land 
(Bogue, 1980). And after the enactment of the Homestead Act, the number of small peasant did 
increase, so was the land. For example, the number of all-scale farms increased from 2 million 
to nearly 6.4 million from 1860 to 1916; whereas, the total farmland had also expanded from 
407 million acres to nearly 879 million acres (Peyrefitte, 1981). 
However, the land concentration in the U.S., was not apparent than that of Britain, 
since the vast majority of the land was still in the process of being reclaimed and sold, in 
particular after the enactment of the Desert Land Act in 1877. Nevertheless, the small peasant 
land tenure did not last long, it was rather a transition to capitalistic farm production since the 
implementations of these Acts did not manage to hold the land in the hands of small farmers. 
In fact, large landowners occupied bigger amount of land, and land speculation was quite 
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prevailing (History.com Editors, 2019). As thus, a notable proportion of land was still 
concentrated in a few hands of big farms along with the process (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). For 
example, 23% of homesteads allocated between 1881 and 1904 acquired land ownership via 
depreciation (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). By 1900, large-farmers accounted for 0.8% of total 
landowners occupied nearly 20% of total farmland, while, small-farmers accounted for 57.4% 
of total landowners only had 16.7% of total farmland. And nearly 1/5 of the rural labour force 
(2 million) were employed as wage labour in the big farms by 1900 (Clapham, 1966). In short, 
the small peasant economy in American agriculture only experienced a short phase, and had 
been transformed into the capitalist farming system eventually (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995).  
Changes in land relations in the industrial revolution of Germany largely occurred 
in the second half of the 19th century. Given its particular history, each region had a different 
timeline in dealing with land relations, especially on the commons and peasants’ holdings. In 
Bavaria, which was mainly tilled by peasants, nothing important happened before 1850, except 
a little voluntary rearrangement of fields. Wurtemberg had much the same history. In Baden, 
the first general law to facilitate the rearrangement of the field dates from 1856. And in Prussia, 
it can be dated back in 1821. In the north-west, like in Schleswig-Holstein, there had been a 
great deal of systematic rearrangement of fields, and even actual enclosure, before 1800. With 
the 19th century, there came a whole series of laws in the Hanover and Brunswick stated to 
facilitate the rearrangement (Clapham, 1966). To elaborate, we take the reforms of Prussia, for 
instance.   
Again, the transformation of feudal land tenure to landlord land tenure still placed a 
big task for Prussia and Germany in general. In Prussia, apart from a series of land acts that 
enacted since 1807, great changes were pushed by enacting the Commutation Law in 1850. 
Besides, the Prussian government also set up a land bank to accelerate the process. From 1850 
to 1865, a total of 640,000 peasants in Prussia went through the process of redemption (Meng, 
2018). However, such a process of redemption not only enabled Junker landlords to converge 
a lot of money but also seized a large amount of land, which in turn, burdened the peasants for 
years with high-interest rates on their redemption debts, substantially increasing their annual 
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payments (Clapham, 1966). E.g., according to statistics, the Junkers in the east of the Elbe River 
received a ransom of one billion Marks and 96,000 hectares of land (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). 
And such conditions made the large farm production possible. Junker landlords had adopted 
advanced capitalist management methods in large-scale farming, improved new agricultural 
technologies, expanded commercial agriculture, and continuously expanded their production 
scales. E.g., by 1850, most of Junkers in the east of Elbe, except for Silesia, had adopted 
capitalistic farm production. The size of their manors generally reached 2,000 acres (Z. H. 
Wang et al., 1995). And wage labourers in Prussian agriculture reached 3.5 million in the 1860s 
(Z. W. Shi & Hu, 2000):Vol.62. And by the beginning of the 1870s, small peasants (71.4% of 
the total number peasants) only possessed 9% of land; whereas the medium and large peasants 
(28.6%) owned 91% of total land (Z. W. Shi & Hu, 2000):Vol.62. As thus, the Prussian path 
had witnessed the landlord land tenure gradually evolved to be the capitalist land relation (Wu, 
2000).   
 
III.3.2.2. Interventions on labour mobility 
 
During the period of the industrial revolution, the rapid expansion of industries 
demanded for abundant labour force. Against this backdrop, most EICs during this period 
started to release previous restrictions on labour mobility. However, after massive rural 
migrants moved to cities, apart from a large proportion of them were relocated in the emerging 
sectors of industry and service, there were still many rural migrants either underemployed or 
unemployed retaining in cities. The emerging issues, such as urban poverty, started to emerge 
in front of most EICs. In response, most EICs, on the one hand, enacted legislation or expand 
relief programmes to release restrictions even encourage on labour mobility; at the same time, 
on the other hand, placed extra regulations to manage and control the urban poor, and their 
mobility (of which most were rural migrants), especially their political mobilization.  
In the UK, a few modifications of the Poor Law were placed to tackle this. For 
example, the Relief of the Poor Act 1782, also known as Gilbert’s Act, provided outdoor relief 
to these able-bodied poor. As well as the outdoor relief (the Berkshire Bread Act, known as the 
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Speenhamland system) was to mitigate rural poverty (Z. H. Jiang, 2012b). In 1795 the Poor 
Removal Act was made to further release the restrictions of the previous Settlement Removal 
Act, which forbade to repatriate those poor before they actually became a burden for the 
receiving parish. And the Union Chargeability Act in 1865 was passed so that the financial 
burden of the poor could be shared on a union-wide basis rather than a parish-wide basis, which 
enabled rural migrants easily to reside in another parish and enlarged the scope of labour 
mobility. It stipulated that those who have lived in a parish for more than five years and did not 
receive local relief are not allowed to repatriate to their places of origin. By then, the previous 
Settlement Removal Act was actually ceased.  
However, at the end of the industrial revolution, the Poor Law also underwent great 
changes. The Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834, known as the New Poor Law, fundamentally 
changed the previous poverty relief system. In the New Poor Law, all relief in money and 
provisions was abolished. The only relief allowed was admission to the workhouses 
immediately built. The regulations for these workhouses, or, as the people call them, “Poor Law 
Bastilles,” were such as to frighten away everyone who has the slightest prospect of life without 
this form of public charity (Frederick Engels, 2005). In essence, the New Poor Law forced the 
poor to work as cheap labour inside the workhouse. Consequently, a large amount of poor was 
sent to the workhouse, for example, the number of the poor in the workhouse had increased by 
151% between 1834 and 1838 in England and Wales (Xue, 2004). As forced labour, many of 
them were sent to the industrial region like Lancashire and Cheshire. Between 1835 and 1837, 
around 5000 poor were sent to the northern manufacturing region (Z. H. Wang, 1996).  
Besides, both the legislators and the courts since in the proto-industrial era had been 
opposed to workers’ collective action. The strike was often considered as a “default” act. Once 
workers blasted into destructive actions in the strike, they would even be accused of criminally 
liable. E.g., the British courts in the 18th century accused that trade unions had the unlawful 
purpose of restricting free trade, which constituted of criminal conspiracy in the common law 
and often tended to charge crimes to union leaders (Tian, 2019). And during the period of the 
industrial revolution, especially the fear of the French Revolution, the Combination Act (An 
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act to prevent Unlawful combinations of workmen) was enacted in 1799 and 1800, which was 
placed to restrict and prohibited the activities of trade unions, like collective bargaining, and 
severely punish workers for participating in any assembling for the purpose of raising wages or 
reducing working hours. Although the Combination of Workmen Act in 1824 attempted to 
repealed the Acts of 1799 and 1800, against the backdrop of the growing waves of strikes, the 
Combinations of Workmen Act 1825 was again passed to reimpose criminal sanctions for 
picketing and other methods of persuading workers not to work (Orth, 1991). Nevertheless, the 
Act of 1825 allowed the trade unions more than just bare existence. The right to collective 
bargaining and the right to strike were recognized for the first time. Also, it was no longer 
illegal to levy or pay voluntary contributions to enable trade union and strike action to be carried 
on (Shawl, 1954). The Act of 1825 then remained in force for fifty years, and during that time, 
there was no further attempt to limit the combinations of workmen. In the years that followed 
the trade union movement concerned itself with widening its scope into national organizations 
and with bringing working-class opinion to bear upon the political situation of the day (Shawl, 
1954). 
In France, the Labour Booklet system that restricted workers’ movement and 
entitled employers’ absolute exploitation was ultimately abolished in 1890 (Z. L. Zhang, 1989). 
Although there were no successive enactments of laws compared to England to monitor and 
manage workers’ mobility, many other measures still could be found that impacted workers’ 
free mobility. Very often, provincial workers during the first half of the 19th century set out on 
a “tour de France” to perfect the skills of their trade. For the most part, these tours were 
organized by compagnonnages (workers’ societies set up to help members find work as they 
came into town) (Traugott, 1993), although it was banned by the Le Chapelier Law. However, 
by the late 19th century, many towns in France had grown to become company towns. These 
were towns where local government and factory management were often on in the same. This 
meant that often regulations and conditions that were in contrast to the law were often 
overlooked. According to the memoir of Jean-Baptiste Dumay, the Schneider factory ran the 
town of Le Creusot. Even though Dumay took off on tour de France, factory towns such as Le 
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Creusot had stabilized the workforce in these towns, all but eliminating the need for traveling 
workers. Work was becoming more and more urban, creating more problems as workers 
flooded the towns (Traugott, 1993).  
Furthermore, during the period of the industrial revolution, there were a few 
attempts to establish the unemployment relief system, which was similar to the Poor Laws of 
Britain. The Right to Work National Workshops (the decree 25 February 1848) was established 
after the Revolution of 1848 (26 February) to guarantee government-funded jobs for the 
unemployed. E.g., by May 1848, the National Workshops were employing 100,000 workers 
and paying out daily wages of 70,000 Livres ( Encyclopedia Marxism, n.d.). However, the 
elections marked the victory of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat and of the towns over the 
countryside. The government of the bourgeoisie made an order for the closing down of the 
national workshops and the moving of the workers employed in them (Encyclopedia Marxism, 
n.d.). As both Paris and the provinces dismantled the workshops following the June revolution. 
By the end of the summer, most workshops had disappeared entirely; only a handful remained 
open, employing between one-fifth and one-fourth the workers who had been on the rolls during 
the May-June peak (Christofferson, 1980). 
As the same as the situation of in Britain, French governments had regarded strikes, 
and indeed most forms of labour organization, as a serious transgression against the rights of 
the industry for most of the early 19th century. For example, from 1791 with the Le Chapelier 
Law, which banned guilds as the early version of trade unions and the right to strike. However, 
changes arrived in 1864, the French Corps Legislatif passed the Coalitions Law, effectively 
granting French workers the right to strike. The law revised earlier legislation that had classified 
the formation of workers’ coalitions, or labour unions, as a criminal offense. But it was not 
totally free for workers. Certain acts remained punishable crimes, which included the use of 
violence, coercion, threats or fraudaulent maneuvers in the attempt to bring about a strike, or 
the use of fines, prohibitions, or bans in plans to prevent people from working. This meant that 
while workers were allowed to strike, there were severe limits on the methods that they could 
use to organize strikes, and they were prevented from taking any actions against strikebreakers. 
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Changes to the laws of association in 1868 allowed union meetings under certain conditions, 
but trade unions were not officially legalized in France until 1884 (S. X. Chen & Yang, 1998). 
Anyway, the workers’ movement in France became increased from the mid-19th century.  
In brief, by the end of its industrial revolution, France more or less built up its legal 
system in regulating workers’ movement. The Labour Inspection act (the Inspection du travail) 
was enacted in 1892 during the Third Republic to inspect of labour conditions; In 1906, France 
established its Minister of Labour (Ministre du Travail), as well as the Minister of Labour and 
Social Security provisions (Ministre du Travail et Prévoyance sociale); And by 1910, the 
French Labour Code (Code du travail) was created; In 1919, the Collective Conventions 
(Conventions Collectives de Travail) were passed to deal with collective labour disputes; Until 
the Matignon Agreements were signed in 1936 between the General Confederation of French 
Production (CGPF) employers’ organization, the CGT trade union and the French state, which 
had guaranteed the legal right to strike, and the removal of all obstacles to union organization. 
Finally, it was not until the 1946 Constitutional Amendment explicitly stated the legitimacy of 
strikes in the Constitution for the first time (Tian, 2019). 
In the United States, labour relations, in general, were more liberal than other EICs. 
Concerning labour mobility before its industrial revolution, in general, the labour markets were 
unencumbered by regulatory legislation (Naidu & Yuchtman, 2016). Instead, the Articles of 
Confederation (1778) reinforced the nation’s mobility by granting all citizens a right to migrate 
among states (Jacoby & Finkin, 2004). Incoming settlers and a territorial expansion that made 
the land available for settlement in the first half of the 18th century reinforced this process. Also, 
the Supreme Court rulings banned hiring preferences for residents of a particular state and 
licensing for some professions at the state level, e.g., lawyers (Jacoby & Finkin, 2004). 
However, there were still some constraints that limited workers’ mobility at this stage, which 
was much associated with workers’ career path, since most artisans were still involved 
apprenticeship under a master before the industrial revolution (Tomlins, 1993). After the mid-
18th century, the incidence of wage labour began to increase. E.g., in Philadelphia, from 30% 
to 50% of the city’s shoemakers and tailors can be found hiring themselves out to master 
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craftsmen. In Boston, during the 1790s, there were still eight master carpenters for every 
journeyman ( Encyclopedia, n.d.). However, after its industrial revolution kicked off. Early in 
the 19th century, employers sought for any legal measures to limit workers’ organizing and 
other union activities. Over the course of some scattered journeymen organizing activities, most 
of their tactics for organizing activities (moving into independent production) earned them 
indictment, and usually conviction for conspiracy (Tomlins, 1993). The Commonwealth v. 
Pullis (1806) firstly reported case arising from a labour strike in the U.S., decided that striking 
workers were illegal conspirators (Commons et al., 1910). Between 1806 and 1815, at least half 
a dozen conspiracy trials took place in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York.  
Gradually, shoemakers, tailors, and textile workers followed up their organizing 
activities. Notably, the Boston house carpenters’ strike of 1825 somehow kicked off workers’ 
organizing activities across a broad front of trades in all the eastern cities (Tomlins, 1993). In 
Philadelphia, journeymen joined with factory hands not only to organize unions but also 
confederations of unions as well as workingmen’s political parties that quickly assumed an 
active role in local and state politics. Establishment in 1827 of the Mechanics’ Union of Trade 
Associations, the first citywide federation of journeymen trade societies in the country, led to 
independent organized participation of workingmen in the 1828 city and state elections. In 1829 
and 1830, Workingmen’s parties also developed in New York and Massachusetts 
( Encyclopedia, n.d.). However, over the first half of the 19th century, many union organizing 
activities were prosecuted for criminal conspiracy. Even peaceable combinations of 
workingmen to raise wages, shorten hours, or ensure employment were illegal in the United 
States. And prior to the landmark decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842), which settled the 
legality of unions(Tomlins, 1993):133. The second half of the 19th century, with the 
Commonwealth v. Hunt, a series of acts legalized workers’ organizing activities. In 1869, an 
organization called the Knights of Labour was founded by Philadelphia artisans, joined by 
miners 1874, and urban tradesmen from 1879 (Fink, 1983). Industrial conflicts on railroads and 
telegraphs from 1883 led to the foundation of the American Federation of Labor in 1886, with 
the simple aim of improving workers’ wages, housing and job security (Higgins, 1950). 
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However, before the end of its industrial revolution, workers’ right to strike and association 
were still uncertain. Like the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, still in certain position against the 
striking workers, such as the US Supreme Court in In re Debs in 1895 which handed down 
concerning Eugene V. Debs and labour unions. 
In Germany, during the period of the industrial revolution and before the political 
unification in 1871, people moved among one another of German states including labour 
migration was still under certain foreign barriers, even the German states had been organized 
in 1834 into the German Customs Union (Burgdorfer, 1931). Although in 1849, the enactment 
of the Imperial Constitution by the Frankfurt parliament regarding the basic rights of the 
German people (Reichsgesetz betreffend die Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes), attempted to 
declare rights included the freedom of movement, and freedom of assembly, etc., the realization 
of these rights was, however, failed together with the revolution. The formation of the North 
German Confederation, pushed the subject of emigration as a matter for the Confederation and 
later for the Empire. Then all restrictions upon the citizen’s freedom of migration and 
movement within the territory of the Confederation were finally abolished in 1867 (Burgdorfer, 
1931), and were guaranteed in the Law on the Free Movement of Persons of 1867, and the Law 
on the Freedom of Industrial Activities of 1869. The Constitution of the North German 
Confederation, with a few amendments only, was adopted in 1871 as the Federal Constitution 
of the Reich. And together with the enactment of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch) in 1900 that can be seen as the last step of legal integration in an area of great 
importance for the national economy (Cappelletti et al., 2013), nearly most of the legal 
restrictions over labour mobility had been finally removed by then.  
And regarding workers’ mobilization, it was the same as other EICs, since there was 
no freedom of association and that any association of workers without permission of the local 
authorities was subject to penal sanction (Weiss & M. Schmidt, 2008). The prevailing rule 
before the enactment of the Trade Act was individual freedom of contract, which has been much 
developed by interpretation of principles laid down in the Constitution. Workers’ movement 
and union organizing emerged in the pre and during the1848 Revolution. The fail of the 
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revolution also led to a loss of strength in the union movement. The establishment of the 
General German Workers’ association in 1863, combined with the Social Democratic Workers’ 
Party of Germany, together formed the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which 
crystalized the trade union’s movement in the 1860s (J. Schmidt, 2019). Only new reforms in 
1869 and 1871, enabled unions to develop as trade partners of entrepreneurs’’ associations. 
Free unions could not start their activities before 1869, when the Trade Act (Gewerbeordnung-
GewO) for the Northern German Confederation, eliminated, at least to a certain extent, the ban 
on freedom of association (W. Jiang, 2013). Towards the end of the 1880s, a social-democratic 
trade union movement emerged from below, initially in the form of ostensibly apolitical trade 
associations. Nevertheless, one can speak of the breakthrough of the German trade unions to 
become a mass movement only for the second half of the 1890s. In the years between 1899 and 
1910, the Free Trade Unions roughly doubled their membership every five years. Since their 
establishment in 1895, the Christian Unions had also grown, although not nearly as great, to 
around 300,000 members, while the liberal HirschDuncker Unions stagnated at 100,000 
members. In 1904, membership of the Free Trade Unions exceeded the one million mark. By 
1913, 2.5 million workers had already been unionized (Welskopp, 2019). 
 
III.3.2.3. Enhancement of labour regulations 
 
Under the rapid expansion of industries, massive workers were concentrated and 
allocated in the emerging units of production, such as big workshops, factories, and 
manufacturing lines, which inevitablely induce sharp deterioration in working conditions, 
safety, workers’ health, etc., as well as issues like abuse of child labour in particular. The 
detailed situation can be found in Engels’ work “The Condition of Working Class in England”. 
On the one hand, confronting workers’ organizing and militant actions; on the other hand, 
strengthened by the lack of labour force due to the reversed labour mobility (back to rural areas), 
such a situation brought about the bourgeois authorities had to step in and produce various 
labour legislations to secure the stability of industrial relations.    
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In the UK, the labour legislation could be dated back to the beginning of the 19th 
century when the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act was enacted in 1802. It is also known 
as the first version of the Factory Act, which was designed to improve conditions for 
apprentices working in cotton mills. Apprentices in the Act were to be given a basic education, 
and their working hours were limited to no more than twelve hours a day and not to work at 
night. Later, the Cotton Mills and Factories Act of 1819 set a minimum age for ‘free children’ 
working in cotton mills. After this, there was constant effort to amend the factory act (1825, 
1831, 1833, 1836, 1838, 1843, 1844, 1847, 1850), enlarging the scope gradually to cover 
women workers as well. Still, in short, before the end of the British industrial revolution, the 
labour legislation was still much adhered to the tradition of liberalism, and the intervention of 
labour relations was very cautious (Tian, 2019). 
In France, labour legislations also started from the regulation on child labour and 
young apprentices, which the first factory act had been passed in 1841 and set the minimum 
age for factory children. Not until 1874 was France’s second factory law enacted, which 
extended the applicability of child labour regulations to virtually all shops, raised the basic 
minimum age for employment, and created a centralized, salaried inspectorate (Weissbach, 
1977). And the factory law of 1892 started to expand its coverage to women workers (Z. L. 
Zhang, 1989). In general, the labour law in France was gradually separated from traditional 
civil law and formed an independent system from the second half of the 19th century (Tian, 
2019). For example, in 1864, France lifted the legal ban on strikes; in 1874 the factory law 
introduced a system of inspectors and outlawed child labour and women working underground; 
In 1884, the act of labour unions was enacted; the Voluntary conciliation and arbitration law 
was enacted in 1892; Law of 1900 started to limit on a working day to ten hours; in 1910 the 
first old-age pension laws got enacted (Docherty & van der Velden, 2012), so on and so forth.  
In the United States, labour regulations also started from that on child labour. In 
1813, Connecticut required employers to provide some schooling to child workers. The state 
legislature of Massachusetts passed a law in 1836 that required all child workers under the age 
of 15 to attend school for at least three months a year. And it further limited daily working 
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hours for children in 1842. In 1848, Pennsylvania became the first state to set a minimum age 
for factory workers. However, it was indeed a long process in the U.S., since by 1900, only 24 
states had set a minimum age for manufacturing workers. Also, federal minimum-age law did 
not pass until 1938 with the Fair Labour Standards Act. Concerning factory laws, as early as 
the 1820s, the “ten-hour” movement sprang up. In 1840 they pressured president Martin Van 
Burin to shorten the workday for employees on federal projects to 10 hours (U.S. Department 
of Labor, n.d.). However, federal law was much delayed. Massachusetts passed the first factory 
safety, and health law in America in 1877 and established an inspection force in 1879. Other 
Northern industrial states soon followed and fourteen states had similar factory acts by 1897. 
Ten of those states gave their inspectors authority to require guarding of machinery; eight 
banned cleaning of moving machinery by women or children; ten required guarding of elevator 
openings; eight required regulation of ventilation and sanitary conditions; seven required 
exhaust fans for dust and fumes; eight required reporting of accidents (U.S. Department of 
Labor, n.d.). 
In Germany, regulation of the conditions of labour in the industry was mostly 
incorporated into the civil codes and the orders of the Federal Council based thereon in 
Germany in the 19th century. Although Prussia in 1839 was the first in German states to pass 
laws restricting child labour in factories and setting the number of hours a child could work, 
the federal law regulating child labour was in 1903, and further included in the Child Labour 
and Working Hours for Juveniles in 1938. Still, new statutes can be traced back to the National 
Trade Code of 1869 of the North German Confederation, and several other subsequently 
enacted laws (Friedlander, 1938). The Industrial Code was a big step towards the creation of a 
legal system to protect workers (Zenker, 2014). For example, it brought regulations, such as 
Sunday and holiday rest, the prohibition of employment underground of female labour, 
limitation of the hours of women and young workers, etc. From 1878 onwards, a series of laws 
enacted, such as the Health Insurance Act (1883), Accident and Disablement Insurance (1884) 
and Provisions for Old Age, Sickness Insurance Act (1889), etc., all of which were part of the 
beginnings of social security (Zenker, 2014). 
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III.3.2.4. Emphasis on primary education and vocational training  
 
In the deepened period of the industrial revolution (or when the manufacture of light 
industry was gradually replaced by the heavy industry or the shift of manufacture based on from 
the labour-intensive to the capital-intensive), the previous simplistic spatial rural labour 
mobility could not anymore sustain the development of the sophisticated industry that 
demanded for skilled workers. That is to say, the career conversion of rural migrants to be more 
skilled became the essential guarantee for industrial upgrading. Thus, the improvement of 
labour skills was an important condition to ensure that rural migrants could smoothly settle 
down in the city. In the light of historical reviews of EICs, there were two common measures 
to achieve these conditions: providing vocational training for the current factory workers and 
ensuring primary education for the next generation. Since vocational training somehow was 
still capable of conducting by the individual or industrial capitalist, the promotion of primary 
education, however, required a lot of resources and efforts which can hardly be achievable by 
the individual. Nevertheless, by the 1870s to the early 20th century, most EICs had basically 
achieved the national system of universal primary education (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). 
Initially, the UK mainly relied on various nongovernmental forces, especially the 
church schools, to provide education. Although the Factory Act (1802) also required factory 
owners to provide some education, it was not until 1870 when the Elementary Education Act 
was enacted. Since then, the UK started to establish its national education system. In 1880, the 
British Parliament issued a decree officially stipulated that primary education was compulsory. 
In 1893, it was stipulated that all children under the age of 11 must be enrolled in school, etc. 
And regarding education for adults, the first adult school is said to have begun in Nottingham 
in 1798 to meet the needs of younger women in lace and hosiery factories (Rowntree & Binns, 
1903). And by the early 19th century, hundreds of technical schools, night schools, and Sunday 
schools appeared in many British towns (Xue, 2004), providing workers required skills of 
manufacturing production (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). The number of workers enrolled in these 
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schools sharply increased from 450,000 in 1815, to 2.25 million in the 1850s (Z. H. Wang et 
al., 1995).  
In France, inspired by the 1789 revolution, the French centralized school system 
was founded even earlier in the 19th century and had taken shape with a set of legislative texts 
during the entire 19th century. Although there were ups and downs in history with governments’ 
endowments to establish the secular school system, during the 1820s and 1830s, there was a 
steady spread of universal, compulsory, elementary education (Grew et al., 1983). During the 
bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe, a law was passed in 1833 that laid the foundations of 
modern primary instruction, obliging the communes to maintain schools (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2019). Ultimately, the enactment of the Jules Ferry Laws established first free 
education in 1881 then mandatory and laic education in 1882. However, there was a long-
lasting dual system of state and church schools during the 19th century in France. Regard to the 
adult education, or workers’ training, as early as the late 18th century, the first so-called 
polytechnics were founded in 1794 and gathered momentum in the middle of the 19th century 
led to the provision of basic education needed by the workforce in vocational oriented evening 
schools/classes (Schreiber-Barsch, 2015). In general, commercial and manufacturing interests 
sponsored more schools in their districts to obtain a more skilled workforce capable of more 
complex operations (Grew et al., 1983). In 1850 law, there was provision for adult classes, and 
for the technical instruction of apprentices (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). Gradually, 
various forms of schools for workers had been flourished afterward.  
Administered locally based on each state, schooling of the United States’ masses in 
the republic’s younger days was immensely diverse (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). 
However, under the Articles of Confederation, the Ordinance of 1787 reserved a plot of land in 
every prospective township for the support of education. Still, along with history, there was no 
consensus for the federal government to step in and enact a federal law on primary education 
in the United States. In 1852, Massachusetts was the first state to enact a compulsory education 
law. And by the beginning of the 20th century, most states had also enacted compulsory 
education law (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). In terms of adult education or workers’ schooling, there 
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were several movements appeared in the 19th century’s U.S., such as the British worker 
education movement, the American Chautauqua movement 40 , and the correspondence 
movement41, the Lyceum movement42, and fuelled by the need for an educated trade and 
working class brought on by industrial and urban development. In particular, the Chautauqua 
Lake Sunday School Assembly was founded in 1874 in western New York, began as a program 
for the training of Sunday-school teachers and church workers. The success of the Chautauqua 
movement led to the founding of many similar Sunday schools throughout the United States. 
And the courses often included kits of tools or instruments and materials to be processed, as 
well as texts and study guides. By 1900 there were hundreds of tent chautauquas and nearly 
150 independent chautauquas with permanent lecture halls (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013). 
And finally, although the government did not step in directly to adult education, the 
establishment of the service ethic as a consequence of the creation of the land grant universities 
with the passage of the Morrill Act in 1862 still facilitates the process.  
In Germany, the state-enforced schooling system was much earlier in its scattered 
former states. In 1619, the municipal government of Weimar Principality first tried to issue 
edicts urging that all school-age children should attend school, which could be considered as 
the first compulsory schooling system in the world (Z. H. Wang et al., 1995). And the principle 
of compulsory school attendance was also conducted in Prussia as early as the rise of the 
Prussian state. In 1717, Prussia ordered all children to attend school, if schools were available. 
And in 1794, a codification already recognized the principle of state supremacy in education 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). Also, by 1807, Prussia abolished certain semi-ecclesiastical 
schools and to place education under the Ministry of the Interior. The formation of the German 
Empire in 1871 saw the beginning of centralized political control in the country and a 
corresponding emphasis on state purposes for education. It continued systematization of 
education, which had progressed in Prussia from 1763. By then, the Volksschule 43  was 
                                                
40 Chautauqua movement was the movement in adult education that flourished during the late 19th and early 20th centuries in 
the U.S. 
41 The correspondence movement evolved in the mid-19th century, feulled by the need for an educated trade and working calss 
brought on by industrial and urban development, and facilitated by the development of improved printing and postal services. 
42 Lyceum movement, early form of organized adult education, widespreaded in the northeastern and midwestern U.S. 
43 The German term Volksschule generally refers to compulsory education, denoting an educational institution every person is 
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universal, free, and compulsory(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). By 1885 some 7.5 million 
students attended primary school throughout the German Reich (Breitman, 1977). 
The adult education also had a long tradition in Germany, although it is well-known 
for its dual system44, which transits young people from compulsory schooling to working life. 
In the middle of the 19th century with the aim of freeing the working class through education, 
kicked out workers’ education (Dausien & Schwendowius, 2009). By the end of the 19th century, 
there was the Craft Trade Workers’ Protection Act (Handwerkerschutzgesetz) in 1897 revived 
many features of traditional vocational training system which can be traced back period when 
guilds of craftsmen and journeymen developed the training system in 15th century (Greinert & 
Hanf, 2004). And at the end of the 19th century, the institution of Vocational school 
(Berufschule) had been a fixture in the vocational training landscape. Besides, apart from the 
public or state-led initiatives, there were also private schools for apprentices that were opened 
for instruction on Sunday and night courses. In short, based on such arrangement, education for 
workers remained unchanged until the enactment of the Vocational Education and Training Act 
in 1969, which was placed to limit autonomous regulation of training conditions among 
employer associations, chambers of handicrafts, and chambers of commerce and industry 
(Greinert & Hanf, 2004). 
In addition, along with the keep-going rural to urban labour mobility, various issues 
centered on urban poverty, living conditions of rural migrants, slummification, etc., all started 
to appear, especially when approaching the second half of the industrial revolution. Although 
each EIC started to intervene via public policies, enactment legislations, social and political 
propaganda, etc., there were merely scattered remediation measures in some cities during this 
period. Mature, systematic, and targeted policies and legislations did not yet generalize until 
the industrialization is basically realized. For example, in Germany where government aid for 
the betterment of housing of the working people has been given more largely probably than in 
any other EICs. A housing found was established in 1901 at the federal level to facilitate real 
                                                
required to attend. 
44 The system of simultaneous training in enterprises and vocational schools is up to today the predominant path from school 
life to working life (Greinert & Hanf, 2004). 
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estate companies to expand on land and buildings for rental to State officials and workmen, 
also in loans to building associations (Meeker, 1915). An official investigation of the activities 
of German municipalities made in 1909, covering cities with a population of 50,000 or more 
and a few others, showed that 42 cities had provided houses to be rented to municipal workmen, 
15 cities had erected houses for rental to the general working classes and people of small means, 
and 33 cities had made loans to building associations for the erection of workmen’s dwellings. 
Of the 15 cities which had erected houses for rental to the general working classes, 8 were in 
Prussia, 4 in Alsace-Lorraine, 2 in Baden, 1 in Saxony (Meeker, 1915).  
In the UK, Government activities in the interest of improved housing were 
controlled by the Artisans’ and Labourers’ Dwellings Improvement Act 1875 and the Housing 
and Town Planning Act (1909), for the purpose of construction or improving or of facilitation 
or encouraging the construction or improvement of dwellings for the working classes. Also, by 
the end of the 19th century, London, together with other big cities, started a slum clearance 
schemes under the various housing acts since 1875. There was also enormous financial aid to 
improve housing, the General Government has made loans to both urban and rural local 
authorities, to philanthropic and semiphilanthropic organizations, to building associations, and 
private individuals (Meeker, 1915). A similar situation also found in France, like its housing 
legislation that was enacted on March 1914. Besides, there were also interventions in other 
areas, like public health, public transport, sanitation, etc. Towards the end of the respective 
industrial revolution, these areas started gain essential solutions.  
To sum up, during the period of the industrial revolution, restrictions on rural labour 
mobility were no longer as apparent as that in the proto-industrial era, and this led subsequent 
interventions in EICs more profound and structural. On the one hand, various interventions 
were placed to exempt remaining barriers and facilitate rural labour mobility; On the other hand, 
they also tended to limit workers’ organizing and union activities. Along with this process, a 
system of labour regulation (labour law) was gradually established, which preserved certain 
roles of the state in determining the mechanism of industrial relations. By doing so, a full supply 
of labour force was ensured for the rapid industrial expansion, meanwhile, workers and trade 
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unions’ activities were framed (or controlled) under the enforced legal framework. More 
specifically, the land relations in rural areas had been pushed eventually to large-farm 
production system which kept the process of eliminating rural surplus labour force and land 
concentration; In terms of labour mobility, it was very common that most EICs on the one hand, 
enacted legislation or expand relief programmes to release restrictions even encourage on 
labour mobility; at the same time, on the other hand, placed extra regulations to manage and 
control the urban poor, and their mobility (of which mostly were rural migrants), especially 
their political mobilization; Also, in response to workers’ militant movement and class struggles, 
the bourgeois authorities had to step in and produce various labour legislations to secure the 
stability of industrial relations; Lastly, the inherent requirements of the transformation of 
industrial revolution drove the previous simplistic spatial rural labour mobility to a career 
conversion of rural migrants that demanded for skilled workers. And additional efforts were 
placed on providing vocational training for the current factory workers and ensuring primary 
education for the next generation. 
 
III.3.3. Intervention at the later stage of industrialization 
 
As entering the later stage of industrialization, the rural-to-urban labour mobility in 
EICs had continued still for a few decades until it got exhausted and stabilized, as presented 
before. At this stage, most of the institutional barriers to free labour mobility had been 
eventually removed. However, the state (including institutional) intervention did not cease. 
They just transformed into a new directional intervention which was less direct and more 
indefinite, in accordance with the transformation of industrial production and structures. At the 
supply side, the agricultural sector was still under the keep-going reforms that squeezed out the 
remaining rural surplus labour force. While at the demand side, the basic mechanism of labour 
market had been established, in which embedded the mature system of vocational training, 
labour legislation, social insurance, employment promotion, mediation and arbitration of 
industrial relations, collective bargaining, even the welfare states. Also, the state started to 
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incorporate activities of trade unions and workers’ organizing under its legal framework, 
instead of depressing, persecuting, and unwilling to recognize them. The state founded labour 
management agencies, public institutions on labour policies, and the tripartite social dialogue 
were also gradually advocated. 
 
III.3.3.1. Land concentration and peasants’ elimination  
 
Apart from France, Britain, the U.S., and Germany, by their end of the industrial 
revolution, already managed to transform its agricultural production into the capitalistic mode 
of production. Basic agrarian reforms also had been done by then. In order to squeeze out more 
labour force from rural areas, different countries adopted varied measures. But the basic 
mechanism was via the improvement of agricultural labour productivity to reduce the demand 
for labour thereof. Most EICs aimed as the world leader in agricultural technology, innovation, 
and sustainability. The common measures often set out a range of actions for the newly created 
Agri-tech industries, institutions, state apparatus, science/research centers, universities, civil 
societies to upgrade agricultural production. And it is worth mentioning one of them that was 
in common among EICs. That is the promotion of medium size farms. 
Generally, there are few restrictions on who can own land or usage rights in land in 
the UK. By the second half of the 19th century, the UK also adopted the agricultural product 
import strategy and reduced its internal production, especially after it repealed the Corn Law in 
1846. Domestic consumption of food, meat, and agricultural raw materials was increasingly 
dependent on imports (D. B. Gao, 1995). For example, from 1852 to 1859, 26.5% of the 
domestic wheat consumption was imported from overseas. And this proportion had been 
increased to 48% between 1868 and 1875. By 1910, its food self-sufficiency rate was only 35.6% 
(Fan & Song, 1981). Self evidently, these shifts would also reduce the amount of people in 
agricultural production. At the beginning of the 20th century, emphasis on agricultural reforms 
laid down interventions between tenants and landlords. The UK enacted a series of laws on the 
Agricultural Holdings Act (1875, 1883, 1900, 1906, 1908, 1923), which revamped the law on 
tenant-right, dispute resolution procedure, etc. However, the Agriculture (Miscellaneous 
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Provisions) Act (1976) allowed for the succession of agricultural tenancies. That is to say, when 
a farmer died, a relative with relevant skills or experience and no holding of his own could 
inherit the tenancy. But it was limited to only two generations of the tenant (Densham et al., 
1997). Also, the Agriculture Act (amendment) in 1967 provided 50% of the cost to merge small 
farms; and the owners of small farms who were willing to merge their land could receive a 
subsidy of up to £2,000 from the government (D. X. Rong & Sima, 1989; S. A. Li, 2005). 
In France, major changes in land relations at the later stage of industrialization were 
to accelerate and reorganize agriculture by supporting the development of middle-sized farms 
(Boinon, 2003). Agricultural Guidance Laws (Loi d’orientation agricole) in 1960 and 1962 
defined a series of measures to promote viable family farms, including land control, aids for 
investments on farms through modernization plans, aids for young farmers, and payments to 
outgoers (G. S. Bhalla, 2008). It also established a land agency called Land Development and 
Rural Establishment Society (SAFER: Société d'aménagement foncier et d'établissement rural) 
which has the right of first purchase on most rural property that comes onto the market (Lv & 
Qi, 2005). SAFER then renovates the purchased land then sells or rents to farmers who have 
good proposal to facilitate the development of medium-sized family farms (D. X. Rong & Sima, 
1989). In 1970, the French government also established a fund to encourage farmers over 55 
years old to hand over their land for a life-long annuity (G. X. Zhang, 2009). Besides, in order 
to prevent the farm size from being fragmented in inheritance, the law stipulated that the farm 
inheritance rights can only be transferred to the spouse of the farmer or one child with 
inheritance rights. Other heirs can only obtain a fund from the farm successor (G. X. Zhang, 
2009). At the same time, France offered a specific subsidy, called DJA (Dotation Jeune 
Agriculteur), to attract young farmers who have less than 35 years old, promising to be farmers 
for 5 years in the mountain or less favored areas in 1973 and extended in 1976 (Boinon, 2003). 
According to statistics, between 1954 and 1962, a total of 1.5 million peasants left the land, of 
which 440,000 elderly peasants withdrew from the agricultural production field, and 
accumulated more than 9 million hectares of land, equivalent to 1/4 of the total agricultural land 
in France (G. X. Zhang, 2009). Consequently, by 1983, not only did the number of farms 
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reduced to 1.13 million (from 5.7 million in 1892), but the number of small-farms with less 
than five hectares also reduced to 297,000 from 4.06 million in 1892 (D. X. Rong & Sima, 
1989).  
Changes of agricultural policies in the U.S. at its later stage of industrialization can 
be traced to the Agricultural Marketing Act (1929) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA 
1933) embedded in Roosevelt New Deal in the 1930s, which were designed to boost agricultural 
prices by reducing the surpluses. As one of the side effects, the Act also reduced crop production, 
in turn, reduced tenant farmers and sharecroppers. E.g., the research measured relevant statistics 
and concluded that the Act indicated a consistent and widespread tendency for cotton croppers 
and, to a considerable extent, tenants to decreased in numbers between 1930 and 1935 (Frey & 
Smith, 1936). Although the Act stimulated American agriculture, it disproportionately 
benefited large farmers and food processors, with lesser benefits to small farmers and 
sharecroppers. After the AAA was judged unconstitutional in 1936. The Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act (1936) and AAA Amendment (1938) also allowed the government to 
pay farmers to reduce production so as to conserve soil and prevent erosion. The New Deal era 
farm programs (also known as Price-Support and Supply-Control Programs) were continued 
into the 1940s and 1950s (Dimitri et al., 2005).  
However, in the middle of the 1960s, agricultural policies started to shift to a more 
market-oriented one, when a compromise solution was reached in the Food and Agricultural 
Act of 1965 (Dimitri et al., 2005). The Act retained elements of supply control but relied on a 
combination of reduced price supports and new income support payments to protect farm 
income. The 1985 Food Security Act and the 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade 
Act helped create incentives to encourage marketing commodities (rather than forfeiting them 
to government-held surpluses), as well as some flexibility in planting decisions (Dimitri et al., 
2005). After 1945, a continued annual 2% increase in productivity led to the further increase in 
farm size and corresponding reductions in the number of farms. Many farmers sold out and 
moved to nearby towns and cities. Others switched to part-time operation, supported by off-
farm employment (Conkin, 2008). In short, since 1900, the number of farms had fallen by 63%, 
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while the average farm size has risen 67% (Dimitri et al., 2005). The number of farms decreased 
from a peak of close to 7 million in the mid-1930s to just over 2 million by the end of the 20th 
century. And the percentage of tenant farmers within the whole of agricultural producers had 
risen from 25.6% in 1880 to 42.4% in 1930, however, it dropped to less than 20% in 1959 
(United States Department of Agriculture). 
In Germany, during the later stage of industrialization, two systems of agricultural 
reforms took place separately. In Eastern Germany, the Land Reform (1945-1949) had 
nationalized around 30% of agricultural land (Hagedorn, 1997). In the process of this reform, 
which actually consisted of confiscation procedures, 7,160 farm and forest operations whose 
owners were classified as big landlords and squires, and which were lager than 100 ha were 
expropriated without any compensation. Two-third of land acquired through these confiscation 
procedures were re-privatized to small farmers. The rest remained nationalized property and 
was mainly used to establish the state-owned estates. And during the 1950s, the collectivization 
was enforced. There was also land confiscated and handed over to the agricultural production 
co-operatives (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften - LPGs). By 1989, 4,530 
LPGs cultivated 82.2% of the agricultural land (Hagedorn, 1997). Great changes, especially to 
East Germany, laid down by the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(Landwirtschaftsanpassungsgesetz) from 29 June 1990. Private property in land was re-
established. Rules for the division, merger, and liquidation of the LPGs were provided as well 
(Hagedorn, 1997). And these led no doubt of land concentration.  
In Western Germany, agriculture had passed through a process of structural 
adjustments as well after WWII. A substantial programme of structural reform was initiated in 
the 1950s. For example, in 1953, the programme of financial aid for farm consolidation 
(Flurbereinigung) was introduced. This programme was extended under the “Green Plans” 
introduced by the Agriculture Act of 1955 (Hallett, 1968), which included land consolidation, 
expansion in farm size, farm resettlement, grants to regions at certain disadvantages, and other 
matters (Alexander, 1964). Within the direct structural policy, consolidation of fragmented 
holdings, farmstead transfer or resettlement, and farm area enlargement were in favour of the 
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land concentration. Take the land consolidation for example, in itself, farm consolidation would 
leave the size of holding unchanged, but in practice, some farmers give up their land during the 
process, so that it is possible to achieve an increase in the size of the holding (Aufstockung) 
(Hallett, 1968). About 11.5 million hectares of farmland required consolidation, for about 3 
million hectares were an urgent need in 1962 (Alexander, 1964). In short, since 1950, the 
agricultural labour force had decreased from 4.7 million to 765,000 in 1992; the number of 
farms declined from 1.65 to 0.52 million (around 68.5%). The average farm size increased 
considerably, as well (Hagedorn, 1997). After the reunification, land concentration was 
continued. Between 1991 and 2012, the number of farms in Germany almost halved from 
541,000 to 287,500 (for holdings of over 5 hectares), despite the fact that many large LPGs 
farms in the East were split up. And between 2007 and 2012, 34,100 German farms closed 
down (Herre, 2013). 
 
III.3.3.2. Labour regulation and control of trade unions 
 
During the later stage of industrialization, most EICs enlarge the scope on labour 
regulation. Given the urbanization rate reached more than 50%, the emphases of EICs started 
to place on the completion of labour market regulations. The initial framework of labour law 
centered on the factory act got enormously expanded, which started to incorporate labour 
contract, collective bargaining agreement, salary, working conditions, workplace safety, 
occupational health, minimum wage, so on and so forth. And the applicable scope of labour 
laws also expanded to extensive coverage of economic sectors, even the public sector, in some 
cases. Due to the fact that most EICs’ land relations had been transformed to an irreversible 
configuration which most rural migrants were no longer able to return. Thus, most EICs started 
to enact various social insurance laws, labour protections, and social welfares to tackle the 
deteriorating issues centered on urban poverty and unemployment at this stage. In addition, they 
also tend to incorporate activities of trade unions, workers’ organizations, strikes, etc., under 
their legal regulations via enactment of laws of trade union, labour disputes mediation and 
arbitration, strike, etc.  
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In the UK, the Factory Act got tremendously supplemented after its industrial 
revolution, by various amendments, such as Factories Act (1856), Factories Act Extension Act 
(1867), Factories (Health of Women, &c.) Act (1874), Factory and Workshop Act (1878, 1895, 
1910), and Factories Act (1937, 1959 and 1961). Fraser even considered these factory acts as 
the preform of the British welfare system (Fraser, 1992). Furthermore, at the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th century, the UK passed several significant social 
legislations, laying the foundation for a modern social security system. For example, the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act (1897), the Old-Age Pensions Act (1908), the National 
Insurance Act (1911), the National Health Service Act (1946), the National Insurance 
(Industrial Injuries) Act (1946), the National Insurance Act (1946), the Family Allowances Act 
(1945), so on and so forth. Besides, concerning the regulation on unemployment, on the one 
hand, the UK enacted the Labour Exchanges Act (1909), and the first 61 offices were opened 
early in 1910 (Security & Commission, 1947), as well as the Employment Agencies Act (1973); 
On the other hand, it enacted the Unemployed Workmen Act (1905) and also established 
Distress Committees that gave out single grants to businesses or local authorities to allow them 
to hire more workers to decrease the number of people out of work. There were many more 
enactments, to name just a few above.  
Although the right of association was legal in 1825, however, activities of workers’ 
organizing and trade union were strictly restrained. By 1871, the first Trade Union Act was 
passed. But it was not until 1906 with the enactment of Trade Disputes Act and the Trade Union 
Act Amendment Bill in 1913, trade unions gained substantial rights. Trade unions also gained 
representation right of workers to sign the collective bargaining agreements. Furthermore, the 
UK also started to establish the labour disputes resolution system. The Conciliation Act (1896) 
was introduced and publicized the role that the already existing Department of Labour could 
play in industrial disputes by providing that the Labour Department of the Board of Trade be 
given the power to appoint an arbitrator upon application by both parties to a dispute (Mumford, 
1996). And further, it was embedded to the Industrial Relations Services (1960), the 
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Conciliation and Advisory Service in 1972, and the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS) in 1974. 
France, at the beginning of the 20th century, also started to pass significant social 
legislation. The factory laws continued to expand its scope and enlarge workers’ rights. For 
example, in 1892, a special regulation for women workers was introduced and followed by 
certain amendments in 1900. The Acts in 1905 and 1906 gradually required Sunday rest and 
regulations on working hours for different occupations; the general sanitation in industrial 
establishments was provided for a law of 1893, and amended in 1903; The decree of 28 July 
1904 also defined in detail conditions of hygiene in dormitories for workmen and shop 
assistants, so on and so forth (Deakin & Wilkinson, 2005). As in the area of social security, 
numerous laws were also enacted during this period. For instance, the law of 15 July 1893 
instituted free medical assistance; the law of 9 April 1898 considerably facilitated the worker 
compensation claims; the law of 27 June 1904 created the childbirth assistance program; and 
on 14 July 1905, an elderly and disabled persons’ assistance program was initiated (Thane, 
2016). Nonetheless, the development of insurance companies, at the beginning of the 20th 
century, was also encouraged by legislation. On 9 April 1898, legislators required that 
employers purchase insurance for indemnity payments to injured employees. Then, on 5 April 
1928, insurance was extended to cover illness, maternity, and death. On 30 April 1930, the law 
was again extended to apply to jobs in the agricultural sector (IBP, 2013). During the WWII, 
the National Council of the French Resistance adopted plans to create a universal social security 
program to cover all citizens, regardless of class, in the event that sickness or injury made the 
unable to work. The Ordonnances of 4 and 19 April 1945, created a generalized, national social 
security system in France (IBP, 2013). However, this social security system was not entirely 
universal. But in the following years, several amendments eventually enable it to be universal 
by the end of the 20th century.  
Although the freedom to organize unions in France was secured in Waldeck 
Rousseau’s laws passed on 21 March 1884, and in 1919 the legislature proceeded to establish 
legal foundations for collective agreements (Sturmthal, 1951). However, it was not until June 
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7, 1936 when the Matignon Accords (Accords de Matignon) embedded to a law (June 24, 1936) 
that removed all obstacles to union organization including the right to have representatives, and 
collective bargaining, as well as the legal right to strike. The Minister of Labour was also given 
the power to “extend” the collective agreements (extension mechanism), in full or in part, to all 
enterprises of the same kind within the territory referred to in the agreement (Sturmthal, 1951). 
After WWII, the law returned to the principles of legislation of 1936 since there were many 
changes during the war period. The Law enacted on February 9, 1950 finally adopted by the 
National Assembly marked a victory for free collective bargaining in labour relations. And it 
was common during the following years (between the 1950s and 1980s), collective bargaining 
legally took place at three levels: the multi-industry level, sectoral level, and company level. 
The social advantages attained at the multi-industry level took precedence over any inferior 
content of the latter two (Rehfeldt & Vincent, 2018). Although the changes in workers’ 
organization and trade unions continued happening afterward, the basic legal framework that 
had been established by then.  
In the United States, during the beginning of the 20th century also witnessed 
tremendous supplements of its labour law. For example, the Adamson Act (1916) established 
an eight-hour workday with additional pay for overtime work, for interstate railroad workers; 
In the same year, there were 30 states implemented statutes on compensation for injured 
workers; In 1900, four other states passed laws prohibiting the employment of women for night 
work; In 1907, the law of Oregon stipulated no more than 10 hours for women workers; In 1916, 
the federal parliament approved the bill (The Keating-Owen Child labor Act) prohibiting child 
labor, and it also prohibited mines from hiring children under the age of 16; In 1912 
Massachusetts became the first state to pass a minimum wage law, etc. (Z. C. Liu et al., 2001). 
In 1938, the Faire Labour Standards Act was enacted, together with the following up 
amendments (1949, 1955, 1961, 1966, 1974,1985, 1989, etc.) as well as the Equal Pay Act 
(1963), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967), the Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Protection Act (1983), so on and so forth well enlarge the scope of 
American labour regulations. The same as other EICs, during its later stage of industrialization, 
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the U.S., also started to build up its social security system. The Social Security Act enacted in 
1935 created a federal safety net for elderly, unemployed and disadvantaged Americans 
although it was not universal to all people, which included old-age pension program, 
unemployment insurance funded by employers, health insurance for people in financial distress, 
financial assistance for widows with children and disabled individuals. And the following years’ 
amendments (1939, 1946, 1950, 1952, 1954, and 1965) also gradually extended the coverage.  
At the same time, various legislations also passed to regulate workers’ organizing 
and union activities. Initially (at the end of the 19th century) only the railroad and postal unions 
were direct beneficiaries of pro-union federal legislation (such as the Erdman Act45 1898 and 
the Lloyd-LaFollette Act 1912), although 17 state legislatures passed laws during the 1880s 
and 1890s prohibiting employers from firing employees for belonging to or joining unions, 
labour had organized widely until the enactment of the Clayton Act with its “labour exemption46 
from the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act” in 1914. And collective bargaining appeared on the 
national scene for the first time in 1918 with the creation of the War Labour Conference Board, 
although it was abolished after WWI (but was substituted by the National Labour Relations 
Board later). In 1935, the congress finally enacted a comprehensive labour statute. The National 
labour Relations Act (NLRA), often called the Wagner Act, declared in Section 7 that workers 
in interstate commerce “have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labour 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection”. However, the direction of the U.S.’ regulations towards trade unions and collective 
bargaining during the following years showed very restrict controls. After the WWII, the Taft-
Hartley Act passed in 1947, also known as the Labour Management Relations Act, did not 
repeal the protections given employees and unions under the NLRA, but lists unfair labour 
practices of unions. It also created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to cope with 
                                                
45 The Erdman Act of 1898 was a United States federal law pertaining to railroad labor disputes. The law provided for 
arbitration for disputes between the interstate railroads and their workers organized into unions. 
46 Section 6 of the Clayton Act asys that labour unions are not “illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under 
the antitrust laws.” Section 20 forbids courts from issuing injunctions in cases involving strikes, boycotts, and other concerted 
union activities as long as they arose out of disputes between employer and employees over the terms of employment. 
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strikes that create national emergencies. And the Landrum-Griffin Act (1959) further 
established a series of controls on internal union procedures, including the method of electing 
union officers and the financial controls necessary to avoid the problems of corruption. It also 
restricted union picketing under various circumstances (Compa, 2014). Nevertheless, the 
general evolution of the U.S.’ labour relations at the later stage of its industrialization was in 
similar lines with other EICs.  
In Germany during its later stage of the industrial revolution, the development of 
labour regulations was very similar to other EICs, labour laws gradually reached to all trades 
and industrial occupations, and embraced regulations on working time, Sunday and holiday rest, 
occupational safety and health, the prohibition of employment underground of female workers, 
special protection for child labour, young workers and women workers, so on and so forth (Z. 
C. Liu et al., 2001), such as the Worker Protection Act 1891, the Child Labour Law (1903), and 
the Imperial Institute for Employment Provision and Unemployment Insurance (1927), etc. The 
Weimar Constitution promulgated in 1918 also guaranteed workers some rights at work, such 
as the Hours of Work Act, which established an eight-hour working system for industrial 
workers (S. X. Chen & Yang, 1998). In 1926, a special labour court jurisdiction was established 
by the Labour Courts Act, and all disputes concerning labour law were decided by the labour 
courts and no longer by the ordinary civil courts (Zenker, 2014). Furthermore, regulations on 
labour were not only in the expansion of labour protection, but they also extend much to 
establish the national social security system. And the first compulsory social insurance 
programs on a national scale were established in Germany since the 1880s, which include the 
health insurance (in 1883), the workmen’s compensation (in 1884), and the old-age and 
invalidity pensions in 1889. And the enactment of the National Social Insurance Code in 1911 
would mark the basic realization of the German social security system (W. S. Gao, 2013). And 
there were further enactments that expand the system, such as the Youth Welfare Act (1922) 
the Unemployment Insurance (1927). Later on, two separate German states evolved after World 
War II, each with its own social welfare programs. 
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The collective bargaining started firstly in the mining sectors in Germany at the 
beginning of the 20th century, however, its evolution did not go smoothly. Rather a system of 
codetermination (work council) was created, functioning similarly to collective bargaining 
(McGaughey, 2016). For example, the Prussian Mining Act (1905) required to establish the 
compulsory work councils at the workplace, however, workers still could not participate. In 
1918, the three largest unions met the employers’ federations to conclude an agreement for a 
post-war Arbitsgemeinschaft (Workplace Community), and signed the most important 
collective agreement in history. The Collective Agreement Ordinance was enacted in 1918, 
which was the first comprehensive legislation on collective bargaining in Germany. During the 
Weimar Republic, the so-called Central Commission of Cooperation 
(Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft) was formed. And the trade unions got fully recognized, and the 
collective agreements set to be the main instrument to regulate working conditions. Also, in the 
Weimar Constitution (Section 159), freedom of association was, for the first time in German 
history, guaranteed without any limitation (Weiss & M. Schmidt, 2008). In 1920 the Work 
Councils Act was passed, and followed by the Supervisory Council Act (1922). However, in 
1923, however, the government passed a new “Ordinance on Arbitration” (Verordnung über 
das Schlichtungswesen), which gave the state the power to use a system of compulsory 
arbitration (Zwangsschlichtung). And in 1929, the Empire Labour Court (Reichsarbeitsgericht) 
was set to reinterpret the general scheme of the work council laws (McGaughey, 2016).  
However, after the Nazis came to power in 1933, they completely abolished free 
trade unions and collective bargaining. In 1934, the Nazis adopted an “Act on the Regulation 
of National Labour” (Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit), which replaced freely 
negotiated collective agreements with governmental ordinances. After the end of WWII, the 
labour laws of the two systems grew further apart. The newly established Federal Republic 
drew up the West German Constitution and labour laws were developed further. The re-founded 
states established the Acts on labour regulation, which mainly reverted to the model of the 
Weimar Republic (Zenker, 2014). In particular, the Collective Agreement Act came into force 
in 1949 in Western Germany; While east Germany broke with the Weimar traditions and 
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experienced rather different developments in labour laws and practice. On 2 March 1990, 
Germany got unified. Labour law, along with the process under the Unification Treaty, core 
elements of the West collective labour laws extended to the East. This led to an amendment to 
the East constitution on 17 June 1990, and to a total revision of the Labour Code on 22 June 
1990 (Weiss & M. Schmidt, 2008). 
 
III.3.3.3. Higher education and vocational education 
 
If the attention on primary education was the main emphasis during the period of 
the industrial revolution, then the endeavor in higher education and technical training placed 
prioritized position during the later stage of industrialization, against the backdrop that most 
EICs experienced a transformation not only from agrarian society to the industrial world but 
also from the industrial world to the technological one. In short, most EICs’ economy was 
witnessing the advent of machine production and its accompanying specialization of occupation. 
In particular, the 20th century saw a continuing decline in the relative demand for physical 
strength as jobs involving hauling, lifting, and digging became more mechanized, while the 
demand for manual skills also declined. The counterpart was the growth of white-collar jobs 
involving higher levels of literacy and numeracy as well as specialized knowledge associated 
with scientific and technical advances (Floud et al., 2014). As thus, the previous basic purpose 
of schooling that was based on de-illiteracy was no more enough for these socio-economic 
transformations. During early this stage, most EICs shifted their endeavor to institutionalize the 
educational system that was much attached to preparation for employment, in accordance with 
the increasing share of employment in services and the declined sectors such as agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, and construction. 
Traditionally, the UK government did not interfere in education, which was mostly 
based on family, church, and voluntary agencies. At the beginning of the 20th century, the state 
actively stepped in the educational system, not only affirmed the elementary and secondary 
education but also brought about the higher education and vocational training. The Education 
Act of 1918 (the Fisher Act) aimed at the establishment of a national system of public education 
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available for all persons capable of profiting thereby. The Education Act of 1944 in England 
and Wales, and that for Scotland in 1945, as well as for Northern Ireland in 1947 were all 
pushed by the state and brought about higher education. Thanks to the Fisher Act, which 
empowered the local authorities to levy a rate of tax to finance such colleges, many post-school 
technical colleges were founded in the early 20th century (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). 
Also, the universities received funds from the central government through the University Grants 
Committee, established in 1911 and reorganized in 1920.  
On the other hand, along with the enactment of the Technical Instruction Act (1889), 
together with technical colleges run by local governments, the vocational training formally 
flourished. At the beginning of the 20th century, various forms of technical education were 
available for workers, such as day continuation schools, evening schools and classes, mechanics 
institutes, polytechnics, tutorial classes, working men’s colleges and courses, etc. And under 
the 1902 Act changed to conditions attached to government grants encouraged the expansion 
of technical education (National Archives, n.d.). Major changes also occurred after WWII when 
the Junior technical schools, commercial schools, and schools of art were fully integrated into 
the revised system of secondary education (National Archives, n.d.). In short, during the 20th 
century, the formal component of training for the professions, such as accountancy, law, 
engineering, science, and medicine, etc., expanded and became increasingly university-based. 
Similar trends can be observed in accounting and other business professions (Floud et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, with the enactment of the Employment and Training Act and Amendments (1948, 
1973), the Industrial Training Act (1964), etc., all required the government to advocate further 
education and vocational training for workers.  
In France, the administration of education remained highly centralized 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). By 1882, it had already achieved universal and compulsory 
primary education. At the beginning of the 20th century, when vocational courses for young 
apprentices were started under the Astier Act that the idea of individual advancement began to 
emerge (Anon, 1971). Major changes happened after WWII, when the basic legislation for adult 
occupational training was drafted in 1946. Besides, educational reforms were also linked to 
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general education with vocational-technical education in an integrated educational system 
(Brauns, 1998). In other words, the vocational training system can be understood in the context 
of the secondary and tertiary school system in which it was in large part embedded. More 
specifically, when students arrived at their 15-18 years old, they were offered a dual-track 
system: either the general high school, successor to the traditional academic high school, or the 
vocational senior high school, encompassing a range of vocational-technical studies and 
qualifications (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). And students who were not apt to follow 
general education were offered the low-status alternative of pre-vocational education, followed 
by a preparatory apprenticeship course. And these tracks typically led to early entry into the 
labour market or to vocational training (Brauns, 1998).  
On the other hand, the system of higher education in France was for long oriented 
to vocational education, which was prevailed pervasively: the whole system was deeply 
dedicated to vocational training of highly skilled engineers and high prestige and status 
occupations (Bienayme, 1984). With the exception of the creation of the Instituts Universitaires 
de Technologie (IUTs), French higher education for long was featured binary between Grandes 
écoles47 and university. And each écoles specialized in engineering and later in corporate 
management studies and public administration. It was not until 1968, when the enactment of 
the Orientation Act of Higher Education (1968) started to replaced the previous vocational-
driven system of higher education. In short, both vocational education and higher education in 
France before 1968 were much biased favoring the labour market.   
Although the U.S. Constitution has delegated educational authority to the states, 
which in turn passed on the responsibility for the administration of schools to local districts, 
there is no lack of federal counsel and assistance. For example, the Morrill Act (1862) disbursed 
many thousands of acres to enable the sates to promote liberal and practical education. 
Beginning with the Smith-Lever Act (1914), Congress legislated measures to develop 
vocational education in schools below the college level (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). In 
1944, the lawmakers financed the first “G.I. Bill (of Rights)” to enable veterans to continue 
                                                
47 The grandes écoles are higher education establishments that are separate and parallel, but often connected to, the main 
framework of the French public university system. 
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their education in school or college. In the 20th century, the early venture in higher education 
was undertaken in 1921 at Antioch College in Ohio, which required its students to divide their 
time between the study of the traditional subjects and the extramural world. In specific, every 
five weeks or so, they forsook the classroom to work at a full-time job. Such an initiative was 
followed by Bennington College in 1932, as well as from the 1930s to the 1950s (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2019). However, great changes in higher education occurred after the 1940s, critics 
called for against the high school’s heavy vocational learning. Thus, between 1955 and 1975, 
colleges became at times almost ungovernable (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). 
But in terms of vocational education, although the U.S. did not develop a formal 
system of apprenticeship and training, the principles that underlay its educational enterprise 
were already set, which pulled ahead of European countries in the share with higher-level 
vocational qualifications and particularly in formal education (Floud et al., 2014). And the 
significant change could lie in the establishment and expansion of the junior college, which 
separated the four-year college into an upper and a lower half. The junior college was expanded 
to include upper vocational schools (including a wide range of technical and clerical 
occupations), community colleges (offering vocational, school completion, and leisure or 
interest courses), and pre- or early-college institutions (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). 
Besides, in the 1950s, the secondary schools also went to great lengths to accommodate the 
generality of young America with courses in areas such as automobile driving, cookery, 
carpentry, and writing. Also, interest in vocational-technical education was directed toward 
establishing specialized vocational schools, improving career information resources, 
integrating school and work experience, utilizing community resources, and meeting the needs 
of the labour market (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019; J. Murphy & Mayborn, 2013). 
Vocational education in Germany is closely linked to the school system. By the end 
of the 19th century, vocational education for workers augmented apprenticeship training with 
part-time education, which forerunned by the vocational Berufsschulen and continued to the 
20th century. Between 1919 and 1938, they filled out the secondary sector to ensure attendance 
at some kind of school for all youth to the age of 18 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). After 
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WWII, West Germany managed to retained the three-tiered system of secondary education, 
which included either a five- or six-year track of the Hauptschule for the completion of 
compulsory schooling, the six-year track of the Realschule for the achievement of an 
intermediate general qualification (Mittlere Reife), or the nine-year track of the Gymnasium to 
prepare for the Abitur that allowed to access to higher education. And there are two institutional 
forms of vocational education: apprenticeship training within the dual system and full-time 
schooling preparation within a differentiated system of vocational schools. Trainees in the dual 
system attend two sites of learning simultaneously: the workplace and the vocational school 
(Berufsschule) (Brauns, 1998). At the same time, they attend a publicly run vocational school 
for one or two days a week to supplement practical work experience with theoretical instruction 
in their vocational field and with some general education. After two to three and a half years, 
apprentices are examined and receive the Facharbeiterbrief or Gesellenbrief in crafts that 
entitles them to carry out skilled work in one of the recognized occupations (Brauns, 1998). 
In the late 19th century and up to the late 1920s, the German system of higher 
education expanded and diversified. Before the 1930s, it was relatively unstratified, with the 
universities on the one hand and the less academically oriented Fachhochschulen on the other. 
The Nazi regime replaced the previous educational system by the totalitarian government to 
exert complete control over the populace. Every institution was infused with Nazist ideology 
and infiltrated by Nazi personnel in chief position (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). After 
WWII, both the Western and Eastern Germany started to design their educational systems. In 
West Germany, higher education institutions, as indeed all cultural and educational affairs, 
became the responsibility of the individual state and basically restored the system pre-1933 by 
the Basic Law of the Federal Republic (1949); whereas a centralized higher education system 
was established in East Germany (Kehm, 1999). In 1969, the West German Basic Law 
(Constitution) was amended to define the joint tasks of the Federal and the state governments 
in higher education, notably the construction of buildings, the coordination of educational 
planning, and research promotion. The Framework Act for Higher Education was also enacted 
in 1976, coupled with the enactments of the Federal Educational Promotion Grants Act (1971), 
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and vocational promotion, comprehensively covered by the Employment Promotion Act (1969) 
(Zacher & Brooke-Ross, 1983). Also, in 1977, a policy of “open access to higher education“ for 
all school leavers, although with the required entrance qualification, was initiated (Kehm, 1999). 
After the reunification of Germany, there were some changes in both higher education and 
vocational education system, but the basic framework was much framed, mainly in accordance 
with that of West Germany. 
 
III.3.3.4. Other initiatives 
 
At the later stage of industrialization, various socio-economic consequences also 
started to emerge in most EICs. Among those, regional inequality induced by industrial 
concentration was one of them. Not only did people were over-populated in some regions, but 
some industries were also over-concentrated and left other regions remained marginalized and 
underdeveloped, especially after the crisis of the 1930s. To unbalance these inequalities, some 
EICs also produced some periodic industrial policies and promoted a comprehensive regional 
distribution of industries in economic development. Industry transfer (industrial readjustment) 
instead of labour mobility was one of the common programmes. For example, in the UK, the 
Government White Paper in 1922 set the industrial strategy by promoting the transfer of 
industry to the region with the high unemployment rate to ensure balanced industrial 
development (A. H. Hansen, 1959). In specific, in 1928, the Government had established the 
Industrial Transference Board to retain men from the declining industries and, by the use of 
grants, enable them to move and find employment in expanding industries (DTI North West 
Regional Office, 1989a).  
And in 1934, the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act was passed, 
which designated four Special Areas: West Central Scotland, West Cumberland, North East 
England, and South Wales and appointed two Commissioners. The Act and its Amendment 
(1937) was to empower to give loans to larger firms, encouraged the development and use of 
trading estates and introduced special tax incentives for firms in the special areas (DTI North 
West Regional Office, 1989). And in 1945, the Distribution of Industry Act was enacted to help 
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redevelop areas, such as south-western Scotland, which depended heavily on specific heavy 
industries, and which had been hard-hit by unemployment in the inter-war period. Furthermore, 
in 1958, the Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance) Act was passed to increase the 
coverage of the Development Area by adding smaller areas. In the 1960s, there were also 
various enactments of laws to ensure the balanced industrial distribution and manage the 
unemployment (DTI North West Regional Office, 1989). The Local Employment Act was 
passed in 1960, which repealed the Distribution of Industry Acts of the previous fifteen years. 
The 1960 Act gave the Board of Trade to power to designate or deschedule Development 
Districts, which were based on Local Employment Exchange areas, smaller units than had been 
used before. In 1966, the Industrial Development Act added more emphasis on regional policy, 
which shifted away from the narrow social need to relieve unemployment towards the wider 
advantages of balanced growth and development throughout the country. These industrial 
policies were continued in the 1970s, such as the enactments of the Local Employment Act 
(1970), the Industrial Act (1972), so on and so forth (Yan, 2004).  
In France, the regional inequalities were also expanded from the end of the 19th 
century and during the first half of the 20th century, especially between the excessive growth of 
Paris and the stagnation for the rest of France (Gravier, 1947). Gravier argued that the artificial 
overdevelopment of Paris was threatening the well being of France as a whole. In the 1950s, 
the Ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism was created, and the subsequent regional planning 
was followed. In 1954 and 1955, the French legislature created subsidies for firms that would 
move out of Paris into certain designated areas (Z. H. Wang & K. K. Huang, 1999). In 1963 a 
new agency for the regional policy was created. It was called DATAR (Délégation à 
l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale, which had responsibility for the regional 
aspects of the national economic plans (A. J. Brown, 1976). It served to stimulate, guide and 
coordinate the regional planning efforts of other agencies. Eventually, it obtained a Special 
Fund for Regional Development Planning (FIAT) to finance infrastructure projects required for 
the success of regional programs that were otherwise not provided for in other agencies’ 
budgets. In the Fifth National Plan (1966-1970) provided for aid to agriculture and assistance 
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to weaken industries, but it also conscientiously began to direct industrial investment away 
from Paris and toward the low-income areas in the west of France (N. Hansen et al., 2013). 
In the U.S., although regional industry policy today has little legitimacy, during its 
early 20th century, it did indeed produce various policies, especially during the New Deal era. 
Also, in the 1960s when the Area Redevelopment Administration (1961) and a year later (1962) 
the Public Works Acceleration Act were established under the auspices of the Department of 
Commerce, that the federal government again committed itself to the development of specific 
areas of the nation that suffered demonstrably high rates of unemployment and poverty (Hicks, 
1982). The efforts rapidly evolved until 1965, when the Public Works and Economic 
Development Act provided for the creation of the Economic Development Administration. The 
multistate efforts on regional development lied in the Appalachian Regional Commission, 
which was established in 1965 with the passage of the Appalachian Regional Development Act. 
However, the regional policies in the U.S. have been hindered by the absence of the basic 
political requirements and got much criticism in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Hicks, 1982).  
The dynamics and evolution of regional industrial policies in each EIC during the 
20th century were much complicated than the above presentation. But the basic rationale and 
attempt were clear, thus, to name just a few. Besides, other areas such as housing, public 
sanitation, transport, urban slum, social services, etc., also drew great attention in all EICs and 
got essentially improved during the later stage of industrialization. Although these are not 
directly linked to rural labour mobility, they were indeed embedded in every aspect of workers’ 
life when they migrated to urban areas, and the overall system restrained their reversed mobility.  
To summarize, during the period of the later stage of industrialization, under the 
keep-going rural-to-urban labour mobility, most of the institutional barriers on the free labour 
mobility had been eventually removed. However, the land systems, to a great extent, prevent 
reversed labour mobility. Rural migrants, together with their next generations once migrated to 
urban areas, basically would remain permanently in urban areas, and fully dependent on 
employment and the further developed social securities. At the end of the 20th century, the land 
got largely concentrated, and peasants got much eliminated. The scope of labour regulation 
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centered on the completion of the labour market mechanism was also expanded 
comprehensively; And a series of social insurances laws, labour protections, and social welfares 
were placed to tackle the deteriorating issues centered on urban poverty and unemployment; 
Workers’ organization, union activities, strikes, etc., were eventually strictly controlled by the 
legal instruments. In order to match the industrial upgrading which required skilled labour force, 
the endeavor in higher education and vocational education got a prioritized position in all EICs. 
And lastly, it was found most EICs intervened in producing regional industrial policies to 
rebalance various forms of inequalities during this stage.  
 
III.4. Summary 
 
By now, the historical evolution of state (institutional) intervention in each process 
of industrialization in EICs was comprehensively presented. On the one hand, those 
interventions exposed a much complexed and dynamic systematic project which are not only 
limited to the direct interventions on labour mobility, but also involved with so many indirect 
and even hidden measures; On the other hand, they also revealed the continuity and consistency 
of these institutional interventions. For example, although there was brutal enclosure movement 
in England that eliminated peasants, at the same time, the poor relief system (such as the Poor 
Laws) was placed to accompany and lasted for almost four centuries until abolishment. In short, 
the review of the institutional intervention brought us broader content-based conditions in 
understanding how these EICs managed (in a certain sense) to intervene in their rural labour 
mobility, in accordance with the inherent requirements of each stage of industrial development 
under the general process of their industrialization.  
Thus, during the proto-industrial stage, EICs principally via agrarian reform on the 
one hand, rapidly accumulated the primitive capital, concentrated land to fewer hands of the 
bourgeoisie or landlord (case of Germany); on the other hand, via abolishment of serfdom, not 
only released labour power, but also expelled them from land. Although the freedom of people’s 
movement had been largely announced, however workers’ mobility was still under restricted 
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control. And these earlier interventions still paved the way towards a further capitalistic 
configuration of labour market, and somehow explored the mechanism of a full supply of labour 
for the industrial revolution that demanded massive labour resources;  
And during the period of the industrial revolution, restrictions on rural labour 
mobility were no longer as apparent as that in the proto-industrial era, and this led to subsequent 
interventions more profound and structural. Various interventions were placed to exempt 
remaining barriers and facilitated rural labour mobility, meanwhile, they also tended to limit 
workers’ organizing and union activities. A full supply of labour force was ensured for the rapid 
industrial expansion, meanwhile, workers and trade unions’ activities were framed (or 
controlled) under the enforced legal framework. Also, in response to workers’ militant 
movement and class struggles, the bourgeois authorities had to step in and produce various 
labour legislations to secure the stability of industrial relations.  
Lastly, during the period of the later stage of industrialization, most of the 
institutional barriers to free labour mobility had been eventually removed. A well-established 
social protection system was placed to ensure the basic livelihood of rural migrants and their 
next generations, given they could not move back to rural areas any more. Eventually, the land 
got largely concentrated, and peasants got much eliminated. The scope of labour regulation 
centered on the completion of the labour market mechanism was also expanded 
comprehensively; And a series of social insurances laws, labour protections, and social welfares 
were placed to tackle the deteriorating issues centered on urban poverty and unemployment; 
Workers’ organization, union activities, strikes, etc., were eventually strictly controlled by the 
legal instruments. In order to match the industrial upgrading which required skilled labour force, 
the endeavor in higher education and vocational education got a prioritized position.  
To be noted, we are not trying to attribute those interventions solely to the state will 
(the ruling class) or to the will of policy-makers. Neither do we consider the state as a static 
organization, nor take the institutional intervention as a natural and spontaneous reaction of all 
social forces. Although we do not intend to elaborate the concrete mechanism of power 
(structures) relations among the state, the bourgeoisie, the nobility, and the working class, we 
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would like to highlight the class struggle and social movement were key to the production of 
some of these policies, especially, the social security, and workplace protection policies. For 
example, the state during the Industrial Revolution was a bourgeois government and the 
representative of the bourgeoisies’ interests. Thus, some of their interventions (especially those 
in favour of labour) were also not voluntary. They were rather passive response and sometimes 
the compromise with workers’ and unions’ movement. Whereas, those interventions on 
workers’ organizing and union mobilization obviously reflected on the interest and power of 
the bourgeoisie.  
Another example can be taken from the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act in 
1802. Its enactment was never the mercy and moral conscience of the bourgeoisie, rather the 
social crisis that induced by the deteriorated conditions for the labour reproduction, widespread 
premature death and disease, violence, the changing social and family relations that threatened 
the long-term interests of these capitalists. More detailed discourses can be found in Engels’ 
the Condition of Working Class in England. According to statistics, from 1805 to 1848, the 
number of people brought to trial in England for crimes such as theft and looting of property 
increased from 4,605 to 27,816 (Xue, 2004). Also, between the 1830s and 1960s, Britain had 
experienced four times of cholera. The first time (1831-32) it took 31,376 lives in England, the 
second time (1849) took 53,293 lives in England, the third time (1854) took 20,097 lives in 
England and Wales, and the fourth (1865), it took 14,378 lives in England (Dyos & Wolff, 
1998). These things, in fact, some times, were the main reasons that they enacted laws to 
improve working conditions.  
On the other hand, industrialization is crucial to democratic processes. It causes 
urbanization, which subsequently leads to the development of big working-class fighting for 
social and political reforms (Herr & Ruoff, 2018). As one of the results of the industrial 
revolution, the working class was formed at the same time. Working-class, union alliance, as 
well as workers’ political party, were emerged as the most significant social force in dealing 
with many socio-economic-political issues. The very dynamic power relations between the 
bourgeoisie and the working class, realized by their political fights, often set the foundation for 
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further reforms or further intervention. To be noted, there was also an evolved process of the 
class struggle, which can be summarized in accordance with the industrialization process. In 
short, during the proto-industrial stage, given the essential working class was not yet formed, 
workers organizing and collective actions were very sporadic, limited, and demonstrated highly 
unorganized and violent struggle. Workers often spontaneously organized themselves, 
smashing the newly invented textile machines, setting fire on factories, attacking factory-
owners, etc (S. X. Chen & Yang, 1998).  
While, during the era of the industrial revolution, workers’ movement gradually 
shifted to an organized strategy, enlarging the struggling scopes of workers. And workers’ 
movements centered on general strikes also tended to be politicized gradually. Although most 
EICs at this stage still had very restricted controls over workers’ organizing and union 
mobilization, trade unions gradually gained workers’ recognition and became the major body 
in class struggles. Initially, workers, together with local unions through different forms of 
strikes against exploitation by capitalists and the principal demands, were still attached to the 
working conditions, wages, and working hours. However, the scopes of general strikes 
gradually embraced the political sphere, such as the British People’s Charter movement during 
the 1830s to 1850s. Workers and their organizations understood very well that the participation 
in political decision-making could essentially solve many problems of the working class. The 
British Charter Movement and the Silesian Textile Workers Uprising in Germany and the Lyon 
Silk Weavers Uprising in France are well known as the three major workers’ movements in 
Europe, indicating that the proletariat had entered the stage of history. Consequently, a large 
amount of labour legislation was enacted under the intense class struggles.  
Workers’ organizations and their political party started came into being in each EIC. 
Like in the UK, early trade unions appeared at the beginning of the 19th century. As for the 
early national unions, most notably was Robert Owen’s Grand National Consolidated Trades 
Union, which was established in 1834. And the first workers’ party can be traced to the 
establishment of the National Charter Association in 1840, though the Independent Labour 
Party was founded in 1893; In France, the national trade union organizations emerged in the 
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late 19th century. Among the first of the five major French confederations of trade unions, the 
General Confederation of Labour was founded in 1895. And the French Workers’ Party was 
the French socialist party created in 1880, which originated with secession from Federation of 
the Socialist Workers of France, which was founded in 1879; In the U.S. unions began to form 
nationally since the mid-19th century (S. X. Chen & Yang, 1998). The early union association 
was established in the 1880s, especially by the American Federation of Labour in 1886. And 
the Socialist Labour Party was established in 1876, originally known as the Workingmen’s 
Party of the United States; In Germany, the first trade unions founded on a national level in 
were the revolution of 1848/49. By 1877, there were already 26 national trade unions (Z. H. 
Jiang, 2012b). And the first workers’ party, the General German Workers’ Association, was 
founded in 1863, which was later combined with the Social Democratic Workers’ party of 
Germany and unified the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). In addition, international 
workers’ organizations were also founded, which can be traced back in 1846 by the 
establishment of the Communist Correspondence Committee, as well as the creation of the 
International Workingmen’s Association (1864), or the Frist International, the Socialist 
International (the Second International), the Communist International (the Third International), 
and the International Labour Organization, etc.  
Lastly, during the later stage of industrialization, workers’ organizations got 
gradually legalized, and workers’ parties also obtained certain political participation. 
Meanwhile, workers’ and unions’ movements were much embedded in the legal framework. 
Subsequently, the class struggles were also placed largely under the institutionalized channels, 
such as the collective bargaining mechanism and limited social dialogue. And by the late 19th 
century, most EICs achieved the universal suffrage system. In general, the overall industrial 
relations were much ruled by law. And the expanding scopes of the social security system, 
together with the emergence of welfare states, were placed on exchanging for the less militant 
class struggles. At least, strike and collective bargaining still maintained as the main mechanism 
of workers’ defense. To demonstrate, we list the strike records of the U.S. and France for 
reference (see Table 37).  
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Table 37: The records of strikes in France and the U.S. 
France The U.S. 
Year No. strikes No. People/1000 Year No. strikes No. People/1000 
1890 313 118.9 1881 477 130 
1891 267 108.9 1882 476 159 
1892 261 48.5 1883 506 170 
1893 634 170.1 1884 485 165 
1894 391 54.6 1885 695 258 
1895 405 45.8 1886 1572 610 
1896 476 49.9 1887 1503 439 
1897 356 68.9 1888 946 163 
1898 368 82.1 1889 1111 260 
1899 739 176.8 1890 1897 373 
1900 902 222.7 1891 1786 330 
1901 523 111.4 1892 1359 239 
1902 512 212.7 1893 1375 288 
1903 567 123.2 1894 1404 690 
1904 1026 271.1 1895 1255 407 
1905 830 177.7 1896 1066 249 
1906 1309 438.5 1897 1110 416 
1907 1275 198 1898 1098 263 
1908 1073 99 1899 1838 432 
1909 1025 167.5 1900 1839 568 
1910 1502 281.4 1905 2186 302 
1915 98 9.4 1915 1593 NA 
1920 1832 1317 1920 3411 NA 
1929 1213 239.9 1929 921 289 
Source: (Anon, 1962):169, 368.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
Both the process of rural labour mobility and industrialization are respectively 
independent, meanwhile interdependent. And rural-to-urban labour mobility/migration in 
history once beyond employment absorption capacity or incompatible with the dynamic 
development of industrialization can be both a symptom of underdevelopment and a factor that 
exacerbates underdevelopment. Although various theories in development economics and 
migrational literature target this proposition, studies of both the rural labour mobility and 
industrialization are often conducted separately and remained much in parallel. As thus, this 
thesis puts forward an initiative to delve into the interactions between these two processes (or, 
rather, places the process of rural labour mobility under the analytical framework of the 
industrialization process) and proposes a different perspective not only in historical 
interpretation but also in theoretical reflection. 
Self evidently, as per se a dynamic social process, rural labour mobility, when is 
integrated into the process of industrialization, manifested a more complex evolution. Not only 
does it undergo external circumstances that embrace various historical singularities such as the 
industrial revolution, the transportation revolution, etc., but it also profoundly embeds in all 
internal power relations/structures leveraged by various social forces, or rather by the broader 
socio-politico-economic circumstances. All these would have both tangible and subtle 
influences on rural labour mobility.  
Thereupon, facilitated by the dynamic paradigm analytical framework that 
entangled within the dimensions of time, space and people, the thesis, on the one hand, explored, 
in particular, these external conditions (context/circumstance-based impacts); On the other 
hand, it also delved into those internal measures (content-based interventions) via institutional 
and evolutionary analyses on the state and other social forces such as trade unions, that 
influence the general process and pace of rural labour mobility. And the historical analysis of 
four selected early industrializers (the UK, France, the U.S., and Germany) along with their 
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respective processes of industrialization, offered us concrete research materials to project the 
whole spectra of structural evolutions in industry, economy, economy, society, etc., which, in 
particular, enabled us to elaborate the impacts of these corresponding changes upon rural labour 
mobility.  
To conclude, over three centuries’ historical analysis of the selected EICs had 
provided us with the whole spectrum of (social, industrial, and economic) structural changes, 
which enabled us to explore the dynamic interactions between industrialization and rural labour 
mobility in a very consistent perspective. In short, this thesis argues that the comparatively 
compatible mobility transition with the process of development of industrialization in these 
early industrializers can be mainly attributed to both the particular external conditions and the 
active internal interventions in history. 
Before concluding key findings, we would like to clarify two points that we do not 
in any position to ignore. For one thing, the term “EICs” that we adopted is by no means to 
homogenize vast differences/diversities among the selected countries (the UK, France, the U.S., 
and Germany), in terms of history, socio-politico-economic structures, approach to 
industrialization, interventions over labour mobility, etc., neither do we intend to imply the 
identical & example experience or approach of these countries in their process of 
industrialization and labour mobility. Owing to this, we had devoted considerable effort to 
delving into each subject so as to compare among all EICs, and thus to highlight different 
approaches in achieving similar objectives. Besides, these countries selected are not in any 
sense implied acquiescence, which they were taken as successful examples, neither in 
industrialization nor in rural labour mobility. In simple words, what they achieved or failed is 
not our principal attention and can be attributed to numerous factors. What we mainly intend to 
do is to deconstruct how did it happen; 
For another, although we have been well aware of the misnomered terminology - 
‘Industrial Revolution’ and used it to divide the industrialization stage, such division is strictly 
adhered to the structural changes of economic and industrial patterns, at the same time, to 
maximum extent obeyed the very consecutive nature of structural evolution. For example, by 
302 
 

division, the selected EICs have each experienced the so-called industrial revolution for more 
or less one century. And their respective industrial revolution has also realized essential 
structural changes in the accordant area that could be sufficient to conclude that society is 
shifted from an agrarian-rural base to an industrial-urban base. Otherwise, without this 
framework on industrialization division, could we bind all these EICs in the same analytical 
comparison given their different time-frame of industrial development.  
Firstly, both rural labour mobility and industrialization manifested prominently 
phased features in all selected EICs. Rural labour mobility in each stage of industrialization 
(namely, proto-industrial era, the industrial revolution, and the later stage of industrialization) 
manifested quite distinctly, and, to a great extent, its pace was highly dependent on the 
industrial structural changes.  
 
During the proto-industrial era, only scattered rural-to-urban labour mobility took 
place. And its scale was much dependent on the level of their agrarian reforms rather 
than drove by industrial expansion. The emergence of private property of land laid as 
a leading force that expelled the rural labour force. However, the significant 
proportion of the rural labour force still managed to access to land and engaged in 
agricultural production. E.g., in the UK, the process of rural-to-urban labour mobility 
was rather relatively intense by its enclosure movement, whereas France manifested 
a mild or even contrast version by its small peasant economy. And before the slow 
growth of industrial cities, most rural migrants moved largely to the rural industries 
or worked in small workshops under the outwork system;  
 
Within the industrial revolution, substantial rural-to-urban labour mobility was 
kicked off in all selected EICs, especially from the second half period of their 
industrial revolution. Most rural migrants were driven principally by the intrinsic 
development of industrial sectors and moved into emerging factories, such as 
manufacturing, handicraft, construction, railway, mining, etc., wherewith growing 
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proportion were in urban areas. While in rural areas, peasants were on a large scale 
eliminated although under different transitions, of which most ended with land 
concentration and articulated itself more into the big farm or capitalistic mode of 
production. As a result, the rural population started to decline, whereas cities grew. 
In particular, by the end of the industrial revolution, all selected EICs achieved more 
than 50% of the urbanization rate. And the employment was offered mainly by the 
second industry, witnessing a steady decline in the agricultural sector. Although the 
immigrant history of the U.S., had a different profile, the fundamental rationale 
remained similar to other EICs; 
 
And at the later stage of industrialization, rural labour mobility continued taking 
place until exhausted and started to manifest its form more in occupational conversion, 
primarily induced by the industrial upgrading. Rural migrants were not only occupied 
largely in the traditional manufacturing sectors but also started to flow into emerging 
sectors, such as machinofacture, telecommunication, metallurgy, electric, chemical, 
automobile, petroleum, etc., especially to service sectors. In rural areas, the process 
of peasant elimination was gradually “achieved,” especially when the proportion of 
agricultural employment dropped below 5% while urbanization reached over 75%. 
But the principal mechanism that expelled peasants at this stage was more via the 
growing labour productivity facilitated by the general process of capitalization and 
modernization of the extensive farming system. 
 
Secondly, the general process of rural labour mobility in most EICs sustained their 
respective industrial development and matched the staged requirements of industrialization. 
And to a great extent, both of their process of industrialization and the rural labour mobility 
demonstrated relatively high consistency, synchronicity, and compatibility, which enabled a 
relatively smooth transition of their rural labour mobility. To deconstruct this proposition, we 
adopt the dynamic paradigm in three dimensions (time, space and people) to explore the 
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external conditions, such as the stage of capitalist development, demography, culture, ideology, 
etc., that enabled those EICs to have certain positions managing the mobility transition 
compatible in accordance with each stage of industrialization;  
 
External conditions: 
 
Time dimension: Foremost, all selected EICs experienced long history (around 1.5 
to 2 centuries) to have finished the task of rural labour mobility, which is much longer 
than their respective period of the industrial revolution. The overall hysteresis of 
mobility transition (comparing to industrialization) in a sense bears potentials (e.g., 
the rapid growth of non-agricultural sectors) to realize a compatible labour allocation 
in accordance with the corresponding changes of industrial structures. Meanwhile, 
the slow diffusion of technology in agriculture also experienced a long time. Thus, 
the peasant elimination process dragged the pace of rural labour mobility on the other 
side. In short, all those long-standing events would provide ample buffer time for 
rural migrants settling down in urban areas and converting their professions; In 
relative terms, most EICs before the industrial revolution took off, various forms of 
agrarian reform (not limited to agricultural revolution) had already taken place. The 
rise of agricultural productivity was served not only good foundation for the early 
industrialization but the keep-going reforms of agriculture have been also parallelly 
developed to the industrialization. In other words, the massive rural-to-urban labour 
mobility has never marginalized the development of agricultural sector;  
Furthermore, earlier capitalist evolution also favored a compatible labour 
mobility transition for early industrializers. In particular, these such as the U.S., 
France, and Germany during the competitive age of world capitalism were able to 
upgrade their departments of means of production and integrate into their restructured 
industrial departments/apparatus. Yet, the capitalist structure was becoming more 
challenging to achieve at the later stage. For example, the diffusion of capitalism in 
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its monopoly age became harder (for late-comers) to permit in qualitative terms of 
the economic and social restructuring rather than that of early industrializers. And 
these socio-economic structural changes, in turn, impacted on rural labour mobility. 
Besides, before the world capitalism approaching to imperialism, industrial 
development was still employment-oriented by nature and centered on productive. 
Moreover, most EICs had already done their basic task of labour mobility transition, 
and their urbanization rates reached more than 50%;  
Lastly, early cyclical capitalist crises (occurred almost once per decade) bore 
high spatial and limited features that had certain physical conditions to equipoise 
between labour and capital, especially prior to the feasibility of long-distance labour 
mobility. In short, the permanently unstable capitalist economy has its own 
corrections by periodic crises. And such a self-correction mechanism also adjusts to 
labour mobility. For instance, these early cyclical crises at the location where 
occurred, to a certain extent, could prevent any further inflow of rural migrants. 
However, each crisis led the additional replacement of labour by the fixed capital, 
discounted this correction mechanism of capitalism, and eventually vanished the 
effect on labour mobility. 
 
Space dimension: The initial expansion of industrial sectors is always with a high 
level of labour absorption, and both of their economic and employment contributions 
maintained high proportioned for over a century-long in all EICs. Prior to the later 
stage of industrialization, rural migrants, apart from directly flowing to urban 
industries, there was a considerable proportion reserved in rural industries. Although 
the capacity of labour absorption after the upsurge of industrial expansion had been 
diminished, it was then much substituted by the expansion of service sectors 
especially at the later stage of industrialization;  
Also, the early short-distance, bi-directional, and layer-by-layer flow of 
mobility favored a modest mobility transition, especially before the transportation 
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revolution, when feasible conditions prevented any large-scale, and massive people’s 
movement. Due to this, a decentralized industrial development pattern had been 
established, which offered multi-spatial locations for rural migrants; Meanwhile, 
before reaching the later stage of industrialization, the long-lasting rural industries 
had always provided employment foundations for rural migrants. Not even to 
mention the fact that most modern industries were born from rural industries. Not 
only did they offer by-employment and absorbed rural migrants, which prolonged the 
general process of rural-to-urban labour mobility, but they also trained a large amount 
of skilled labour force for the further industrial revolution. Even at the later stage of 
industrialization, many previous rural industries had also been upgraded and 
integrated into the modern system, and largely participated in the upstream and 
downstream industries based on agriculture. Thus, during the entire process of 
industrialization, rural industries in all selected EICs play a significant role and 
contribute tremendously to their economy and employment. 
Along with the entire process of urbanization, all selected EICs had 
experienced steady urban growth, but none of them had a sharp expansion in any 
short period. And the urbanization lay fundamentally on the development of 
industrialization since most EICs had manifested the high correlation between 
industrialization and urbanization. In general, apart from a few megacities, most EICs 
had managed to achieve the even distribution of cities. And the development of small 
towns has never been marginalized even at the later stage of industrialization. In turn, 
this developmental pattern of cities would suggest an even distribution of rural labour 
mobility;  
Lastly, the transportation revolution indeed altered the static geographic 
location of economic activity, and enlarged the scope of labour mobility, since raw 
materials needed to enter factories, finished products required to reach the market, as 
well, workers needed to reach the workplace. In particular, after the 
commercialization of the railroad, the large-scale and long-distance labour mobility 
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became feasible. But it had been essentially achieved only in the second half of their 
industrial revolution when industrial development deepened. Meanwhile, sectors of 
transportation per se are emerging industries, which would absorb a large amount of 
rural labour force. Besides, the development of transportation also led to the 
expansion of other industries, since industries of transportation themselves bore high 
intensity of inter-industrial purchasing relations. Nevertheless, the previously limited 
equilibrium of labour supply-demand centered on the short-distance mobility ceased. 
Coincidentally, most EICs by that time had basically achieved their task of rural-to-
urban labour migration. 
 
People’s dimension: When people’s dimension at collective layer, such as history, 
culture, value, demography, etc., also bears circumstance-based conditions which 
could facilitate EICs in certain positions to have a compatible mobility transition. In 
short, the demographic transition of the EICs in history, was, to a certain extent, 
organically embedded in their processes of industrialization and manifested a 
relatively long and balanced demographic transition. Both birth rate and mortality 
rate experienced a relatively long time uncompressed, which in turn demonstrated a 
compatible feature with the new industrial world. That is to say, when the 
demographic transition is at the high growth stage, namely, with high birth rate and 
low mortality rate, it is also when the path of modernization/industrialization is 
gradually embarking on. And the tension of the modern industrial sector is basically 
able to absorb the growing economically active population. Whereas, when the 
demographic transition is at the low growth phase, namely, with flat birth rate and 
low mortality rate, it was when their necessary industrialization/urbanization had 
been more or less realized. And this foundation of demographic transition essentially 
determined the overall labour supply. In addition, most EICs once upon also 
experienced the efflux of emigrants to alleviate their population pressure in history. 
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And a big part of those emigrants was peasants, farmworkers, unemployed workers, 
landless workers, or in other words, they were the so-called surplus rural labour force. 
 
The above external conditions certainly facilitated EICs in a better position in 
dealing with rural labour mobility and made it more compatible with the industrialization 
process. However, the compatible mobility transition cannot be merely resulted by these 
external and historical conditions. Otherwise, we would have too far underestimated this big 
event. Plus, we should not neglect the fact that during their respective history of 
industrialization, all selected EICs indeed experienced various social problems that were mainly 
induced by the influx of rural labour force, such as overpopulation, urban poverty, 
slummification of cities, high unemployment, pollution, etc. As thus, apart from the above 
external conditions that favored most EICs in history a compatible or seemingly smooth 
mobility transition, we also spare equal attention delving into those internal measures of EICs 
such as their legislations and public policies that dealt with these emerging social problems 
under the industrialization process.  
Thirdly, along with the process of industrialization, all selected EICs indeed 
intervened and adjusted their process of rural labour mobility in accordance with their 
industrialization stage. Nevertheless, their ways of intervention shifted gradually from direct to 
indirect, and from tangible to intangible. And most interventions of EICs in history were 
following the principle which the rural-to-urban labour mobility was managed to be below the 
employment absorption capacity. To be noted, rural labour mobility was never as liberal as we 
assume in today’s context. And most EICs managed so in a gradual process. In short, the rural 
labourer’s mobility was gradually released and was much in accordance with their industrial 
development stage. To elaborate this, we followed the old institutionalist and the new 
structuralist school of thought in exploring the state and the institutional interventions on rural 
labour mobility. 
 
Internal measures: 
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Interventions during the proto-industrial era: Serfdom was the biggest obstacle to 
free labour mobility. Thus, the foremost task for all EICs was firstly to release labour-
power from Feudal serfs. All selected EICs exempted serfdom over a long period of 
time. Some even had it done during its industrial revolution, like Germany. Although 
each country managed in their own ways, like some by agrarian reforms, some by 
revolution, violence, or even war, all via enclosure/confiscation/merge concentrated 
land into fewer hands of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy and expelled some 
proportion of peasants and turned them into wage labour. Apart from the UK via its 
enclosure movement to achieve this process more apparently, the rest EICs all 
manifested a hidden and even cruel way. In short, at this stage, apart from the UK 
most EICs’ agriculture was slow in articulating itself to the market and adopting new 
methods of production, such as big farm production;  
Rural labour mobility was strictly controlled during that time, especially 
towards those skilled craftsmen for emigration. Neither did other workers have total 
freedom to move internally inside the country. In doing so, most EICs enacted a series 
of legislation and policies to control people’s movement and compelled workers to 
attach to their owners. Rural migrants, especially those poor, always had risks to get 
repatriated back to his place of origin. At the same, most EICs also via legislation to 
control the mobility of the urban poor. In addition, for instance, in the UK, they forced 
those able-bodied poor to work in the workhouse/poorhouse engaged in forced labour. 
To summarize, these earlier interventions paved the way towards a further capitalistic 
configuration of the labour market and intended to explore the potential mechanism 
to have a full supply of labour for the industrial revolution, at the same time with 
fewer problems of the influx of rural poor. Besides, at this stage in some of EICs, the 
freedom of profession had not yet realized.  
 
Interventions within the industrial revolution: Most institutional and legal barriers 
had been gradually removed, the free labour mobility in all EICs had been basically 
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realized by the end of their respective industrial revolution. Meanwhile, a stream of 
acts and policies were placed to ensure the full supply of labour for rapid industrial 
expansion. At the same, to tackle the emerging issues such as urban poverty and 
unemployment, on the one hand, most EICs via enactment of laws to expand the 
scope of relief programmes; on the other hand, placed extra regulations to restrict the 
mobility their targeting group, namely the urban poor, especially their mobilization 
such as strike and collective bargaining. However, there were a few EICs attempted 
to legally recognize the right of association and formation of trade unions to ease the 
growing class struggle at the later period of the industrial revolution. But in general, 
the movement of workers and trade unions was still restricted by a stream of measures 
and legislation;  
During this period, in rural areas, the state and institutional interventions were 
rather less apparent than the inherent extrusion effect of the capitalistic mode of 
production. The development of agricultural production was much led by the 
competition of improving agricultural mechanization and farming techniques, 
although different countries had very different profiles in transforming their agrarian 
reforms. Thereupon, a large number of smallholders was bankrupted and were forced 
to mortgage their land, in turn, facilitated the land concentration. At the end of their 
respective industrial revolution, most EICs had eventually managed to articulate their 
land tenure into the capitalistic or semi-capitalistic system. Agricultural production 
was gradually developed towards the large farm production, which, in turn, 
accelerated the process of peasant elimination. 
Against the backdrop of the emerging class struggle together with their 
militant social movement, in exchange for socio-politic stabilization and long-term 
economic interests, a certain range of social and work protection was compromised 
by the bourgeoisie government. Since most rural migrants were concentrated in the 
emerging units of production, such as big workshops, factories, and manufacturing 
lines, all EICs via enhancement of labour regulation to manage the working class. As 
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thus, a series of Decrees, Acts, and policies of the labour market (the preform of 
labour code/law), such as to reduce working hours, protect child labour, expand 
workplace safety, improve sanitation, and establish factory/mining inspection 
systems, so on and so forth, were placed to alleviate the intensified class conflicts or 
exchange for political support; 
Furthermore, given industries per se were also evolved during the industrial 
revolution, the previous simplistic spatial rural labour mobility could not any longer 
sustain the development of sophisticated industries that demanded more skilled 
workers. Thus, to facilitate industrial upgrading, all IECs mainly via education to 
improve labour skills. For example, most EICs offered vocational training for the 
current factory workers, whereas provided the universal primary schooling for the 
next generation. And by the early 20th century, most EICs had basically achieved the 
national system of universal primary education, whereas the promotion of vocational 
education was more diversified and not necessarily dependent on the public 
endeavour. Lastly, all EICs, although started to intervene in the areas of urban poverty, 
living conditions, housing, health, sanitation, etc., there were merely scattered 
remediation measures during this period.  
 
Interventions at the later stage of industrialization: The rural-to-urban labour 
mobility had continued for a few decades until it got finally exhausted. At this stage, 
most selected EICs removed nearly all institutional barriers against free labour 
mobility. Yet, the state and institutional interventions did not cease and turned out to 
be more indirect and indefinite. For example, the interventions still worked in a 
certain sense that manages on labour mobility, like to facilitate on workers’ 
occupational conversion; At the same time, the basic mechanism of labour market 
had been established, and well embedded to the relatively mature system of 
vocational training, labour regulation, social insurance, employment promotion, 
mediation and arbitration, collective bargaining, even the welfare states. Also, the 
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state started to incorporate the activities/mobilizations of trade unions and workers 
under their authorized channels, instead of depressing, persecuting, and unwilling to 
recognize them. Also, all EICs started to advocate the state-funded industrial relations 
agencies, public institutions on labour policies, and tripartite social dialogue, subtly 
dealing with labour mobility. Furthermore, due to the fact that most EICs’ land 
relations had been transformed into an irreversible configuration which most rural 
migrants were no longer able to return. Thus, all EICs started to enact various social 
insurance laws, labour protection, and social welfare to tackle the deteriorating issues 
centered on urban poverty and unemployment at this stage;  
In rural areas, agriculture was kept reforming and via modern organizational 
approach and improvement of agricultural productivity to squeeze out the remaining 
rural surplus labour force. At this stage, the agricultural production was much 
dominant by the large and medium-sized farms, meanwhile vanished the small-
peasant holdings in most EICs. The possession of small peasants’ land had been 
deprived nearly thoroughly in some EICs. A large amount of small agricultural 
producers, tenant farmers, were constantly bankrupted in competing with those big 
farms. Also, the biased advocation on the medium-size farm resulted in vanishing 
small peasantry; 
Besides, the endeavour in higher education and technical training or 
vocational education also placed a prioritized position during the later stage of 
industrialization, against the backdrop that most EICs experienced the transformation 
not only from an agrarian society to the industrial world but also from the industrial 
world to technological one. Jobs involving higher levels of literacy and numeracy, as 
well as specialized knowledge associated with scientific and technical advances 
experiencing rapid growth. As thus, most EICs shifted their endeavour to 
institutionalize the educational system that was much attached to preparation for 
employment, in accordance with the increasing share of employment in services and 
the declined sectors such as agriculture, mining, manufacturing and construction. In 
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addition, most EICs via varied industrial policies to tackle the emerging socio-
economic consequences, such as regional inequality, overpopulation, and other social 
issues. Among all, the Industry Transfer (or industrial readjustment) instead of labour 
mobility was advocated at the later period. 
 
To be noted, in any sense, we do not underestimate the effect of the capitalist 
mechanism per se in dealing with labour mobility since the state and institutional intervention 
could never achieve solely. Or rather, the state and institutional intervention were always 
accompanied or sometimes as the carrier of the effect for the capitalist mechanism on labour 
mobility. Neither do we imply the separate and parallel effects on labour mobility in both of 
these external conditions and internal interventions. In the real world, they are always 
overlapped, inter-restricted, and inter-complemented with each other. In addition, those 
interventions are under a broad concept with various forms of influence, not only directly to the 
migration process but also involved with other indirect factors. For instance, any institutional 
supports that have the propensity to improve the rural livelihood would contribute to a modest 
process of rural labour mobility, which at the same time generate relative time favoured in 
urban areas to absorb the influx of rural migrants. 
Last but not the least, neither external conditions nor internal interventions (in 
particular) would function if without workers’ response and their subjective initiatives. Plus, 
we do not intend to attribute those interventions solely to the will of the state and policy-makers. 
Neither do we consider the state as a static organization, nor take the institutional intervention 
as a natural and spontaneous reaction of all social forces. Instead, we highlight the class struggle 
and social movement, in turn, were the key to the production of some of these policies, like 
social security and workplace protection policies. In particular, many social forces such as the 
working class, trade unions, the state, bourgeoisie, nobility, etc., via the very intense power 
struggles/relations/games all together impacted on the general evolution of rural labour 
mobility, as well as remedies of social issues induced thereof. In other words, many legal and 
institutional interventions (especially those in favour of labour) were not voluntarily produced 
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at all. They were rather passive response and sometimes as the compromise to workers’ and 
unions’ militant social movement. Even some were from the social crisis induced by the 
deteriorated conditions for the labour reproduction, widespread premature death and disease, 
violence, etc., that in turn threatened the long-term interests and security of the capitalist class. 
Besides, industrialization is also crucial to democratic processes. Working-class, union alliance, 
as well as workers’ political party via political movement/mobilization, could also govern the 
country, and enacted laws and policies to favour the working class.  
Having come this far, the topic of rural labour mobility in the process of 
industrialization has been comprehensively presented, although there are many areas that 
deserve highlighting, which can be left for the following up research. Before concluding, a few 
theoretical contributions from this thesis are also worth mentioning. Firstly, the analytical 
framework, both in theories and analysis provides a very refreshed methodology in studying 
labour mobility in the industrialization process. In particular, the dynamic paradigm entangled 
among the tempo-spatial-people dimensions would be the first attempt in migrational studies. 
And when it is embedded to explore both the external conditions and internal measures, the 
potential areas can be readily targeted. And the research structures can also be consistent, thus, 
suitable for comparative studies. Although we do not yet apply to an exclusive study on LDCs, 
the dynamic paradigm of this thesis has already provided a very comprehensive analytical 
framework, which can be used to identify potential differences between EICs and LDCs. In 
addition, the areas that we have been brought on in EICs would be valid for the LDCs as well.  
Secondly, labour mobility is neither a mere economic phenomenon nor purely an 
individual economic behaviour. However, in most migrational studies, people are often one-
sided assumed to be homogeneous and homo economicus (mainly in macro anchor), or 
heterogeneous (mainly in micro anchor). Although the meso anchor attempts to neutralize this 
one-sidedness, its analytical scope is still limited to family, community, social networks, etc. 
Also, most studies are conducted by taking one side only. In this thesis, we dismiss this biased 
hypothesis and incorporate them under the overarching scope with the dynamic paradigm. On 
the one hand, we acknowledge the impacts of both external and internal conditions on labour 
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mobility. On the other hand, we also stress the effects of people’s subjective initiative in altering 
their own labour mobility and political mobilization. In other words, we treat labour mobility 
also as one of the productive factors that lie in subjective uncertainty differentiated from other 
factors whereas the subjective uncertainty not only relies on individual decision making but 
also influenced by factors such as family, social group, history, values, culture, politics, so on 
and so forth.  
Thirdly, beyond artificial divisions in macro, meso, and micro dimensions, the 
tempo-spatial-people analysis enables us to see the whole evolution of theories on labour 
mobility with shifting lenses, and reveal the very complexity and dynamics of labour mobility, 
in terms of decision making, patterns of migration, socio-culture, demography, politics, power 
relations, class struggles, etc. Especially when it is embedded into both the context-based and 
content-based explorations, the thesis offers us a more fundamental, with the whole spectrum 
of changes, evolution, and very dynamic perceptions in labour mobility. These all together pave 
the way for further attempts to construct a research tool for LDCs. For example, having realized 
that the rural-to-urban labour mobility/migration if beyond employment capacity (urban labour 
absorption) is both a symptom of underdevelopment and a factor that exacerbates 
underdevelopment in most LDCs. Labour surplus economy is then a developing concept within 
the economic dualism of LDCs, used as an analyzing tool, and referring to the rural labour force 
in excess of the urban absorbent capacities under a certain level of industrial development, and 
the allocation process of the so-called ‘surplus’ labour force from agriculture to industry/service. 
Fourthly, this thesis also bears the intention to stress the differences between 
theories of labour mobility “as a process,” from theories of labour migration (most labour 
market theories) “as the status,” and that is why this thesis was entitled labour mobility rather 
than labour migration. Since labour migration is often defined broadly as a permanent or semi-
permanent change of residence (Lee, 1966), which contains statistical and legal meaning in 
administrative measurements, so it cannot fully reflect the real process of the mobility of rural 
labour force. In specific, the term labour migration is often viewed as a static result once 
workers physically move to the urban labour market and it is when the whole process of labour 
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mobility ends, regardless of the segmentation of urban labour market, as well as dynamic 
interactions between migrant workers and rural labour market. Whereas the term “mobility” 
denotes not only a great variety of movements, usually short-term, bidirectional, repetitive, or 
cyclical in nature, but also the further occupational conversion after the spatial migration has 
been done, exactly as what we have elaborated the meaning of labour mobility in the later stage 
of industrialization. As thus, it is significant to distinguish these two terminologies, especially 
when conducting research on early rural-to-urban labour mobility in both EICs and LDCs.  
Fifthly, this thesis also spurns mainstream perceptions of the history of industrial 
revolution/industrialization of EICs and re-interprets it in the angle of rural labour mobility and 
labour mobilization. With this over three-century long exploration, we have dragged the 
orthodox attention from industrial policies to labour policies when interpreting the 
industrialization history. Moreover, we have deliberated profound impacts of the history of the 
world capitalism on the process of rural labour mobility and tried to uncover how distinct the 
development of the industrialization of EICs in the nineteenth century from the development of 
industrialization in the 20th century at the monopolist capitalism. In short, no one could deny 
the fact that world capitalism has been evolved into a very different pattern that is even more 
difficult for today’s LDCs to imitate the approach of EICs. Or rather, the diffusion of capitalism 
at the world level tended to reproduce the similar structures of England in most EICs, however, 
was no longer permitted in qualitative terms of socio-economic structures in the monopoly 
capitalism age in the twentieth century. Therefore, this thesis contains the very ambition to 
answer these fundamental changes.  
In addition, this time-length prevented us from what Keynes had criticized: “[...] the 
long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run, we are all dead. Economists 
set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that 
when the storm is past the ocean is flat again [...]” (Keynes, 1923). In particular, with our 
advocate to incorporate the demographic analysis, this thesis also pointed out another 
indisputable fact that the demographic transformations have been seldom seen as an essential 
variable in most of the orthodoxy theories.  
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Sixth, economics claims to be a science, but policy issues appear everywhere. Even 
those who adhere to the notion of a “value-free” economic science are often the very same 
people who are keen to pronounce policies (Hodgson, 2000). The debate is not about 
government intervention or non-intervention, but about degrees and kinds of intervention 
(Gilbert, 1959). Back to our thesis, the state, together with institutional interventions on rural 
labour mobility do not necessarily have to be as direct as to limit peoples’ freedom of movement, 
and if from the beginning following the absolute laissez-faire, various forms of urban poverty 
would be inevitably caused. No doubt, we have seen this very clearly in both the history of 
EICs and LDCs. However, what has been much unseen are those indirect and even hidden 
interventions that are not apparent but essentially slow down the excessive rural-to-urban labour 
mobility, and this pace of mobility transition could be embedded compatibly to the phased 
industrialization process. After all, rural-to-urban labour mobility does not only embrace the 
spatial movement of rural labour force migrant from rural areas to urban areas, but it also 
involves with the occupational conversion which requires relevant institutional facilitation, 
such as vocational education (for short-run) and universal elementary education (for long-run), 
as well as a comprehensive relief system for rural migrants in their early transition in urban 
labour markets.  
Last but not least, we have to bear in mind that all the economic questions per se are 
moral issues. The state and institutional intervention together with their particular way to 
intervene, although brought us the very rich experience and lesson of EICs in history, we do 
not intend to imply in any sense that today’s LDCs should do in the same way. Meanwhile, this 
does not prevent us in understanding the role of the state coupled with other social forces, and 
the area that appropriate interventions could play in positive manners. Especially how did EICs 
intervened in the area like urban poverty, slummification, relief system, education, vocational 
training etc., as well as other indirect measures in slowing down the rapid process of rural-to-
urban labour mobility, instead of solely focus on these immoral and direct interventions, such 
as these measures of the enclosure, labour booklet, peasant elimination, etc., that were placed 
to control people’s freedom of mobility. Furthermore, the LDCs should also be open to 
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recognizing the crux that the rural-to-urban labour mobility/migration if beyond employment 
capacity (urban labour absorption) is both a symptom of underdevelopment and a factor that 
exacerbates underdevelopment, and pay sufficient attention to all the measures as well as what 
were those context-based circumstances that enabled EICs in transfer their rural labour force 
comparatively smoothly, such as the employment transition by the initial development of rural 
industries.     
Besides, economic questions per se are also political. When we talk about the state 
and institutional intervention, we do not intend to materialize the state, the socio-economic-
political force and the institute & institution as an independent social entity. Rather, we highly 
underline the very nature of each social unity that is constituted of the complexity of power 
relations and power structures. As thus, the so-called state and institutional intervention is by 
no means the sole will of policy-makers/rule-makers, instead of the manifestation of the 
complicated entanglement/interaction/struggles among different interests of these social 
entities. Directly speaking, each piece of law/policy/initiative that was enacted during the 
industrial revolution of EICs favoured labour, would have never been achieved if without any 
difficult and intensive class struggle. At the same time, the seemingly compromise of the 
capitalist class on each improvement of working condition was bearing long-term and broader 
version that would keep the system of capitalism going.   
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